Sampson v. Clarke et al
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 12/28/2018. (Copy mailed to Plaintiff) (smej, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
ORVIN LEE SAMPSON,
Plaintiff,
V.
Civil Action No. 3:17CV715
HAROLD W. CLARKE, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Orvin Lee Sampson, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed
this
42
U.S.C. §
individuals as
1983
action.
defendants:
Sampson
Harold
W.
names
Clarke,
the
following
Director
of the
Virginia Department of Corrections C'VDOC"); A. David Robinson,
Director of Corrections Operations; D. Ratliffe-Walker, Warden of
Lunenburg Correctional Center {^^LCC");
Charlene Davis, Regional
Administrator for the VDOC; B. Reed, Food Director; and, Phyllis
Hughes, Assistant Food Director (collectively, ''Defendants"). The
matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
the Court's responsibility to review prisoner actions under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
For the reasons that follow, the Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 13) will be granted.
I.
"A
motion
to
PRELIMINARY REVIEW
dismiss
under
Rule
12(b)(6)
tests
the
sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve
contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses."
Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin^
980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)).
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the
complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993);
see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952.
This principle applies only to
factual allegations, however, and ''a court considering a motion to
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because
they
are
no
more
than
conclusions,
are
not entitled
to the
assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
While the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon
V. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as
the
inmate's
advocate,
sua
sponte
developing
statutory
and
constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the
face of his complaint.
See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243
(4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
II.
SUMMARY OF PERTINENT ALLEGATIONS
At all times pertinent to the Complaint, Sampson was confined
in LCC.
(Compl. SI 2.)
''Sampson is a Messianic Jew."
(Id. SI 41.)
As a Messianic Jew, on the Day of Atonement, Yom Kippur, Sampson
was and is required to fast for twenty-four hours, from sundown to
sundown.
(Id. SISI 12, 15.)
Sampson, also alleges, in a somewhat
confusing fashion that, "during the Messianic fast, he can only
eat prior to sunrise and after sunset."
(Id. SI 41.)
On July 1,
2015, Defendant Robinson implemented a policy that provides that
those observing the Day of Atonement will be provided with only
two meals at the conclusion of their twenty-four hour fast.
(Id.
SI 15.)
In 2016, Sampson was employed in the Food Service Department
at LCC.
(Id. SISI 27, 30.)
After sundown on October 12, 2016,
Sampson began fasting in observance of the Day of Atonement.
SI 12.)
(Id.
On October 13, 2016, Sampson "was given breakfast before
the sun came up and nothing else to eat until the sundown of the
day.
After sundown [Sampson] was given a dinner tray plus a bag
meal to meet the calorie intake of the day . . . ."
(Id. SISI 41,
42.) Sampson noticed that the bag meal "was not properly equipped
with the calories dietary count intake for that day . . . ." (Id.
SI 43.)
Sampson brought the perceived inadequacy of the bag meal to
the
attention
of
Food
Service
Director
Reed.
(Id.
f
44.)
Defendant Reed directed Sampson to take the issue up with Assistant
Food
Service
Director
Hughes.
(Id.)
Sampson, ""I don't know what to tell you."
Defendant
Hughes
told
(Id.)
Sampson then went Food Service Supervisor Bennet. (Id. 1 45.)
Mr. Bennet acknowledged that Sampson was ''missing a meal."
(Id.)
Sampson asked Mr. Bennet if he could put, a peanut butter and jelly
sandwich, vegetables, and fruit in a bag.
(Id.)
Mr. Bennet agreed
to allow Sampson to put the above items in a bag.
(Id.)
Upon discovering Sampson's actions. Defendant "Reed sent
[Sampson] back to his housing unit due to preparing unauthorized
food
and
putting
extra
in
the
snack
bags."
(Id.
5
13.)
Additionally, on October 13, 2016, Defendant Reed requested that
Sampson be terminated from his job with Food Service Department on
the grounds that, inter alia, Sampson was "unwilling to follow
policy, instructions, and directives within the Food Service
Operation."
(EOF No. 1-1, at 12.)
