Lucas et al v. Henrico County Public School Board et al
Filing
73
MEMORANDUM OPINION (Defendants' Renewed Motions to Dismiss). See Opinion for details. Signed by Senior United States District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 11/6/2019. (sbea, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
KANDISE LUCAS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HENRICO COUNTY PUBLIC
SCHOOL BOARD, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 3:18cv402-HEH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Defendants' Renewed Motions to Dismiss)
This matter is before the Court on remand from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit (ECF No. 59). 1 On September 19, 2018, this Court issued a
Memorandum Opinion, dismissing the entirety of Plaintiffs '-Kandise Lucas, Marla
Crawford, and Toni Hunter-Davis ("Plaintiffs")-Complaint on various grounds (ECF
No. 48). On April 12, 2019, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded this Court's
dismissal of Plaintiffs' federal civil rights claims as to Defendants Henrico County Public
School Board ("HCPS Board"), Superintendent Patrick Kinlaw ("Kinlaw"), Principal
Kirk Eggleston ("Eggleston"), Henrico County Police Department" ("HCPD"), Police
Chief Humberto Cardounel ("Cardounel"), and Police Sergeant P .F. Crook ("Crook"). 2
1
Because the Plaintiffs in this case are pro se, this Memorandum Opinion is lengthier and
contains more explanation than is customary for this Court.
2
Defendants HCPS Board and HCPD contend that the Complaint misstates their names, which
are, respectively, "County School Board of Henrico County" and "Henrico County Police
Division." (See Renewed Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, ECF No. 62.) For
consistency, the Court will use the parties' names as stated in the ~omplaint. Because this
The Fourth Circuit also vacated and remanded the dismissal of Plaintiffs' state law
claims.
Following the Fourth Circuit's remand, these Defendants filed their Renewed
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim on May 20, 2019 (ECF No. 61). Plaintiffs
filed their Response on June 7, 2019 (ECF No. 69). 3 The Court will dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions have been adequately presented to the
Court. See E.D. Va. Local Civ. R. 7(J).
I.
BACKGROUND
On June 11, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a seven-count Complaint with this Court against
nine Defendants, alleging various violations of federal and state law. 4 (See Comp I., ECF
No. 1.) This Court dismissed the entirety of Plaintiffs' Complaint by Memorandum
Opinion. (ECF No. 48.) On Plaintiffs' appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the majority
of this Court's ruling dismissing all of Plaintiffs' claims. However, the Fourth Circuit
vacated and remanded Plaintiffs' federal civil rights claims as to Defendants HCPS
Board, Kinlaw, Eggleston, HCPD, Cardounel, and Crook, under Plaintiffs' First Second
Memorandum Opinion largely focuses on only Defendants Kinlaw, Eggleston, Cardounel, and
Crook, where appropriate, these Defendants collectively will simply be referred to as
"Defendants."
3
On August 22, 2019, Plaintiff Crawford also filed a Motion to Sever (ECF No. 72), seeking to
sever her claim.
4
For a more extensive summation of the facts, see this Court's first Memorandum Opinion in
this case. (ECF No. 48.)
2
Cause of Action ("Count 11"). 5 This Court had dismissed those claims on the grounds
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman6 doctrine, or in the
alternative, that it was required to abstain under the Younger 7 doctrine. The Fourth
Circuit disagreed, and remanded the federal civil rights claim~ to this Court for a
determination that was consistent with the Fourth Circuit's opinion. However,.the Fourth
Circuit upheld the dismissal of the federal civil rights claims as to Defendants Shannon
Taylor ("Taylor"), Tania Kregar ("Kregar"), and Judge L. Neil Steverson ("Steverson"),
as those claims are barred by prosecutorial and judicial immunity. Finally, because this
Court dismissed the state law claims by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in
the absence of any remaining federal cause of action, the Fourth Circuit remanded those
claims as well.
Accordingly, this Court will review Plaintiffs' Complaint, along with the
accompanying Renewed Motions to Dismiss, 8 as to only the federal civil rights claims
5 The
Complaint contains two counts that are both labeled as Plaintiffs' "Second Cause of
Action." (Compl. at 29, 34.) In its previous Memorandum Opinion, this Court referred to the
First Second Cause of Action as Count II. For the sake of consistency with its prior opinion, this
Court will continue to refer to this cause of action as Count II.
6
D.C. Ct. ofAppeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923).
1
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
8
Defendants Taylor, Kregar, and Steverson submitted Renewed Motions to Dismiss (ECF
Nos. 63, 66), re-asserting their defenses of sovereign and absolute immunity as to the state law
claims alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint. However, this Court need not address these defenses for
reasons discussed in Section 111.F of this Memorandum Opinion.
3
alleged in Count II-specifically 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 19869-and as alleged
against only Defendants HCPS Board, Kinlaw, Eggleston, H~PD, Cardounel, and Crook,
and the state law claims alleged in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of
Action ("Counts IV-VI").
For the reasons stated, the Court will grant Defendants' Renewed Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 61) as to the remaining claims in Count U-under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), and will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to Counts IV-VI.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Complaint will be dismissed.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surroundingthe facts, the merits of a claim, or
the applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofNC. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952
(4th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[] only
'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in
order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests."' Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint need not assert "detailed factual
allegations," but must contain "more than labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. at 555 (citations omitted). Thus, the
9
This Court need only address the federal civil rights allegations contained in Count II, as the
Fourth Circuit remanded only those claims back to this Court for further consideration.
