Robinson v. Fenner et al
Filing
54
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 02/19/2020. Copy mailed to plaintiff. (tjoh, )
lU
p
b
m 10
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
CLERK, U.S. DISIKIUI ouuKI
RICHMOND. VA
Richmond Division
WILLIAM ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:18CV117-HEH
V.
J. FENNER,et aL,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss)
William Robinson, a former Virginia pretrial detainee proceeding pro se, filed this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.^ This action proceeds on Robinson's Second Particularized
Complaint("Complaint," ECF No. 39). Robinson contends that Defendants Officer J.
Fenner("Officer Fenner"), Captain Hurlock, and Lieutenant Hansen violated his rights
during his incarceration at the Prince William-Manassas Regional Adult Detention
Center. The following claims remain before the Court:^
'That statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
^ The Court employs the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system to the parties'
submissions. The Court corrects the spelling, punctuation, and capitalization in the quotations
from Robinson's submissions.
11
y
Claim One:
Officer Fenner (a) assaulted Robinson and used excessive
force, (b)"falsely arrested [Robinson]," (c) "maliciously
made false statements causing [Robinson] to be false[ly]
imprisoned inside of the jail on TSL,"^ and (d) "punished
[Robinson] for being assaulted, all without due process."
(Compl. 1.)
Claim Two:
After Robinson was assaulted. Lieutenant Hansen "denied
[Robinson] due process [by] not investigating [Robinson's]
description of the events which were true enough that [he]
was found not guilty of assault." {Id.)
Claim Three: Captain Hurlock violated Robinson's (a) right to due
process and (b) right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment when Captain Hurlock "had [Robinson] placed
on TSL from the time of the incident 8-30-17 to 1-11-18."
{Id. at l.y
As relief, Robinson seeks monetary damages.^ {Id. at 3-4.)
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECFNo. 50.) Robinson filed a Response. (ECF
No. 52.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss(ECF No. 50) will be
granted in part and denied in part.
^ Robinson does not define the components of the acronym "TSL," but indicates that when
placed on TSL, he was "housed on a higher security level." (Compl. 3.)
^ The Court notes that in its prior Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court did not delineate .
between Claim Three (a) and (b). {See ECF No.48, at 5.) For clarity, the Court does so in this
Memorandum Opinion and Order.
^ Robinson also requests that Officer Fenner be "criminally charged." (Compl. 3.) However,
§ 1983 does not provide a mechanism by which an individual may bring criminal charges against
another, and it does not provide a mechanism for compelling a prosecutor to seek the prosecution
of another. See Linda R.S. v. Richard Z)., 410 U.S. 614,619(1973)(holding that"a private
citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the [criminal] prosecution or nonprosecution of .
another"); Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486,494 (4th Cir. 1990)("No citizen has an enforceable
right to institute a criminal prosecution."(citation omitted)).
I. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or
the applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin,980 F.2d 943,952
(4th Cir. 1992)(citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and •
Procedure § 1356(1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134(4th
Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual
allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin
by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,679(2009).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[]only 'a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant
fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp.
V. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555(2007)(second alteration in original)(quoting Conley v. .
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47(1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints
containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient
"to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a
claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570, rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
3
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or
complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must "allege facts
sufficient to state all the elements of[his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003)(citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d
193, 213(4th Cir. 2002);lodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)).
Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d
1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate's advocate and develop, sua
sponte, statutory and constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the
face of his complaint. See Brock y. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241,243 (4th Cir. 1997)(Luttig, J.,
concurring); Beaudett v. City ofHampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
A motion made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges
the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of a complaint. Such challenges can be
facial, asserting that the facts as pled fail to establish jurisdiction, or factual, disputing the
pleadings themselves and arguing that other facts demonstrate that no jurisdiction exists.-
Lufti V. United States, 527 F. App'x 236, 241 (4th Cir. 2013)(citing Kerns v. United
States, 585 F.3d 187, 192-93(4th Cir. 2009)). If a defendant raises a factual challenge,
"the district court may then go beyond the allegations ofthe complaint and resolve the
jurisdictional facts in dispute by considering evidence outside the pleadings, such as
affidavits." United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 348 (4th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted). Consideration of evidence outside of the pleadings on a Rule
12(b)(1) motion does not necessarily convert the motion to one for summary judgment.
