Stith v. Townsend et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge M. Hannah Lauck on 5/10/2024. (jenjones, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
RAQUEL STITH,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:23cv676

v.
WESLEY TOWNSEND, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Raquel Stith, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. 1 The matter is before the Court on Mr. Stith's Second Particularized
Complaint, (ECF No. 19), for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and for
Mr. Stith's compliance with the Court's April 3, 2024 Memorandum Order, (ECF No. 18).

I. Procedural History
Mr. Stith filed his original Complaint against J.D. Fulk and Wesley Townsend. (ECF No.
1.)2 However, Mr. Stith failed to name Defendant Fulk in the body of the complaint. (See ECF
No. I.) Mr. Stith's allegations against Defendant Townsend vaguely suggested that Defendant

1

The statute provides, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law ....
42 u.s.c. § 1983.
2

The Court employs the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system. The
Court corrects the capitalization, punctuation, and spelling in quotations from Mr. Stith's
submissions.

Townsend was "denying me my rights" by not allowing Mr. Stith to contact his lawyer. (ECF
No. 1, at 4.) Mr. Stith suggested that Defendant Townsend's actions violated his "1st
Amendment, 8th Amendment [and] 14th Amendment rights." (ECF No. 1, at 4.) Accordingly,
by Memorandum Order entered on February 6, 2024, the Court explained as follows:
In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,[] a plaintiff must
allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a
constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States. See Dowe
v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir.
1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Courts must liberally construe prose civil rights
complaints in order to address constitutional deprivations. Gordon v. Leeke, 514
F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Nevertheless, "[p]rinciples requiring generous
construction of pro se complaints are not ... without limits." Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 115 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs Complaint fails to
comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). That rule provides:

(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's
jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim
needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff fails to provide a short and plain statement of his
claim. Plaintiffs current terse allegations also fail to provide each defendant with
fair notice of the facts and legal basis upon which his or her liability rests. See Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Accordingly, Plaintiff is DIRECTED, within thirty (30) days of the date of
entry hereof, to particularize his complaint in conformance with the following
directions and in the order set forth below:
a.
At the very top of the particularized pleading,
Plaintiff is directed to place the following caption in all capital
letters "PARTICULARIZED COMPLAINT FOR CIVIL ACTION
NUMBER 3:23CV676."
2

b.
The first paragraph of the particularized pleading
must contain a list of defendants. Thereafter, in the body of the
particularized complaint, Plaintiff must set forth legibly, in
separately numbered paragraphs, a short statement of the facts
giving rise to his claims for relief. Thereafter, in separately
captioned sections, Plaintiff must clearly identify each civil right
violated. Under each section, the Plaintiff must list each defendant
purportedly liable under that legal theory and explain why he
believes each defendant is liable to him. Such explanation should
reference the specific numbered factual paragraphs in the body of
the particularized complaint that support that assertion. Plaintiff
shall also include a prayer for relief.
c.
The particularized pleading will supplant the prior
complaints. The particularized pleading must stand or fall of its
own accord. Plaintiff may not reference statements in the
prior complaints.
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE FOREGOING DIRECTIONS WILL
RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4l(b).

(ECF No. 12, at 1-3.) On February 15, 2024, the Court received Mr. Stith's Particularized
Complaint. (ECF No. 13.) By Memorandum Order entered on March 19, 2024, the
Court stated:
The Court appreciates that Plaintiff attempted to comply with Rule 8 and its prior
instructions; however, Plaintiffs current terse allegations still fail to provide each
defendant with fair notice of the facts and legal basis upon which his or her liability
rests. Plaintiffs fact section is a mere three paragraphs and less than a page of an
8-inch by 5-inch notepad. Plaintiff repeats the vague statement "to include, but not
limited to" to describe the facts behind his claims. (Id at 1-2.) Plaintiff must state
all facts that support his claim that defendants violated his constitutional rights.
(ECF No. 14, at 2.) The Court then directed Mr. Stith to file a second particularized complaint
within thirty (30) days of the date of entry hereof and again provided Stith with specific
instructions on how to file such a complaint. (ECF No. 14, at 2-3.) In addition to the
instructions provided in the prior order, the Court added:
c.
The particularized pleading will supplant the prior
complaints. This means that the particularized complaint will
REPLACE any other complaint and the Court will not consider any
3

old complaint. The particularized pleading must stand or fall of its
own accord so Plaintiff should include all facts and all legal claims
that he wishes the Court to consider. Plaintiff may not reference
statements in the prior complaints.
(ECF No. 14, at 3.)
Instead of filing a Second Particularized Complaint, Mr. Stith filed two letter requests for
the appointment of counsel. (ECF Nos. 15, 16.) Mr. Stith indicated that he "followed the steps
that were given to [him] as best as I could" and asks for an attorney to help him with his case.
(See ECF No. 15, at 1.) By Memorandum Order entered on April 4, 2024, the Court repeated the

