McCray v. Ardelle Associates Inc., et al.
Filing
23
OPINION AND ORDER Granting 6 Motion to Dismiss. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTED the Notice of Demurrer and Plea in Bar, CONVERTED Ardelle's Demurrer and Plea in Bar into a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), GRANTED the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, and DISMISSED all of Plaintiffs claims against Ardelle.. Signed by District Judge Robert G. Doumar and filed on 6/23/15. Copies distributed to all parties 6/23/15. (ldab, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
NEWPORT NEWS DIVISION
SHERYL MCCRAY,
Plaintiff
CIVIL NO. 4:14cvl58
v.
ARDELLE ASSOCIATES INC., et al.,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon the Notice of Demurrer and Plea in Bar or, in
the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss ("Notice of Demurrer and Plea in Bar") filed by Ardelle
Associates Inc. ("Ardelle"). ECF No. 6. This Notice requested the Court to consider the
Demurrer and Plea in Bar that were undecided and pending in state court when the case was
removed to this Court. On June 11, 2015, the Court held a hearing at which counsel for Ardelle
and Sheryl McCray ("Plaintiff) appeared and argued their respective positions. At the hearing,
the Court GRANTED the Notice of Demurrer and Plea in Bar, CONVERTED Ardelle's
Demurrer and Plea in Bar into a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), GRANTED the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, and DISMISSED all of Plaintiffs
claims against Ardelle. The Court now memorializes its reasons herein.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.
Factual History
The following summary is taken from factual allegations contained in Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint, which, for purposes of ruling on the instant Motion to Dismiss, the Court
accepts as true.1
This case arises from an allegedly hostile work encounter involving Plaintiff in
September 2012. At the time, Plaintiffwas employed by Ardelle and/or Infused Solutions, LLC
("Infused")2 at a United States Army Recruiting Center in Hampton, Virginia. Compl. ffll 2, 4, 5.
On September 20, 2012, Plaintiff had a work dispute with a colleague, Sergeant First Class Jonah
Jancewicz. Id. 1 7. During this dispute, Plaintiff claims that Sergeant Jancewicz verbally
assaulted and physically intimidated her. Id. ffl| 8, 9. Plaintiff reported the incident to her
supervisor later that day. Id ^ 10. On September 24, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Sergeant
Jancewicz and learned that he had also filed a complaint against her. Id. ffi[ 11, 12. On September
26, Jamie Baker, an employee of Infused, called Plaintiff to discuss the incident. Id 11 13, 16,
17. Ms. Baker informed Plaintiff that she was Plaintiffs reporting official and that, as a result of
the incident on September 20, Plaintiff was going to be placed on 90-day probation. Id. ffij 13,
14. Ms. Baker also indicated that another Infused employee had already warned Plaintiff about
her prior misconduct, which Plaintiff insisted had never happened. Jd Later that day, Ms. Baker
sent Plaintiff a final warning notice, which stated that Plaintiff was being disciplined for
insubordination and that Plaintiff had consistently exhibited such misconduct. ]d 1 17. On
September 28, Plaintiff sent an email to Ms. Baker challenging that characterization of her
behavior and asked for paperwork concerning these statements. Id. 1 20. On October 4, 2014,
Plaintiff received a termination notice from her supervisor stating that Plaintiff was being fired
for violating the workplace violence policy. Id 123.
B.
Procedural Background
On May 3, 2013, Plaintiff brought a defamation action in federal court against Sergeant
1 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the plaintiffs factual allegations as true. See
Bumette v. Fahev. 687 F.3d 171, 180 (4th Cir. 2012).
2Plaintiff has alleged that either Ardelle and/or Infused was her employer.
Jancewicz, Ardelle, Infused, Jamie Baker, the United States Army Recruiter Command, a John
Doe, and a Jane Doe in connection with her reprimand and termination. Case No, 4:13cv60, ECF
No. 1. Subsequently, the Court granted Ardelle's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.
Id, ECF No. 27. On April 17, 2014, the Court dismissed the remaining claims for lack of
jurisdiction. Id, ECF No. 45.
On August 7, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Ardelle, Infused, Ms. Baker,
Sergeant Jancewicz, a John Doe, and a Jane Doe in Hampton Circuit Court. See ECF No. 1, Ex.