4
Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642,647(4th Cir. 1999)(citation omitted);
McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 409(4th Cir. 2010)(Agee, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)(discussing that motions under Rule 12(b)(1) are not restricted by
Rule 12(d)). Regardless of whether the challenge is facial or factual, the plaintiff bears
the burden of proofto preserve jurisdiction. Jadhav, 555 F.3d at 348; Richmond,
Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765,768(4th Cir. 1991).
11. ROBINSON'S ALLEGATIONS
In Robinson's Complaint, he presents the following allegations:
Officer J. Fenner assaulted me causing injury to my person while I
was inside of my cell awaiting trial. Then used excessive force when he
falsely arrested me. This officer maliciously made false statements causing
me to be false[ly] imprisoned inside of the jail on TSL by [Captain]
Hurlock. I was punished for being assaulted all without due process.
[Lieutenant] Hansen denied me due process [by] not investigating
my description of events which were true enough that I was found not
guilty of assault. This [lieutenant] only accepted Officer Fenner's story
which in my opinion denied me of a basic right of due process.
[Lieutenant] Hansen also told me that he would not reopen the investigation
[and] consider[ed] this matter closed.
[Captain] Hurlock had me placed on TSL from the time of the
incident 8-30-17 to 1-11-18. I had to be handcuffed and shackled to leave
my cell. I was forced at times to wear shackles while showering. I was
only allowed recreation every 3 or 4 days. Sometimes I'd go for 1 week or
more without a shower or recreation. Even though I was injured and used a
wheelchair at times, I was still made to [wear] shackles at times.
Also, Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, I was awakened,
handcuff[ed], and forced to stand for 5 minutes or more facing the wall
while my cell was being searched, destroying property and throwing away
food at times. These officers were aware that I was injured and required
help with mobility at times. All state charges were dropped on 1-11-18
and [Captain] Hurlock moved me to an Administrative Unit, but continued
to house me on TSL; only then did I begin to get showers and recreation
daily. I remained on TSL until late February of 2018. I was denied due
process and cruel and unusual punishment.
(Compl. 1-2(paragraph numbers omitted).) As a result of Defendants' actions, Robinson
contends that his rights were violated in the following manner:
[Officer] Fenner assaulted me causing sciatic nerve damage, pain
and suffering, excessive force, cruel and unusual punishment, malicious
prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, and due process ....
[Lieutenant] Hansen[:] I feel that this [lieutenant] violated my right
to due process ....
[Captain] Hurlock forced me to be housed on a higher security level
[and to] wear shackles knowing that I was injured with sciatica and chronic
back issues, which caused stress, anxiety, and pain due to being forced to
stand facing the wall while handcuffed during the 3 times a week that they
searched my cell (Mon., Wed. & Fri.) knowing I could barely walk due to
the sciatic nerve damage that was caused by [Officer] Fenner. I was also
sometimes made to shower with shackles on. [Captain] Hurlock is
responsible because it is his policy of cruel and unusual punishment [and]
denial of due process; during the time I was forced to stay on TSL, I was
forced to endure unreasonable searches and never a seizure.^
{Id. at 3-4(paragraph numbers omitted).)
III. DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSAL
A.
Lack of Jurisdiction
Defendants first argue that Robinson has failed to meet his burden to establish that
the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims because he "fails to include any
specific references to federal laws or constitutional amendments he claims were violatedby the Defendants' actions." (Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 5,ECF No. 51.) Specifically,
Defendants argue that instead of including "references to discrete constitutional
violations," Robinson "uses commonplace buzzwords like violation of due process.
