Williams et al v. Big Picture Loans LLC et al
Filing
33
MEMORANDUM OPINION. See Opinion for details. Signed by Senior United States District Judge Robert E. Payne on 2/8/2019. (sbea, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
LULA WILLIAMS, et al.,
on behalf of herself and
all individuals similarly
situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil Action No. 3:18-mc-12
BIG PICTURE LOANS, LLC,
et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Simon Xu Liang's AMENDED
MOTION
TO
QUASH
SUBPOENA
TO
SIMON
XU
LIANG
TO
TESTIFY
DEPOSITION IN A CIVIL ACTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
3) . 1
For
the
following
reasons,
the
AMENDED
MOTION
AT
A
(ECF No.
TO
QUASH
SUBPOENA TO SIMON XU LIANG TO TESTIFY AT A DEPOSITION IN A CIVIL
ACTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
(ECF No.
3) will be granted in
part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
In Williams v. Big Picture Loans,
(E.D. Va. 2018),
2
LLC,
329 F. Supp. 3d 248
the Court set out the basis for this litigation
11
This matter was transferred from the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina.
2 The published version of the Memorandum Opinion is Williams
v. Big Picture Loans, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-461, ECF No. 146, and it is
1
and
the
efforts
of
Technologies, Inc.
Picture
escape
Loans")
the
the
two
corporate
defendants,
Ascension
("Ascension") and Big Picture Loans, LLC ("Big
(collectively
reach
of
this
the
case
by
"Corporate
Defendants")
trying
come
to
within
to
the
sovereign immunity of the Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians (the "Tribe").
Memorandum Opinion,
For the reasons set forth in the
the Corporate Defendants'
this case for lack of
immunity was rejected.
jurisdiction under a
motion to dismiss
claim of sovereign
That decision is pending before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The plaintiffs'
Complaint against the Corporate Defendants
and Martorello alleges two violations of the federal Racketeering
Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act,
18 U.S. C.
§§
1962 ( c)
1962(d), as well as violation of Virginia's usury laws,
and
a claim
for unjust enrichment, and a plea for declaratory judgment.
The facts that give rise to these claims are outlined in the
Memorandum Opinion,
Williams,
32 9
F.
Supp.
3d at
253-66.
As
explained in the Memorandum Opinion, the corporate structures here
are convoluted and somewhat difficult to follow.
Memorandum
Opinion
recites
a
structure
that
was
In sum,
the
manipulated
principally for the purpose of affording Martorello and his related
entities the protection of tribal immunity while violating usury
a redacted version of the sealed and complete Memorandum Opinion
found at Williams, No. 3:17-cv-461, ECF No. 130.
2
laws
when,
in
fact,
the
applicable
test
shows
that
neither
Ascension nor Big Picture Loans is an arm of the tribe, and that,
therefore,
neither are
entitled to
The
immunity.
fundamental
purpose of the corporate arrangements was to permit the defendants
to evade the usury laws of the states, including those of Virginia,
and to allow the making of consumer loans at rates approximating
699% per annum, with the overwhelming share of the yield of the
repayment
of
those
loans
going
to
Martorello
or
corporations
controlled by him and a very small portion going to the Tribe.
After the Corporate Defendants appealed from the decision
denying them protections of sovereign immunity, the case was set
for
trial on the claims against Martorello.
The case against
Martorello was set for trial to begin on March 18, 2019, but as
explained in the Memorandum Order entered on January 23,
2019,
Williams, No. 3:17-cv-461, ECF No. 323, the Corporate Defendants
thwarted the discovery efforts of the plaintiffs and Martorello to
adequately prepare for trial.
It therefore became necessary to
continue the trial against Martorello generally, because, in part,
of the need to take the deposition of Simon Xu Liang and others
who
are
Bellicose
employed
Capital,
Memorandum Opinion,
by Ascension
LLC
but
were
("Bellicose").
formerly
As
employed
explained
by
in
the
Bellicose was controlled by Martorello,
but
Bellicose was acquired by the Tribe in 2015. Williams, 329 F. Supp.
