Gray v. Hackworth
Filing
11
MEMORANDUM OPINION (Dismissing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Action). Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 10/29/2020. (Copy mailed to plaintiff) (smej, )
Case 3:20-cv-00195-HEH-RCY Document 11 Filed 10/29/20 Page 1 of 5 PageID# 41
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
ANTWAN D. GRAY,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:20CV195-HEH
DAVID HACKWORTH,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Dismissing 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 Action)
Antwan D. Gray, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and informa pauperis, filed
this 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 action.* The matter is proceeding on Gray's Particularized Complaint
("Complaint," ECF No. 10.) The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
1. PRELIMINARY REVIEW
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act("PLRA")this Court must dismiss
any action filed by a prisoner ifthe Court determines the action: (1)"is frivolous"; or(2)
"fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28
* The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who,under color ofany statute...ofany State...subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws,shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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U.S.C. § 1915A. The first standard includes claims based upon "an indisputably
meritless legal theory," or claims where the "factual contentions are clearly baseless."
Clay V. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417,427(E.D. Va. 1992)(quoting
v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319,327(1989)). The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or
the applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943,952
(4th Cir. 1992)(citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1356(1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130,1134(4th
Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual
allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin
by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption oftruth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,679(2009).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[]only 'a short and plain statement
ofthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant
fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp.
V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,555(2007)(second alteration in original)(quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47(1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints
containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation ofthe elements of a
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cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient
"to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a
claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570, rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or
complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must "allege facts
sufficient to state all the elements of[his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003)(citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d
193,213(4th Cir. 2002);lodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)).
Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d
1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate's advocate and develop,sua
sponte, statutory and constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the
face of his complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241,243(4th Cir. 1997)(Luttig, J.,
concurring); Beaudett v. City ofHampton,775 F.2d 1274, 1278(4th Cir. 1985).
II. GRAY'S COMPLAINT
On December 10, 2019, Gray was walking down a hallway in the Hampton Roads
Regional Jail ("the Jail"). (Compl. 1.) Gray slipped and fell on a wet floor and injured
his back and hip. (Id.) The floor was wet because of a leaking pipe in the ceiling. (Id.)
Gray was taken to the medical department. (Id.)
David Hackworth was the Superintendent ofthe Jail at the time of Gray's
accident. (Id.) According to Gray, Hackworth knew that the pipes leaked from time to
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time and did not bother to get them fixed. {Id.) Gray contends that Hackworth's inaction
in the face ofthese conditions violated Gray's right to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
III. ANALYSIS
"[I]t is settled that pretrial detainees possess a constitutional right 'to be free from
punishment.'" Williamson v. Stirling., 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018)(quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). This right "derives from the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects such detainees from punishment 'prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process oflaw.'" Id.(quoting Bell, 441 U.S.
535 n.l6).
Claims such as Gray's, which challenge the general conditions of confinement at a
facility, are pursued as a violation of a detainee's substantive due process rights. Id. at
174 (citations omitted).^ "The controlling inquiry for such a claim is whether the
conditions imposed on the pretrial detainee constitute 'punishment.'" Id. at 175 (citations
omitted). The relevant precedent teaches that "punishment, whether for a convicted
inmate or a pretrial detainee, is the product of intentional action, or intentional inaction,
respecting known and substantial risks of harm." Westmoreland v. Brown,883 F. Supp.
67,72(E.D. Va. 1995)(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,837-38(1994)).
In this regard,"individuals do not have a constitutional right(1)to be free from a
government employee's negligence, even if it causes an injury, or(2)to have the
^"A pretrial detainee challenging individually-imposed restrictions — as opposed to
shared conditions of confinement — is entitled to pursue a procedural due process claim."
Williamson,912 F.3d at 174(citations omitted).
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government protect them from such an injury." Ball v. City ofBristol, Va., Jail,
No. 7:10CV00303,2010 WL 2754320, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 12, 2010){cWrng Daniels v.
Williams,474 U.S. 327(1986)). Courts have routinely held that slip and fall cases fail to
state a claim of constitutional dimension under § 1983. See Bacon v. Carroll, 232 F.
App'x 158, 160(3d Cir. 2007)(holding that failure to warn ofslippery floor stated a
claim of mere negligence and not a constitutional violation); Reynolds v. Powell, 370
F.3d 1028, 1031-32(10th Cir. 2004)(finding that slippery conditions arising from
standing water in shower was not a condition that posed a substantial risk of serious
harm, even where inmate was on crutches and warned employees that he faced a
heightened risk offailing); Beasley v. Anderson,67 F. App'x 242,242(5th Cir. 2003)
(citations omitted)(holding slip and fall claim sounded in negligence and was insufficient
to allege a constitutional claim). Accordingly, Gray fails to demonstrate that the slippery
floor to which he was exposed amounted to punishment that would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Accordingly, Gray's claim and the action will be dismissed. The Clerk
will note the disposition ofthe action for purposes ofthe 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Is/
Henry E. Hudson
Date:ftc1Xij 2jt>2X>
Richmond, Virginia
Senior United States District Judge
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