^ To the extent that Robinson intended his passing reference to "endur[ing] unreasonable
searches and never a seizure,"(Compl. 4), to constitute a separate Fourth Amendment claim,
such a claim fails because the Supreme Court has previously held that "the Fourth Amendment
has no applicability to a prison cell." Hudson v. Palmer,468 U.S. 517,536(1984).
excessive force, false arrest, excessive force, and cruel and unusual punishment, etc.," all
of which relate to "alleged wrongs [that] could be brought under the Virginia
Constitution and are not exclusive to federal law." {Id. at 4.)
However, while stopping short of advocacy, the Court must be solicitous ofpro se
civil rights actions. Gordon v. Leeke, 51A F.2d 1147, 1152-53 (4th Cir. 1978). Here, as
Defendants concede, Robinson uses "buzzwords" in his Complaint that relate to claims
that can be brought under the United States Constitution, and as such, can establish
federal question jurisdiction. {See Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 4); cf. Holloway v. Pagan
River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.Sd 448,452(4th Cir. 2012)("The failure to state the
elements of a federal claim can form the basis for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion 'only when the
claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of[the Supreme]
Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.'"
(citations omitted)(some internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, when Robinson
filed his original complaint, he indicated that he was filing this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. {See ECF No. 1, at 1.) Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint for lack ofjurisdiction will be denied.
B.
Failure to State a Claim
1.
Claim One (a),(b), and (c)
a.
Claim One(a)
In Claim One (a), Robinson contends that while he was a pretrial detainee. Officer
Fenner assaulted him and used excessive force. (Compl. 1.) Allegations of excessive
force against a pretrial detainee must be evaluated under the Due Process Clause ofthe
7
Fourteenth Amendment. See Goodman v. Barber, 539 P. App'x 87, 89(4th Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted). Under the Fourteenth Amendment standard, a plaintiff must show that
the defendant "inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering upon the detainee."
Carr v. Deeds,453 F.3d 593,605 (4th Cir. 2006)(citations omitted)(internal quotation
marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34(2010). A
detainee may prevail by "providing only objective evidence that the challenged
governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate govemmental objective or
that it is excessive in relation to that purpose." Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466,
2473-74(2015)(citations omitted).'' Factors a court may consider to determine whether
force was objectively unreasonable may include
the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of
force used; the extent of [the detainee's] injury; any effort made by the
officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security
problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and
whether the [detainee] was actively resisting.
Id. at 2473 (citing Graham v. Connor,490 U.S. 386, 396(1989)). Because "officers
facing disturbances 'are often forced to make split-second judgments'.... a court must
judge the reasonableness of the force used from the perspective and with the knowledge
ofthe defendant officer." Id. at 2474 (citing Graham,490 U.S. at 397). The Court must
recognize that "agents ofthe state are permitted to exercise a certain degree offorce in
order to protect the interests of society." Sawyer v. Asbury, 537 F. App'x 283,294(4th
^ In Kingsley, the Supreme Court determined that the appropriate standard for the Fourteenth
Amendment is "only that the officers' use of that force was objectively unreasonable," not that
"the officers were subjectively aware that their use offorce was unreasonable
" 135 S. Ct.
at 2470.
8
Cir. 2013)(o^oimg Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382(4th Cir. 1987), vacated on
other grounds by 490 U.S. 1087(1989)). Thus, not every "push or shove, even if it may
later seem unnecessary" is serious enough to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442,447(4th Cir. 2008)(quoting Graham,490 U.S. at 396),
abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins, 559 U.S. 34.
Consequently, the Court "must accord due deference to an officer's efforts to
restrain a detainee when faced with a dynamic and potentially violent situation;
otherwise,'we would give encouragement to insubordination in an environment which is
already volatile enough.'" Scarbro v. New Hanover Cty., 374 F. App'x 366, 370(4th Cir.
2010)(quoting Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692,696(4th Cir. 1999)). In addition, the
determination of whether an officer used excessive force must be made "from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the
time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473.