4
"[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief abov~ the. speculative level"
to one that is "plausible on its face," rather than merely "conceivable." Id. at 555, 570.
"[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citing.Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In considering such a motion, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true, and
the complaint is viewed in the light m·ost favorable to the plaintiff. T. G. Slater & Son,
Inc. v. Donald P. & Patricia A. Brennan LLC, 385 F.3d 836, 841 (4th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted). Legal conclusions enjoy no such deference. Iqbal; 556 U.S. at 678.
The Court also acknowledges that pro se complaints are afford~d a liberal
construction. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404,413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006). The Court,
however, need not attempt "to discern the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff." Id. Nor
does the requirement of liberal construction excuse a clear failure in the pleading to
allege a federally cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep 't ofSoc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387,
390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). As the Fourth Circuit articulated in Beaudet! v. City ofHampton,
"[p]rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not ... without
limits." 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). "Though [prose] litigants cannot, of
course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in
the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and
decide issues never fairly presented to them." Id. at 1276.
··
While a motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint, courts may
consider documents that are either "explicitly incorporated into the complaint by
reference" or "those attached to the complaint as exhibits." Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs.
5
Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016). "[I]n the event of conflict between the bare
allegations of the complaint and any exhibit attached ... , the exhibit prevails." Id. at 166
(quoting Fayetteville Inv'rs v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir.
1991). This is based on "the presumption that the plaintiff, by basing his claim on the
attached document, has adopted as true the contents of that document." Id. at 167.
However, "before treating the contents of an attached or incorporated document as true,
the district court should consider the nature of the document and why the plaintiff
attached it," and it should consider whether plaintiff r_elied on the attachment for its
truthfulness. See id. at 167-69; see also Wallace v. Baylouny, No. 1:16-cv-0047, 2016
WL 3059996, at *4 (E.D. Va. May 31, 2016).
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Defendant HCPD is an Improper Party
Defendant HCPD is an improper party in this action, as HCPD is not an entity
..
capable of being sued. State law determines whether a governmental body has the
capacity to be sued in federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). "In Virginia, dep~ments of
municipal governments are not capable of being sued in their own names." Allmond v.
Sec. 8 Dep't ofHous., No. 03-894-A, 2003 WL 23784041, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 25,
2003). Notably, several courts in this Circuit have dismissed claims against police
departments in Virginia, holding that they lack the capacity to be sued. See, e.g.,
Harrison v. Prince William Cty. Police Dept., 640 F. Supp. 2d 688, 711 (E.D. Va. 2009);
Muniz v. Fairfax Cty. Police Dept., No. l:05CV466, 2005 WL 1838326, at *2 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 2, 2005); Estate ofHarris v. Arlington Cty., No 99-cvl 144, 2000 WL 34477900, at
6
*3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 14, 2000) (granting summary judgment in favor of the Arlington
County Police Department as to plaintiffs§§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 claims based on its
finding "that the police department is not an entity capable of being sued"); Hearn v.
Hudson, 549 F. Supp. 949, 952 n.1 (W.D. Va. 1982) ("It appears that nothing in Virginia
..
law recognizes municipal police departments as entities separate from their respective
municipalities. Nor does anything inVirginia law support a direct action against a police
department as an entity separate from the municipality itself.").
This Court similarly finds that the claims against HCPD must be dismissed
because HCPD does not exist as a separate legal entity from Henrico County and is not
capable of being sued.
Even if Plaintiffs attempted to bring suit against Henrico County, instead of
HCPD, such attempt would be futile under Monell v. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978). 10 In Monell, the Supreme Court held that vicarious liability, under a theory of
respondeat superior, is not available for claims brought under§ 1983. 436 U.S. at 691.
Because it appears that Plaintiffs are only bringing suit against HCPD due to alleged
..
actions of its officers-that is, a vicarious liability claim-any suit against Henrico
County for such alleged actions would be foreclosed under Monell. See id. at 691, 694
("[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents.").
10
Based on the limited factual allegations in the Complaint, it appears that Plaintiffs are seeking
to hold Defendant HCPD liable under§ 1983, rather than§§ 1985 and 1986. However, if
Plaintiffs are attempting to hold Defendant HCPD liable under §§ 1985 and 1986, those claims
must also be dismissed for reasons discussed infra.
7
Therefore, the claims against Defendant HCPD will be dismissed.
B. The Claims Against Defendant HCPS Board Fail Under Monell
Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege facts in their Complaint that Defendant
HCPS Board implemented and executed an unlawful policy or custom that ~as
responsible for Plaintiffs' alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that municipalities and local government units,
like school boards, can be sued directly under§ 1983, where "the action that is alleged to
be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Id. at 690. That is,
"[u]nder Monell, a municipality's liability arises only where the constitutionally offensive
actions of employees are taken in furtherance of some municipal policy or custom. Thus,
[plaintiffs are] obliged to identify a municipal policy or custom that caused their injury."
Walkerv. Prince George's Cty., 575 F.3d426, 431 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). Furthermore, the plaintiff "must demonstrate a direct causal link
between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights." Bd. ofCty. Comm 'rs
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,404 (1997).
In this case, it appears that Plaintiffs have made only a single allegation against
Defendant HCPS Board in Count II. (Compl. ,I 107 ("Plaintiffs allege that Police Chief
Cardounel and Sergeant Crooks failed to prevent defendant HCPS from obtaining an
unenforceable and unlawful summons knowing that no violation had occurred in
violation of the parties [sic] Fourth and Fourteenth Amendm~nt rights under the United
States Constitution.").) Viewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
8
Plaintiffs have failed to identify a School Board policy, cust~~' or practice that caused
their injuries. See Walker, 575 F.3d at 431. As such, Plaintiffs have failed to plead a
viable claim under Monell against Defendant HCPS Board.