instructions it had provided Mr. Stith in the February 6, 2024 and March 19, 2024 Memorandum
Orders. (ECF No. 18, at 1-3.) The Court added:
Counsel need not be appointed in § 1983 cases unless the case presents complex
issues or exceptional circumstances. See Fowler v. Lee, 18 F. App'x 164, 166
(4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). This action presents no complex issues or
exceptional circumstances, Plaintiff simply did not include a sufficient
description of the supporting facts. Additionally, Plaintiff's pleadings demonstrate
that he is competent to represent himself in the action. Accordingly, Plaintiff's
requests for the appointment of counsel (ECF Nos. 15, 16) are DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff must file a Second Particularized Complaint that complies with
the directions given above within thirty (30) days of the date of entry hereof. In
addition to what the Court explained above, the Court again explains that
Plaintiff did not include in his Particularized Complaint enough facts to
allow the Defendants to know why Plaintiff believes that they violated his
constitutional rights.
(ECF No. 18, at 3--4.) Mr. Stith has filed his Second Particularized Complaint. (ECF No. 19.) As
explained below, Mr. Stith's claims lack merit and will be DISMISSED.
II. Preliminary Review

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), this Court must dismiss any
action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The
4

first standard includes claims based upon "an indisputably meritless legal theory," or claims
where the "factual contentions are clearly baseless." Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427 (E.D.
Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,327 (1989)). The second standard is the
familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.
1992) (citing SA Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1356
(1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded
allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980
F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering
a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[] only 'a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of
what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."' Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and
conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations
omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570,

5

rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In
order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore, the
plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.1

DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft
Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270,281 (4th
Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes prose complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574
F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing
statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint.

See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241,243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City
of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III. Summary of Allegations and Claims
In his Second Particularized Complaint, Mr. Stith failed to follow the Court's instructions
to identify the Defendants at the top of his particularized pleading. Instead, in the body of his
Second Particularized Complaint, Mr. Stith mentions Captain Townsend and Lt. Fulk
("Defendants"), but it is unclear from Mr. Stith's submissions how these two Defendants
violated Mr. Stith's constitutional rights. (See ECF No. 19, at 4.) Mr. Stith alleges, in sum:
1.
Defendant violated Plaintiffs Fourteenth[3], Eighth[4], and Fifth
Amendment[5] rights by Plaintiff counsel and to confer with counsel while Plaintiff
3

"No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
oflaw ...." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
4

"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
5 "No

person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.... " U.S. Const. amend. V.
6

had ongoing criminal litigation in the State Courts which proves he was deprived
of life, liberty, or property because of these violations of due process of law.
Plaintiff was on segregation and used his resources to contact Captain Townsend
to have access to the phone and the mail to contact his attorney which is a
[c]onstitutional [r]ight. Complainant was let out [ofj his cell every 3 days and was
denied access to [a]ttomey calls and mail deliberately because the phones were cut
off on purpose and other times his pin number was compromised so that it was
inoperable. Therefore, this is a serious violation of Due Process of the Constitution
of the United States violating the Plaintiffs Fourteenth, Eighth, and Fifth
Amendment violations which is a very grave miscarriage of justice.
2.
Plaintiff was denied access to U.S. mail and materials to contact his
[a]ttomey by U.S. mail which is not only a violation of his rights, but also a criminal
violation of the United States Postal Service[.]
3.
Plaintiff asked Defendant and his advisory Captain Townsend
and Shift Commander Lt. Fulk that he needed [a] grievance because of the abovemention[ed] violations occurring on the above events and violations. A
grievance is a [c]onstitutional right[;] therefore, making this a grave violation
of said Plaintiffs Due Process violation under the Fourteenth, Fifth, and
Eighth Amendments.
So therefore Plaintiff prays this court gives him relief and punitive damages
of $150,000 to satisfy this civil rights violation.
(ECF No. 19, at 1-6.)

