Seaman v. IAC/Interactivecorp, Inc. et al

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 4/3/2019. (jsmi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

DAVID SEAMAN,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-401

v.

IAC/INTERACTIVECORP, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on the MOTION TO DISMISS BY
DEFENDANTS IAC/INTERACTIVECORP AND THE DAILY BEAST COMPANY LLC FOR
IMPROPER VENUE AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (ECF No. 13) and the
DEFENDANTS'

MOTION

following reasons,

TO

TRANSFER

VENUE

(ECF

No.

21).

the Court will grant DEFENDANTS'

For

the

MOTION TO

TRANSFER VENUE (ECF No. 21) and the case will be transferred to
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York

("SONY").

The Court will deny the MOTION TO DISMISS BY

DEFENDANTS IAC/INTERACTIVECORP AND THE DAILY BEAST COMPANY LLC FOR
IMPROPER VENUE AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (ECF No. 13) as it
pertains to improper venue as moot, and leave consideration of the
MOTION TO DISMISS BY DEFENDANTS IAC/INTERACTIVECORP AND THE DAILY
BEAST COMPANY LLC FOR IMPROPER VENUE AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
(ECF No. 13) as it pertains to failure to state a claim to the
SONY.

BACKGROUND

David

Seaman

("Seaman")

filed

this

action

against

IAC/InterActiveCorp, Inc. ("IAC") and The Daily Beast Company, LLC
("Daily Beast"}

(hereinafter referred to as

"the Defendants"}

alleging defamation per se (Count I}, insulting words (Count II},
unauthorized use of name and picture in violation of Va. Code§
8.01-40

(Count III},

generally Compl.

and permanent injunction

(ECF No. 1}; id.

CJ[CJ[

(Count IV}. 1 See

23-43. Seaman's claims arise

out of an article published by the Daily Beast on March 24, 2017.
I .

Factual Background

IAC is a public \\e-commerce media company" incorporated in
Delaware with its principal place of business in New York. 2 Id.

CJ[

2. The Daily Beast, an online news and entertainment source, is a
limited

liability

\\headquarters"

in

company
New

organized

York,

West

under

Delaware

Hollywood,

the

law

with

District

of

1

Originally, Seaman also sued Jennings Brown ("Brown"}, a citizen
of New York, and the author of the article in question. Compl. CJ[
4. However, on December 28, 2018, Seaman voluntarily filed a NOTICE
OF DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT, JENNINGS BROWN, ONLY
(ECF No. 18) . All claims against Brown were dismissed without
prejudice.
Seaman alleges that IAC is '\certified and registered to transact
business in Virginia," \'derives substantial revenues from the
business it transacts in Virginia," and "maintains a registered
agent in Glen Allen, Virginia." Compl. CJ[ 2. IAC does not deny these
allegations.
2

2

Columbia, and Chicago. Id.

'jJ:

3. "IAC is the sole member of the

Daily Beast." Id.
Seaman is a 32-year-old resident of the District of Columbia.
Id.

1.

He alleges

that

reporter,

researcher,

pundit,

'jJ:

he

is

a

"journalist,

author

investigative

and publisher"

who

"has

reported on matters of great public concern, including #pedogate 3
- child sex trafficking, ritualistic murder, torture, kidnapping,
rape,

child sex slavery,

and the global network of child sex

traffickers and pedophile rings for rich and powerful people in
the

elite

ruling

classes,

Hollywood

and

the

entertainment

industry." Id. Because of his reporting, he alleges that he has
been censored by online entities such as YouTube and "attacked by
left-wing media giants, such as IAC/Daily Beast." Id.
Seaman's claims against the Defendants arise out of an article
written by Jennings Brown and published in the Daily Beast on March
24, 2017. Id.

'jJ:

11; ECF No. 14, Ex. A (article). That article,

titled "The Self-Proclaimed 'Publicity Whore' and Fired Jezebel
Intern Running Point on Pizzagate," allegedly contained false and
defamatory

statements

Pizzagate/Pedogate.

Compl.

about
'jJ:'jJ:

role

in

Seaman characterizes

the

and

Seaman
11-12.

article as a "hit piece" against him, id.