Notably, it seems that Plaintiffs have named Defendant HCPS Board as a
defendant in their Complaint in order to hold the School Board liable for the alleged
misconduct of Derendants Kinlaw and Eggleston. I I However, as the Court previously
addressed above, vicarious liability is not available for § 1983 claims. See Monell, 436
U.S. at 691. .
As such, the claims against Defendant HCPS Board will be dismissed.
C. Plaintiffs Fail to State a§ 1983 Claim
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Defendants for civil conspiracy under
§ 1983. Notably, it is unclear from Plaintifrs Complaint-w~ich governs this Court's
analysis-which counts are alleged violations of§ 1983, and which ones are instead
alleged violations of§ 1985. However, because Plaintiffs have named both§§ 1983 and
1985 in Count II, the Court will address both statutes.
To state a claim for conspiracy under§ 1983, a plaintiff"must present evidence
that [(l)] the [defendants] acted jointly in concert and [(2)] that some overt act was done
[(3)] in furtherance of the conspiracy [(4)] which resulted in [plaintiffs'] deprivation of a
constitutional right. ... " Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416,421 (4th Cir. 1996)
11
Based on the limited factual allegations in the Complaint, it appears that Plaintiffs are seeking
to hold Defendant HCPS Board liable under§ 1983, rather than§ 1985 and§ 1986. However, if
Plaintiffs are attempting to hold Defendant HCPS Board liable under§§ 1985 and 1986, those
claims must also be dismissed for reasons discussed infra.
9
(citing Hafner v. Brown, 983 F.2d 570, 577 (4th Cir~ 1992)). "While [plaintiffs] need not
produc~ direct evidence of a meeting of the minds, [they] must come forward with
specific circumstantial evidence that each member of the alleged conspiracy shared the
same conspiratorial objective." Id. Plaintiffs' evidence must "reasonably lead to the
inference that· [defendants] positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to try to
accomplish a common and unlawful plan." Id.; see also Ruttenberg v. Jones, 283 F.
App'x 121, 132 (4th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) ("[Plaintiffs] were required to allege
'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face' .... [which] requires a
'plausible suggestion of conspiracy."' (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566, 570)); Brown
v. Angelone, 938 F. Supp. 340, 346 (E.D. Va. 1996) ("The plaintiff must allege facts
which show that the defendants shared a 'unity of purpose or common design' to injure
the plaintiff.... The mere fact that each of [the] actors played a part in the events is not
sufficient to show such a unity of purpose." (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946))). Plaintiffs "have a weighty burd~,i to establish a civil rights
conspiracy." Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 421; see also Simmons v. Poe, 41 F.3d 1370, 1377 (4th
Cir. 1995) ("[C]ourts have[] required that plaintiffs alleging unlawful intent in
conspiracy claims under§ 1985(3) or 1983 plead specific facts in a nonconclusory
fashion to survive a motion to dismiss." (quoting Gooden v. Howard Cty., 954 F .2d 960,
969-70 (4th Cir. 1992) (alterations in original))).
Most evidently, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege facts of any deprivation
of a constitutional right. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Kinlaw, Eggleston, Cardounel,
and Crook conspired amongst themselves (and with Defendants Taylor, Kregar, and
10
Steverson) to unlawfully serve, prosecute, and convict Plaintiffs of trespassing on school
grounds under Va. Code Ann.§ 18.2-128, in violation of Plaintiffs' First, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 12 However, Plaintiffs have failed to show that
Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of any of these constitutionally protected rights, and thus,
have failed to make out a claim for conspiracy under§ 1983.~3
12
Plaintiffs also allege that their Eighth Amendment rights were violated .. However, it appears
that onlyJudge Steverson is alleged to have violated this right. Because the Fourth Circuit
dismissed the federal civil rights claims as to Judge Steverson, the Court need not address the
alleged Eighth Amendment violation.
13
The Court recognizes that claims against individuals in their official capacity "generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. "As long as the government entity receives notice and an
opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated
as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Thus, when a
§ 1983 suit alleges claims against both the officer in his official capacity and the entity, courts in
this Circuit have dismissed the official capacity claim. See, e.g., Conley v. Town of Elkton,
5:04CV00030, 2005 WL 415897, at *7 (W.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2005) (citing Love-Lane v. Martin,
355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004)). It is unclear from the face of the Complaint whether
Plaintiffs are suing these officials in their official or individual capacity. To the extent that they
are sued in their official capacity, and to the extent the claims against them duplicate the claims
against HCPD and HCPS Board, the§ 1983 claims against the officers in their official capacities
will be dismissed because the entities received notice and were given the opportunity to respond.
See Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 783 ("The district court correctly held that the§ 1983 claim against
[the defendant] in his official capacity as Superintendent is essentially a claim against the Board
and thus should be dismissed as duplicative."). To the extent the claims are not duplicative,
§ 1983 suits against officers in their official capacities are governed by Monell. See Hughes v.
Blankenship, 672 F.2d 403,406 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Official capacity suits generally represent but
another way of pleading an action against the entity of which the officer is an agent ....
[Therefore, since] the injury occurring in this case did not arise frpm the execution of
governmental policy or custom, the defendants cannot be liable in their official capacities."