3d at 259. Bellicose's assets were assigned to Ascension and its
3
liabilities were
ceased
to
assigned to Big
exist.
Id.
Ascension and Big
at
261.
Picture Loans,
This
and Bellicose
restructuring
Picture Loans take on
(which
saw
lending operations of
Bellicoise and another Martorello company) was part of a plan by
Martorello,
Ascension,
and
Big
Picture
to
clothe
a
lending
operation-which the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York said could be regulated under New York's nondiscriminatory anti-usury laws-in the Tribe's sovereign immunity.
Id. at 257-259; see also Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. N.Y.
State Dep't of Fin. Servs., 974 F. Supp. 2d 353, 360-61 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); aff'd, 769 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014).
With that in mind,
against
the Corporate
plaintiffs
employees
sought
about
to
and precluded from conducting discovery
Defendants because of
obtain information
Bellicose
and
its
their appeal,
from
operations
farmer
as
the
Bellicose
well
as
the
transformation of Bellicose and affiliated entities into Ascension
and Big Picture Loans.
That evidence was intended to help them
prove their merits case against Martorello.
did not
initiate
the depositions
against
Although Martorello
the
former
Bellicose
employees, he has said he needs information from the to aid in his
defense.
Liang is the controller of Ascension and he was formerly an
employee
of
Bellicose.
He
is
a
part
owner of
Eventide Credit
Acquisitions, LLC ("Eventide") which provided the initial loan of
4
$300M that was to fund the lending operations to be conducted by
Ascension and Big Picture Loans after Bellicose became what is now
Ascension and Big Picture Loans.
The plaintiffs in Williams,
No.
with two subpoenas ad testificandum,
3: 17-cv-461,
served Liang
one under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 30(b) (1) and the other under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 45.
After the Corporate Defendants filed their appeal,
Liang's counsel and plaintiffs' counsel discussed the subpoenas,
and plaintiffs' counsel made clear that they planned to proceed
with a deposition of Liang under the Rule 45 subpoena.
Liang,
who
is
represented by the
same
law
firm
as
the
Corporate Defendants, filed the AMENDED MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA
TO SIMON XU LIANG TO TESTIFY AT A DEPOSITION IN A CIVIL ACTION AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT (ECF No. 3).
The plaintiffs responded to
that motion (ECF No. 7), and Liang replied (ECF No. 9). The parties
presented oral argument.
After the AMENDED MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA TO SIMON XU LIANG
TO TESTIFY AT A DEPOSITION IN A CIVIL ACTION AND MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT (ECF No. 3) was ripe, but before the Court had a hearing
on the motion, the Court decided the Corporate Defendants' motion
to stay in Williams. See No. 3:17-cv-461, ECF No. 323.
Relevant
here, the Court confirmed that neither Matt Martorello (the third
defendant in the case) nor the plaintiffs could serve discovery
directly
on
the
Corporate
Defendants,
5
because
the
Corporate
Defendants' appeal to the Fourth Circuit must be respected.
at 7,
9.
But,
Id.
the Court also held that the case against Matt
Martorello would not be stayed even though the trial had to be
moved
because
of
the
delayed
discovery
caused
by
expansive
assertions of sovereign immunity of which the assertion by Liang
is but a part.
Id.
Matt Martorello,
because the Court is divested only "over [the]
at 6.
Thus,
discovery may proceed against
aspects of the case involved in the appeal."
Id. at 8-9 (quoting
Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)).
DISCUSSION
A court must quash or modify a
subpoena that "subjects a
person to undue burden" or that "requires disclosure of privileged
or
other
protected
Fed.
matter."
R.
Civ.
P.
45(d) (3) (A).