On November 1, 2016, Sampson filed a grievance complaining
about his termination from his job for placing extra food in the
bag meals provided for after the fast of Yom Kippur.
Defendant
Ratliffe-Walker
denied
Sampson's
(Id. at 8.)
grievance
noting,
Sampson "played one supervisor against another" and placed extra
food in the bags when you were told by Defendants Hughes and Reed
to follow the memo.
his grievance.
appeal.
(Id. at 9.)
(Compl. SI 22.)
Sampson appealed the denial of
Defendant Davis denied Sampson's
(Id.)
III.
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Sampson contends that the Defendants' actions violated his
''constitutional right to be employed, and to practice his religion
in a proper manner . . . ."
(Compl. SI 9.)
Sampson contends that
by failing to provide him proper meals to break the fast of Yom
Kippur and then terminating him from his job Defendants violated
his rights under the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the
Fourteenth
Amendment,
and
the
Religious
Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA").^
Land
Use
and
(Id. SISI 10, 28, 40,
51.) Sampson also claims that Defendants' action violated his
rights under the
Fifth Amendment,2 the Sixth Amendment,^ the
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000CC-1(a).
2 The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise
infamous
crime,
unless
on
a
presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. Const, amend. V.
2 The Sixth Amendment provides:
5
Religious Freedom Restoration Act,'' and Article 1, section 8 of
the Virginia Constituion.^
(See, e.g., Compl. SISI 28, 50.)
It is
appropriate the summary dismiss these claims, as Sampson fails to
suggest how the Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Article 1,
section 8 of the Virginia Constituion are implicated, much less
violated, by Defendants' actions.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has found that Congress exceeded its powers by applying RFRA to
states and localities under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
Accordingly,
any claim under RFRA, the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment,
Article
1,
section
8
of
the
Virginia
Constitution
will
be
dismissed.
IV.
A.
ANALYSIS
RLUIPA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RLUIPA provides, in pertinent part, that:
the
No government shall impose a substantial burden on
religious exercise of a person residing in or
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the
accusation;
to
be
confronted
with
the
witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
U.S. Const, amend. VI.
^ 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
5 Article 1, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution pertains
to criminal prosecutions.
confined to an institution . . . unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a).
plausibly
suggesting
Thus, to begin, Sampson must allege facts
that
Defendants'
policies
""substantial burden" on his religious exercise.
impose
a
In determining if
Sampson has met this standard, the Court must answer two questions:
""(1) Is the burdened activity "religious exercise,' and if so (2)
is the burden "substantial'?"
Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567
{5th Cir. 2004); see Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 200-01 (4th Cir.
2012) (employing similar two-part inquiry).
""RLUIPA
defines the
term
"religious exercise'
broadly to
include "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief.'"
200
(quoting
42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)).
Couch, 679 F. 3d at
Sampson's
claim
implicates one activity—his ability to observe the fast of Yom
Kippur and immediately thereafter have adequate food.
Given
RLUIPA's broad definition of religious exercise, this activity
constitutes religious exercise.
Nevertheless, as explained below,
Sampson fails to alleges facts that plausibly indicate this
religious exercise was or will be substantially burdened.®
® The Court construes Sampson to claim not merely to challenge
Defendants conduct for Yom Kippur 2015, but also to challenge the
RLUIPA
fails
to
define
Couch;. 679 F.3d at 200.
the
Fourth
jurisprudence
Circuit
the
term
burden.
See
The United States Court of Appeals for
determined
interpreting
guidance on the issue.
substantial
the
that
Free
the
Exercise
Supreme
Court's
Clause
provides
See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 187.
Thus, the
Fourth Circuit has explained that a substantial burden
is one that put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent
to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, or
one that forces a person to choose between following the
precepts of h[is] religion and forfeiting [governmental]
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of h[is] religion . . . on the other hand.
Couch, 679 F.3d at 200 (alterations and omission in original)
(quoting Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 187). In conducting the substantial
burden inquiry, the plaintiff ^^is not required . . . to [allege
facts indicating] that the exercise at issue is required by or
essential to his [or her] religion."
Krieqer v. Brown, 496 F.
App'x 322, 325 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709, 725 n.l3 (2005)).
