Ozfidan v. Marshall et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 01/09/2018. Copy mailed to pro parties. (tjoh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
OSCAR O.OZFIDAN,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:17CV726-HEH
V.
JOHN MARSHALL, Presiding Judge,
and PAMELA L. OZFIDAN,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Dismissing Complaint for Lack of Federal Jurisdiction)
This is an actionbroughtunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory judgment,
specifically that an award of spousal support to Plaintiffs former wife by the Circuit
Court of Henrico County, Virginia ("Circuit Court") is unconstitutional and
unenforceable. The Plaintiff, proceedingpro se} names both the Circuit Court Judge and
his former wife, in their individual capacities, as Defendants. His claims hinge on the
contention that the trial court, led astray by his former wife, arbitrarily and capriciously
disregarded what he contends is established Virginia procedural and substantive law. He
maintains that those sections of the Code of Virginia pertaining to the award of alimony
were unconstitutionally applied by the trial court.
The issue of a spousal support award between Plaintiff and Defendant Ozfidan
was first litigated in the Circuit Court. Following an evidentiary hearing on November
25, 2013, addressing the issues of divorce, equitable distribution, fees and costs, the state
Both Plaintiff and his wife were represented by counsel in state court.
trial court indicated that it would not address the spousal support issue at that point for
two reasons. First, the divorce complaintdid not request spousal support, and second, a
hearing on spousal support was pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
("J&DR") Court. On December 11,2013, the trial court issued a letter opinion
concluding that "the divorce will be entered on the grounds of cruelty" and that "matters
of spousal support will be transferred to the J&DR Court." Ozfidan v. Ozfidan, 2017 WL
83630 at *2-3 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2017) (quotingthe Circuit Court's letter opinion).
Plaintiff subsequently filed a "Motion to Decree Spousal Support," petitioning the
trial court to override the J&DR court's award and issue its own support decree, and
further requesting that if any such decree was made, it would be made in periodic
payments for a defined duration. This motion was denied "as [Ms. Ozfidan's] pleadings
never requested [a] spousal support [decree]" from the trial court. Ofzidan^ 2017 WL
83630 at *2. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals for Virginia, which remanded the
case back to the trial court for reconsideration of the spousal support issue. Ozfidan v.
Ozfidan, 2015 WL 1994114 (Va. Ct. App. May 05,2015). On remand, Judge Marshall
considered the direction of the Court of Appeals, Virginiaprecedent, and the parties'
positions, and ultimately issued a letter opinion orderingPlaintiff to pay Ms. Ozfidan
spousal support for an indefinite duration. Ofzidan, 2017 WL 83630 at *3. Plaintiff
again appealed, but this time the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Virginia Supreme Court
subsequently denied Plaintiffs petition for review. The present action followed.
^The case originated with Judge Hammond in the Circuit Court. After Plaintiffappealed Judge
Hammond's decision and the Virginia Court of Appeals remanded thecase forconsideration of spousal
support,the matter was assigned to DefendantJudge Marshall.
This matter is presently before the Court on Motions to Dismiss filed by
Defendants Judge John Marshall^ ("Judge Marshall") and Pamela L. Ozfidan ("Ms.
Ozfidan")."^ All parties have filed memoranda supporting their respective positions. For
the reasons that follow, both motions to dismiss will begranted.^
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff fails to identify any relevant
authority to support his abstract allegation that Virginia's statutory scheme enabling
circuit courts to award support in domestic relations cases is, in any manner,
unconstitutional. Furthermore, this Court's survey of domestic relations jurisprudence
reveals none.^ To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a plaintiffs
complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level and facially state a plausible claim to relief Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).
The HonorableJohn Marshall is a Judge with the Circuit Court ofthe County of Henrico, Virginia.
Plamtiffs pro se claim against his former wife, Pamela L. Ozfidan, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 founders at
the startinggate. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a vehiclefor bringingsuit against state or local officialsfor
deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Ms. Ozfidan is a private citizen outside the ambit ofthe statute. Simplyfiling a lawsuit relying on
established Virginia law does not, standing along, make her a state actor.
^Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Ozfidan's Motion to Dismiss should be stricken because "Ms. Ozfidan
failed to timely file her answer and is in default." (Mot. Strike, ECFNo. 15;PI. Br. 0pp. Ozfidan Mot.
Dismiss 1, ECFNo. 14.) As stated in the Court's Order regarding Plaintiffs Request for Entry of Default
(ECFNo. 18), however, the Courtdeems Defendant'sMotion to Dismiss to be a timely-filed responsive
pleading. Therefore, Defendant is not in default. Just as the Court directed the Clerkto deny Plaintiff's
Request for Entry of Default, the Court accordinglywill deny Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 15).
^Sections 20-79(b) and 20-107.1, Virginia Code Ann., the statutes atissue in this case, authorize circuit
courtjudgesto award maintenance and support to spouses andchildren, as wellas childcustody andcare,
at various stages of divorce proceedings in Virginia.
The Court nextturns to Judge Marshall's Motion to Dismiss. Although Judge
Marshall appropriately points out that he is generally entitled to absolute judicial
immunity andnotes thatthe Complaint fails to state a claim upon which reliefcanbe
granted, the centerpiece of his Motion to Dismiss is this Court's lackof subject matter
jurisdiction overthe Complaint. This Court agrees with Judge Marshall that this action
is, in essence, an appeal of the Circuit Court's award of spousal support sailing under the
false flag of a constitutional claim. Plaintiffs assertions of illegality are quite nuanced.
In attempting to carefully craft a facially viable claim, Plaintiff asserts that "the
Complaint does not ask this court to review the merits of the state court decision but
ratherthe procedural and legal improprieties which led to the ruling from the
constitutional perspective." (PI. Br. 0pp. Ozfidan Mot. Dismiss 8, ECF No. 14.) "The
primary focus of the [C]omplaint is undeniably on procedural and legal improprieties
encouraged by Ms. Ozfidan and employed by Judge Marshall leading up to the rulingto
reach an unconstitutional result they personally desired." {Id.) "I am seeking a
judgement declaring that whatever the legal bases Judge Marshall relied on in making the
spousal support award to Ms. Ozfidan were unconstitutional as applied by him for the
reasons stated in my Complaint." {Id. at 10.) "Judge Marshall disregarded state rules,
statues [sic], and binding precedents, my independent right to be heard in an impartial
forum was violated also." {Id. at 13.) "As a citizen of the Commonwealth, I have a right
to expect that the support award would comply with Virginia rules and statues [sic]." (PI.
Br. Opp. Marshall Mot. Dismiss 11, ECF No. 12.) "The claims in my Complaint
question the constitutionality of vague Virginia rules and statues [sic] and
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constitutionality of Judge Marshall's application of whatever the legal bases were for the
support award." (Id. at 13.)
Focusing the analysis more closely, the genesis of Plaintiffs challenge is the
Circuit Court's purported error in making an award of spousal support to his wife in the
absence of a valid pleading before the court, filed by her, which requested such support.
Plaintiff contends that the only issue properly before the Circuit Court on remand was his
own Motion to Decree Spousal Support, which he, by counsel, attempted to retroactively
limit to a request that the Circuit Court "decrease spousal support... to a denial of
support for [Ms. Ozfidan]." Ofzidan, 2017 WL 83630 at *2. Such limited review,
however, is contrary both to the text ofPlaintiffs original Motion and to well established
Virginia law, particularly in a court of equity. Trial courts in Virginia have broad
discretion in awarding and fixing the amount of spousal support. Brooks v. Brooks, 498
S.E.2d461,463 (Va. 1998).
The Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected Plaintiffs counsel's contention that his
wife had waived her right to spousal support by not addressing spousal support
specifically in her divorce complaintin the Circuit Court. In affirming the decision of the
Circuit Court, the Court of Appeals of Virginia noted:
The facts at bar indicate that wife had no intent to relinquish her right to
spousal support. Wife's opposition to husband's motionto decree spousal
support was predicated on the belief that, absent a trial court ruling on
spousal support, her favorable [J&DR] court support order would remain in
effect, a position wife has consistently maintained throughout this
litigation. Only after this Court remanded the spousal support issue to the
trial court for reconsideration did wife, knowing that a trial court award
would nullify the JDR court's award, begin affirmatively seeking a spousal
support award in the trial court. Wife's desire to receive an award of
spousal support, either from the original JDR court order or from the trial
court, has remained constant throughout this litigation.
{Id. at *8-9.)^
As acknowledged by the Court of Appeals, the reasoning Judge Marshall
employed in awarding support to Plaintiffs wife was consistent in all respects with the
dictates of the Virginia Supreme Court. In Wernerv. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court
held that "a support order of a juvenile and domestic relations court continues in frill
force and effect notwithstanding the entry by a court of record of a divorce decree that is
silent as to support." 181 S.E.2d 76, 78 (Va. 1972). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to
show that Judge Marshall acted unconstitutionally, substantively or procedurally.
In addition to highlighting the inherent legal fallacies underlying Plaintiffs
claims, Judge Marshall correctly challenges this Court's jurisdiction to entertain what is
essentially an appeal of a state court's award of alimony. Initially, Judge Marshall points
out that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine,® although narrow in application, squarely
precludes federal district courts from reviewing such state court decisions. Judge
Marshall argues that despite Plaintiffs effort to characterize his claims to the contrary,
the relief he seeks necessarily involves a review of a state court's decision to award
' In its opinion, the Court ofAppeals ofVirginia noted that Plaintiffs pleading asked the trial court "to
decree the maintenance and support of thespouses" tracking Section 20-107.1(a), Virginia Code Ann.
{Id. at *5)(emphasis added). The appellate courtconcluded that"[hjusband requested thatthe trial court
decree support of the 'spouses'—^not support for husband only, and not a denial of support for the wife."
{Id.)
*Rooker v. Fid Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,415-16 (1923); D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,483
(1983).
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alimony to his former wife: Plaintiffs sole objective is a declaration by this Court that
the spousal support award is unenforceable. This Court agrees.
As the United States Supreme Court carefiilly articulated in ExxonMobile Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., "[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine ... is confined to cases ...
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments." 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Similar to the present case, in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., parties defeated in state
court turned to a federal district court for relief, alleging that the adverse state court
judgment was rendered in contravention of the Constitution. The parties urged the
federal court to declare it null and void. 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923). The Supreme Court
fiirther noted in Rooker that even "[i]fthe [state court] decisionwas wrong, that did not
make the judgment void, but merely left it open to reversal or modification in an
appropriate and timely appellate proceeding." Id. The immediate case falls squarely
within the prohibition announced in Rooker and Feldman.
The gravamenof Plaintiffs Complaint is that he suffered constitutionally
cognizable injury as a result of the state courtjudge's incorrectapplication of state law.
(Compl. Ill, ECF No. 1.) Employing a subtle analysis. Plaintiff attempts to decouple the
court's decisional process from the underlying authority relied upon—and the resulting
decision. Plaintiff contends that, "[i]n short, being vague there were no state rules or
authorities requiring him to rule the way he did." (PL Br. 0pp. Marshall Mot. Dismiss
14.) Plaintiff adds that "Judge Marshall should have not assumed authority to grant
support because the rules and statutes were unconstitutionally vague." (Jd.)
Presumably, Plaintiff also believes that the Virginia Court of Appeals, which
reviewed and affirmed Judge Marshall's award of alimony, both substantively and
procedurally, engaged in the same type of allegedly errant reasoning. The Virginia Court
of Appeals rejected the identical constitutional claims raised by Plaintiff in the immediate
case.
