Clark v. Astrue
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge James P. Jones on 8/17/11. (sc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ABINGDON DIVISION
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RHONDA V. CLARK,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:10CV00051
OPINION
By: James P. Jones
United States District Judge
Ginger J. Largen, Morefield & Largen, P.L.C., Abingdon, Virginia, for
Plaintiff; Eric P. Kressman, Regional Chief Counsel, Region III; Anne von
Scheven, Assistant Regional Counsel, Alexander L. Cristaudo, Special Assistant
United States Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Social Security
Administration, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Defendant.
In this social security case, I affirm the final decision of the Commissioner.
I
Plaintiff Rhonda Clark filed this action challenging the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her claims for
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social
Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-433, 1381-1383d (West 2003 & Supp.
2010). Jurisdiction of this court exists pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g).
Clark filed for benefits in 2007, alleging she became disabled in 2002, due to
bipolar disorder. Her claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Clark
received a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), during which
Clark, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert testified. The ALJ denied
Clark’s claim, and the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied her
Request for Reconsideration. Clark then filed her Complaint with this court,
objecting to the Commissioner’s final decision.
The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment and have briefed
the issues. The case is ripe for decision.
II
Clark was 47 years old when she filed for benefits, making her a younger
person under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c) (2010). Clark has a high
school education.
She has worked in the past as a drill press operator,
woodworking machine operator, and sanding machine operator at a furniture
factory from 1978 to 2002. In 2002, the factory closed and she was laid off.
In 2001, Clark complained to her doctor about work stress and irritability.
She was prescribed Zoloft for depression and anxiety. In 2004, her doctor noted
that her mood was good and that she continued long-term management of
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depression and anxiety but was not following up with a psychiatrist. Clark also
complained about migraines.
In March 2006, Clark began receiving treatment from Delano W. Bolter,
Ph.D., a psychiatrist. She complained of frequent irritability, anger, insomnia,
mood swings, fatigue, and a racing mind. Dr. Bolter diagnosed her with moderate
bipolar disorder. He prescribed Topamax for migraine headaches and Trazodone
and psychotherapy to treat her mental symptoms. In April 2006, she reported
doing better and feeling less irritable, but she was prescribed Celexa, an
antidepressant. In May 2006 and July 2006, her Trazodone dosage was increased.
In December 2006, she was reasonably stable but continued to report feelings of
stress related to family issues.
In June 2007, Dr. Bolter changed Clark’s antidepressant to Cymbalta. In
September 2007, she reported doing better on the new medication. In December
2007 and March 2008, her mood was stable. In June 2008, Clark reported walking
a mile a day and was having no significant side effects from her medication. Dr.
Bolter increased her Cymbalta dosage. In July 2008, Clark reported stress and
conflict regarding family issues, but Dr. Bolter continued to find that the
prescribed treatment was effective.
Based on his initial examination of Clark in March 2006, Dr. Bolter
determined that Clark had fair to poor abilities in all areas of making occupational
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adjustment. In September 2008 and July 2009, Dr. Bolter completed assessments
of Clark’s work-related mental abilities. In both assessments, he opined that Clark
had poor to no ability to deal with work stresses and maintain attention and
concentration; had fair to poor ability to relate to co-workers, deal with the public,
interact with supervisors, carry out job instructions, and demonstrate reliability;
and had good to fair ability to follow rules, use judgment, and maintain personal
appearance.
He attributed Clark’s limited ability to concentrate to her mood
swings, irritability, insomnia, fatigue, and agitation.
Since 2008, Clark has begun taking Levoxyl for thyroid hormone
replacement therapy and reported having more energy on that medication. In
December 2008, it was noted that Clark had not had a migraine in about two years.
Two state agency psychologists reviewed Clark’s records. They concluded
that Clark had no significant limitations in several areas.
She had, at most,
moderate limitations in her ability to carry out detailed instructions, maintain
attention and concentration for extended periods, perform activities within a
schedule, complete a normal workweek without psychological interruptions,
interact with the general public, get along with co-workers or peers, maintain
socially appropriate behavior, respond to changes in a work setting, and set
realistic goals.
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Gary T. Bennett, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist, testified at the
administrative hearing as a medical expert. He testified that, based on his review
of the medical evidence, Clark likely has bipolar disorder but that the condition did
not meet or equal a listed impairment. He testified that Clark appeared to be stable
and was doing well on medication.
He characterized Clark’s impairment as
moderate based on her activities of daily living and her treatment record.
After reviewing Clark’s records, the ALJ determined that she had severe
impairments of bipolar disorder and hypertension but that neither of these
conditions, either alone or in combination, met or medically equaled a listed
impairment. The ALJ also recognized that Clark suffered from hyperlipidemia,
migraines, a digestive disorder, and diabetes but found that none of those
conditions were severe.
Taking into account Clark’s limitations, the ALJ
determined that Clark retained the residual functional capacity to perform work
that required only simple, routine tasks and minimal social interaction.