Nevertheless, ''at a minimum the
substantial burden test requires that a RLUIPA plaintiff [allege
facts indicating] that the government's denial of a particular
religious . . . observance was more than an inconvenience to one's
religious practice."
Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1278 (11th
Cir. 2007) (citing Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v.
Town of Surfside.
Defendant Robinson's policy that only provides for two meals after
the fast of Yom Kippur.
(Compl. H 15.)
8
366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004));"^ cf♦
Krieger,
496 F. App'x
at 326 (affirming grant of summary judgment where inmate failed to
'"show that the deprivation of an outdoor worship circle and the
requested
sacred
items
religious beliefs"
modified
his
(citing Lovelace,
substantial burden occurs
behavior
and
violated
472 F.3d at 187) ) .
his
Thus,
no
if the government action merely makes
the ^'religious exercise more expensive or difficult," but fails to
pressure the adherent to violate his or her religious beliefs or
abandon one of the precepts of his religion.
of God V.
Cir.
Charter Twp.
of Meridian,
258
F.
Living Water Church
App'x 729,
739
(6th
2007) .
Two
recent
cases
from
the
Fourth
Circuit
illustrate
a
plaintiff s responsibility with respect to alleging facts that
plausibly suggest a substantial burden.
In Couch, the plaintiff
''testified that the primary religious texts of Islam command that
he grow a beard and that the refusal to maintain a beard is a sin
comparable in severity to eating pork."
Couch, 679 F.3d at 200.
The VDOC's grooming policy prohibited inmates from growing beards
and enforced this
program that
rule by placing a noncompliant
"restricted or
limited
[the
inmate
inmate's]
in a
access
to
personal property, movement rights, the right to eat and associate
7 In Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 293 (2011) , the Supreme
Court abrogated Smith's ultimate holding that RLUIPA allows for
monetary damages against state officials acting in their official
capacity.
with others, recreation time, and visitation time."
The
Fourth
Circuit
concluded
that
VDOCs
Id. at 199.
grooming
policy
and
enforcement mechanism "'fit squarely within the accepted definition
of ^substantial burden'" because it placed substantial pressure on
the plaintiff to modify his behavior and violate his beliefs.
Id.
at 200-01 (citing Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995-96
(9th Cir. 2005)).
In Krieger, the Fourth Circuit declined to find that an inmate
had
demonstrated
a
substantial
burden
where
prison
officials
denied "his requests for an ^outdoor worship circle' and certain
^sacred
items'
related
to
his
religious
Krieger, 496 F. App'x at 322.
practice
of Asatru."
The plaintiff "asserted that
deprivation of the outdoor worship circle would require him to
pray indoors, and that the ^Blot' ceremony is ^best performed
outdoors.'"
Id. at 325 (emphasis added).
The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the mere denial of the optimal manner for performing
the "Blot" ceremony could not demonstrate a substantial burden
where the plaintiff "failed to offer any explanation regarding the
reason why indoor worship would compromise his religious beliefs."
Id.
Similarly, the inmate failed to demonstrate a substantial
burden with respect to the denial of additional sacred items simply
by the "blanket assertion" that "the sacred items were 'necessary'
to perform 'well-established rituals.'"
Id. at 326.
The Fourth
Circuit noted that plaintiff "did not identify those rituals, or
10
explain why the absence of the sacred items had an impact on the
rituals and violated his beliefs."
Id.
Krieqer illuminates another consideration in conducting the
substantial burden inquiry.
The availability to an inmate, in the
most general sense, of other means to practice his or her faith is
not relevant to the RLUIPA substantial burden inquiry.
Shear, 325 F. App'x 190, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
Al-Amin v.
'^Nevertheless,
courts properly consider whether the inmate retains other means
for engaging in the particular religious activity, such as the
"Blot" ceremony, in assessing whether a denial of the inmate's
preferred method for engaging that religious exercise imposes a
substantial burden."
Shabazz v. Va. Dep't Corr., 3:10CV638, 2013
WL 1098102, at *7 (E.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2013) (citing Krieqer, 496 F.