(citations omitted)). Just as Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts of a policy or custom that
governed the actions of the entities in this case, as explained above, Plaintiffs have similarly
failed to allege any policy or custom that governed the actions of the officials. Furthermore, to
the extent the individuals are being sued in their individual capacity, the qualified immunity
analysis also disposes of those claims. See Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995)
("[Q]ualified immunity is available only in a personal capacity suit.... " (citation omitted)).
Finally, as it is unclear whether the individuals here are being sued in their official or individual
capacity, the failure to state a claim analyses apply to either type of suit. See, e.g., Greene v.
Obama, 633 F. App'x 196 (4th Cir. 2016) (unpublished).
11
Plaintiffs first contend that "Superintendent Kinlaw and Principa~ Eggleston did
maliciously conspire to seek an unlawful and otherwise unenforceable summons against
the parties for trespass in violation of the parties' rights and protections under the First
and Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ...." (Compl. 1104.) In
regard to the First Amendment violation, Plaintiffs allege that "[t]he attempt to re-enroll
M.A. in his school of origin was a protected activity and it included the First Amendment
rights of [Plaintiffs] ...." (Id. 162.) Plaintiffs presumably allege that their First
Amendment rights were violated when they were served with summonses in response to
their "sit in" and "protected activities" of "free speech and right to peaceably assemble."
. (Id. ,I,I 66, 70.)
However, the Fourth Circuit has found that "[s]chool officials ... have the
authority and responsibility for assuring that parents and third parties conduct themselves
appropriately while on school property .... [and], such officials should never be
intimidated into compromising the safety of those who utilize school property." Lovern
v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648,655 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
470-71 (1980) ("[N]o mandate in our Constitution leaves States and governmental units
powerless to pass laws to protect the public from the from the kind of boisterous and
threatening conduct that disturbs the tranquility of spots sele~_ted by the people ... [such
as] public and other buildings that require peace and quiet to carry out their functions,
such as courts, libraries, schools, and hospitals." (citation omitted)). "The right to
communicate is not limitless." See Lovern, 190 F.3d at 656.
12
In Lovern, the non-custodial parent of three students of Henrico County public
schools brought suit against the Superintendent, alleging thafthe Superintendent violated
§ 1983 and the plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment rights after the school
administration sought to bar the plaintiff from entering school property. Id. at 650, 653,
656. The Superintendent's decision to prohibit plaintiffs entry onto school property was
due to plaintiffs '\!ontinued pattern of verbal abuse and threatening behavior towards
school officials." Id. at 65 5. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to assert a substantial federal
claim as it was unable to find that his constitutional rights w~~e implicated. Id at 656.
The facts of this case are substantially similar to th~ facts in Lovern, excep_t that
notably only Plaintiff Hunter-Davis is a parent of the student whose rights Plaintiffs were
allegedly seeking to protect. As Plaintiffs plead in their Complaint, "Eggleston went to
the magistrate to swear out the summons for trespass, citing the 'staged lockdown' to
justify the perception of the parties as 'disruptions' and threats to the students and the
staff." (Compl. ,r 74.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that even after the police arrived
previously to ask the Plaintiffs to leave the school, Plaintiffs returned the next day and
"publicly announced through a Facebook communique that the parties ~ould be engaged
in a 'sit in"' until the child was re-enrolled in the school. (Id. 1158-70.) Plaintiffs
contend that "Eggleston once again demanded that they leave" and that he later "went to
the magistrate to swear out the summons for trespass." (Id.
,r,r 66, 74.)
Considering the facts as Plaintiffs allege them, Plaintiffs have failed to establish
that their First Amendment rights were implicated by Defendants Kinlaw's and
13
Eggleston's alleged actions in seeking Plaintiffs' removal from the school's property, as
they have the duty and responsibility to maintain the safety and decorum of the school
and may seek to prevent threats to the school and its students. See Lovern, 189 F .3d at
..
655-56. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim for a violation of their
First Amendment rights.
Plaintiffs next contend that Defendants (in various conspiracies) violated
Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendments rights by allegedly seeking and serving Plaintiffs with
unlawful and unenforceable summonses. The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent
part that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons [and] houses ... against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated ...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Plaintiffs' Complaint, liberally construed, does not provide any factual allegations of an
unlawful search. As such, the Court construes Plaintiffs' Complaint to allege an unlawful
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
However, Plaintiffs continually allege throughout the Complaint.that they were
only served with summonses for trespass, and that they were ·never in fact arrested. (See
Comp I. ,I 108 ("Plaintiffs allege that HCPD officers serv[ed] unlawful suml'll:onses where
no violation or arrests had occurred ....").) "A summons requiring no more than a court
appearance, without additional restrictions, does not constitute a Fourth Amendment
seizure." Ryu v. Whitten, 684 F. App'x 308, 311 (4th Cir. 2017) (unpublished)
(collecting cases) (finding that the defendant had not violated the plaintiff's Fourth
Amendment rights by obtaining and issuing a summons, even if the defendant had been
14
negligent in obtaining the summons as to that plaintiff). 14 Thus, the mere fact that
Plaintiffs were served with summons for trespass does not constitute an unreasonable
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
The Complaint does allege that "five HCPD officers arrived to [Plaintiff Lucas' s]
home to serve her with the summons." (Compl. 179.) The Court recognizes that the
home is the quintessential constitutionally protected area under the Fourth Amendment.