Here, Robinson alleges, that "Officer J. Fenner assaulted [him] causing injury to
[his] person while [he] was inside of[his] cell awaiting trial." (Compl. 1.) Robinson
contends that the assault "caus[ed] sciatic nerve damage." {Id. at 3.) Defendants argue .
that dismissal of this claim is warranted because "[Robinson] does not explain why he
was assaulted or how it took place," and because "[n]o explanation is given, or facts
provided as to how one might draw the conclusion ofinference that [Officer] Fenner's
use offorce was excessive." (Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 8-9.) However, although
Robinson's allegations lack precision, at this stage, Robinson has pled sufficient facts to
plausibly suggest that Officer Fenner used force against him while he was in his cell,
9
which "caus[ed] sciatic nerve damage," and that such actions constituted excessive
force.^ See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473-74. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss will be
denied with respect to Claim One (a).
b.
Claim One(b)and (c)
In Claim One (b), Robinson alleges, in sum,that after the incident with Officer
Fenner that occurred in his cell,(the allegations of which are set forth in Claim One (a)).
Officer Fenner "falsely arrested [him]." (Compl. 1.) Relatedly, in Claim One (c),
Robinson alleges, in sum, that Officer Fenner "maliciously made false statements causing
[Robinson] to be false[ly] imprisoned inside of the jail on TSL,"(id), which Robinson
indicates is a "higher security level." (Id. at 3.)
However,"a false disciplinary charge cannot serve as the basis for a constitutional
claim." Cole v. Holloway,631 F. App'x 185, 186 (4th Cir. 2016)(c\\\ng Freeman v.
Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986)). Although "there are exceptions to this rule,"
Robinson's cursory and conclusory allegations fail to plausibly suggest that any such
exception applies here. See id. (citing Surprenant v. Rivas,424 F.3d 5, 13-14(1st Cir.
2005); Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450,452(8th Cir. 1989)). Therefore, with respect
to claims of false arrest and false imprisonment,"[a] prisoner does not have a
constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely accused" of a disciplinary
charge. See Carlton v. Jackson Cty. Ct., No. 88-2255, 1989 WL 56525, at *1 (6th Cir.
^ The Court notes that Robinson's prior submissions indicate that the attack on his person was
unprovoked. Cf. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,94(2007)(observing that the petitioner
"bolstered his claim by making more specific allegations in documents attached to the complaint
and in later filings").
10
May 31, 1989)(citing Freeman,808 F.2d at 951; Baker v. McCollan,443 U.S. 137, 146
(1979)). Instead,"the Constitution merely guarantees that prison inmates will 'not... be
deprived of a protected liberty interest without due process of law.'" Franco v. Kelly,
854 F.2d 584, 587(2d Cir. 1988)(alteration in original)(citation omitted)("[T]he key
inquiry in assessing an allegation that an inmate has been found guilty offalse
disciplinary charges is whether or not the prison has provided the inmate with the
minimum procedural due process protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment."). As discussed below, Robinson fails to allege any facts to plausibly
suggest that Defendants violated his right to due process. See infra Part III.B.2-3.
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted with respect to Claim One(b)
and (c). Claim One(b)and (c) will be dismissed without prejudice.
2.
Claim One(d)
In Claim One (d), Robinson contends, in sum,that Officer Fenner "punished [him]
for being assaulted all without due process." (Compl. 1.)
"Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished." Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 n.l6(1979);
Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870(4th Cir. 1988).
However,"not every inconvenience encountered during pretrial detention amounts to
'punishment' in the constitutional sense." Martin, 849 F.2d at 870 (citation omitted).
Here, Robinson wholly fails to allege any facts describing how Officer Fenner
"punished" him and how he was denied "due process." {See Compl. 1); see also Bell Atl
Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Robinson's cursory and conclusory
allegations fail to state a plausible due process claim against Officer Fenner. Cf
11
Richardson v. Ray,492 F. App'x 395, 396(4th Cir. 2012)(concluding that a prisoner
•
failed to state a claim for relief with respect to a false disciplinary charges when the
prisoner "provide[d] no details ofthe [disciplinary] hearing,[did] not assert that it was
not conducted in accordance with due process, and [did] not state whether he appealed").
But see Moore v. Plaster, 266 F.3d 928,931 (8th Cir. 2001)("[Courts] have long
recognized an inmate's cause of action for retaliatory discipline under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
where a prison official files disciplinary charges in retaliation for the inmate's exercise of
his [or her] constitutional rights."(emphasis added)(citation omitted)).