Donald Anderson, Ed.D., a vocational expert, testified that Clark’s past
relevant work as a boring machine operator and a woodworking machine operator
was unskilled, medium work and that her job as a machine sander was semiskilled, medium work.
In response to a question about transferability, Dr.
Anderson testified that Clark’s skills were not transferable to other jobs at the light
or sedentary exertional level. He then stated that Clark would be unable to perform
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her past work and that there was no work to which her skills would transfer.
Nevertheless, the ALJ concluded that Clark was able to perform her past relevant
work and was therefore not disabled under the Act.
Clark argues the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence
because the evidence about Clark’s nonexertional impairments was not fully
developed and because the ALJ substituted his medical opinion for the opinions of
health professionals. For the reasons below, I affirm the final decision of the
Commissioner.
III
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is under a disability.
Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972). The standard for
disability is strict.
The plaintiff must show that her “physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do
[her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy . . . .” 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d) (2) (A).
In assessing DIB claims, the Commissioner applies a five-step sequential
evaluation process. The Commissioner considers whether the claimant: (1) has
worked during the alleged period of disability; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has
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a condition that meets or equals the severity of a listed impairment; (4) could
return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether she could perform other
work present in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) (2010). If
it is determined at any point in the five-step analysis that the claimant is not
disabled, the inquiry immediately ceases. Id.; McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866,
868-69 (4th Cir. 1983). The fourth and fifth steps of the inquiry require an
assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity, which is then compared
with the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant work and of
other work present in the national economy. Id. at 869.
In accordance with the Act, I must uphold the Commissioner’s findings if
substantial evidence supports them and the findings were reached through
application of the correct legal standard. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th
Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Substantial
evidence is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than
a preponderance.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). It is the
role of the ALJ to resolve evidentiary conflicts, including inconsistencies in the
evidence. Seacrist v. Weinbarger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1956-57 (4th Cir. 1976). It is
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not the role of this court to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
Clark first argues that there are gaps in the record relating to Clark’s
nonexertional impairments and therefore she was denied the fair and adequate
hearing to which she was entitled under 20 C.F.R. § 404.944 (2010). Clark
presented complete medical records from numerous physicians.
The ALJ
considered all of the medical evidence presented by Clark, read the reports of two
reviewing physicians, and heard testimony from Clark, a medical expert, and a
vocational expert. Clark has not identified material evidence that was missing at
the hearing and has not presented new material evidence that should be considered.
Therefore, Clark’s argument has no merit.
Clark also argues that the ALJ improperly discounted the assessments
prepared by Dr. Bolter. A treating physician’s medical opinion will be given
controlling weight when it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (2010). However, the
ALJ has “the discretion to give less weight to the testimony of a treating physician
in the face of persuasive contrary evidence.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178
(4th Cir. 2001). In the present case, the ALJ found that Dr. Bolter’s assessments
were inconsistent with his treatment records and with Clark’s complaints. His
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notes showed that Clark’s condition was stable and that her medication was
effective. Clark reported feeling worse only when she had family problems, which
is consistent with situational depression, generally a mild condition. Therefore, Dr.
Bolter’s assessments were afforded no weight.
There is substantial evidence to support discounting Dr. Bolter’s
assessments. The ALJ properly determined that Dr. Bolter’s notes and the course
of treatment did not support the severe limitations Dr. Bolter outlined in the
assessments.
Furthermore, other evidence before the ALJ conflicts with Dr.
Bolter’s assessments.
Particularly, the state agency physicians who reviewed
Clark’s medical records disagreed with Dr. Bolter’s assessments and found only
moderate limitations.
Contrary to Clark’s assertions, the ALJ’s did not find that
Clark does not have any serious limitations. Rather, the ALJ found that, based on
the medical evidence presented, Clark has limitations but that those limitations
were not as severe as indicated in Dr. Bolter’s assessments.
Clark also argues that the ALJ erred in his consideration of Clark’s activities
of daily living. Clark testified that she does not go to church or family gatherings
and that her husband usually does the shopping, although sometimes she will go
with him. A typical day in 2007 would include getting up at 10 or 11 in the
morning, eating breakfast, feeding the cat, watching television, and cooking
supper. Clark did some cleaning. Relying in part on the testimony of medical
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expert Dr. Bennett, the ALJ determined that Clark’s activities of daily living were
mildly restricted. The finding appears consistent with the evidence presented and
is not inconsistent with the accepted diagnosis of bipolar disorder. The ALJ did
not err by concluding that Clark did not have marked restriction in her activities of
daily living.
Although Dr. Anderson, the vocational expert, briefly testified that Clark
could not perform her past relevant work, he did not explain the basis for his
decision. The ALJ is not bound by the opinion of the vocational expert. See
Goodman v. Apfel, No. 97-1361, 1998 WL 120148 at *4 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 1998)
(unpublished). The ALJ properly relied on evidence from other experts and on
Clark’s medical history for his determination that Clark could perform her past
work.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment will
be denied, and the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted. A
final judgment will be entered affirming the Commissioner’s final decision
denying benefits.
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DATED: August 17, 2011
/s/ James P. Jones
United States District Judge
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