Prasad v. State of Va, et al.

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge John A. Gibney, Jr on 04/26/2018. Copy mailed to pro se plaintiff. (tjoh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

SUNDARI K. PRASAD,

Plaintiff,
V.

Civil Action No. 3:17CV686

STATE OFVA,e/fl/.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, a Virginia inmate proceedingpro se and informa pauperis, submitted this civil
action. On her ovm initiative. Plaintiff filed a Particularized Complaint. (ECF No. 11.) By
Memorandum Order entered on March 15, 2018, the Court directed Plaintiff to file a second

particularized complaint and explained as follows:

However, in order to state a viable claim under Bivens,^ a plaintiff must
allege that a person acting under color of federal authority deprived him or her of
a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States. See
Williams V. Burgess, No. 3:09cvll5, 2010 WL 1957105, at *2 (E.D. Va. May 13,
2010) (citing Goldstein v. Moatz, 364 F.3d 205, 210 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004)). Courts
must liberally construe pro se civil rights complaints in order to address
constitutional deprivations. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.
1978). Nevertheless, "[pjrinciples requiring generous construction of pro se
complaints are not... without limits." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs current allegations fail to provide each
defendant with fair notice of the facts and legal basis upon which his or her
liability rests. See Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Accordingly, Plaintiff is DIRECTED, within fourteen (14) days of the date
of entry hereof, to file a second particularized complaint in conformance with the
follov^ng directions and in the order set forth below:
a.
At the very top of the particularized pleading.
Plaintiff is directed to place the following caption in all capital

^Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents ofFed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).

letters "SECOND PARTICULARIZED
CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 3:17CV686."

b.

COMPLAINT

FOR

The first paragraph of the particularized pleading

must contain a list of defendants. Thereafter, in the body of the

particularized complaint. Plaintiff must set forth legibly, in
separately numbered paragraphs, a short statement of the facts
giving rise to her claims for relief. Thereafter, in separately
captioned sections. Plaintiff must clearly identify each civil right
violated. Under each section, the Plaintiff must list each defendant

purportedly liable under that legal theory and explain why she
believes each defendant is liable to her. Such explanation should
reference the specific numbered factual paragraphs in the body of
the particularized complaint that support that assertion. Plaintiff
shall also include a prayer for relief
c.
The particularized pleading will supplant the prior
complaints. The particularized pleading must stand or fall of its
own accord. Plaintiff may not reference statements in the prior
complaints.
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE FOREGOING DIRECTIONS WILL

RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) provides that: "A party asserting a
claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim may join, as independent or
alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party."
Nevertheless, when a plaintiff seeks to bring multiple claims against multiple
defendants, she must also satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 which
provides:
(2) Defendants, Persons . . . may be joined in one action as
defendants if:

(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or
in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences;
and

(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise
in the action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). "Rule 20 does not authorize a plaintiff to add claims
'against different parties [that] present[] entirely different factual and legal
issues.'" Sykes v. Bayer Pharm. Corp., 548 F. Supp. 2d 208, 218 (E.D. Va. 2008)
(alterations in original) (quoting Lovelace v. Lee, No. 7:03CV00395, 2007 WL
3069660, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 21, 2007)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs second
particularized complaint must also comport with the joinder requirements. If
Plaintiff fails to submit an appropriate second particularized complaint that
comports with the joinder requirements, the Court will drop all defendants not
properly joined with the first named defendant.
(ECF No. 13, at 1-3 (alteration in original).)

On March 22, 2018, the Court received a submission from Plaintiff in which she asks the
Court to "add this as cover sheet to Particularized Complaint," attempts to add a "claim, [and]

list of defend, [and] additional evidence," and explains "as I believe this satisfies M.H. Lauck's

requirements [and] part, complaints a bit better as she seems to have some difficulty translating
my writing style and is a bit rude doing so." (ECF No. 14, at 1.) On March 27, 2018, the Court
received Plaintiffs Second Particularized Complaint. (ECF No. 15.) In an attached letter,

Plaintiff indicates that "I re-wrote the prayer for relief for it to make better sense as well, and I

previously sent you a revised 'statement of claim' [and] list of defendants that I hope you

reviewed. It's in here again if you did not." (ECF No. 15, at 1.)^ On the next page, Plaintiff
titles her complaint, "Second Amended Complaint." (ECF No. 15-1, at 1.)

As previously stated, "[p]rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se complaints
are not... without limits." Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278. The Court need not attempt "to discern

the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff." Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006).
The Fourth Circuit has explained that "[t]hough [pro se] litigants cannot, of course, be expected

to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in
law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented
to them." Beaudett, 11S F.2d at 1276. In other words, "[d]istrict judges are not mind readers ...

[and] they cannot be expected to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments . . . ." Id.
at 1278.

It is both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended discussion of

Prasad's theories for relief.