1 at 2-13. Plaintiff brings a defamation claim against Ardelle, Infused, Ms. Baker, and Sergeant
Jancewicz, as well as a wrongful termination action against Ardelle and Infused. On October 29,
2014, Ardelle filed a Demurrer and Plea in Bar asserting that Plaintiffs defamation claim was
barred by the statute of limitations and that she had failed to state a claim for defamation and
wrongful termination under Virginia law. ECF No. 6-1. Plaintiff filed an Opposition on
November 17,2104, and Ardelle filed a Reply on December 3, 2014.
However, before the state court could rule on the motions, on December 2, 2014, the
United States removed the case to federal court pursuant to the U.S. Attorney's certification
under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). ECF No. 1. Consequently, the case was brought before this Court,
and the United States was substituted for Sergeant Jancewicz as a defendant. ECF No. 2.
Following removal, the Government filed an unopposed Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). ECF No. 3. On January
17, 2015, Ardelle filed the instant Notice of Demurrer and Plea in Bar.3 ECF No. 6. The Court
granted the Government's Motion to Dismiss on April 7, 2015, ECF No. 11, and found no
independent grounds for federal jurisdiction—remanding the case to the state court. However, on
Neither Ms. Baker nor Infused filed a motion requesting the Court to rule on their respective state
motions.
May 1, 2015, the Court granted Ardelle's and Infused's Motion for Reconsideration and
removed the case back to federal court. ECF No. 13. On June 10, 2015, Plaintiff filed an
Information to the Court and Request for Incorporation of Plaintiffs Pleadings Filed of Record
in Hampton Circuit Court ("Information and Request")/ ECF No. 19. On June 11, 2015, the
Court held a hearing at which counsel for Ardelle and Plaintiff appeared and argued their
respective positions regarding Ardelle's Notice of Demurrer and Plea in Bar. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the Court converted Ardelle's Demurrer and Plea in Bar into a Motion to Dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and granted the Motion to Dismiss, dismissing
all of Plaintiff s claims against Ardelle. The Court now memorializes its reasons herein.
II.
NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND PLEA IN BAR
Ardelle's Notice of Demurrer and Plea in Bar requested the Court to consider its
Demurrer and Plea in Bar, which were undecided and pending in state court when the case was
removed. Ardelle's Plea in Bar asserted that Plaintiffs defamation claim was barred by the
statute of limitations, which Ardelle maintained had already run. Ardelle's Demurrer contended
that Plaintiffs Complaint failed to state a claim for defamation and wrongful discharge. In the
alternative, Ardelle requested that its Demurrer and Plea in Bar be converted into a Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss.
First, the Court had to consider whether it could rule on pending state motions filed prior
to the removal of the case, without requiring the moving party to refile the motions in the federal
court. Language in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicates that the Court could consider
such motions. Rule 81 expressly states that "[ajfter removal, repleading is unnecessary unless the
court orders it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(2). This Rule also provides specific guidelines for filing
4 The Court accepted Ardelle's characterization of Plaintiffs Information and Request Plaintiffs as an
untimely opposition to Ardelle's unopposed Notice of Demurrer and Plea in Bar. Accordingly, the Court refused to
consider the arguments therein and DENIED the Information and Request. ECF No. 19.
answers or "other defenses" when the defendant did not do so before removal. Id ("A defendant
who did not answer before removal must answer or present other defenses or objections under
these rules . . . ."). The obvious implication of this language is that a party need not refile
pending state motions in the federal court. See ajso 77 C.J.S. Removal of Cases § 192 (2015)
("Where a cause [sic] is removed from a state court to a federal district court while a motion
theretofore made is pending, such motion is transferred with the record to the federal court, to be
determined by that court."). Accordingly, the Court concluded that it could rule on motions
pending in the state court upon removal, without requiring the motions to be refiled.
Nevertheless, "federal procedural rules govern a case that has been removed to federal
court." Smith v. Baver Corp.. 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2374 n.l (2011); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(1)
("These rules apply to a civil action after it is removed from a state court."). As a result, the
Court CONVERTED Ardelle's Demurrer and Plea in Bar into a Motion to Dismiss under
Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). However, although federal procedural law applied, state law
applied to govern the substantive claims. See United States v. St. Louis Univ., 336 F.3d 294, 300
(4th Cir. 2003) ("The [Federal Tort Claims] Act requires the government's liability to be
determined 'in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.'"
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1))). Therefore, Virginia law supplied the applicable substantive
law.
A.
Ardelle's Plea in Bar
In its Plea in Bar, Ardelle argued that the statute of limitations on Plaintiffs defamation
claim had run. Courts have previously considered such a challenge in a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.