App'x at 326; Coleman v. Governor of Mich., 413 F. App'x 866, 87576 (6th Cir. 2011)).
Thus, an inmate failed to demonstrate the
denial of additional group study time imposed a substantial burden
upon
his
religious
exercise
where
prison
officials
already
provided three hours of group study and worship time and allowed
inmate to study in his cell.
See Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d
639, 656-57 (8th Cir. 2009).
Similarly, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that prison policies
which limited the inmates' access to religious radio and television
broadcasts failed to substantially burden the inmates' religious
exercise because the inmates "may receive religious literature via
11
the mail and may receive visitors at the prison to discuss their
religious beliefs."
Coleman, 413 F. App'x at 876.
As explained
below, in light of the foregoing principles, Sampson fails to
allege facts that plausibly suggest any substantial burden upon
his religious exercise.
Here, it is undisputed that Sampson was permitted to fast for
the religiously required period during Yom Kippur.
provide
Sampson
with
food
upon
the
conclusion
In order to
of
the
fast.
Defendants provided Sampson with ^^a dinner tray plus a bag meal."
(Compl. 5 42.)
Sampson, however, apparently wanted to be provided
with a third meal to make up for every meal he skipped.
Given the
food provided, the failure to provide Sampson with additional food
(in the form of a PB&J sandwich, fruit and vegetables) hardly
placed ^^substantial pressure" on Sampson to violate his religious
beliefs
or
abandon
one
of
the
precepts
of
his
religion.
Whitehouse, 2011 WL 5843622, at *4 (citing Lovelace, 472 F.3d 187);
cf. Living Water Church of God, 258 F. App'x at 739.
so hold demeans the
notion of a
substantial burden.
Indeed, to
At most,
Sampson alleges an inconvenience to his religious exercise.
See
Smith, 502 F.3d at 1278 (explaining that a burden that is merely
an "inconvenience on religious exercise" is not substantial);
Living Water Church of God, 258 F. App'x at 739 (no substantial
burden occurs if the government action merely makes the "religious
exercise more expensive or difficult"). While Sampson's preferred
12
manner for breaking his fast was to provide him with the full three
meals upon the conclusion of his fast, the failure to do so fails
to state a claim under RLUIPA.
Cf. Van Wyhe, 581 F.3d at 657 (''The
prison must permit a reasonable opportunity for an inmate to engage
in
religious
activities
opportunities.").
but
need
not
provide
unlimited
Accordingly, Sampson's RLUIPA claims will be
dismissed.®
Similar to RLUIPA, to state a First Amendment, a plaintiff
must state facts that indicate he engaged in a religious exercise
and
that the exercise
has been
substantially burdened.
RLUIPA
provides considerably more protection for an inmate's religious
exercise than does the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution of
the United States.
plaintiff failed
Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 186. "Thus, because
to
allege
facts sufficient to establish
a
substantial burden under the more protective standard or RLUIPA,
his claim must fail under the more stringent standard of the Free
Exercise Clause."
Accordingly, Sampson's First Amendment claims
will be dismissed.
® It is not clear whether Sampson also believes firing him
from his job also somehow violated RLUIPA, the First Amendment,
the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. What is clear,
however, is that terminating Sampson from his job did not violate
RLUIPA, the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, to the extent Sampson seeks to bring
constitutional or statutory claims under that theory, they are
meritless and will be dismissed.
13
B.
Eighth Amendment
To state an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must allege
facts that indicate (1) that objectively the deprivation suffered
or
harm
inflicted
subjectively
the
^^was
prison
culpable state of mind.'"
^sufficiently
officials
serious,'
acted
with
a
and
(2)
that
^sufficiently
Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167
(4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298
(1991)). ^'These requirements spring from the text of the amendment
itself; absent intentionality, a condition imposed on an inmate
cannot properly be called ^punishment,' and absent severity, such
punishment cannot be called ^cruel and unusual.'"
Iko v. Shreve,
535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 298-300 (1991)). ''What must be [alleged] with regard to
each component 'varies according to the nature of the alleged
constitutional violation.'"
Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756,
761 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5
(1992)).
When an inmate challenges his conditions of confinement, he
must allege "(1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need; and
(2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of
prison officials."
Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th
Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted) (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at
301-03).
Deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to allege
facts suggesting that a particular defendant actually knew of and
14
disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff's
person.
See
Farmer
v.
Brennan,
511
U.S.
825,
837
(1994).
"Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing of mere
negligence will not meet it."
Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695
(4th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06
(1976)).
"The
Eighth
Amendment
requires
that
inmates
be
provided
^well-balanced meal[s], containing sufficient nutritional value to
preserve health.'"
Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir.
1999) (alteration in original)
(some internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 770 (5th Cir.
1986)); see also Wilson v. Johnson, 385 F. App'x 319, 320 (4th
Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (explaining that Eighth Amendment
requires nutritionally adequate food). In determining whether an
Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, "[c]ourts consider the
amount and duration of the deprivation of food."
Lockamy v.
Rodriguez, 402 F. App'x 950, 951 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted)
(finding deprivation of six
meals in fifty-four
hour period
insufficient to state a claim absent allegation of injury as a
result of missing meals); see Berry, 192 F.3d at 506-08 (finding
deprivation of eight meals over seven-month period insufficient to
state an Eighth Amendment claim absent specific allegations of
physical harm).
Here, after his voluntary fast in 2016, Sampson
was provided with a dinner tray and a snack bag, which he then
15
supplemented with another sandwich and fruit and vegetables.
The
provision of this food fails to support the objective component
for an Eighth Amendment claim.
Additionally, the fact that, in
the future, after his Yom Kippur fasts Sampson will only receive
a dinner tray and a snack bag does not amount to more than the
""routine discomfort [that] is part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society."
Strickler v.
Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1380 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)).
Furthermore, Sampson fails to
allege facts that suggest that any Defendant should have perceived
the failure to provide additional food would pose a substantial
risk of serious harm to Sampson's person.
Accordingly, Sampson's
Eighth Amendment claims with respect to the provision of food will
be dismissed.
Sampson also suggests Defendants violated his right under the
Eighth Amendment by terminating him from his prison employment.
This action fails to support an Eighth Amendment claim, see Padilla
V. Beard, 206 F. App'x 123, 125 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Jan.
25, 2007), and will be dismissed.
C.
Fourteenth Amendment
1.
The Due Process Clause
Smith contends that Defendants deprived him of due process
when they terminated him from his prison employment.
Process
Clause
applies
when
government
16
action
The Due
deprives
an
individual of a legitimate liberty or property interest.
Bd. of
Regents of State Colls, v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
Thus,
the first step in analyzing a procedural due process claim is to
identify whether the alleged conduct affects a protected interest.
Beverati v. Smith, 120
cases).
F.3d 500, 502 (4th
Cir. 1997) (citing
Sampson does not enjoy a protected liberty interest in
prison employment.
See Robles v. Sturdinvant, No. 7:14-CV-00070,
2014 WL 4853409, at *1 (W.D. Va. Mar. 27, 2014) (citing Bulger v.
United States Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 50-51 (5th Cir. 1995);
Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 1989); Altizer v.
Paderick, 569 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1978); Alley v. Anqelone, 962 F.
Supp. 827, 834 (E.D. Va. 1997)), aff^d, 583 F. App'x 129 (4th Cir.
2014).
Accordingly,
Sampson's
due
process
claims
will
be
dismissed.
2.
The Equal
Equal Protection
Protection
Clause of the
Fourteenth
Amendment
commands that similarly situated persons be treated alike. See
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)
(citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
In order to
state an equal protection claim, Sampson must allege facts that
indicate: ''that he has been treated differently from others with
whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was
the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination." Morrison
V. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001).
17
Sampson has not
done so.
Accordingly, Sampson's equal protection claims will be
dismissed.
V.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (EOF No. 12) will be granted.
Sampson's claims will be dismissed.
The action will be dismissed.
The Clerk will be directed to note the disposition of the action
for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
The Clerk is directed to send a copy of the Memorandum Opinion
to Sampson and counsel for Defendants.
It is so ORDERED.
/s/
/^%(P
Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge
Date
Richmond, Virginia
18
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?