See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452,459 (2011) ("It is a basic principle ofF~urth
Amendment law ... that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable." (citations and quotations omitted)). "Except in such
special situations [as consent or exigent circumstances], we have consistently held that
the entry into a home to conduct a search or make an arrest is unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment unless done pursuant to a warrant." Guerrero v. Moore, 442 F.
App'x 57, 58 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (quoting Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204, 211 (1981) (alterations in original)).
In Guerrero, the Fourth Circuit found·that an officer was not shielded by qualified
immunity when he entered the plaintiffs home in an attempt to serve her with a
14
Thus, even though Plaintiffs continually allege that the-summonses were obtained
"unlawfully" and were "otherwise unenforceable," Plaintiffs have failed to show that their
Fourth Amendment rights were violated. See Ryu, 684 F. App'x at 311 (concluding that the
officer did not violate the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right by obtaining a summons, despite
the fact that the summons "might have been voidable"); see also Glass v. Anne Arundel Cty,, 716
F. App'x 179, 180 n.l (4th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) ("To the extent that [plaintiff] claims that
[the officer] lacked probable cause to issue a citation, [the officer] issued only a summons, and a
summons alone is insufficient to support a Fourth Amendment seizure claim." (collecting
cases)). However, Plaintiffs' allegations that the summonses were unlawful are conclusory, with
insufficient factual assertions to support them, which the Court need not accept.
15
misdemeanor summons, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. ("[The officer] fails
to persuade us ... that the summons was the functional equivalent of an arrest warrant for
Fourth Amendment purposes .... [The officer] fails to cite any persuasive Fourth
Amendment precedent that permits a government official to ~nter a dwelling to serve a
non-custodial misdemeanor summons." (emphasis added)).· However, unlike in that case,
this Complaint alleges only that the officers "arrived to," rather than "entered," Plaintiff
Lucas's home. (See Compl., 79.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs do·not allege any further facts
that the officers acted unreasonably, and in violation of the Fourth Amendment, when
they served the summons on Plaintiff Lucas. That is, there are no facts alleged that
Plaintiff Lucas was unreasonably seized, or her home unreasonably searched, which
would support a plausible claim for a Fourth Amendment violation.
Consequently, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for an alleged Fourth
Amendment violation ..
Plaintiffs next contend that Defendant Kinlaw
did conspire with [Taylor] on January 30, 2018 before the summonses for
trespass were sworn to "address" the parties return ·cm January 31, 2018.
Plaintiffs further allege that after 2 of the parties were served on January 31,
2018, Kinlaw did again conspire with [Taylor] to prosecute the trespass case
against the parties based on an unlawfully· pbtained summons, and that
[Taylor] did maliciously prosecute the matter in the interest of Kinlaw and
HCPS, rather than in the interest of the public, justice, and the State.
(Compl., 109.) Plaintiffs allege that this was done in violation of the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 15 The Court has already found that Plaintiffs have
15
The remainder of this paragraph in the Complaint contains allegations against Defendant
Taylor alone, and then concludes by alleging these various violations of the Constitution. Thus,
it is not clear if Plaintiffs are claiming that this alleged conspiracy between Defendants Kinlaw
16
failed to state a claim for a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Furthermore,
Plaintiffs do not allege any facts as to how, and under which provisions, their Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights were violated by Defendants. Even construing the. Complaint
liberally, the Court cannot-nor is it required t~iscem how Defendants deprived
Plaintiffs of these constitutionally protected rights without any factual support alleged.
See Laber, 438 F.3d at 413 n.3.
Finally~ Plaintiffs repeatedly allege throughout Count II that Defendants' actions
violated their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 The Court first
surmises that Plaintiffs have included the Fourteenth Amendment in the majority of their
allegations because the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to the States the
provisions of the Bill of Rights that Plaintiffs allege pefendants have violate~. See Timbs
v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019) ("When ratified in 1791, the Bill of Rights applied
only to the Federal Government. ... With only 'a handful' of exceptions, this Court has
held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the protections
contained in the Bill of Rights, rendering them applicable to_the States." (citing
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764-65 & nn. 12-13 (2010)). The
and Taylor violated these constitutional rights. However, the Court will liberally construe the
Complaint to include such alleged violations for the conspiracy claim.
16
In this Court's previous Memorandum Opinion in this case, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs'
equal protection claim for lack of standing to the extent that that claim was brought as an alleged
violation of M.A. 's constitutional rights, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, the
Court need not address the parts of Count II of the Complaint that allege violations of M.A.' s
equal protection rights.
17
Fourteenth Amendment, however, does not save Plaintiffs from failing to state a claim
for any of the alleged violations under the Bill of Rights~
To the extent Plaintiffs allege independent violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment, these allegations also fail to state a claim. Like the claims alleging
violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Complaint fails to state how, and
under which provisions, Defendants violated Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights.
(See, e.g., Compl. 1 105.) Plaintiffs are presumably alleging violations under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as they reiterate that Defendants engaged
in a conspiracy to obtain an "unlawful and unenforceable summons for trespass" against
Plaintiffs. (See, e.g., id.
1~ 105, 109.)
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no State shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. While the Due Process Clause offers a breadth of protections,
it is not the proper way "to evaluate law enforcement's pretrial missteps. Compared to
the more generalized notion of due process, the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection against unreasonable seizures and arrests and
defines the process that is due for seizures of persons or property in criminal ·cases."
Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241,245 (4th Cir. 2017) (citations and internal quotations
omitted); see also Cty. ofSacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,. 843 ("[I]f a constitutional
claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision ... , the claim must be analyzed
.