'jJ:

his

16, and alleges that

it was shared and republished by the Daily Beast and others on the

3

"Pedogate" is also referred to as "Pizzagate." See, e.g., Compl.
i 9, 12.
3

Internet. Id.
alleges,
protect

"was
the

':l[':I[

to

13-18. The "sole purpose" of the article, Seaman
further

Clintons,

Defendants'

John

predetermined agenda:

Podesta,

Tony

Podesta

suspected of child sex trafficking and pedophilia,

and

to

others

to discredit

David, and to distract from the important mission of investigating
and exposing #pedogate." Id. ':I[ 20.
Seaman alleges that IAC and the Daily Beast are subject to
both general and specific personal jurisdiction in Virginia.
':I[

Id.

7. The Defendants do not deny that they are subject to personal

jurisdiction in Virginia.

II.

Procedural Background

In

June

2018,

Seaman

filed

the

COMPLAINT

against

the

Defendants (and against Jennings Brown), assertingdefamation per
se,

insulting words,

unauthorized

use

of name

and picture

violation of Va. Code§ 8.01-40, and permanent injunction.
Compl.

':1[':I[

in
See

23-43 (ECF No. 1). Thereafter, the Defendants filed the

MOTION TO DISMISS BY DEFENDANTS IAC/INTERACTIVECORP AND THE DAILY
BEAST COMPANY LLC FOR IMPROPER VENUE AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
(ECF No.

13) .

On the same day that he filed his MEMORANDUM IN

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 19), Seaman
also filed his NOTICE OF DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT,
JENNINGS BROWN, ONLY (ECF No. 18).
Because Seaman's dismissal of Brown appeared to correct the
venue

issue,

see

ECF No.

20

at
4

2,

the

Defendants

then

filed

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE (ECF No. 21) in which they
seek a

transfer to

the United States

District Court

for

the

Southern District of New York ("SONY"). ECF No. 21 at 1. Seaman
opposes both motions. See generally ECF Nos. 19, 23.
Both motions have been fully briefed and the matter is ripe
for decision.
DISCUSSION

For the reasons set forth below,

the Court concludes that

this case has insufficient connection to Virginia or the Eastern
District of Virginia ( "EDVA") to warrant continuation of the action
here, and that it is appropriate to transfer the case to the SONY.
Accordingly, the DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE (ECF No. 21)
will be granted. Further, as set forth below, the MOTION TO DISMISS
BY DEFENDANTS IAC/INTERACTIVECORP AND THE DAILY BEAST COMPANY LLC
FOR IMPROPER VENUE AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (ECF No. 13) will
be denied,

as moot,

proper venue.

insofar as it seeks dismissal for lack of

The challenge to the Complaint under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b) (6) should be decided by the transferee court.
I.

MOTION TO DISMISS BY DEFENDANTS IAC/INTERACTIVECORP AND THE
DAILY BEAST COMPANY LLC FOR IMPROPER VENUE AND FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM (ECF NO. 13)

Before proceeding to the DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
(ECF No. 21), the Court briefly addresses the MOTION TO DISMISS BY
DEFENDANTS IAC/INTERACTIVECORP AND THE DAILY BEAST COMPANY LLC FOR
IMPROPER VENUE AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (ECF No. 13).
5

In that

motion,

the

Defendants

argue

that

venue

is

improper

in

this

district because: (1) "not all defendants reside in Virginia";

(2)

a "substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the
claim"

did

not

occur

in

the

Eastern

District

of

Virginia

or

Richmond division; and (3) the catch-all venue provision does not
apply because venue is proper elsewhere.
U.S.C.

§

The

ECF No. 14 at 9-10; 28

1391(b) (1)-(3).
Complaint,

as

originally

filed,

presented

a

serious

question as to whether the EDVA is a proper venue for Seaman's
action.

In the face of the Defendants' arguments, Seaman dismissed

Jennings Brown as a defendant in the action. See ECF No. 18. Now,
as both parties agree, venue in this district is proper under 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1) because both IAC and the Daily Beast "reside"
in Virginia.
[their]

Entities "with the capacity to sue and be sued in

common

name(s]

under

applicable

law,

whether

or

not

incorporated . . . reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district
in

which

such

defendant

is

subject

to

the

court's

personal

jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question." 28
U.S.C.

