Archer v. SunTrust Bank, a Georgia Corporation et al

Filing 16

OPINION. Signed by District Judge John A. Gibney, Jr. on 12/22/2017. (jsmi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

FAYE F. ARCHER,
Plaintiff

V.

Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-616

SUNTRUST BANK, et al..
Defendants.
OPINION

This case arises under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

("ERISA"). The plaintiff, Faye F. Archer, worked for defendant SunTrust Bank ("SunTrust")'
until October 2010, when she ended her employment due to physical disabilities.

Sedgwick

Claims Management Services, Inc. ("Sedgwick"), the plan administrator for the employee
benefit plan in which Archer participated, paid her long-term disability benefits until February,
2014. After reinstating Archer's benefits in November, 2016, Sedgwick again terminated them
in November, 2017.

Archer filed suit against SunTrust and Sedgwick, alleging two counts under ERISA, for
(I) denial of disability benefits, and (II) breach of fiduciary duties. The defendants have moved
to dismiss Count II. Because Count II is in essence a claim for denial of benefits, and Count I

provides the appropriate remedy for a denial of benefits in this case, Archer cannot also maintain
Count II. The Court therefore grants the defendants' motion to dismiss Count II.

* SunTrust alleges that the proper defendant is SunTrust Banks, Inc., and that entity should
replace SunTrust Bank. If that is the case, the Court advises the parties to take the proper steps
to ensure the complaint lists the correct entity.

I. BACKGROUND

Archer worked as a Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS")
Administrator for SunTrust until October 20, 2010, when her physical disabilities caused her to

stop working. Archer suffers from a variety of ailments: sleep apnea, fibromyalgia, chronic
fatigue syndrome, cognitive inabilities, insomnia, restless leg syndrome, chronic pain syndrome,
chronic migraines, irritable bowel syndrome, nausea, esophagus problems, gastroesophageal
reflux disease ("GERD"), and neck and back pain. Archer has not qualified for Social Security
disability benefits because she worked for an insufficient period prior to her disability. After
leaving SunTrust, Archer received short-term disability benefits through Aetna until April 4,

2011. Sedgwick then paid her long-term disability benefits from April 18, 2011, until February
7, 2014.

After Sedgwick terminated her benefits in 2014, Archer filed suit in this Court. (Civil
Action No. 3:15-cv-444-JAG.)

In November, 2015, Sedgwick reinstated her benefits, and

Archer dismissed the lawsuit. Sedgwick again terminated Archer's benefits effective November
18, 2016. Sedgwick's December 12, 2016, termination letter indicated Archer's condition had
improved such that she could return to ftill-time employment.

Archer submitted additional

documentation to demonstrate that she is unable to work, but Sedgwick refiised to reconsider.
Archer has exhausted all administrative remedies.

Archer filed this suit for (I) denial of disability benefits and (II) breach of fiduciary duty

under ERISA.^ The defendants moved to dismiss Count II.

^ The complaint lists ERISA "§§ 502(a)(1)(B), 501(a)(3), 502(c) and 503" as the bases for
Archer's claims. (Compl., at 1.) The complaint, however, does not refer to specific ERISA
provisions in its discussion of the two counts, and only briefly mentions § 503 in the facts
section. In Archer's opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss, she argues that her claims
"of both denial of disability benefits under Section 501(a)(1)(B) [sic] and breach of fiduciary

II. DISCUSSION^

SunTrust and Sedgwick moved to dismiss Count II on the grounds that Archer's breach
of fiduciary duty claim is simply a repackaged version of Count I, for denial of benefits. The
defendants argue that Archer may not maintain a fiduciary duty claim under ERISA § 502(a)(3)

because her injury derives from Sedgwick denying her long-term disability benefits, for which
§ 502(a)(1)(B) provides an adequate remedy.