.
under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of
substantive due process." (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,272 n.7
18
(1997))). Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is not the proper
vehicle for Plaintiffs' claims; instead, the Fourth Amendment would be the only available
actionable ground for relief, but as discussed previously, Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently
allege a viable Fourth Amendment violation. 17
Even if the Court were to read the Complaint as alleging a violation of Plaintiffs'
equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiffs have yet again failed
to allege a sufficient claim. The Equal Protection Clause provi_des that no State shall
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." ·U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV,§ 1. "In order to survive a motion to dismiss an equal protection claim, a
plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to demonstrate plausibly t}iat he was treated
differently from others who were similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was
the result of discriminatory animus." Equity in Athletics, Inc., v. Dep 't. ofEduc., 639
F.3d 91, 108 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir.
2001)). Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts that they were not treated just as any
other member of society would have been treated after threatening a "sit in" on school
property on a social media website, demanding that they had rights to remain on and
return to that property, and commanding that they would return everyday if necessary.
17
Even if the Plaintiffs' claims were not covered by the Fourth Amendment, and instead a
substantive due process analysis were more appropriate, Plaintiffs have not provided a sufficient
factual basis to show that Defendants' actions "shocked the conscience." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847
("[T]he substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only
when it can properly be characterized as -arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional
sense." (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
19 ·
(Compl. 1166, 70.) As such, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
..
Thus, by failing to allege sufficient facts of any deprivation of their constitutional
rights, ~laintiffs have failed to state a claim for civil_ conspiracy under§ 198~. 18 See
Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 421; see also Richardson v. Grievance Coordinator, No. 7:14cv470,
2014 WL 5147916, at *3 (W.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2014) (dismissing the plaintiff's civil
conspiracy claim because he "failed to demonstrate that actions of _any of the defendants
18
To the extent the Complaint also alleges any non-conspiratorial constitutional deprivation
under § 1983, see, e.g., Compl. ,r,r 107-08, those claims will be similarly dismissed for failure to
state a claim because plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege any constitutional injury.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,269 (1994) ("Section 1983 is not-itself a source of substantive
rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. The first
step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed."
(internal citations and quotations omitted)); see also Harris v. Frazier, No. 3:07-cv~701, 2009
WL 890161, at *12 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2009) ("[S]upervisory liability under§ 1983 cannot exist
without an underlying constitutional violation ...."); Lowe v. Hoffman, No. 1:07cv363, 2008
WL 3895599, at *5 (E.D. Va. Aug. 20, 2008) (concluding that defendants could not be held
liable based on a theory of bystander liability because plaintiffs constitutional rights were not
violated). Additionally, while the Complaint contains allegations that Defendant Crook
committed perjury, the only allegation of perjury in Count II was that Defendants Taylor and
Kregar conspired to procure Defendant Crook's perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1622, which
provides that "[w]hoever procures another to commit anyperjury is guilty of subornation of
perjury." (See Compl. ,r,r 85, 110.) Thus, Count II does not contain a perjury allegation against
Defendant Crook, or any of the remaining Defendants. However, to the extent the Complaint
can be viewed as attempting to hold Defendant Crook liable under federal civil rights law for his
alleged perjury, Plaintiffs fail to assert how this alleged perjury violated their constitutional
rights or formed the basis for any federal civil rights claim. See Foster v. Fisher, l:14-cv-292,
2016 WL 900654, at *11 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 9, 2016) ("While Plaintiff makes clear that
[Defendant's] alleged perjury is of the utmost importance to her, Plaintiff fails to make any
argument as to how the alleged perjury of a (state actor) witness in a state court proceeding
forms any basis for a federal civil rights claim."), ajf'd, 694 F. App'x 887, 888 (4th Cir. 2017)
(unpublished) ("We agree with the district court that [the plaintiff] has failed to articulate how
the alleged perjury amounts to a viable civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).").
20
violated his constitutional rights, as is required to establish a civil conspiracy); Bell v.
Johnson, No. 7:09-cv-214, 2011 WL 1226003, at* 10 (W.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2011)
("[Plaintiff's] conspiracy claim ... is foiled at the outset ... since he has failed to
establish an underlying constitutional deprivation.").
While the Court need not address the additional elements of a § 1983 civil
conspiracy claim, Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts establishing these
remaining elements. See Hinkle, 81 F .3d at 421. Specifically, Plaintiffs have failed to
show that Defendants "shared the same conspiratorial objective" or that they_ "positively
or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful
plan." 19 See id. Instead, the facts Plaintiffs do allege show that the school administrators
legitimately reached out to law enforcement officers, and sought summonses, to
rightfully protect their school and students against disruptive behavior on school
property. See Lovern, 190 F .3d at 655-56.
As such, Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege a claim for civil conspiracy
under§ 1983 .. Accordingly, those claims will be dismissed.
19
Plaintiffs continually rely on language from an email that they attached as an exhibit to their
Complaint. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Cardounel "did conspire with
Superintendent Kinlaw and Principal Eggleston to advise them on.how they could provide the
police with the 'direction/authority' to 'address' the parties as trespassers in violation of their
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protections ...." (Compl. 1106 (quoting Ex. 6).) However,
on its face, this allegation fails to satisfy Plaintiffs' weighty burden to establish an unlawful
agreement between the parties. See Hinkle, 81 F .3d at 421. Furthermore, the actual email
exhibit shows that the email was written after the summonses were issued, and thus fails to show
how Defendants conspired against Plaintiffs in seeking the summonses. Because Plaintiffs
continually incorporate the "direction/authority" language from the exhibit in their Complaint
and assert it as part of their factual basis of an alleged conspiracy, .the Court finds that Plaintiffs
have relied on the exhibit for its truthfulness; given the conflict between the exhibit and the
allegations in the Complaint, the exhibit prevails~ See Goines, 822 F.3d at 165-69.