United States v. Kivanc. 714 F.3d 782, 789 (4th Cir. 2013) ("The statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense that may be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss . . . ."). The Court
first had to decide which statute of limitations governed the case at bar: the Federal Tort Claims
Act ("the Act") or Virginia law. The original action was removed pursuant to the Act, which
carries a two-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). However, by the time of the
hearing, the United States had been dismissed from this case. The remaining claims were state
law claims against private parties that had no independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Court accepted Ardelle's argument that Virginia law prescribed the applicable
statute of limitations.
Ardelle asserted that the one-year statute of limitations for defamation actions under
Virginia law had run. See Va. Code § 8.01-247.1 (stating an action for defamation must be
"brought within one year after the cause of action accrues."). Ardelle pointed out that the
defamatory statements alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint occurred around late September or early
October 2012. See Compl. ffl] 17, 23. Ardelle reasoned that because Plaintiff did not file this
lawsuit until August 7, 2014—nearly two years after the alleged defamation occurred—the
statute of limitations had run and Plaintiffs defamation claim was consequently barred.
In response, Plaintiff argued that her defamation claim against Ardelle was not timebarred because the statute of limitations was previously tolled. Plaintiff pointed out that Virginia
Code Section 8.01-229(E)(1) tolls an action commenced within the prescribed limitation period
if the action is dismissed without determining the merits. Plaintiff reasoned that she brought a
nearly identical defamation action on May 3, 2013. That suit was later dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction on April 17, 2014. As a result, Plaintiff contended that the statute of limitations was
tolled from May 3, 2013 to April 17, 2014, which brought the current action within the one-year
deadline.
Therefore, the Court had to consider whether the tolling provision in Virginia Code
Section 8.01-229(E)(1) applied to the present case. Under this code section, "if any action is
commenced within the prescribed limitation period and for any cause abates or is dismissed
without determining the merits, the time such action is pending shall not be computed as part of
the period within which such action may be brought." Va. Code § 8.01-229(E)(1). Furthermore,
for the tolling to have applied, "the subsequently filed action must be filed by the same party in
interest on the same cause of action in the same right." Casey v. Merck & Co.. Inc., 283 Va. 411,
417, 722 S.E.2d 842, 845 (2012)..
The primary issue was whether the prior suit was dismissed on the merits. As mentioned
earlier, Plaintiffs prior suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, which does not constitute a
judgment on the merits under Section 8.01-229(E)(1). See Rivers v. Black & White Cars. Inc..
1990 WL 303324, at *6-9 (E.D. Va. June, 7 1990). However, the claims against Ardelle were
dismissed from the suit on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss before the Court dismissed the entire
case. Although neither Virginia nor federal courts have ruled on whether a dismissal pursuant to
a 12(b)(6) motion constitutes a judgment on the merits in the context of Section 8.01-229(E)(1),
other courts have found such a dismissal to constitute a judgment on the merits in similar
contexts. Bell v. Hood. 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S. Ct. 773, 776 (1946) ("For it is well settled that
the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a
dismissal for want of jurisdiction."); Enzo Therapeutics. Inc. v. Yeda Research & Dev. Co. of
The Weizmann Inst, of Sci.. 467 F. Supp. 2d 579, 585 (E.D. Va. 2006) (finding that a dismissal
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "constitutes a judgment on the merits, and therefore triggers claim
preclusive and res judicata effect"); Rivers v. Norfolk. Baltimore. & Carolina Line. Inc.. 210 F.
Supp. 283, 287 (E.D. Va. 1962) ("In Virginia the authorities are uniform to the effect that a
demurrer goes to the heart of the case and, if sustained, it is a decision on the merits."). Thus, the
Court had to determine whether the dismissal of Plaintiffs entire suit or, on the other hand, her
specific claims against Ardelle, counted as a dismissal under Section 8.01-229(E)(1).
Because no Virginia or federal courts have ruled on this issue, the Court had to look to
the statute. In interpreting a statute under Virginia law, a court "must 'ascertain and give effect to
the intention of the legislature, which is usually self-evident from the statutory language.'"
