Jenkins v. State Of Virginia et al
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 12/28/2018. (Copy mailed to Plaintiff) (smej, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
DARYL JENKINS,
Plaintiff,
V.
Civil Action No. 3:18CV203
STATE OF VIRGINIA, ^ al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Daryl Jenkins, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in
forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.^
proceeds
No. 16).
on
the
PARTICULARIZED
COMPLAINT.
The action
(^^Complaint,"
EOF
The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
I.
PRELIMINARY REVIEW
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
C'PLRA") this
Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court
determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state a
^ The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute . . .
of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
injured in an action at law . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
party
claim on which relief may be granted."
see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2);
The first standard includes claims based
upon ^^an indisputably meritless legal theory, or claims where the
"
""factual contentions are clearly baseless."
Clay v. Yates, 809 F.
Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S.
319,
327
(1989)).
The
second
standard
is
the
familiar
standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
""A
motion
sufficiency
of
to
a
dismiss
complaint;
under
Rule
importantly,
12(b)(6)
it
does
tests
not
the
resolve
contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses."
Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin,
980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)).
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a plaintiff s well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the
complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993);
see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952.
This principle applies only to
factual allegations, however, and ""a court considering a motion to
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because
they
are
no
more
than
conclusions,
are
not
entitled
to
the
assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ""require[ ] only "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,' in order to ^give the defendant fair notice
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.
'"
Bell
Atl.
Corp.
v.
Twombly,
550 U.S.
544,
555
(2007)
(second
alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)).
containing
Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints
only
^^labels
and
conclusions"
or
recitation of the elements of a cause of action."
omitted).
a
^^formulaic
Id. (citations
Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id. (citation
omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at
570, rather than merely "conceivable."
Id.
"A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556).
In order for a claim or
complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the
plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements
of [his or] her claim."
Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324
F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.,
309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); lodice v. United States, 289
F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)).
Lastly, while the Court liberally
construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151
(4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua
sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate
failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint.
V.
Carroll,
107
F.3d
241,
243
(4th
Cir.
1997)
See Brock
(Luttig,
J.,
concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th
Cir. 1985).
II.
ALLEGATIONS
In his Complaint, Jenkins argues that his First, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth,
Ninth,
and
Fourteenth
Amendment
were
violated
(Compl. 1.)^
during his state criminal proceedings.
rights
Jenkins
identifies Mark Herring, the Attorney General of Virginia, as the
Defendant.
(Id.)
Jenkins contends that:
My rights were violated by the Commonwealth of
Virginia by denying my 6th Amendment right to due
process. I was not properly informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against me.
I was denied my
right to counsel and deprived of my life and liberty.
A. I
had cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted
upon me by the court going out of [the] sentencing
guidelines and over the jury recommended sentence (8th
Amendment right violated). . . .
B.
My
14th
Amendment
right
to
due
process
was
violated by me being removed from the courtroom and the
trial continuing without my presence (6th Amendment
right violated). . . .
C. Prosecuted quasi in rem instead of as a (natural
person 28 U.S.C. [§] 1391) violating my 1st, 5th, 6th,
9th, and 14th Amendment rights. . . .
2 The Court employs the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF
docketing system to Jenkins's submissions. The Court corrects the
spelling, punctuation, and capitalization in the quotations from
Jenkins's submissions.
(Id.)
Jenkins argues that ^^Mark Herring is liable because he is
the Virginia Attorney General."
(Id. at 2.)
Jenkins asks for a
^^declaration that the acts and omissions described herein violate
his rights," and monetary damages.
(Id. at 3.)
III. ANALYSIS
It is both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an
extended discussion of Jenkins's terse theories for relief.
See
Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing
that ^^abbreviated treatment" is consistent with Congress's vision
for the disposition of frivolous or ^'insubstantial claims" (citing
Neitzke
v.
Williams,
490
U.S.
319,
324
(1989))).
Jenkins's
Complaint will be dismissed for failing to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and as legally frivolous.
A.
"[A]
No Personal Involvement
plaintiff
must
plead
that
each
Government-official
defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution."
(2009).
Accordingly,
the
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
plaintiff
must
allege
facts
that
affirmatively show "that the official charged acted personally in
the deprivation of the plaintiff['s] rights.