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted with respect to Claim One (d).
Claim One(d) will be dismissed without prejudice.
3.
Claim Two and Claim Three(a)
In Claim Two, Robinson alleges that Lieutenant Hansen "denied [Robinson] due
process [by] not investigating [Robinson's] description of the events which were true
enough that [he] was found not guilty of assault." (Compl. 1.) In Claim Three (a),
Robinson alleges that Captain Hurlock violated his right to due process when Captain
Hurlock "had [Robinson] placed on TSL from the time ofthe incident 8-30-17 to 1-1118." {Id. at 2.)
The Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const,
amend. XIV. "To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must(1)identify a
protected liberty or property interest and (2)demonstrate deprivation ofthat interest
without due process of law." Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248(4th Cir. 2015). A
12
liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, or from state or federal laws and
policies. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005)(citations omitted).
"[P]retrial detainees have not been convicted of the crimes with which they are
charged," and "[f]or that reason, the [United States] Supreme Court held in Bell v.
Wolfish, they retain a liberty interest in freedom from 'punishment,' even while they are
detained to ensure their presence at trial." Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 251 (4th
Cir. 2016)(quoting 5e// v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37(1979)). Specifically, pretrial.
detainees are "entitled under Bell to procedural due process in connection with any
'punishment' imposed on [them] by the Detention Facility." Id. at 252. In "the prison
discipline context," the "core component of due process ... is the right to a hearing." Id.
at 254. Further, an inmate charged with a disciplinary violation is entitled to notice of the
charges prior to the hearing, and a "written report describing the disciplinary findings
made as a result ofthe hearing." Id. at 253-54.
Here, Robinson contends that Lieutenant Hansen "denied [Robinson] due process
[by] not investigating [Robinson's] description of events," by "only accept[ing] Officer
Fenner's story," and by "[telling][Robinson] that he would not reopen the investigation
[and] consider[ed] this matter closed." (Compl. 1.) Robinson contends that Captain
Hurlock violated Robinson's right to due process when he "had [Robinson] placed on
TSL from the time of the incident 8-30-17 to 1-11-18." {Id. at 2.)
As an initial matter, Robinson fails to allege any facts identifying in which context
Lieutenant Hansen failed to investigate Robinson's "description of events" and "only
accept[ed] Officer Fenner's story." (Compl. 1.) Further, besides Robinson's cursory and
13
conclusory allegations that Captain Hurlock violated Robinson's right to due process
when he "had [Robinson] placed on TSL," Robinson wholly fails to allege any facts to
indicate how Captain Hurlock violated his right to due process. {See id. at 2); see
also Beaudett v. City ofHampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)(discussing that
"[pjrinciples requiring generous construction ofpro se complaints are not, however,
without limits").
Nevertheless, from Robinson's cursory and conclusory allegations, as best as the
Court can discern, Robinson appears to allege that, in the prison discipline context.
Lieutenant Hansen failed to properly investigate the incident between Robinson and
Officer Fenner, and Captain Hurlock improperly "placed [Robinson] on TSL," which is a
higher security level. {See Compl. 1-2, 3.) As noted above, in the prison discipline
context,"the minimal requirement" of due process afforded to a pretrial detainees is
notice ofthe charges, a hearing, and a written report describing the findings after the
hearing. Dilworth, 841 F.3d at 253-54 (citations omitted). However, with respect to the
due process required at such hearings,''Wolff{v. McDonnell,418 U.S. 539(1974),] does
not contemplate 'full adversary proceedings,' and prison officials retain the discretion to
'keep [a] hearing within reasonable limits' in an effort to avoid disruption and threats to
safety." Id. at 254(second alteration in original)(citations omitted). For example,
"prison officials need not permit an inmate to cross-examine witnesses against him, nor
allow an inmate to call witnesses who would 'create a risk of reprisal or undermine
authority'; and inmates do not possess the right to retained or appointed counsel." Id.
(citations omitted).
