Yarrington v. Berryhill

Filing 17

FINAL ORDER. The Court ADOPTS AND APPROVES in full 14 Report and Recommendations. Plaintiff's 9 Motion for Summary Judgment and 10 Motion to Remand are DENIED, Defendant's 12 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by District Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen on 3/5/18. (bpet)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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i MAR - 6

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Newport News Division

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i

i

JENNIFER LYNN YARRINGTON,

Plaintiff,
V.

Civil No.4:17-cv-33

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Acting Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,
Defendant.

FINAL ORDER

Plaintiff Jennifer Yarrington brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking

judicial review of the final decision of the Acting Social Security Commissioner ("the
Commissioner") to deny her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental
Security Income ("SSI") under the Social Security Act. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B)

and (C), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and the Local Rules, this matter was referred to a
United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation ("R&R"). ECF No. 7.
In the R&R filed on January 26, 2018, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the decision

by the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to deny Ms. Yarrington's claim was supported by
substantial evidence. ECF No. 14. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommended denying

Ms. Yarrington's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Remand (ECF Nos. 9, 10),
granting the Commissioner's Motion for Summaiy Judgment (ECF No. 12), affirming the
decision of the Commissioner, and dismissing the case with prejudice. ECF No. 14 at 21.

By copy of the Report, eachpartywas advised of the right to file written objections to the
finds and recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Id. On February 9, 2018, the Court

received Plaintiffs objections to the Magistrate Judge's R&R. ECF No. 15. On February 23,
2018, the Court received the Commissioner's response to Plaintiffs objections. ECF No. 16.
I.

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), the Court reviews de novo any part

of a magistrate judge's recommendation to which a party has properly objected. See also
Wimmer v. Cook, 11A F.2d 68, 73 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[A]ny individual findings of fact or

recommendations for disposition by [the magistrate judge], if objected to, are subject to final de
novo determination ... by a district judge ....").

A court reviewing a decision made in accordance with the Social Security Act must
determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and were reached

through application of the correct legal standard. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir.
1996).

Accordingly, if the Commissioner's denial of benefits is supported by substantial

evidence and was reached by applying the correct legal standard, the Court must affirm the
Commissioner's final decision. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
"Substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion; [i]t consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may
be somewhat less than a preponderance." Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 (citations omitted).

In

reviewing for substantial evidence, this Court does not reweigh conflicting evidence, make
credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. The
Commissioner's findings as to £iny fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and
must be affirmed. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971).
II.

BACKGROUND

As recounted in the R&R, Ms. Yarrington initially filed an application for DIB and SSI in

September 2012, alleging disability due to migraines and mental health impairments. ECF No.
14 at 7-8. After the Social Security Administration denied her initial application and her

application on reconsideration, the ALJ found that Ms. Yarrington was not disabled during the
period of the alleged disability and denied her claim for benefits on February 10, 2016. The
Appeals Council denied Ms. Yarrington's request for review on February 7, 2017. Id. at 2.

In denying Ms. Yarrington's application, the ALJ made the following determinations, as
required by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920: (1) that Ms. Yarrington had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity between the alleged onset date, April 27, 2012, and the date of the
hearing; (2) that Ms. Yarrington suffered from severe impairments that included both mental and

physical conditions; (3) that the evidence failed to demonstrate that Ms. Yarrington had an
impairment or combination of impairments that equaled one of the listed impairments set forth in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) that Ms. Yarrington was unable to perform past
relevant work; but that (5) work suitable for Ms. Yarrington's residual functional capacity

existed in significant numbers in the national economy. See id. at 11-12. After the Appeals
Council denied Ms. Yarrington's request for review, Ms. Yarrington filed the instant Complaint

for judicial review of the Commissioner's decision, which was then referred to the Magistrate
Judge. See ECF Nos. 1,7. As reviewed above, the Magistrate Judge's R&R recommended that
Ms. Yarrington's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Remand be denied, that the
Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, and that the final decision of the
Commissioner be affirmed. See ECF No. 14 at 21.

