Rabenstine v. National Association of State Boating Law Administrators, Inc. et al
Filing
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OPINION & ORDER re: Granting 24 Motion for Summary Judgment. Denying 26 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply & 35 Supplemental MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion and dismisses Defendant Hagan from this matter WITH PREJUDICE. The Court is Denying documents 26 & 35. Signed by District Judge Henry C. Morgan, Jr and filed on 6/1/15. Copies distributed to all parties 6/1/15. (ldab, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Newport News Division
VICTORIA G. RABENSTINE,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 4:14cv78
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE
BOATING LAW ADMINISTRATORS, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant James Hagan's ("Defendant" or
"Hagan") Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant James Hagan ("Motion"). Doc. 24.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion and dismisses
Defendant Hagan from this matter WITH PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations
This is a personal injury action arising out of a boating accident brought "under the
general maritime and tort laws of the United States as well as any other applicable law of the
Commonwealth of Virginia." Compl. ^ 1. Defendants removed the action to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on June 27, 2014, and the Court's admiralty
jurisdiction has been invoked.
Doc. 1.
Plaintiff Victoria Rabenstine ("Plaintiff or
"Rabenstine") is a resident of Virginia. Compl. U 2. There are three Defendants in this action:
Defendant National Association of State Boating Law Administrators, Inc. ("NASBLA");
Defendant Hagan, a foreign citizen; and Defendant State of Louisiana, through the Department
of Wildlife & Fisheries ("Louisiana").
Id. fflf 3-4. Rabenstine was a student in a "Tactical
Operator's Course" in which Defendant Hagan was an instructor. Id. 1fl| 6-8. Defendant Hagan
is alleged to be an agent or servant of Defendants NASBLA and Louisiana. Id. ^ 8.
Rabenstine was injured in a boating accident on May 21, 2012, which she alleges was
caused by Defendants' negligence. Id. 1 9. The accident occurred on the James River near
Craney Island, which is purported to be navigable water, when a student in the Tactical
Operator's Course performed a ninety degree starboard turn called a "Gate Drill." ]d. During
this drill, the vessel suddenly shifted to the port side and threw Plaintiff about the deck of the
vessel, causing injury. Id. ffif 7, 9. Rabenstine alleges that at the time of the accident the vessel
was under Defendant Hagan's care and control and that he was negligent in his instruction of the
student operator. Doc. 29 at 2. It is not disputed that Hagan was acting within the scope of his
employment with the Louisiana at the time of the accident. Id at 6.
B. Procedural History
Defendant filed the present Motion on May 8, 2015 contending that he is immune from
suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Doc. 25. Plaintiff argues in her response1 that
Defendant enjoys no qualified immunity in the Commonwealth of Virginia because any
immunity he might be entitled to in Louisiana does not extend to the Commonwealth. Doc. 29 at
1. She also reasserts the argument rejected by this Court in a previous opinion that the State of
Louisiana waived its sovereign immunity when it removed the action to federal court. Id. at 3:
'Priorto filing herresponse to Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Response
to the Motion for Summary Judgment of James Hagan, Doc. 26, but submitted her response to the Motion within
fifteen minutes of filing the first Motion for Extension of Time. Doc. 27. Accordingly, that Motion was considered
moot. On May 29, 2015, however, after the Motion for Summary Judgment was fully briefed, Plaintiff submitted a
renewed Motion for Extension of Time, Doc. 35, on the same grounds as the first, namely, that the responsive
deadline should be extended until after additional discovery has been completed.
The Supreme Court of the United States has clearly stated that, on summary judgment, until the threshold
legal questions underlying qualified immunity are resolved, "discovery should not be allowed." Harlow v.
Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "Unless the plaintiffs allegations state a claim of violation of clearly
established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of
discovery." Michell v. Forsyth. 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Plaintiff has not alleged such a violation here;
accordingly, this Court is DENYING the Motions, Docs. 26, 35.
see Doc. 21 at 10, n.3.2 Lastly, Plaintiff contends that Defendant was performing a ministerial
and not discretionary function at the time of the accident. Doc. 29 at 7. Defendants Hagan and
Louisianan replied to Plaintiffs arguments on May 22 and May 23,2015 respectively.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment
Summaryjudgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is appropriate only when a
court, viewing the record as a whole and in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
determines that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See, e.g.. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322-24 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986); Terry's
Floor Fashions v. Burlington Indus.. 763 F.2d 604, 610 (4th Cir. 1985).
Once a party has
properly filed evidence supporting the motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party may
not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must instead set forth specific facts
illustrating genuine issues for trial. Celotex. 477 U.S. at 322-24. Such facts must be presented
in the form of exhibits and sworn affidavits. Failure by the nonmoving party to rebut the motion
with such evidence on its behalf will result in summary judgment when appropriate.
"[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment... against
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322. A
mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Rather,
2"Plaintiff also attempted to argue that Defendant Louisiana waived its sovereign immunity by being the party that
removed this action to federal court. Doc. 14 at 9. By removing this case to federal court, Defendant Louisiana
simply consents to have the federal court adjudicate its sovereign immunity defense. Stewart v. North Carolina. 393
F.3d 484, 490 (4th Cir. 2005). It has not affected a waiver of its sovereign immunity defense as to liability. Id"
Further, Plaintiffin this matter hasconfused the doctrine of "sovereign immunity" with that of"qualified immunity,"
the matter currently before this Court. These doctrines are distinct, and the Court will only address the matter
currently before it.
the evidence must be such that the fact-finder reasonably could find for the nonmoving party.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Although the Court must draw
all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, in order to successfully defeat a motion
for summary judgment a nonmoving party cannot rely on "mere belief or conjecture, or the
allegations and denials contained in his pleadings." Doyle v. Sentry Ins., 877 F. Supp. 1002,
1005 (E.D. Va. 1995) (citing Celotex. 477 U.S. at 324).
B. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is immunity from civil liability enjoyed by government officials
performing discretionary functions provided their conduct "does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Wheeler v.
Gilmore. 998 F. Supp. 666, 669 (E.D. Va. 1998) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a state official is entitled
to qualified immunity, this Court must make a two-fold determination. Pittman v. Nelms. 87
F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1996). Firstly, the Court must determine whether a "defendant's conduct
violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff." Id. at 119. The case will only proceed to the
second level of analysis if the Court finds that Defendant acted illegally by violating either
Plaintiffs constitutional or statutory right. Id.; see also Harlow. 457 U.S. at 818. If so, it must
then be determined "whether the law governing the violation was clearly established at the time
of the incident, and whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position should have known
that his conduct was illegal.
Both are issues of law for the court."
Id. (internal citations
omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Official Capacity
Before determining whether a qualified immunity analysis is warranted, Defendant
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Hagan's "official status" must be established. See Leverette v. Bell. 247 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir.
2001). The parties do not dispute that at the time of the accident Defendant Hagan "was acting
within his scope as an employee of the State of Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries."
Doc. 29 at 6. At the time of the accident, Hagan was acting as an "assistant instructor" in the
Tactical Operator's Course attended by Plaintiff, and did so at the instruction of his supervisors.
Doc. 30 at 2. Accordingly, Defendant Hagan was acting in his official capacity as an employee
of the State of Louisiana when the incident occurred, and he is eligible for qualified immunity
under federal law, which "specifically protects public officials from the specter of damages
liability for judgment calls made in a legally uncertain environment." Ryder v. United States.
515 U.S. 177, 185 (1995) (citing Harjow, 457 U.S. at 806) (emphasis added).
B. Discretionary Functions
In her Complaint, Plaintiffs only allegation against Hagan is that he acted negligently
during various stages of a training exercise. Compl. ^ 9, 11. The Supreme Court has stated, "[a]
law that fails to specify the precise action that the official must take in each instance creates only
discretionary authority; and that authority remains discretionary however egregiously it is
abused." Davis v. Scherer. 468 U.S. 183, 196 n. 14 (1984). The Fourth Circuit has expounded
"that without the ability to exercise some element of judgment in the execution of law, neither
federal, state, nor local government could function." McMellon v. United States. 387 F.3d 329,
350 (4th Cir. 2004). In fact, this Court asserted that "there are few, if any, acts performed by
officials which are not discretionary." Williamson v. City of Virginia Beach. 786 F. Supp. 1238,
1260 (E.D. Va. 1992).
Plaintiff has failed to cite either a case which implies training is a ministerial function or
statue purporting to set forth the precise actions Defendant Hagan was required to execute during
the training exercise. By its very nature, the act of training requires a high level of discretion on
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the part of an instructor who must both determine the individual level of skill possessed by each
student and tailor his or her instruction in order to maximize the skills and education benefits to
each. Accordingly, this Court FINDS that Defendant Hagan was engaged in a discretionary and
not ministerial function at the time of the accident.
C. Rights Violation
Plaintiff has not alleged which, if any, constitutional or statutory right Defendant has
violated in the present action. Again, the only claim against Hagan is that he acted negligently
during various stages of a training exercise.
The Supreme Court has stated that qualified
immunity "provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law." Mallev v. Briggs. 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). According to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, there "are surprisingly few cases addressing
qualified immunity for non-constitutional maritime torts." Sol v. City of Miami. 776 F. Supp. 2d
1375, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2011). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
held that state officials are entitled to qualified immunity for non-constitutional maritime torts
brought pursuant to its admiralty jurisdiction, Harrell v. United States. 875 F.2d 828, 831 (11th
Cir. 1989), while the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have extended qualified immunity to government
employees for actions taken during training exercises. See Cartv v. Rodriguez. 470 F. App'x
234, 239-40 (5th Cir. 2012); Humes v. Gilless. 108 F. App'x 266, 269 (6th Cir. 2004).
The Fourth Circuit has clarified, albeit in the context of Eight Amendment claims, that
"negligence or good faith error" on the part of public officials "will not establish a constitutional
claim" for purposes of qualified immunity.
Lopez v. Robinson. 914 F.2d 486, 490 (4th Cir.
1990). In Sol, the district court was faced with the question of whether a police officer alleged to
have negligently operated a Miami police boat under federal maritime law was entitled to
qualified immunity for ordinary negligence claims. 776 F. Supp. 2d at 1382. The court held that
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the officer's alleged violations of federal maritime law did not "eliminate his immunity from suit
in an ordinary negligence case." and dismissed the claims against him. Id.
In the present matter. Plaintiff has only alleged ordinary negligence claims against
Defendant Hagan. and such claims do not establish a constitutional or statutory right for
purposes of a qualified immunity analysis. Plaintiff has conceded that Defendant Hagan was
operating in his official capacity at the time of the accident, and this Court has determined
Defendant was performing a discretionary and not ministerial function at that time. Plaintiff has
not shown that "defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff," Pittman. 87
F.3d at 119, and as such, the Court is not required to proceed to the second prong of the qualified
immunity analysis. See id.: Harlow. 457 U.S. at 818. There are no material facts in dispute, and
Defendant Hagan is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion and dismisses
Defendant Hagan from this matter WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk is REQUESTED to send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record.
It is so ORDERED.
/s/
Henry Coke Morgan, Jr.
Senior United States District Judge
HENRY COKE MORGAN. JR. A}
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Norfolk. VA
June /^2015
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