14
Although it is clear that Robinson disagreed with the actions taken by Lieutenant
Hansen and Captain Hurlock, Robinson fails to allege any facts to plausibly suggest that
he did not receive the required due process with respect to his placement "on TSL" or
that his due process rights were violated in any manner. {See CompL 1); see
also Dilworth, 841 F.3d at 254 (citations omitted). Furthermore, contrary to Robinson's
assertions, he was not entitled to the investigation of his choosing nor the re-opening of
the matter after the investigation concluded. Cf. Dilworth, 841 F.3d at 254 (citations
omitted)(discussing the prison officials retain the discretion to "keep [a] hearing within
reasonable limits"). Thus, for these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted with
respect to Claims Two and Three (a). Claims Two and Three(a) will be dismissed
without prejudice.
4.
Claim Three(b)
In Claim Three (b), Robinson alleges that Captain Hurlock violated his right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment when Captain Hurlock "had [Robinson] placed
on TSL from the time of the incident 8-30-17 to 1-11-18," the date on which "[a]ll state
charges were dropped." (Compl. 2.) Robinson also alleges, inter alia, that during his
placement on TSL, he "had to be handcuffed and shackled to leave [his] cell,""was
forced at times to wear shackles while showering,""was only allowed recreation every 3
or 4 days,""sometimes [went] for 1 week or more without a shower or recreation" and
"[e]ven though [he] was injured and used a wheelchair at times,[he] was still made to
wear shackles at times." {Id.)
15
As noted above,"[d]ue process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished."
Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n.l6. "An individual pretrial detainee may raise a substantive due
process challenge to [the] conditions [of his or her confinement] where they are so
disproportionate or arbitrary that they are not related to legitimate penological objectives
and amount to punishment." Tate v. Parks, No. 19-6260, 2019 WL 5885038, at *1 (4th
Cir. Nov. 19, 2019)(citing Williamson v Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 174-76(4th Cir. 2018)).
To state such a claim, Robinson must allege sufficient facts to plausibly indicate •
that "the challenged conditions were either '(1)imposed with an expressed intent to
punish or(2)not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective,
in which case an intent to punish may be inferred.'" Williamson, 912F.3datl78
(quoting Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg'l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 251 (4th Cir. 2005)). "In
evaluating whether there is an intent to punish, a court may not simply accept the
defendant's justification for placing a detainee in administrative segregation but must
'meaningfully consider whether the conditions of confinement were reasonably related to
the stated objective, or whether they were excessive in relation thereto.'" Tate, 2019 WL
5885038, at *2(citing Williamson, 912 F.3d at 178).
Defendants contend that dismissal of this claim is warranted, arguing that
"[sjimply because [Robinson][had] to live by the rules of a particular housing
classification does not mean he is being punished." (Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 10.)
Further, Defendants argue that "Robinson does not allege he contested his security
classification or that he was denied review of it." {Id.)
16
However, although Robinson's allegations lack precision, at this stage, Robinson
has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that the conditions of his confinement
while on TSL were "not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental
objective." Williamson, 912 F.3d at 178 (citation omitted). Specifically, Robinson
identifies a number of specific conditions of his confinement, which he contends were
imposed on him from the date of the incident between Robinson and Officer Fenner,
which he identifies as August 30, 2017, to January 11, 2018, the date on which he
indicates the related state charges were dropped, and Defendants do not specifically
address this claim regarding the conditions of Robinson's confinement while he was on
TSL. Accordingly, for these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss will be denied with respect
to Claim Three (b).
IV. CONCLUSION
The Motion to Dismiss(ECF No. 50) will be granted in part and denied in part.
Claim One (b),(c), and (d), and Claim Three(a) will be dismissed without prejudice.
The claims against Lieutenant Hansen, which are set forth in Claim Two, will be
dismissed without prejudice. The action will proceed on Claim One(a) against Officer
Fenner and Claim Three(b)against Captain Hurlock. Any party wishing to file a
dispositive motion must do so within sixty (60) days of the date of entry hereof.
An appropriate Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Is/
HENRY E. HUDSON
Date:
ll ioZ o
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Richmond^ Virginia
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?