Ms. Yarrington presents two objections to the R&R, both of which are substantially

similar to the grounds presented in her Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Remand:
(1) that the ALJ, in rejecting the opinion of Ms. Yarrington's treating psychiatrist as to Ms.
Yarrington's ability to work, did not properly weigh the medical opinion evidence regarding her

mental impairments; and (2) that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Ms. Yarrington's
credibility. ECFNo. 15 at 2-4.
III.

ANALYSIS

A.

Weight of Medical Opinion Evidence Regarding Ms. Yarrington's Impairments

First, Ms. Yarrington contends that the Magistrate Judge erred when he concluded that
substantial evidence supported the decision of the ALJ to reject the opinion from Ms.

Yarrington's treating psychiatrist as to Ms. Yarrington's ability to work. This opinion, set forth
in a Questionnaire that Ms. Yarrington's attorney had created to assist with Ms. Yamngton's

disability claim, concluded that Ms. Yarrington had "marked" limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace that would keep her off task at work and require frequent absences. R. at
1059-64, 1173-77.

However, as the R&R recognizes, the ALJ carefully reviewed all the medical evidence,

including the treating psychiatrist's records, in reaching a conclusion as to Ms. Yarrington's

ability to work. Because the evidence before the ALJ as to Ms. Yamngton's mental impairments
and her ability to work was conflicting, the ALJ was required to evaluate the credibility of the
source of each piece of evidence. In conducting such an evaluation, he concluded that the only

opinion that he discounted—the Questionnaire from the treating psychiatrist—did not appear in
any medical records, and that the treatment record did not support the treating psychiatrist's
opinion as to Ms. Yarrington's limitations. As a lack of support in the treatment record is a
proper basis for discounting a treating physician's opinion, the ALJ's decision to afford less

weight to the Questionnaire was appropriate. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 590. Furthermore, the
Magistrate Judge correctly recognized that forms that lack any medical explanation or
justification are not entitled to great weight, even when completed by the treating physician. See
Leonard v. Astrue, No. 2:1lcv48, 2012 WL 4404508, at *4 (W.D. Va. Sept. 25, 2012).

To the extent that there were observations in the treating psychiatrist's notes that were

consistent with the signs and symptoms identified in the Questionnaire, the treating psychiatrist
also noted in those same treatment notes that Ms. Yarrington had normal attention, normal

judgment, no delusions, no hallucinations, no obsessions or compulsions, and no suicidal or
homicidal thoughts. R. at 572, 1028, 1030, 1034, 1048. The treating psychiatrist categorized

Ms. Yarrington's mental condition as mild to moderate. R. at 1027, 1029, 1031, 1033. In
addition, other medical records also indicated that Ms. Yarrington's depression and anxiety

responded favorably to medication, contradicting the treating psychiatrist's opinion that Ms.

Yarrington was incapable of working. See R. at 1033. Finally, state agency consultative
psychologists who reviewed Ms. Yarrington's record concluded that Ms. Yamngton was "not

significantly limited" in her "ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without
an unreasonable number and length of rest periods." See R. at 108. The ALJ accorded

significant to moderate weight to these opinions from the state agency psychologists. See R. at
29;

also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2)(i), 416.927(e)(2)(i). In considering the conflicting

evidence, the ALJ appropriately evaluated the credibility ofthe source of each piece ofevidence.
A review of the record reveals that the ALJ's decision to give more weight to the state agency

psychologists and less to the opinion from Ms. Yarrington's treating psychiatrist is supported by
substantial evidence.

