Bey v. Bearing Contracting, LLC et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 1/3/2018. Copy mailed to Pro Se Plaintiff. (jsmi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

NASIRALIM BEY,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-651-HEH

V.

BEARING CONTRACTING, LLC,
et al,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss)
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction with Roseboro, filed November 10, 2017. (ECF No. 7.) The Defendants

included an appropriate Roseboro Notice as required by Local Civil Rule 7(K) and the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975).

All parties have filed memoranda supporting their respective positions. The Court
will dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the Court, and oral argument would not aid in the
decisional process. E.D. Va. Local Civ. R. 7(J).
For the reasons that follow, the Court determines that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction and therefore must dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint in its entirety.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Nasir Alim Bey ("Plaintiff) was hired as a bricklayer by Defendant
Bearing Contracting, LLC ("Bearing") on February 21, 2017. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 4.)

Defendant Thomas Cornell Berry III ("Berry") is the Vice President of Bearing, and
Defendant Jason Guard ("Guard") is a foreman for Bearing. {Id,) In the paperwork

required for his employment, Plaintiffidentified himselfas a member of the Moorish
Nation, and on February 28, 2017, Plaintiff was informed by Defendant Guard that he

needed to provide additional documentation as the Moorish Nation is not recognized by
the United States. {Id.) On March 1, 2017, Plaintiff met with DefendantBerry to discuss
his deficient documentation and produced an "Allodial American National Identification"
card and an "Unalienable Right to Travel" card. {Id. at 2, Ex. E.) On March 2, 2017,

Defendant Berry informed Plaintiff that this documentation was insufficient and that

Bearing required additional documentation, namely a Social Security Number. {Id. at 2.)
On the same day. DefendantBerry providedPlaintiff with a check for the value of the
hours Plaintiff had worked. {Id. at 5.) The check was a "Vendor" check, not a

"Paycheck," and bore the notation that it was for the sale of a saw blade. {Id. at 3, 5, 6,
Ex. J.)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co. ofAm., 511 U.S 375, 377 (1994). They possess only such power as is authorized by
the Constitution or conferred by statute. Id. "The requirement that jurisdiction be
established as a threshold matter 'spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial
power of the United States' and is 'inflexible and without exception.'" Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry.

Co. V. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). Accordingly, the Court may "or, more precisely,

must" raise issues of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte if it appears at any time during
the proceedings that the court's exercise ofjurisdiction would be improper. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(h)(3); Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng'g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 390 (4th
Cir. 2004) (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sh. Dist,, 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986).
Plaintiffs have the burden of proving subject-matterjurisdiction. Piney Run Pres. Ass'n
V. County Comm. 'rs ofCarroll Cnty., Md., 523 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2008). A court

determining whetherjurisdiction exists "may consider evidence outside the pleadings
without converting the proceeding to one for summaryjudgment." Richmond,

Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991).
In addition, the Court acknowledges the liberal construction afforded to pro se

complaints. Later v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n. 3 (4th Cir.2006). The Court,
however, need not attempt "to discern the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff." Id. Nor
does the requirement of liberal construction excuse a clear failure in the pleading to

allege a federally cognizable claim. Welter v. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.
1990). As the Fourth Circuit explained in Beaudett v. City ofHampton, "[t]hough [pro se

^ litigants cannot, of course, be expectedto frame legal issues with the clarity and
precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be
required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them." 775 F.2d 1274,
1276 (4th Cir. 1985).

The principal means through which a federal district court obtains subject-matter

jurisdiction are 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal-question and diversity
jurisdiction, respectively.

Under federal-question jurisdiction, "district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."

28 U.S.C. § 1331. "[T]he vast majority of cases brought under the general federalquestion jurisdiction of the federal courts are those in which federal law creates the cause
of action." See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). The

well-pleaded complaint rule requires that federal-question jurisdiction be evident from

the face of a plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint. See id. Dismissal for want of

jurisdiction is only appropriate where the allegations supporting jurisdiction are "wholly
unsubstantial or frivolous." Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2009)

(quoting jBe//v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).

Underdiversity jurisdiction, a federal district court has original jurisdiction over
all civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C, § 1332(a)(1). With the

exception of certain class actions. Section 1332 requires complete diversity among

parties, meaning that the citizenship of every plaintiffmust be different from the
citizenship of every defendant. Cent. W Va. Energy Co. v. Mt. State Carbon, LLC, 636
F.3d 101, 103 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).
III.

DISCUSSION

At the outset, the Court notes that it is difficult to discern from Plaintiffs

Complaint precisely what cause of action he is asserting. It appears that Plaintiffs claims
stem from the mislabeling of his check as a vendor check versus a paycheck and

Defendants requiring him to provide additional documentation as a condition of

employment. The Complaint also does not identify whether jurisdiction is predicated on
diversity of the parties or a federal question. Under either jurisdictional theory, the
allegations in the Complaint are insufficient.

No basis for Federal-question jurisdiction is revealed by the facts alleged in the

Complaint. Plaintiffinscrutably lists various sources of lawbut fails to provide any
indication as to how these provisions apply in this case. These sources of law include: an

administrative regulation, federal statutes, the United States Constitution, the Virginia
Constitution, and various Articles from the United Nations. Asserting a private cause of
action from the federal criminal statutes cited or the accompanying administrative

regulations governing the disclosure of social security numbers by federal agencies, is
patently nonsensical. Moreover, the Complaint fails to indicate how the Virginia
Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal Constitution, the United Nations Declaration

of Human Rights, or the United Nations Rights of Indigenous People, present a federal
question in this suit against wholly private Defendants. Plaintifftherefore has failed to
establish jurisdiction under a federal-question theory.
The Complaint similarly contains insufficient factual allegations to support

diversity jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1332, as it does not identifythe citizenship of the
parties involved. Moreover, attachments to Plaintiffs Complaint indicate that Plaintiff
and multiple of the Defendants are all residents of Virginia. Plaintiff therefore has failed

to establish jurisdiction under a diversity theory.^

' Several courts have found claims predicated on a claimants status as a Moorish American to be frivolous. See. e.g..
Metaphyzic El-EctromagneticSupreme-El V. Director, Dept. ofCorr., No. 3:14-cv-52, 2015 WL 1138246,at *3

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons identified above, Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient facts to

confer subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, his Complaint (ECF No. 4) will be
dismissed without prejudice. He is free to amplify the factual and legal basis upon which
his claim rests and refile his claims.

ShouldPlaintiff wish to appeal, written notice of appeal must be filed with the
Clerk of Court within thirty (30) days of the date of entry hereof Failure to file a notice
of appeal within that period may result in the loss of the right of appeal.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Henry E. Hudson

Date: Pan. 3

/y

United States District Judge

Richmond, Virginia

(E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2015); Purser v. Long-Nickens, No. 3:12-cv-704-FDW-DSC, 2012 WL 6566693, at *2 (W.D.N.C.
Nov. 30, 2012). This Court agrees.