§

1391(c) (2).

IAC and the Daily Beast have not raised a

personal jurisdiction challenge, 4 see ECF No. 24 at 5 n.5 (noting

4

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (1), a personal jurisdiction defense
is waived if not properly raised by, inter alia, a proper motion
or responsive pleading. Such a defense has not been raised by the
Defendants.
6

that they did not raise personal jurisdiction to avoid "inevitable
jurisdictional discovery"), and concede that venue is now proper
under

§

1391 (b) ( 1) .

See

ECF No.

20

at

1-2

( "Seaman has

now

dismissed Brown . . . to come within 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1) .").
Accordingly,

the

MOTION

TO

DISMISS

BY

DEFENDANTS

IAC/INTERACTIVECORP AND THE DAILY BEAST COMPANY LLC FOR IMPROPER
VENUE AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (ECF No. 13) will be denied
insofar as it pertains to improper venue.
And because, as set forth below, the case must be transferred,
it is appropriate that this Court not consider the Defendants'
request for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) for failure
to state a claim. See U.S.A. ex rel. Advance Concrete, LLC v.
T.H.R. Enterprises, Inc., No. 2:15cv477, 2016 WL 3002408, *5 (E.D.
Va.

May 19,

2016)

(" [B] ecause the Court has ordered this case

transferred, it declines to rule on the Defendants' Rule 12(b) (6)
Motions to Dismiss, as the transferee court is the more appropriate
forum to address those Motions.").
II.

Transfer Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) Is Warranted

In the DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE (ECF No. 21) under
28 U.S.C. § 1404, the Defendants move to transfer this case to the
SONY. Their motion is well-taken and, therefore, the case will be
transferred.

7

A.
28

Legal Framework For Transfers Under§ 1404(a)

U.S.C.

§

1404 (a),

which permits the transfer of civil

actions, provides that:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been
brought or to any district or di vision to
which all parties have consented.
In analyzing a motion seeking transfer under Section 1404, it is
necessary

to

decide:

" ( 1)

whether

brought in the transferee forum,
justice

and

convenience

transfer to that forum."

of

the

claims

might

have

been

and (2) whether the interest of

the

parties

and

witnesses

justify

Hengle v. Curry, No. 3:18-cv-100, 2018

WL 301628 9, * 5 ( E. D. Va. June 15, 2018)

( quoting Koh v. Microtek

Int'l, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630 (E.D. Va. 2003)); see also
Fitzgibbon v.

Radack,

No.

3:18-cv-247,

2019 WL 470905,

*2

(E.D.

Va. Feb. 6, 2019).
The first part of the test requires the movant to "establish
that both venue and jurisdiction with respect to each defendant is
proper in the transferee district." Hengle, 2018 WL 3016289 at *5.
The second part of the test requires the consideration of several
factors, which are: "(1) the weight accorded to plaintiff's choice
of venue;

(2) witness convenience and access;

(3) convenience of

the parties; and (4) the interest of justice." Trs. of the Plumbers

8

&

Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund v. Plumbing Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d

436, 444 (4th Cir. 2015); Fitzgibbon, 2019 WL 470905 at *2. 5
A district court has discretion to decide motions to transfer
according to an "individualized,

case-by-case consideration of

convenience and fairness." Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S.

22,

2 9 ( quoting Van Dusen v.

Barrack,

(1964)); Fitzgibbon, 2019 WL 470905 at *2;

37 6 U.S.

612,

622

One Beacon Ins. Co. v.

JNB Storage Trailer Rental Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828 (E.D.
Va. 2004)

(the decision to transfer is "committed to the sound

discretion of the district court"). The moving party,

here the

Defendants, have the burden of showing that transfer is proper.
Byerson, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 631. In fact, the Defendants must show
that the balance of convenience among the parties and witnesses
"is beyond dead center, and strongly favors the transfer sought."
Medicenters of America, Inc. v. T & V Realty & Equip. Corp., 371
F. Supp. 1180, 1184 (E.D. Va. 1974).
The relevant factors will be considered in turn.