Additionally, the "party or attorney responsible for issuing and
serving
a
subpoena
must
take
imposing undue burden or
expense
subpoena."
P.
Fed.
R.
Civ.
reasonable
on
45(c) (1).
a
person
steps
to
subject
avoid
to
the
The burden to establish
that a subpoena ad testificandum imposes an undue burden is on the
person opposing its command.
Co.,
289 F.R.D. 237, 241
F.R.D.
618,
620
(E.D.
Va.
See Singletary v. Sterling Transp.
(E.D. Va. 2012); Castle v. Jallah, 142
1992);
9A Fed.
Prac.
&
Proc.
Civ.
§
2463.1 (3d ed.).
First, Liang argues that he should not have to testify while
the Corporate Defendants' appeal is pending because he shares the
6
same immunity as the Tribe and thus cannot be deposed by thirdparty
subpoenas. 3
The
Court
finds
this
argument
unpersuasive
insofar as it pertains to Liang's employment at Bellicose and in
his role as part owner of Eventide.
Liang has failed to provide
a single case in which a court has held that an officer of a tribal
entity is protected by his employer's sovereign immunity from being
questioned about
entity.
his
employment before working
for
the
Nor has the Court found any case that so holds.
tribal
Further,
although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that tribal immunity
may cover tribal employees and officials acting within the scope
of their employment so that they cannot be sued, see Michigan v.
Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 791 n.4
(2014), the Supreme
Court has also held that tribal employees may be sued in their
individual
employee.
capacity
for
torts
committed
by
the
individual
See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1288 (2017).
If
they can be sued in their individual capacity, surely they can be
3
Liang raises two other arguments for why he should not have
to testify, but, since the time of the filing of the motion to
quash, the Court has held that both are unpersuasive.
First, as
stated earlier, this Court has already held that it is only ~over
[the] aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Williams, No.
3:17-cv-461, ECF No. 323 at 8-9 (quoting Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58);
see also Alice L. v. Dusek, 492 F.3d 563, 564 (5th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam).
Second, Liang argues that the subpoena subjects him to an
undue burden because whether the case against Matt Martorello
should be stayed was pending at the time the motion was filed.
That too was decided in a prior order, and the motion to stay was
denied. Williams, No. 3:17-cv-461, ECF No. 323 at 6-7.
7
subpoenaed for depositions as individuals.
Thus, the Court holds
that Liang can be deposed about all activities in his role as an
officer or employee or shareholder of Bellicose and Eventide, the
operation of Bellicose, the reasons for Bellicose's sale to the
Tribe, and the structure of the Bellicose sale.
But, whether Liang can be questioned about his employment at
Ascension must be left for another day.
Although the Court doubts
that Liang can altogether avoid testifying about his work at
Ascension even if the Fourth Circuit decides that the Corporate
Defendants
are
protected by
the
Tribe's
immunity,
the
Court
believes that prudence dictates that Liang should not be asked
about his role at Ascension during the pendency of the appeal.
If
the Fourth Circuit affirms the decision rejecting the claim to
sovereign
immunity,
then
discovery
can
be
reopened
to
allow
inquiry.
However, because of problems with discovery and delay caused
by dealing with broad claims of immunity from discovery interposed
by the Corporate Defendants, this case is now out of kilter.
The
requested deposition is related to the merits of the claims against
Martorello.
And, it is correct that preserving testimony now would
be helpful to the plaintiffs.
However, there is pending a class
certification motion against Martorello that ought to be decided
first.
Therefore,
the
deposition
allowed
here
will
scheduled until after class certification is decided.
8
not
be
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and as set forth above, the AMENDED
MOTION TO QUASH
SUBPOENA TO
SIMON XU LIANG TO TESTIFY AT A
DEPOSITION IN A CIVIL ACTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT (ECF No. 3)
will be granted in part and denied in part.
It is so ORDERED.
/s/
Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge
Richmond, Virginia
Date: February 8, 2019
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