Rutter v. Oakwood Living Ctrs. of Va.. Inc.. 282 Va. 4, 9, 710 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2011) (quoting
Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. v. Interactive Return Serv.. Inc.. 271 Va. 304, 309, 626
S.E.2d 436, 438 (2006)). A court must interpret the "the plain meaning of the words used in the
statute." Sheppard v. Junes. 287 Va. 397, 403, 756 S.E.2d 409, 411 (2014). Furthermore, courts
"must consider 'a statute in its entirety, rather than by isolating particular words or phrases.'" Id.
at 403, 756 S.E.2d at 411 (quoting Small v. Fannie Mae. 286 Va. 119, 127, 747 S.E.2d 817, 821
(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Reading the statute as a whole, the Court found that for the purposes of dismissal, Section
8.01-229(E)(1) counts the abatement or dismissal of the plaintiffs entire case, rather than the
claims against the defendant. Section 8.01-229(E)(1) specifically uses "action" rather than
"claim" to determine the time that the suit is tolled. Va. Code § 8.01-229(E)(1) ("[I]f any action
is commenced within the prescribed limitation period and for any cause ... is dismissed without
determining the merits, the time such action is pending shall not be computed as part of the
period within which such action may be brought . . . .") (emphasis added). The fact that the
statute uses the term "claim" in other subsections indicates that the use of "action" rather than
"claim" was intentional. The Virginia Supreme Court has found the term "action" under Section
8.01-229(E)(1) "refers to civil litigation in both the state and federal courts." Welding. Inc. v.
Bland Cntv. Serv. Auth.. 261 Va. 218, 224, 541 S.E.2d 909, 912 (2001). Therefore, the Court
concluded that the dismissal of the entire action counted as the determinative dismissal under
Section 8.01-229(E)(1).
Upon applying this principle, the Court found that the present action was brought within
the statute of limitations. According to the Complaint, the alleged defamation occurred on
October 4,2012 at the latest. Plaintiffs first suit was brought 212 days later on May 3, 2013. The
action was tolled from that date until April 17, 2014, when it was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The second suit was brought 113 days later on August 7, 2014. Therefore, the total
time, not counting the time the prior action was pending, was 325 days, which was within the
365 day limit for bringing a defamation claim. Accordingly, the statute of limitations had not run
and, consequently, Plaintiffs defamation claim was not barred.
B.
Ardelle's Demurrer
In its Demurrer, Ardelle argued that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for defamation and
wrongful termination. As noted earlier, the Court converted Ardelle's Demurrer into a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. Therefore, it considers these challenges in light of Rule 12(b)(6). Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) mandates that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, dismissal
is appropriate if it appears that the plaintiff is not "entitled to reliefunder any legal theory which
might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged." Harrison v. U.S. Postal Serv.. 840 F.2d 1149,
1152 (4th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted); Davis v. Hudeins. 896 F. Supp. 561, 566 (E.D. Va.
1995). When reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept "all well-
pleaded allegations in the plaintiffs complaint as true" and draw "all reasonable factual
inferences from those facts in the plaintiffs favor." Edwards v. Citv of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,
244 (4th Cir. 1999). Legal conclusions, on the other hand, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth if they are not supported by factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The Fourth Circuit has held that a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
should be granted only in "very limited circumstances." Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co..
883 F.2d 324, 325 (4th Cir. 1989).
1.
Defamation Claim
Ardelle first challenged Plaintiffs defamation claim. "The elements of defamation are
'(1) publication of (2) an actionable statement with (3) the requisite intent.'" Tharpe v. Saunders.
285 Va. 476, 476, 737 S.E.2d 890, 892 (2013) (quoting Jordan v. Kollman. 269 Va. 569, 575,
612 S.E.2d 203, 206 (2005)). Specifically, Ardelle argued that Plaintiff failed to properly plead
the element of publication. "[T]he publication element of a defamation action requires
dissemination of the statement to a third party in a nonprivileged context." Shaheen v. WellPoint
Companies. Inc.. 490 Fed. App'x 552, 555 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying Virginia law). "It is
sufficient to show that, when the defendant addressed the defamatory words to the plaintiff,
another person was present, heard the words spoken, and understood the statement as referring to
the plaintiff." Food Lion. Inc. v. Melton. 250 Va. 144, 150,458 S.E.2d 580, 584 (1995).
The Court found that Plaintiff failed to properly allege publication in its defamation claim
against Ardelle. At the hearing, counsel for Plaintiff was unable to identify any particular
language in the Complaint that alleged publication. After reviewing the Complaint, the Court
found only two paragraphs that were potentially relevant to an allegation of publication. First, the
Court identified paragraph 17, which stated, "Defendant Baker and/or other as yet unknown
agents or employees of Defendants Ardelle Associates and/or Team Infused uttered and/or
communicated these falsehoods concerning Plaintiff to third parties." Compl. 1 17 (emphasis
added). Such a vague and generalized statement, which also failed to name the specific party to
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whom the defamatory statement was communicated, only established, at most, a mere possibility
that publication occurred. The mere possibility of misconduct is insufficient to meet the federal
pleading standard. See Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 ("But where the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
has alleged—but it has not 'showfn]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Court found that this language failed to
allege Ardelle's publication.