See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996)

(emphasizing that "abbreviated treatment" is consistent with Congress's vision for the

^ The Second Particularized Complaint is so lengthy that the Clerk had to split it up in
order to docket it. The Court refers to each piece based on the pagination assigned to this
submission by the CM/ECF docketing system.
The Court corrects the capitalization,
punctuation, and spelling and omits the emphasis in quotations from her submissions.

disposition of frivolous or "insubstantial claims" (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324

(1989))).

As explained below. Plaintiffs Second Particularized Complaint wholly fails to

comply with the directives of the Court, fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 8(a), 18, and 20, and fails to provide each defendant with fair notice of the facts upon which
his or her liability rests.

The Second Particularized Complaint is a two-hundred and twenty-six page, rambling

narrative, consisting of what appears to be large quotations of the law and Prasad's factual

allegations in no particular order, interspersed with assorted printouts of caselaw and statutes,
logs, records, police reports, and letters. Plaintiff names at least sixty defendants comprised of
institutional staff, state and federal judges and officials, police officers, and several private

entities. (ECF No. 15-1, at 2-4.) Plaintiff indicates her Second Particularized Complaint is two

parts (ECF No. 15, at 1), and contains twenty-seven counts (ECF No. 15-9, at 22), that range
from claims for negligence to Bivens and § 1983 claims. Indeed, it appears that Plaintiff may
have just attached various pieces of prior complaints or filings that have been submitted to this
Court or to various state courts in no discemable order. First, Plaintiffs Second Particularized

Complaint fails to comport with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a). That rule provides:
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless
the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support;

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief; and

(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or
different types of relief
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In a similar vein, Plaintiffs Second Particularized Complaint fails to

comport with the Court's directive that her allegations must provide each defendant with fair
notice of the facts and legal basis upon which his or her liability rests. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). Plaintiffs two-hundred and twenty-six page, rambling,

nearly incomprehensible submission against fifty-one defendants cannot be said to provide a

"short and plain statement or satisfy the requirements of notice pleading. Plaintiff fails to set
forth discemable claims with a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that [she] is
entitled to relief and for this reason alone her Second Particularized Complaint can be
dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

The Court also instructed Plaintiff that her Second Particularized Complaint must

comport with joinder requirements. The Court explained that "Rule 20 does not authorize a
plaintiff to add claims against different parties [that] present[] entirely different factual and legal
issues. Sykes v. Bayer Pharm. Corp., 548 F. Supp. 2d 208, 218 (E.D. Va. 2008) (alterations in
original) (quoting Lovelace v. Lee, No. 7:03CV00395, 2007 WL 3069660, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct.
21, 2007))."

(ECF No. 13, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).)

Plaintiffs rambling

narrative, which names fifty-one individuals involved in what appears to be her ongoing state

criminal proceedings, an unrelated juvenile and domestic relations court proceeding, and her
current detention, fails to satisfy joinder requirements. Once again. Plaintiff appears to name

anyone who has purportedly wronged her in this process, the majority of whom are immune from
suit. Stump V. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978) (explaining judges are immune from
suit); Butler v. Johnson, No. I:07cvll96 (GBL/TRJ), 2007 WL 4376135, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec.
12, 2007) (citing Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1969)) (explaining court
staff immune from suit).

Moreover, much of Plaintiffs Second Particularized Complaint is

comprised of pieces of prior civil actions filed in this Court and in the state courts. It is apparent
that Plaintiff has submitted the sort of "mishmash of a complainf that the rules governing the

joinder of parties aim to prevent. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

As the Court has explained to Plaintiff ad nauseum, although Plaintiffs pro se status
makes her "entitled to some deference," it does not relieve her of her duty to abide by the rules

and orders of this Court. Bollard v. Carlson^ 882 F.2d 93, 96 (4th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff has refused repeatedly to comply with the Court's directives.^ Accordingly, the action
will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

An appropriate Order shall issue.

John A. Gibncy, Jr.
United States Disi

Date: V/26//S
Richmond, Virginia

^Plaintiff has engaged in a pattern of refusing to follow the directives of the Court. See,
e.g., Prasad v. Judge M. Hannah Lauck, No. 3:17CV42 (E.D. Va. Sept. 14, 2017), ECF Nos. 17,
18; Prasad V. Chesterfield Village Apts, No. 3:16CV898 (E.D. Va. June 9, 2017), ECF Nos. 13,
14; Prasad V. Vick, No. 3:16CV40, 2017 WL 1091785, at *1^ (E.D. Va. Mar, 22, 2017), ECF
Nos. 84, 85.

Moreover, Plaintiffs Second Particularized Complaint appears to be an attempt to harass
those individuals involved in obtaining her criminal conviction and her ongoing detention. Cf.
Saub V. Phillips, No. 3:16CV414, 2017 WL 1658831, at *9 (E.D. Va. May 1, 2017) (alteration in

original), aff'd, 669 F. App'x 179 (2017) (dismissing as malicious action brought against judges
and attorneys involved in state criminal prosecution where tone of allegations "indicates that he
is bringing his suit merely to satisfy his desire for vengeance against [those involved in securing
his incarceration]").