The Supreme Court has considered the function of § 502(a)(3) and determined that it is a
"catchall" provision, intended to serve as a "safety net, offering appropriate equitable relief for
injuries caused by violations that § 502 does not elsewhere adequately remedy." Varity Corp. v.
Howe^ 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996). In other words, where Congress provided sufficient relief for
an injury through another subsection of ERISA, the plaintiff needs no further equitable relief
under § 502(a)(3). Id. at 515. The Fourth Circuit joined "the great majority of circuit courts" in
interpreting Varity to hold that "a claimant whose injury creates a cause of action under

duty under Section 502(a)(3) should proceed." (PL 0pp., at 4) (emphasis in original). The
Court presumes Archer intended to cite § 502(a)(1)(B), rather than § 501(a)(1)(B), in her
response, as § 501 addresses criminal penalties and does not contain this specific subsection.
Because ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)] pertains to denial of benefits, and
Archer's fiduciary duty claim arises from § 502(a)(3) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)], the Court limits
its analysis to those two provisions.

^The defendants moved to dismiss Count II pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). A
Rule 12(b)(6) motion gauges the sufficiency of a complaint without resolving any factual
discrepancies or testing the merits of the claims. Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d
943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). In considering the motion, a court must accept all allegations in the
complaint as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Edwards
V. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999)). The principle that a court must accept
all allegations as true, however, does not apply to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must state facts that,
when accepted as true, state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. "A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

[§ 502(a)(1)(B)] may not proceed with a claim under [§ 502(a)(3)]." Korotynska v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 474 F.3d 101, 106 (4th Cir. 2006).

Claimants cannot get around this rule by

characterizing a denial of benefits as a breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 107; see also Jenkins v.

Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, No. 2:14-cv-526, 2015 WL 1291883, at *8 (E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2015)

(dismissing the plaintiffs § 502(a)(3) claim because it was a "repackaged" denial of benefits
claim).

Archer's two counts fit within the pattern of claims that Varity and Korotynska foreclose.
Her breach of fiduciary duty count essentially reformulates her denial of benefits claim. She

does not state any independent factual basis for her fiduciary duty claim.

Because ERISA

§ 502(a)(1)(B) provides Archer with a remedy for her alleged injury, she cannot also bring the
same claim under § 502(a)(3).

In addition to benefits, Archer asks the Court for an order designating her an eligible plan

participant or an order remanding her claim for reconsideration using medical evidence. Again,
Archer simply wants to overcome the Varity hurdle by couching her claim for benefits as a
request for equitable relief; once again, she does not succeed. See Estate ofSpinner v. Anthem

Health Plans of Virginia, Inc., 388 F. App'x 275, 282 (4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting a claim for
benefits reclassified as an equitable claim for "restitution"); Korotynska, 474 F.3d at 107-08
(determining that, although the plaintiff sought revised claims procedures, her ultimate goal was

to secure benefits). Moreover, courts regularly consider allegations relating to claims procedures
in appeals of benefits denials, so § 502(a)(1)(B) provides an appropriate avenue to address all of
Archer's claims. Id. (noting that a court reviewing a benefits determination should consider
fiduciary motives and conflicts of interest).

Archer argues that McCravy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., entitles her to relief under
§ 502(a)(3). 690 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2012). McCravy relied on the Supreme Court's decision in

Cigna Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011), and expanded the equitable relief available under
§ 502(a)(3) to include monetary damages. McCravy, 690 F.3d at 182-83. McCravy andAmara,
however, have no bearing here, as they do not alter the rule in Varity and Korotynska. The

Fourth Circuit confirmed this proposition in a ^osi-Amara decision by affirming dismissal of the
plaintiffs fiduciary duty claim on the grounds that "a party may not request simultaneous relief
under both §§ 502(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3). Savani v. Wash. Safety Mgmt. Solutions, LLC, 474 F.

App'x 310, 313 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Campbell v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 7:13-cv-2638, 2014
WL 3868008, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 5, 2014) (collecting district court cases finding XhsiXAmara and
McCravy do not alter the rule in Varity and Korotynska).
III. CONCLUSION

Archer's alleged injury for denial of long-term disability benefits gives rise to a cause of
action under ERISA §§ 502(a)(1)(B). She cannot also bring a claim stemming from the same

injury under § 502(a)(3). Therefore, Count II of the complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The Court accordingly grants the defendants' motion to dismiss Count II.
The Court will enter an appropriate order.
Let the Clerk send a copy of this Opinion to all counsel of record.

Date;
Richmond, VA

2-2.

2017

John A. Gibney, Jr.
United States District JUdg