21
D. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Conspiracy Under §§ 1985 and 1986
Plaintiffs further allege in Count II that Defendants' actions violated§ 1985.
Plaintiffs do ~ot identify which subsection of§ 1985 was allegedly violated. · However, in
the Complaint's Statement of Facts, Plaintiffs have included language from§ 1985(2).
(See Compl. , 32 ("if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding,
hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State
or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to
injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of
..
any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws").)
While Plaintiffs have included verbatim the language from § 198S(2),. that
subsection proscribes conspiracies that interfere with the administration of justice in the
court system. Notably, the language quoted by Plaintiffs comes from the "second part of
§ 1985(2)" which "applies to conspiracies to obstruct the course of justice in state
courts." Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 722 n.3, 725 (1983); see also Roper v. Cty. of
Chesterfield, 807 F. Supp. 1221, 1226 (E.D. Va. 1992) ("Virtually all courts have held
that the second clause of Section 1985(2) applies to ... joint efforts to prevent equal
access to state judicial proceedings." (citations omitted)). "[This portion] of the statute
contains language requiring that the conspirators' actions be motivated by an intent to
deprive their victims of the equal protection of the laws." Kush, 460 U.S. at 725; see also
Bloch v. Mountain Mission Sch., No. 86-1279, 1988 WL 45433, at *1 (4th Cir. May 2,
1988) (unpublished) ("[A] racial or class-based animus is necessary for a vio_lation of ...
the second half of§ 1985(2) ...."). However, it is unclear from the allegations in the
22
Complaint: 1) how Defendants conspired "to obstru~t th~ course of justice in state
courts," that is, how Defendants acted in concert to prevent Plaintiffs' equal access to
Virginia state court proceedings, and 2) that Defendants acted with the intent to deprive
Plaintiffs "of the equal protection of the laws." See Kush, 460 U.S. at 725. Thus,
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under § 1985(2).
Despite Plaintiffs having included language from § 1985(2) in their Statement of
Facts, Defendants have repeatedly contended that Plaintiffs have presumably brought suit
under§ 1985(3). Plaintiffs have not argued to the contrary, despite numerous
opportunities to do so. Construing Plaintiffs' Complaint liberally as the Court must, the
Court also finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under§ 1985(3).
Section 1985(3) proscribes:
If two or more persons ... conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection
of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws ... whereby
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so
injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages,
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1376 (quoting§ 1985(3)).
To state a claim for conspiracy under§ 1985(3), Plaintiffs must prove the
following elements:
(1) a conspiracy of two or more persons, (2) who are motivated by a specific
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus to ·(3) deprive the plaintiff of
the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all, (4) and which results
in injury to the plaintiff as (5) a consequence of an overt act committed by
the defendants in connection with the conspiracy.
23
Id. .Plaintiffs "must show an agreement or a 'meeting of the minds' by defendants to
violate [Plaintiffs'] constitutional rights." Id. at 1377 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs must
satisfy a "relatively stringent standard" in order to establish a viable § 1985 conspiracy
claim. Id. "[T]he racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus requires
concrete supporting facts and cannot be inferred." Patterson..v. McCormick, No.
2:13cv293, 20J4 WC2039966, at *7 (E.D. Va. May 15, 2014) (citing Gooden, 954 F.2d
at970).:
Thus, in order to establish a§ 1985(3) conspiracy claim, Plaintiffs must again
show that Defendants unlawfully conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional
rights. See Simmons, 4 7 F .3d at 13 77 ("Under this relatively stringent standard for
establishing section 1985 conspiracies, it is clear that [the plaintift] did not put forth
sufficient evidence that [the defendants] 'conspired' or participated in any joint plan, to
deprive him of his constitutional rights under section 1985(3)."). Accordingly, for the
same reasons the conspiracy claims under § 1983 must be dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6)-that is, because Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts of any
constitutional injury or that Defendants mutually agreed to p~icipate in an unlawful
plan-and because Plaintiffs have failed to allege -that Defendants were "motivated by a
specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus," Plaintiffs have failed to state a
claim for a§ 1985(3) conspiracy. 20 See id. at 1376; see also Patterson, 2014 WL
20
In Gooden, the Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs"§ 1985(3) claim was essentially an
afterthought with little more to support it than the_ respective racial identities of the individuals
involved," and that the mere assertion that the officers in question were of a different race than
the plaintiff was not enough "to overcome the fact that the officers acted upon the basis of a
citizen's complaint, confirmed repeatedly by their own observations ...." 954 F.2d at 970.
24
2039966, at *8 ("[T]he Plaintiff fails to show any 'meeting of the minds' by the
Defendants to_ deprive him of any civil rights."). Accordingly, those claims will similarly
be dismissed. 21
Because "[a] cause of action based upon § 1986 is dependent upon the existence of
a claim under§ 1985," Plaintiffs' § 1986 claim will also be dismissed. Treri_ce v.
Summons, 755 F.2d 1081, 1085 (4th Cir. 1985).