In addition, the Magistrate Judge's thorough review of the ALJ's evaluation also
confirms that there were no errors in the consideration of the medical evidence Ms. Yarrington

presented, or in the scope of that consideration. The ALJ considered the treating psychiatrist's

opinion that Ms. Yarrington could not work as the result of her mental impairments, but after

conducting a careful review of the medical evidence, found such an opinion inconsistent and
contradictory with that evidence. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that

"[bjecause the ALJ's decision to give little weight to certain opinions of Yarrington's treating
[psychiatrist] and more weight to the state agency consultative psychologists was supported by
substantial evidence, those decisions do not warrant remand," ECF No. 14 at 18. This Court

agrees. See also Dunn v. Colvin, 607 Fed. App'x 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal citations
omitted) (noting that courts should not disturb an ALJ's decision as to the weight afforded a
medical opinion absent some indication that the ALJ "dredged up 'specious inconsistencies'").
B.

The ALJ's Evaluation of Ms. Yarrington's Credibility

Second, Ms. Yarrington also contends that the Magistrate Judge erred by concluding that
the ALJ's decision to discount Ms. Yarrington's credibility regarding the impact of her

conditions on her ability to work was supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Ms.

Yarrington contends that the Magistrate Judge did not reference any of the ALJ's findings related
to Plaintiffs mental impairments or find that the ALJ properly considered such statements. Ms.

Yarrington argues that this requires remand for reconsideration of Ms. Yarrington's statements
regarding her mental impairments. ECF No. 15 at 4.

When evaluating a claimant's subjective symptoms, an ALJ must determine whether
there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment that reasonably
could produce the individual's pain or other related symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a),
416.929(a).

If the underlying impairment reasonably could be expected to produce the

individual's pain, the ALJ must then evaluate a claimant's statements about the intensity and
persistence of the pain and the extent to which it affects an individual's ability to work, including

by making a determination as to the credibility of the claimant's statements regarding the extent
of the symptoms. Craig, 76 F.3d at 595-96.

Here, as the R&R recognized, in evaluating Ms. Yarrington's statements regarding the

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, the ALJ's decision to discount Ms.
Yarrington's testimony regarding the impact of her conditions on her ability to work was

supported by substantial evidence. First, the ALJ found that although Ms. Yarrington did

experience migraines and musculoskeletal pain, these symptoms were "reasonably wellcontrolled with conservative treatment and medication," as evidenced by records from her visits

to the emergency room to treat these symptoms and from other providers. R. at 27, 1106-09.
Second, the evidence before the ALJ did not show any treatment for her migraines after 2013.

Third, her chiropractor opined that Ms. Yarrington was a malingerer. The ALJ properly noted

that the chiropractor's assessment of her overall disability status was "consistent v^th objective
medical evidence and [her] extensive daily activities." R. at 29, 1076-78. As reviewed above,
the R&R discussed the mental illness evidence reviewed by the ALJ, the ALJ's reasons for

discounting much of the evidence, and the evidence that supported the ALJ's conclusion. ECF
No. 14 at 18-20.

The Court agrees with the R&R's conclusion that that the ALJ's assessment of Ms.
Yarrington's credibility was supported by substantial evidence. See Craig, 16 F.3d at 589.
Accordingly, neither the ALJ northe Magistrate Judge committed errors compelling remand.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Following this Court's de novo review of the R&R filed on January 26, 2018, and of the

objections filed thereto, and finding no errors, the Court ADOPTS AND APPROVES in full the
findings and recommendations set forth in the R&R.

ECF No. 14.

Accordingly, Ms.

Yarrington's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Remand (ECF Nos. 9, 10) are

DENIED, the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED, the
decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The parties are ADVISED that an appeal from this Final Order may be commenced by
forwarding a written notice of appeal to the Clerk of the United States District Court, United
States Courthouse, 600 Granby Street, Norfolk, Virginia 23510. This written notice must be
received by the Clerk within sixty days from the date of this Final Order.

The Clerk is REQUESTED to forward a copy of this Order to all parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Arenda L. Wri^ Allen
LreWa L. Wriglat
United States-^Jistri
L ited States-District Judge
March

,2018

Norfolk, Virginia