The only other language relevant to the present inquiry was an allegation of Ardelle's
liability under an alter ego theory. This language stated that "Ardelle and Infused Solutions were
so interconnected as to operations and functions that the corporate boundaries between the two
were eroded and both comprised [of] one collective entity," and therefore "Ardelle Associates
and Infused Solutions are liable for each other's actions under an alter ego theory." Compl. ^ 32.
Through this allegation, Plaintiff sought to impute Infused's liability for defamation to Ardelle.
Even assuming arguendo that Infused was liable to Plaintiff for defamation, this language failed
to establish such liability. Under Virginia law, "courts will disregard the separate legal identities
of the corporation only when one is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrongs, protect
fraud or crime of the other." Eure v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp.. Inc., 263 Va. 624,
634, 561 S.E.2d 663, 669 (2002) (quoting Beale v. Kappa Alpha Order. 192 Va. 382, 399, 64
S.E.2d 789, 798 (1951). "Only 'an extraordinary exception' will justify disregarding the
corporate entity." Greenbere v. Com, ex rel. Attv. Gen, of Va.. 255 Va. 594, 604, 499 S.E.2d
266, 272 (1998) (quoting Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply Co.. Inc.. 234 Va. 207, 212,
360 S.E.2d 828, 831 (1987)). Plaintiffs allegations plainly failed to plead any wrong, fraud, or
criminal activity to justify disregarding the corporate form. Thus, the Court found that the alter
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ego theory did not apply.
Because Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead publication of the alleged defamatory
statement, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for defamation. Accordingly, the
Court DISMISSED Plaintiffs defamation claim against Ardelle.
2.
Wrongful Termination
Ardelle also argued that Plaintifffailed to state a claim for wrongful termination. Virginia
'strongly adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine.'" VanBuren v. Grubb. 284 Va. 584, 589,
733 S.E.2d 919, 921 (2012). The common law tort of wrongful discharge has been carved out as
an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Bowman v. State Bank of Kevsville. 229 Va.
534, 539, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1985). This "exception to the employment-at-will doctrine [is]
limited to discharges which violate public policy, that is, the policy underlying existing laws
designed to protect the property rights, personal freedoms, health, safety, or welfare of the people
in general." Miller v. SEVAMP. Inc.. 234 Va. 462, 468, 362 S.E.2d 915, 918 (1987). "In a
wrongful discharge case, the tortious act is not the discharge itself; rather, the discharge becomes
tortious by virtue of the wrongful reasons behind it." VanBuren, 284 Va. at 592, 733 S.E.2d at
923. The Virginia Supreme Court has recognized that a claim for wrongful discharge arises when
the discharge violates a public policy recognized in Virginia. Bowman. 229 Va. at 539, 331
S.E.2dat801.
Upon review, the Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to allege such a public policy.
From what the Court could discern, Plaintiff had pled three reasons for her wrongful discharge.
First, she alleged that her "termination was clearly a retaliatory act against her for filing a
complaint against Defendant Sergeant Jancewicz and for requesting any copies of past
documentation concerning her work behavior." Compl. 1 23. Second, she pled that contrary to
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company procedure, her employer did not investigate the incident. Id. ffl| 23, 28. Finally, she
alleged that the defamatory statement was "used as a pretext" to terminate her employment. Id. 1
26. These allegations failed to identify how her termination violated any public policy. Instead,
Plaintiff allegations only identify the potential violation of her private rights. See Miller, 234 Va.
at 468, 362 S.E.2d at 919. Wrongful discharge is "not so broad as to make actionable those
discharges of at-will employees which violate only private rights or interests." Id. at 468, 362
S.E.2d at 918. Because Plaintiff never identified the violation of a recognized public policy, she
failed to state a claim for wrongful discharge. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSED Plaintiffs
wrongful termination claim against Ardelle.
II.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTED the Notice of Demurrer and Plea in Bar,
CONVERTED Ardelle's Demurrer and Plea in Bar into a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), GRANTED the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, and
DISMISSED all of Plaintiffs claims against Ardelle. The Clerk is DIRECTED to forward a
copy of this Order to all Counsel of Record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
IITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Newport News, VA
June ^g-, 2015
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