2017 WL 83630 *3-8.
Based on Plaintiffs strained line of reasoning, he seeks to circumnavigate the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine by alleging that he is not challenging the state court judgment
per se, but the constitutionality of the trial judge's analysis and the legal basis for
awarding support. There is no logical route to achieve the result Plaintiff seeks, other
than finding that the trial court erred in awarding alimony. Sheared of rhetoric, the relief
Plaintiff seeks is an order relieving him of his responsibility for paying alimony.
Consequently, Rooker-Feldman clearly divests this Court ofjurisdiction to nullify the
award of alimony.
Thejurisdiction of this Court to review the legality of the spousal support award in
this case is further undermined by the enduring admonition of the Supreme Court that
"[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." In Re Burrus,
136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). "[T]he domestic relations exception, as articulated by [the
United States Supreme Court] sinceBarber, divests the federal courts of powerto issue
divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees." Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,
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703 (1992) (citing Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1858)). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has long recognized this jurisdictional limitation. See
Doe V. Doe, 660 F.2d 101, 105-106 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Wilkins v. Rogers, 581 F.2d
399 (4th Cir. 1978); Gullo v. Hirst, 332 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1964).
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs
Claims against Judge Marshall.
Finally, with respect to Ms. Ozfidan, Plaintiff argues that his wife "encouraged
Judge Marshall to engage in procedural and legal improprieties leading to an
unconstitutional result." (PL Br. 0pp. Ozfidan Mot. Dismiss 8.) Plaintiff, however, fails
to particularize how Ms. Ozfidan importuned the court into reaching an unconstitutional
decision to award statutorily authorized spousal support. Furthermore, merely asking the
court to award her statutory relief does not make her a state actor. As the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuitexplained in DeBauche v. Trani, "[t]o implicate
42 U.S.C. § 1983, conduct must be 'fairly attributable to the State.'... The person
charged must eitherbe a state actor or have a sufficiently close relationship with state
actors such that a court would conclude that the non-state actor is engaged in the state's
action." 191 F.3d 499, 506 (4th Cir. 1999) (citmg Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 937 (1982)). "Stated differently, to become state action, private action must have a
'sufficiently close nexus' with the statethat the private action 'may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself.'" Debauche, 191 F.3d at 507 (quoting
Mfrs. Mut Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999)). See alsoAndrews v. Fed. Home Loan Bank ofAtlanta,
998 F.2d 214, 217-220 (4th Cir. 1993).
If Plaintiffs theory of vicarious Section 1983 liability was adopted by federal
courts, it would potentially sweep every prevailing litigant in a state court action within
its ambit based solely on the threadbare argumentthat the judge's decision in favor of
that litigant was unconstitutional. Such expansive interpretation of Section 1983 was
specifically rejected by the U.S. Supreme Courtwhen it determined that "merely
resorting to the courts and beingon the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a
co-conspiratoror a joint actor with the judge." Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980).
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim against Ms. Ozfidan.
Based on the above analysis, this Court fmds that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction overPlaintiffs thinly veiled challenge to the judgmentof the Circuit Court.
Even if this Court had the requisite jurisdiction, it would conclude that Plaintiffs
Complaint fails to demonstrate a viableconstitutional claim against eitherJudge
Marshall, a well-respected jurist, or Ms. Ozfidan, a private citizen. Plaintiffs Complaint
will therefore be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice.
Highlighting the frivolity of Plaintiffs Complaint and his alleged abuse of legal
process, Ms. Ozfidan urges this Court to impose sanctions against Plaintiff, under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11, to deter future abusive litigation. Even though the record at hand may
arguably support such sanctions, given this Court's tenuous jurisdiction. Plaintiffspro se
status, and the nature of the underlying dispute, with some hesitation no sanctions will be
imposed unless further similarly ill-advised litigation is filed in this Court.
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An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Is!
Henry E. Hudson
United States District Judge
Date: '4o>n..0l^ 20/g
Richmond, Virginia
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