E. Defendants Kinlaw and Eggleston are Protected by Qualified Immunity
As government officials, Defendants Kinlaw and Eggleston are protected from suit
by qualified immunity. As such, Count II will additionally be dismissed against these
defendants on qualified immunity grounds, to the extent Plaintiffs seek damages against
these Defendants in their personal capacities. 22
Similarly, in this case, the mere fact that Plaintiffs and M.A. are African American and that the
school is "predominantly Asian and White," and that Defendants Kinlaw and Eggleston are
Caucasian and Defendant Cardounel is Latino (as alleged in the Complaint), does not show the
unlawful intent necessary to establish a§ 1985(3) claim. (Compl. ,i,i 7-26.)
21
In Hinkle, upon finding that the district court properly dismissed the civil conspiracy claim
under§ 1983, in a footnote, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the conspiracy claims under§ 1985 for
the same reasons, as the claimants used the same evidence to support both conspiracy claims. 81
F.3d at 423 n.4. This Court applies the same reasoning, as Plaintiffs have failed to offer differing
evidence for their conspiracy claims; indeed, they allege the same counts for the § 1983 claim as
they do for the § 1985 claim, and fail to distinguish them in their Complaint.
22
The Court recognizes that qualified immunity only applies to suits that seek damages, and not
equitable relief, against government officials. See Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492,498 n.9 (4th Cir.
2014) ("The plaintiffs claims for equitable relief are not affected by the doctrine of qualified
immunity, which 'has no application to suits for declaratory or injunctive relief."' (quoting S.C.
State Bd ofDentistryv. F.T.C., 455 F.3d 436, 446-47 (4th Cir. 2006))). It is clear.from the face
of the Complaint that Plaintiffs seek damages from Defendants Kinlaw and Eggleston.
(Compl. 40.) However, it is unclear the extent to which the Plaintiffs seek declaratory and
injunctive relief from these two Defendants. Thus, for the sake of thoroughness, the Court also
dismisses Plaintiffs' claims against these two Defendants under Rule 12(b)(6).
25
"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."' Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818
(1982)); see also Goines, 822 F.3d at 163. Qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit
..
rather than a mere defense to liability ... [and] it is effectively lost if a case is
erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472_ U.S. 511, 526 _(1985)
(emphasis omitted). Thus, issues of immunity should be resolved "at the earliest possible
stage of litigation." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,
227 (1991)) .
. To determine whether an officer is protected by qualified immunity, the Court
must decide: 1) whether the alleged facts "make out a violation of a constitutional right,"
and 2) whether that right was "clearly established" at the time of the officer's alleged
misconduct. Id.; see also Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292,306
(4th Cir. 2006) (defining the "qualified immunity test" as "(1) the allegations underlying
the claim, if true, substantiate the violation of a federal statutory or constitutional right;
and (2) this violation was of a 'clearly established' right of which a reasonable person
would have known" (internal citations and quotations omitted)). The Supreme Court no
longer mandates a particular sequence in how these two elements should be addressed.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. If both aspects of the test are met, then the government official
is not entitled to a qualified immunity defense. See Ridpath, 447 F.3d 292 at 306.
26
In this case, the Court need not address the second-prong of the qualified
immunity test, as Plai~tiffs' have failed to sufficiently allege violations of any
constitutionally protected right, for the reasons stated in Section 111.C of this
Memorandum Opinion. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 63§, 646 (4th Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted) ("To escape dismissal of a complaint on qualified immunity grounds, a
plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right (2) that is clearly established at the time of
the violation."). As such, for the same reasons the Complaint must be dismissed because
the Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege a violation of ~f constitutional right, see
Sheppardv. Visitors of Va. State Univ., No. 3:18-cv-723-HEH, 2019 WL 1869856, at *6
(E.D. Va. Apr. 25, 2019), Defendants Eggleston and Kinlaw are protected by qualified
immunity, and Plaintiffs are barred from pursuing their damages claims against them in
their individual capacities. 23
F. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs'
Remaining State Claims
This Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs'
remaining Counts IV-VI. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) ("The district courts may decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... [where] the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction .... "). Because this Court has
dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims over which it has original jurisdiction, for the reasons
23
It appears that Plaintiffs do not seek damages from Defendants Cardounel and Crook. Because
qualified immunity only applies in damages suits, the Court does not apply this doctrine to these
defendants. However, if Plaintiffs did attempt to later bring a damages suit against these
defendants, or to the extent the Complaint could be read as seeking damages against these
defendants, they would also be protected by qualified immunity.
27
discussed supra, the Court need not resolve Plaintiffs' remaining Counts IV-VI, which
arise under the laws and constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Accordingly,
these state law claims will also be dismissed. 24
IV.
CONCLUSION
For all ·these reasons, the remaining claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint will be
dismissed in their entirety. Accordingly, Plaintiff Crawford's Motion to Sever Plaintiff
(ECF No. 72) will be denied as moot. Because the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law. claims, the Court need not address
Defendants Taylor's, Kregar's, and Steverson's Renewed Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos.
63, 66), and they will also be denied as moot.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Henry E. Hudson
Senior United States District Judge
N
of. G 2,ol 'I
Date:
1
Richmond, VA
24
While the Fourth Circuit did vacate this Court's previous judgment declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims, it did so because it also vacated the
dismissal of the remaining federal civil rights claims against Defendants. Having now dismissed
these federal claims on alternative grounds, this Court may again decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims as to all Defendants, including Defendants
Kregar, Taylor, and Steverson.
28
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