IV. Analysis
A.

No Personal Involvement Alleged

In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a
person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right
conferred by a law of the United States. See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke

Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998). "Government officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior." lq bal,
556 U.S. at 676 (citations omitted). To state a legally sufficient claim for an alleged violation of
a federal constitutional right, "[a] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,
through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Id. Accordingly,
7

the plaintiff must allege facts that affirmatively show "that the official charged acted personally
in the deprivation of the plaintiff['s] rights." Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir.
1977) (internal quotation marks omitted); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001)
(noting that liability is "personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations").
Throughout the terse Second Particularized Complaint, Mr. Stith faults an unidentified
"Defendant" for the alleged constitutional violations. Mr. Stith mentions Captain Townsend
only to state that Mr. Stith "used his resources to contact Captain Townsend to have access to the
phone and the mail to contact his attorney." (ECF No. 19, at 2-3.) Later, Mr. Stith states that he
"asked Defendant and his advisory Captain Townsend and Shift Commander Lt. Fulk that he
needed [a] grievance." (ECF No. 19, at 4-5.) Thus, Mr. Stith fails to identify the "Defendant,"
and that individual does not appear to be either of the named Defendants. Moreover, Mr. Stith
does not allege that either Defendant Townsend or Fulk violated his constitutional rights through
the actions alleged in the Second Particularized Complaint. At most, Mr. Stith contends that he
asked Defendant Townsend to have access to the phone and mail, and then asked both
Defendants Townsend and Fulk for a grievance. (See ECF No. 19, at 4-5.)
Here, Mr. Stith has failed to allege sufficient facts that suggest each named Defendant
was personally involved in the violation of Mr. Stith's rights. That deficiency alone warrants the
dismissal of his claim. But, as explained more fully below, even assuming that Defendants
Townsend and Fulk were somehow involved in the alleged deprivation of his rights, Mr. Stith
has failed to plausibly allege sufficient facts to support a constitutional claim.

B.

Mr. Stith Fails to State a Claim for Relief

As a preliminary matter, because Mr. Stith is a state inmate bringing claims against state
actors, his due process claims are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth

8

Amendment. See Winfieldv. Bass, 106 F.3d 525,530 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997). Mr. Stith also
contends that Defendants' actions violate the Eighth Amendment, but he fails to allege facts
that would plausibly suggest that Defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment.
Accordingly, any claim brought pursuant to the Fifth or Eighth Amendment will
be DISMISSED.
Generously construed, the Court reads Mr. Stith to allege the following two claims:
Claim One:

Defendant Townsend denied Mr. Stith access to the phone and mail to
contact his attorney in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to
due process.

Claim Two:

Defendants denied Mr. Stith a grievance form in violation of due process.

1.

Claim One

In Claim One, Mr. Stith contends that Defendant Townsend denied Mr. Stith access to
the phone and mail to contact his attorney in violation of his right to due process. On further
inspection of Mr. Stith's allegations, it is unclear whether Defendant Townsend was personally
responsible for denying Mr. Stith the ability to contact his attorney. Mr. Stith contends that he
was in segregation and "used his resources to contact Captain Townsend to have access to the
phone and the mail to contact his attorney." (ECF No. 19, at 1-3.) Mr. Stith then states that he
was only allowed out of his cell every three days, but that the phones were not working, or his
pin number would not work because it had been compromised. (ECF No. 19, at 3.) Thus, Mr.
Stith fails to allege facts that would plausibly suggest that Defendant Townsend was personally
responsible for Mr. Stith's inability to call his attorney. Rather, it seems that technical
difficulties, not any action or inaction of Defendant Townsend, were the cause of the denial of
access to his attorney.

9

Mr. Stith also fails to explain how Defendant Townsend personally denied him the right
to send mail to his attorney. At most Mr. Stith states that he was "denied ... mail deliberately"
without any reference to a particular named Defendant. (ECF No. 19, at 3.) Mr. Stith fails to
allege facts that would plausibly suggests that Defendant Townsend denied him the ability to
contact his attorney through the mail. Accordingly, Claim One lacks merit and will be
DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

2.

Claim Two

In Claim Two, Mr. Stith contends that Defendants denied him a grievance form and a
"grievance is a constitutional right." (ECF No. 19, at 5.) Contrary to Mr. Stith's contention,
"inmates have no constitutional entitlement or due process interest in access to a grievance
procedure. An inmate thus cannot bring a § 1983 claim alleging denial of a specific grievance
process ...." Booker v. S.C. Dep 't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 541 (4th Cir. 2017); see Adams v.

Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance
procedures or access to any such procedure voluntarily established by a state."); Doans v. Rice,
No. 87-7244, 1987 WL 38813, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 15, 1987) ("Because inmate grievance
procedures are not constitutionally required in state prison systems, the failure to follow
grievance procedures does not give rise to a§ 1983 claim."). Accordingly, Mr. Stith has no
constitutional right to a grievance form, and Claim Two will be DISMISSED for failure to state a
claim and as legally frivolous.

V. Conclusion
Mr. Stith's claims will be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim and as legally
frivolous. The Clerk will be DIRECTED to note the disposition for the purposes of 28 U. S.C.
§ 191 S(g).
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

5l

\D\008L\
Date:
Richmond, Virginia

II