Prasad v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Commission

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION. See OPINION for complete details. Signed by District Judge M. Hannah Lauck on 04/30/2018. Copy of Memorandum Opinion mailed to Plaintiff as directed.(ccol, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

SUNDARIK.PRASAD,

Plaintiff,
V.

Civil Action No.3:17CV498

JUDICIAL INQUIRY & REVIEW COMMISSION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Sundari K. Prasad, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and informa pauperis, filed this
civil action. By Memorandum Order entered on December 11,2017,the Court directed Prasad
to submit a particularized complaint within fourteen (14)days ofthe date of entry thereof. In
that Memorandum Order,the Court explained as follows:

In order to state a viable claim under Bivens,^ a plaintiff must allege that a
person acting under color of federal authority deprived him or her of a
constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States. See
Williams v. Burgess, No. 3:09cvll5, 2010 WL 1957105, at *2(E.D. Va. May 13,
2010)(citing Goldstein v. Moatz, 364 F.3d 205, 210 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004)). Courts
must liberally construe pro se civil rights complaints in order to address
constitutional deprivations. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.
1978). Nevertheless, "[p]rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se

complaints are not... without limits." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs current allegations fail to provide the

Defendant with fair notice of the facts and legal basis upon which its liability
rests. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(quoting Conley
V. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47(1957)). Moreover, it is unclear why Plaintiff believes

that Defendant, apparently a commission ofthe Commonwealth of Virginia, acted

under color offederal authority.^

'Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents ofFed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403
U.S. 388(1971).

^ In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a
constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States. See

(ECF No. 9, at 1-2.) The Court also explained that ifPrasad instead desired to bring this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she must clearly indicate that at the top of her particularized
complaint. The Court warned Prasad that the failure to submit the particularized complaint would
result in the dismissal ofthe action.

By Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on February 22,2018,the Court dismissed
the action without prejudice because more than fourteen(14)days had elapsed since the entry of
the December 11,2017 Memorandum Order and Prasad failed to submit a particularized

complaint or otherwise respond. On March 2,2018,the Court received a letter from Prasad

indicating that she never received the December 11,2017 Memorandum Order and asking for an
extension ofthirty days to file a particularized complaint. By Memorandum Order entered on
March 15,2018, the Court granted her request for an extension oftime to the extent that Prasad
was required to file a particularized complaint that comported with the directives therein within
thirty(30)days ofthe date ofentry hereof. The Court explained that ifPrasad timely filed a
particularized complaint, the Court would reinstate the action on the active docket.

The Court has received Prasad's Particularized Complaint. (ECF No. 14.)^ Thus, the
action will be reinstated on the active docket and the February 22,2018, Memorandum Opinion
and Order will be vacated. Nevertheless, because Prasad's claims lack merit, the Court will

dismiss the action with prejudice.

Dowe V. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653,658 (4th
Cir. 1998)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

^ The Court also received Prasad's later request to "append" additional documents and
add Judge Hutton as a Defendant. (ECF No. 15, at 1.) That request to "append"(ECF No. 15)
will be DENIED as frivolous for the reasons stated in Part III.

I.

PRELIMINARY REVIEW

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act("PLRA")this Court must dismiss any
action filed by a prisoner ifthe Court determines the action(1)"is frivolous" or(2)"fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The
first standard includes claims based upon "an indisputably meritless legal theory," or claims
where the "factual contentions are clearly baseless." Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417,427(E.D.
Va. 1992)(quoting Neitzke v. Williams,490 U.S. 319, 327(1989)). The second standard is the
familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943,952(4th Cir.

1992)(citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356

(1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded
allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 1 F.3d 1130,1134(4th Cir. 1993);see also Martin,980

F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering
a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more

than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption oftruth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.662,
679(2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[] only 'a short and plain statement ofthe

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of

what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555(2007)(second alteration in original)(quoting Conley v. Gibson,355 U.S. 41,

47(1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and
conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation ofthe elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations

omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570,
rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp.,550 U.S. at 556). In
order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,the plaintiff must
"allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of[his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de

Nemours & Co.,324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003)(citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d
193,213(4th Cir. 2002); lodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270,281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly,

while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th

Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate's advocate and develop,sua sponte, statutory and
constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See
Brock V. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241,243(4th Cir. 1997)(Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of
Hampton,775 F.2d 1274,1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
XL

SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS

After the Court's prior admonition, it appears that Prasad now brings her action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 and not pursuant to Bivens. (See Part. Compl. 1,3.) Prasad alleges that
several Virginia state courtjudges violated her rights to equal protection and due process and
"judges canons/code," in what appears to stem from civil cases in the Juvenile and Domestic

Relations Court("JD&R Court")and the Circuit Court("Circuit Court")for the County of
Chesterfield, Virginia. (Id. at 1-2.) Prasad names JD&R Court Judges Jayne Pemberton and TJ

Hauler, and Judge William Shaw, who appears to be a Circuit Courtjudge . {Id. at 2.)"* Prasad
demands damages "in no event less than 6 million dollars" and declaratory relief. {Id. at 18
(capitalization corrected).)
III.

ANALYSIS

Judges are absolutely immune from suits under § 1983 for acts committed within their

judicial discretion. Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 349, 355-56(1978). "Absolute judicial
immunity exists 'because it is recognized that judicial officers in whom discretion is entrusted

must be able to exercise discretion vigorously and effectively, without apprehension that they
will be subjected to burdensome and vexatious litigation.'" Lesane v. Spencer, No. 3:09CV012,

2009 WL 4730716, at *2(E.D. Va. Dec. 8,2009)(citations omitted)(quoting McCray v.
Maryland,456 F.2d 1,3(4th Cir. 1972), overruled on other grounds.Pink v. Lester,52 F.3d 73,
77(4th Cir. 1995)). A judge is entitled to immunity even if"the action he [or she] took was in
error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his [or her] authority" Stump,435 U.S. at 356.
This immunity extends to state magistrates in Virginia. Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514,517
(4th Cir. 1987)(citation omitted)(noting that "[a]s judicial officers, magistrates are entitled to

absolute immunity for acts performed in their judicial capacity"). Only two exceptions apply to
judicial immunity: (1)nonjudicial actions; and(2)those actions "though judicial in nature, taken

in complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles v. Waco,502 U.S. 9, 11-12(1991)(citations
omitted). Neither exception applies in this instance.

Prasad alleges that Judges Pemberton and Hauler, who appear to have presided over
Prasad's child custody dispute, wronged her in their actions and rulings and should have

"stepped down." (Part. Compl. 2,6.) Prasad faults Judge Shaw for dismissing her civil action

"Although Prasad begins the "Defendants" portion ofher caption by listing "Judicial
Inqmry [and] Review," that entity, to the extent it exists, is not named in the body ofthe
Particularized Complaint, and does not appear to be a fourth defendant. (Part Compl. 1-2.)
5

against the Chesterfield County Police Department. {Id. at 2,6.) Prasad fails to allege facts that
plausibly suggest that the judges' actions amounted to nonjudicial actions or that they acted in
the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Skillings v. Knott,251 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1000,

1002-03(E.D. Va. Apr. 21,2017)(explaining thatjudicial decisions and actions taken by judge
in official capacity entitled him or her to immunity). Thus, Prasad's claims will be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.

Moreover,Prasad appears to be displeased with the result of her state court proceedings
and has filed this action, not in good faith to vindicate her legal rights, but instead, maliciously,
to harass the jurists who presided over her civil actions. Accordingly, the Court also will

DISMISS this action as malicious. See Cain v. Virginia,982 F. Supp. 1132, 1136-38(E.D. Va.
1997)(citations omitted)(observing that where "the tone of all the Plaintiffs allegations

indicates that [she] is bringing [her] suit merely to satisfy [her] desire for vengeance against
Defendants and not to rectify any wrong done to [her], then the suit is a MALICIOUS one"

(quoting

V. Rhodes,656 F. Supp. 458,463-64(E.D.N.C. 1987))).

IV.

CONCLUSION

The February 22, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and Order (EOF Nos. 10, 11) will be
VACATED and the action will be placed on the active docket. Nevertheless, Prasad's claims are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous, malicious, and for failure to state a claim.

Prasad's request to "append" certain documents and add Judge Mutton as a Defendant will be
DENIED as frivolous. The action will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk will be

DIRECTED to note the disposition ofthe action for the purposes of28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

M.Hannah L^(

Date: APR 3 0 2018
Richmond, Virginia

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