Vinnedge v. Gibbs,
550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted). "Where a complaint alleges no specific
act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is
silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the
caption,
the
complaint
is
properly
dismissed,
even
liberal construction to be given pro se complaints."
under
the
Potter v.
Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing Brzozowski v.
Randall, 281 F. Supp. 306, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1968)).
Jenkins fails to state a claim against Defendant Herring.
Jenkins merely describes Defendant Herring's title and fails to
allege any facts suggesting that Defendant Herring had any direct
involvement
or
personal
responsibility
Jenkins's constitutional rights.
in
the
deprivation
of
For that reason alone, Jenkins's
claims against Defendant Herring will be dismissed as frivolous.
B.
Jenkins's Claims Are Barred by Heck
Jenkins argues, in sum, that his constitutional rights were
violated because
[he] was not properly informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against [him],"
[he] was denied [his]
right to counsel and deprived of [his] life and liberty," ^^the
court [went] out of [the] sentencing guidelines and over the jury
recommended sentence," he was ''removed from the courtroom and the
trial
continu[ed]
without
[his]
presence,"
and
he
was
"[p]rosecuted quasi in rem instead of as a (natural person 28
U.S.C. [§] 1391)." (Compl. 1.)
Jenkins seeks a "declaration that
the acts and omissions described herein violate his rights," and
monetary damages.
(Id. at 3.)
While
not
well-articulated,
Jenkins
clearly
seeks
the
invalidation or vacation of his criminal conviction and sentence.
The
notion
that
Jenkins
may
seek,
through
a
civil
suit,
the
vacation or alteration of his criminal convictions and sentence,
"is legally frivolous in light of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994), and related cases."
Payne v. Virginia, No. 3:07CV337,
2008 WL 1766665, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 17, 2008).
In Heck, the Supreme Court emphasized that civil tort actions
are "not appropriate vehicles for challenging the
outstanding criminal judgments."
validity of
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486.
The
Supreme Court then held that:
[I]n
order
unconstitutional
to
recover damages for
allegedly
conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render
a
conviction
or
sentence
invalid,
a
[civil
rights] plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Id. at 486-87 (internal footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court then
required that "when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983
suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction
or
sentence;
if
it
would,
the
complaint
must
be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction
or sentence has already been invalidated."
Id. at 487.
In Edwards v. Balisoky
the Supreme Court extended Heck to
civil rights actions that do not directly challenge confinement,
but instead contest procedures which necessarily imply unlawful
confinement.
See 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997).
The Supreme Court has
explained that Heck and its progeny teach that:
[A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred
(absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought
(damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of
the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction
or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that
action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of
confinement or its duration.
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
In his terse allegations, Jenkins vaguely suggests that he
was improperly prosecuted "quasi in rem instead of as a (natural
person 28 U.S.C. [§] 1391)."
(Compl. 1.)
He also contends that
during his criminal proceedings, his right to due process was
violated because, inter alia, "[he] was not properly informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against [him]" and he was
"removed from the courtroom [with] the trial continuing without
[his] presence."
(Id.)
Jenkins also argues that his resulting
sentence constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" because the
sentence was "out of [the] sentencing guidelines and over the jury
recommended sentence."
(Id.)
Jenkins requests a "jury trial on
all issues triable by jury," and seeks declaratory and monetary
relief.
(Id. at 3.)
Jenkins does not articulate, and the Court
does not discern, how he could both prevail on such claims and not
simultaneously
Edwards,
520
invalidate
U.S.
at
the
648;
fact
Heck,
512
of
his
U.S.
confinement.
at
481-90;
See
see
also
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (holding that when
''the
relief [a
prisoner] seeks is a
determination that he is
entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from [custody],
his sole federal remedy is the writ of habeas corpus").
Because success on
his claims necessarily implies invalid
confinement, under the second prong of the Heck analysis, Jenkins
must demonstrate a successful challenge to his current conviction.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
Jenkins makes no allegation that the state
court has invalidated his current convictions or sentence.
486-87.
JA. at
Thus, Heck also bars Jenkins's claims.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the action will be dismissed as
frivolous
and
§ 1915(e)(2).
for
failure
to
state
a
claim
under
28
U.S.C.
The Clerk will be directed to note the disposition
of the action for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
The Clerk is directed to send a copy of the Memorandum Opinion
to Jenkins.
It is so ORDERED.
/s/
Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge
: Se^cci/vbM,Ii,
Richmond, Virginia ^
Date
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