Other cases have framed the factors to be considered slightly
differently. For example, in Byerson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC,
467 F. Supp. 2d 627, 631 (E.D. Va. 2006) (citation omitted), the
Court "consider[ed] and balance[d] several factors," including:
"(1) ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the convenience of
the parties and witnesses; (3) the cost of obtaining the attendance
of witnesses; (4) the availability of compulsory processes; (5)
the interest in having local controversies decided at home; (6) in
diversity cases, the court's familiarity with the applicable law;
and (7) the interest of justice." The Court will rely on the Fourth
Circuit's more streamlined factor test here.
5

9

B. Seaman Could Have Brought This Action In The Southern
District Of New York

The first inquiry is whether the transferee forum-the SDNYhas jurisdiction over this action and whether it is a proper venue.
See Hengle, 2018 WL 3016289 at *5. Seaman concedes that he could
have brought this case in the SDNY. 6 Seaman's concession is wise.
Jurisdiction-both
Defendants

in

subject matter

the

SDNY.

Subject

and

personal-exists

matter

over

jurisdiction

the

exists

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because Seaman and the Defendants are
citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. See Compl. i i 1-3, 5 (ECF No. 1). Personal jurisdiction

exists over the Defendants because each has its principal place of
business in New York. Id. i i 2-3; ECF No. 22 at 4; Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014)

(citation omitted) (alteration in

original)

a

("With

respect

to

corporation,

the

place

of

incorporation and principal place of business are paradig(m] . .
. bases for general jurisdiction."). Accordingly, the SONY would
have jurisdiction over these Defendants.
The SONY is also a proper venue for this action. See 28 U.S.C.
§

1391.

Venue is proper under Section 1391 (b) (1)

because the

Defendants both "reside" in New York because they are subject to
personal jurisdiction there.

Venue is also proper in the SONY

6

See ECF No. 23 at 2 n. 2 ( "This action also could have been brought
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, where
Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction.").
10

under Section 1391(b} (2} because "a substantial part of the events
or

omissions

"reporting,

giving

rise

writing,

to

the

claim occurred." To wit,

the

editing and publication of the Article" at

issue occurred in the SONY. ECF No. 22 at 5.
Because jurisdiction and venue would both be proper in the
SONY, Seaman could have brought this case there, thus satisfying
the first inquiry required for transfer.
C. The 1404(a) Factors Weigh In Favor Of Transfer

As outlined above, the factors to be considered for a Section
1404(a}

transfer

motion

are:

plaintiff's choice of venue;

"(l}

the

weight

accorded

to

(2} witness convenience and access;

(3} convenience of the parties; and (4) the interest of justice."
Trs. of the Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund, 791 F.3d at
444;

Fitzgibbon,

2019 WL

470905 at

*2.

These

factors

strongly

support transfer to the SONY.
1. Seaman's Choice Of Forum

"As a general rule, a plaintiff's 'choice of venue is entitled
to

substantial

weight

appropriate.'" Trs.
Fund,

791

F.3d at

in

determining

of the Plumbers
444

(quoting

Bd.

&

whether

transfer

Pipefitters Nat.

of Trs.

v.

is

Pension

Sullivant Ave.

Props., LLC, 508 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477 (E.D. Va. 2007}}; Fitzgibbon,
2019 WL 470905 at *3.

But, if the plaintiff's choice of forum is

neither the nucleus of operative facts nor the plaintiff's home
forum,

the

plaintiff's

choice

is
11

accorded

less

weight.

See

Intranexus, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sols. Health Servs. Corp., 227 F.
Supp. 2d 581, 583 (E.D. Va. 2002). Even then, the choice of forum
is relevant if there is a connection between the forum and the
plaintiff's claim that logically supports the plaintiff's decision
to bring the case in the chosen forum. See Mullins v. Equifax Info.
Servs., LLC, No. 3:05-cv-888, 2006 WL 1214024, *5 (E.D. Va. April
28, 2006).
Seaman argues that he "chose Virginia because he suffered
damage to his reputation" there. ECF No. 23 at 6. His choice of
venue is entitled to "great deference," he argues,

because the

"Daily Beast published an online article that it knew or should
have known would be read by its subscribers and followers

in

Virginia." Id.
However, Seaman is in error when he argues that his choice of
forum is entitled to "great deference" in this case.

