Brown v. United States Department of Justice et al
Filing
3
MEMORANDUM OPINION. SEE OPINION for complete details. Signed by District Judge John A. Gibney, Jr on 06/12/2018. Copy of Memorandum Opinion mailed to Plaintiff. (ccol, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
MILTON BROWN,
aka SULTAN IMMANUEL-EL-BEY
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 3:18CV349
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Milton Brown, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and requesting to proceed in forma
pauperis, filed this civil action. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Brown's request
to proceed informa pauperis, file the action, and dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 191 SA as frivolous and malicious.
I. PRELIMINARY REVIEW
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any
action filed by an individual proceeding in forma pauperis if the Court determines the action "is
frivolous or malicious."
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
The first
standard includes claims based upon "an indisputably meritless legal theory," or claims where
the "factual contentions are clearly baseless." Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417,427 (E.D. Va.
1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). With respect to second standard,
this Court has observed that:
A litigant may be deemed to act maliciously if his actions [i]mport a wish
to vex, annoy, or injure another, or an intent to do a wrongful act, and may consist
in direct intention to injure, or in reckless disregard of another's rights.
Therefore, the court must assess the character of the allegations insofar as they
indicate a motive on the part of the plaintiff to merely harass or vex the
defendants rather than to seek redress for a legitimate legal claim.
Cain v. Virginia, 982 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D. Va. 1997) (alteration in original) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). Further, "[t]he courts have long recognized that inmate complaints
against state officials are a particularly fertile arena for frivolous and malicious litigation." Id.
(citing Daye v. Bounds, 509 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir. 1975)).
This is true, in part, because
incarcerated litigants "possess both time and dissatisfactions in abundance." Cochran v. Morris,
73 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1996). Further, in assessing whether an action is frivolous or
malicious, the Court is informed by a plaintiffs past litigious conduct and the tone of his or her
current allegations. Id.
II. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS AND BROWN'S OTHER LITIGATION
Brown claims that "MILTON BROWN is my private property and trust pursuant to Title
28 U.S.C. Section 3002 which I own." (ECF No. 1, at 1.) 1 The limited factual allegations in
Brown's complaint assert that Sergeant Cassells conspired with others to "kidnap[]" Brown.
(Id) Brown contends that he is now being held for ransom at the Hampton Roads Regional Jail.
(Id.) Brown asserts that such actions violate, inter alia, a host of federal criminal statutes,
(including provisions that criminalize threatening the President, 18 U.S.C. § 871, and prohibit
violence against maritime fixed platforms, 28 U.S.C. § 2281), "the Treaty of Peace & Friendship
1787," and "the Clock of Destiny/Zodiac Constitution." (Id)
Elsewhere in his Complaint,
Brown makes a variety of references which indicate that he subscribes to the Moorish American
ideology. (Id) Brown demands billions of dollars in damages. (Id)
Other records before the Court reflect that Brown has not been kidnapped and held for
ransom. Rather, Brown is currently serving a sentence of three years and six months imposed by
1
The Court corrects the capitalization in the quotations from Brown's submissions.
2
the Circuit Court for the City of Newport News. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2,
Brown v. Virginia, 3:18CV136 (E.D. Va. filed Feb. 28, 2018). In his Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Brown once again characterizes his detention as a form of "kidnapping." Id
Brown also contends that his detention is illegal based on his status as a Moorish American. Id.
at 6. Further, since February 28, 2018, Brown has filed nearly thirty actions with the Court. In
those cases, Brown advances demands for relief based on his status as a Moorish American.
III. ANALYSIS
It is both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended discussion of the utter
lack of merit of Brown's theories for relief. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir.
1996) (emphasizing that "abbreviated treatment" is consistent with Congress's vision for the
disposition of frivolous or "insubstantial claims" (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324
(1989))).
"[l]t is well-recognized that ... the Moorish American Nation ... [is a] notorious
organization[] of scofflaws and ne'er-do-wells who attempt to benefit from the protections of
federal and state law while simultaneously proclaiming their independence from and total lack of
responsibility under those same laws." Metaphyzic El-Ectromagnetic Supreme-El v. Dir., Dep 't
of Corr., No. 3:14CV52, 2015 WL 1138246, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2015) (alterations in
original) (quoting Abdullah, v. New Jersey, No. 12-4202 (RBK), 2012 WL 2916738, at *5
(D.N.J. July 16, 2012)). Neither the Zodiac Constitution, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, nor
any of Brown's other silly theories provide a viable basis for relief.
See id at *6.
"Notwithstanding [Brown's] personal subscription to the Zodiac Constitution ... and his belief
that the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Morocco and the United States ... deprive the
state courts of jurisdiction over him, courts have soundly rejected these claims." Id; see El
Ameen Bey v. Stumpf, 825 F. Supp. 2d 537, 558 (D.N.J. 2011) ("[A] litigant's reliance on any
3
Barbary Treaty, including on the Treaty with Morocco, for the purposes of a civil suit raising
claims based on the events that occurred within what is the United States' geographical territory
is facially frivolous.''); Jones-El v. South Carolina, No. 5:13-cv-01851-JMC, 2014 WL
958302, at *8 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2014) (rejecting habeas claims under the Zodiac Constitution
and Treaty of Peace and Friendship as "completely frivolous, whether raised under § 2254,
§ 2241, or by way of civil complaint''). Accordingly, the Court finds the action is subject to
dismissal as frivolous.
Additionally, the Court finds the action is subject to dismissal as malicious. Brown
demands billions of dollars of damages against Sergeant Cassells, who apparently arrested
Brown. Brown provides no coherent explanation for this outlandish demand. Under similar
circumstances, courts have observed:
when there is no recital of credible probative facts that support the allegations that
the plaintiff is attempting to make, the Plaintiff sues those involved in securing his
incarceration, and the tone of all the Plaintiffs allegations indicates that he is
bringing his suit merely to satisfy his desire for vengeance against the Defendants
and not to rectify any wrong done to him, then the suit is a MALICIOUS one.
Cain v. Virginia, 982 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D. Va. 1997) (quoting Spencer v Rhodes, 656 F.
Supp. 458, 463--64 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 1987)). Brown has filed dozens of suits of this ilk in
recent months. The sum of all of this compels the conclusion that Brown filed the present action
"to merely harass or vex the defendants rather than to seek redress for a legitimate legal claim."
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
4
IV. CONCLUSION
Brown's request to proceed in forma pauperis will be GRANTED. The action will be
FILED. The action will be DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS and MALICIOUS.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: 6{ l i,.{ Lt
Richmond, Vir!inia
Isl
John A. Gibney, Jr.
United States District Juclg
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?