Prasad v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Commission
Filing
24
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge M. Hannah Lauck on 9/10/2018. Copy to Pro Se Plaintiff. (jsmi, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
SUNDARIK.PRASAD,
Plaintiff,
V.
Civil Action No. 3:17CV498
JUDICIAL INQUIRY & REVIEW COMMISSION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sundari K.Prasad, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action. By
Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on April 30, 2018,the Court dismissed the action as
legally frivolous, malicious, and for failure to state claim. {See ECF Nos. 16,17.) The matter is
now before the Court on Prasad's "Motion to Rehear due to MHL's Recusal [and] Again
Judging!!" that will be construed as a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)("Rule
59(e) Motion," ECF No.20(emphasis omitted)).^ See MLC Auto., LLC v. Town ofS. Pines, 532
F.3d 269, 277-78 (4th Cir. 2008)(stating that filings made within twenty-eight days after the
entry ofjudgment are construed as Rule 59(e) motions (citing Dove v. CODESCO,569 F.2d 807,
809(4th Cir. 1978))).
"[Rjeconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should
be used sparingly." Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'I Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396,403 (4th Cir. 1998)
(citation omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit recognizes three grounds for relief under Rule 59(e): "(1)to accommodate an
intervening change in controlling law;(2)to account for new evidence not available at trial; or
^ The Court employs the pagination assigned to Prasad's Rule 59(e) Motion by the
CM/ECF docketing system.
(3)to correct a clear error oflaw or prevent manifest injustice." Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d
1076,1081 (4th Cir. 1993)(citing Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., Ill F. Supp. 1406, 1419
(D. Md. 1991); Atkins v. Marathon LeTourneau Co., 130 F.R.D. 625,626(S.D. Miss. 1990)).
Prasad does not explicitly address any ofthe above recognized grounds for relief in her
Rule 59(e) Motion. However,the Court construes Prasad to argue that the Court should grant
her Rule 59(e) Motion "to correct a clear error oflaw or prevent manifest injustice." Id.
(citations omitted). Prasad contends that, because the undersigned recused herself in one of
Prasad's many civil actions filed in this Court, that she necessarily must recuse herselfin this
action. Prasad points to no persuasive authority that would support her position, and contrary to
her suggestion, that is simply not required. The undersigned recused herselffrom presiding over
the action,Prasad v. State ofVa., No. 3:17CV686(E.D. Va.), ECF No. 16, because Prasad
named the undersigned as a defendant in that particular action.
Moreover,the bar for recusal is high, as "courts have only granted recusal motions in
cases involving particularly egregious conduct." Belue v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567,573(4th Cir.
2011). Contrary to Prasad's belief, unfavorable "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a
valid basis for bias" or a valid reason to demand recusal of ajudge. Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540,555(1994)(citation omitted). Prasad has not demonstrated that the undersigned
harbors any bias against Prasad or any circumstance where the impartiality ofthe undersigned
might reasonably be questioned. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144,^ 455.^ The Court harbors no bias.
^ The statute provides, in relevant part:
Whenever a party to a proceeding in a district court makes and files a
timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending
has a personal bias or prejudice either against him [or her] or in favor of any
adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall
be assigned to hear such proceeding.
Accordingly, the Court discerns no clear error oflaw or manifest injustice in the dismissal of
Prasad's Complaint.
Prasad also contends that "[i]f you had looked at the Amended Complaint you would've
seen... that the Defendants changed to Robert Q. Harris and another Defendant. The
Respondents to my letters - not the judges." (Rule 59(e) Mot. 3(emphasis omitted).) In the
caption of her Particularized Complaint,Prasad clearly lists "Judicial Inquiry [and] Review:
Judge TJ Hauler[,] Judge Jayne Pemberton[,] Judge William Shaw." (ECF No. 14, at 1; see also
id. at 2.) The Court then dismissed this action because judges are entitled to judicial immunity.
(ECF No. 16, at 5-7.) Prasad fails to demonstrate any clear errors oflaw in the conclusions of
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or
prejudice exists .... A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It
shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in
good faith.
28 U.S.C. § 144.
The statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself [or herself] in any proceeding in which his [or her] impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.
(b) He [or she] shall also disqualify himself [or herself] in the following
circumstances:
(1) Where he [or she] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding....
28 U.S.C. § 455.
the Court or that the dismissal ofthis action resulted in manifest injustice. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion(EOF No. 20)will be DENIED.
An appropriate Order shall issue.
M. Hannah Lauc
United States District Aidge
Date:SCP 1 0 2018
Richmond, Virginia
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