First, it is

uncontroverted that the EDVA is not Seaman's home forum (that is
the District of Columbia). See, e.g. Compl.

~

1 (ECF No. 1); ECF

No. 23 at 6. Second, the offending act at issue-the publication of
the article-did not occur in Virginia. See, e.g., Hengle, 2018 WL
3016289 at *9; Koh, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 635; Intranexus, 227 F.
Supp. 2d at 583. The article at issue was researched, written, and
published in New York. Its subject matter has nothing to do with
Virginia.

12

It is true that the article could have been accessed on the
Internet in Virginia and that IAC has a registered agent in the
Commonwealth. 7 See ECF No. 24 at 4. It is also true that some of
the alleged reputational injury occurred in Virginia.

However,

those tethers to Virginia are insufficient to warrant according
Seaman's choice of forum any significant preference.
The
limiting

first

alleged

principle

when

connection
it

comes

(Internet
to

online

access)

has

no

publications.

If

accepted, that notion would mean that, in similar cases involving
online publications, a plaintiff's choice of forum would be given
significant weight in virtually any judicial district because the
Internet

is

everywhere.

And,

having

a

registered

agent

in

Virginia, without more, is insufficient to connect this action to
the EDVA. See GTE Wireless, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d
517,

519

(E.D. Va. 1999)

(holding that,

even though a defendant

was "registered to conduct business in Virginia," the plaintiff's
choice of forum was not entitled to dispositive deference).
Simply put, the EDVA is not Seaman's home forum and there is
no logical connection between the events in this case and this
district. Thus, Seaman's choice of forum is entitled only to slight

7

Further, al though Seaman's counsel has off ices in Virginia,
"convenience to counsel is not an appropriate consideration in
resolving a motion to transfer venue." Koh, 250 F. Supp. 2d at
635; Acterna, L.L.C. v. Adtech, Inc., l~F. Supp. 2d 936, 939
( E . D. Va . 2001 ) ( same ) .
13

deference.

And, on the facts of this case, the SONY is a more

appropriate venue because the article at issue was written there,
the Defendants reside there, and the witnesses, for the most part,
are located there.
2. Convenience of the Witnesses

The convenience of witnesses is of considerable importance
when considering a transfer, especially the convenience of nonparty witnesses, whose location should be afforded greater weight
in deciding a motion to transfer venue. See Fitzgibbon, 2019 WL
470905 at *4; Hengle, 2018 WL 3016289 at *10; Koh, 250 F. Supp. 2d
at 636-37. The party asserting witness inconvenience must offer
sufficient details respecting the witnesses and their potential
testimony,

"by affidavit or otherwise," to enable the Court to

assess the materiality of evidence and the degree of inconvenience.
Koh, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 636 (emphasis added). In other words, "the
influence of this factor cannot be assessed in the absence of
reliable

information

identifying

the

witnesses

involved

and

specifically describing their testimony." Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal
Workers Nat. Fund v. Baylor Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 702
F. Supp. 1253, 1258 (E.D. Va. 1988) (footnote omitted). To satisfy
their burden that a

forum is

inconvenient for witnesses,

the

Defendants must provide particularized information of a witness's
potential
cumulative,

testimony,

how that

testimony

is material

and non-

or the degree to which it will be inconvenient to
14

access that testimony in this district. See Koh, 250 F. Supp. 2d
at 636.
The

Defendants

argue

that

witness

convenience

overwhelmingly in favor of transfer." ECF No. 22 at 6.

"weigh[s)
That is

so, say the Defendants, because Jennings Brown, a non-party who
lives in New York,

is likely to be the key witness in Seaman's

case because the article he wrote is the source of Seaman's legal
claims. Id. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, Brown cannot be subpoenaed
to attend trial in this Court because he lives more than 100 miles
from Virginia. See Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

45 (c) (1); ECF No.

Defendants also argue that other non-party witnesses,

22 at 6.
such as

"current or former employees of Jezebel and The Huffington Post,
two

New

York-based

publications,

who

can

testify

regarding

Seaman's claims about his termination from each publication," are
located in New York. ECF No. 22 at 7.

Seaman responds by arguing

that the Defendants have not sufficiently shown what the identified
witnesses would testify about or that recorded testimony would be
insufficient. See ECF No. 23 at 8-9.

And, Seaman is correct.

The

Defendants here (as is all too often true} have not specified what
testimony the identified witnesses have to offer or why recorded
testimony would not suffice.
All too often lawyers seem to think that their burden on this
facet

of the test can be carried by reciting the number and

location of witnesses.

Counsel here made the same misjudgment.
15

Often, that lapse is fatal to a transfer motion.

Here, it is not

because, even though the Defendants have not submitted an affidavit
about the subject of each witnesses'

testimony,

it is a fairly

elementary proposition that the author of an allegedly defamatory
article (Brown) is a key witness about the writing of the article,
the research he did, and the claims he asserts in the article. See
Koh, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 636 (describing that witness testimony can
be offered "by affidavit or otherwise"). The Court credits the
Defendants' assertion that Brown will be a key witness and finds
that Seaman has provided no evidence of any witnesses or evidence
located in this District. Nor has Seaman disputed that the other
non-party witnesses are in the SDNY. Thus,

on this record,

and

even considering that the Defendants have not fully lived up to
their obligations, this factor slightly favors transfer.
3. Convenience of the Parties

The

third

factor

is

the

convenience

to

the

parties

in

litigating in either venue. See Fitzgibbon, 2019 WL 470905 at *3;
Koh, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 638-39. The Defendants, as movants, must
show {1) that the original forum is inconvenient for them and (2)
that

Seaman

will

not

be

substantially

inconvenienced

by

the

transfer. Fitzgibbon, 2019 WL 470905 at *3; Koh, 250 F. Supp. 2d
at 636.

The residence of the parties is a consideration in this

assessment, but "residence is not a controlling factor and may be
outweighed in the context of a particular case by countervailing
16

considerations relevant to the convenience of the witnesses and
the interest of justice." 15 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris.§ 3849 (4th
ed.} .
Because the Defendants reside in New York and Seaman resides
in the District of Columbia, the Defendants concede that Seaman
"might be mildly inconvenienced by having to travel to New York
for hearings and/or trial" and that "this factor at most does not
weigh strongly in either direction." ECF No. 22 at 7. Seaman argues
that, at most, transfer to New York just shifts the balance of
inconvenience to him. ECF No. 23 at 7.
The

Court

concludes

that

this

factor

supports

transfer.

First, whether the case is in this Court or the SDNY, Seaman will
be inconvenienced because he does not live in Richmond (or anywhere
in Virginia}. It is true that the distance between the District of
Columbia and New York is greater than

the distance

from the

District of Columbia to Richmond. But, Seaman has not identified
any reason why he would not or could not travel to New York. See
StrikeForce Techs.,

Inc.

2017 WL 8809781,

(E.D. Va. June 9, 2017}

*2

v.

SecureAuth Corp.,

No.

1: 17-cv-307,

("Plaintiff is not

located in either [the transferee forum] or the EDVA. Accordingly,
Plaintiff will likely be flying to the forum regardless of whether
that forum is the EDVA or California.

11

}

•

Second, the case that

Seaman cites for his argument that transfer merely "shift[s] the
balance of inconvenience" to him, VS Techs., LLC v. Twitter, Inc.,
17

No.

2:11-cv-43,

2011 WL 11074291,

*7

(E.D.

Va.

June 28,

2011),

does not support him on the facts in this case. In VS Techs., one
of the key agents of the plaintiff, VS Technologies, was "located
in the Eastern District of Virginia." Id.

No similar connection

to Virginia or the EDVA exists in this case.
Lastly,
for

while the SONY will require some additional travel

Seaman,

it

will

be

significantly more

convenient

for

the

Defendants, their witnesses, and the production of evidence. See
Baylor Heating, 702 F. Supp. at 1259. When a "plaintiff chooses a
forum away from home," then "plaintiff's venue choice is given
less

weight

and

if

the

venue

substantially

inconveniences

defendants, transfer may be ordered." Id. Because Virginia is not
Seaman's home forum, he has not identified any reason why he cannot
travel to New York or how he would be inconvenienced, and the SONY
will be significantly more convenient for the Defendants,

this

factor supports transfer.
4. The Interest of Justice

The last factor for the Court to consider is "the interest of
justice,"

which

encompasses

public

"systemic integrity and fairness."

interest

factors

Stewart Org.,

Inc.

aimed
v.

at

Ricoh

Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988). Judicial economy and the avoidance
of

inconsistent

judgments

are

prominent

among

the

principal

elements of systemic integrity. See Fitzgibbon, 2019 WL 470905 at
*4; U.S.

Ship Mgmt.,

Inc. v. Marsk Line,
18

Ltd.,

357 F.

Supp.

2d

924, 937-38 (E.D. Va. 2005). Other factors include "the pendency
of a related action, the court's familiarity with the applicable
law, docket conditions, access to premises that might have to be
viewed, the possibility of unfair trial, the ability to join other
parties, and the possibility of harassment." Koh, 250 F. Supp. 2d
at 639.

Systematic integrity "must also.

party's

attempt

to

game

the

federal

. take account of a
courts

through

forum

manipulation." Hengle, 2018 WL 3016289 at *11 (internal quotation
omitted).
The parties seem to agree that New York substantive law will
apply in this case.

However, it appears as if the substantive law

of Virginia and New York are essentially the same on the three
claims made by Seaman.

Therefore, familiarity with the substantive

law has little relevance in assessing the interest of justice
factor in this case. And, the other factors mentioned in Koh are
not significantly implicated in this case.
It is true that, because of docket conditions, the case likely
will be resolved more promptly here than in the SONY.

However,

the docket conditions here and in the SONY are not drastically
different.

Thus, the differences in docket conditions between the

SONY and the EOVA are "minor consideration [s]" that "receive little
weight if all other reasonable and logical factors result in a
transfer of venue."

Koh,

250

F.

Supp.

2d at

639.

The

other

"reasonable and logical factors" support transfer in this case.
19

Lastly, the Court has significant concerns about forum shopping.
And, as was explained in Phillips v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3;15cv-544, 2016 WL 165024, *3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2016):
As noted by the EDVA many times over, "[t]his
Court cannot stand as a willing repository for
cases which have no real nexus to this
district.n Cognitronics Imaging Sys., Inc. v.
Recognition Research Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 689,
699 (E.D. Va. 2000). "The 'rocket docket'
certainly attracts plaintiff's, but the Court
must ensure that this attraction does not dull
the ability of the Court to continue to act in
an expeditious manner." Id.
Given that this case is only slightly tethered to this district,
Seaman's docket conditions arguments do not carry the day.
is especially so given that the other factors,

That

taken as a whole,

militate toward transfer. 8
CONCLUSION

For

the

reasons

set

forth

above,

the

Defendants

have

satisfied their burden to demonstrate that a Section 1404 transfer
is

warranted.

Accordingly,

the

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION

TO

TRANSFER

VENUE (ECF No. 21) will be granted and the case will be transferred
to the Southern District of New York.

It will be up to that Court

to decide the MOTION TO DISMISS BY DEFENDANTS IAC/INTERACTIVECORP

8

The Court notes that counsel for Seaman has brought at least two
quite similar cases in this District that were subsequently
transferred to different venues because the events at issue had
few, if any, ties to Virginia. See Phillips, 2016 WL 165024
(transfer to SDNY); Falls v. Katmai Support Servs., No. 3:14cv315,
2014 WL 6900916 (E.D. Va. Dec. 5, 2014) (transfer to District of
Alaska).
20

AND THE DAILY BEAST COMPANY LLC FOR IMPROPER VENUE AND FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM (ECF No. 13) as it pertains to failure to state a
claim.

The MOTION TO DISMISS BY DEFENDANTS IAC/INTERACTIVECORP

AND THE DAILY BEAST COMPANY LLC FOR IMPROPER VENUE AND FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM {ECF No. 13) as it pertains to improper venue will
be denied as moot.
The Court dispenses with oral argument because the facts and
legal conclusions are adequately presented in the materials and
oral argument would not aid in the decisional process.
It is so ORDERED.

Isl
Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge
Richmond, Virginia
Date: April -,3-., 2019

21