Taylor v. City of Bristol, Virginia

Filing 13

OPINION AND ORDER denying 6 Motion to Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge James P. Jones on 3/8/12. (sc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ABINGDON DIVISION
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ROBERT TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF BRISTOL, VIRGINIA,
Defendant.

Case No. 1:12CV00003
OPINION AND ORDER
By: James P. Jones
United States District Judge

John M. Loeschen, John M. Loeschen Law Offices, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Plaintiff. W. Bradford Stallard, Penn, Stuart & Eskridge, Abingdon, Virginia, for
Defendant.
Before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Count One of the Amended
Petition for Permanent Injunction and Action at Law to state court. Because I find
that remand is not appropriate, I will deny the plaintiff’s motion.

I
The plaintiff, Robert Taylor, worked as a firefighter for the City of Bristol,
Virginia (the “City”). According to his allegations made in this case, Taylor was
told that he would be permitted to resign and that if he did not resign, he would
never be hired as a firefighter again. He signed a letter of resignation but claims
that the resignation was involuntary. On the same day as he signed the letter of
resignation, he submitted a letter seeking to revoke the resignation.

He also

attempted to initiate a grievance procedure pursuant to state law. According to
Taylor, the City refused to accept his resignation and effectively denied his attempt
to file a grievance.
Taylor filed a complaint seeking an injunction and other state law remedies
in state court. After the City filed responsive pleadings, Taylor amended his
complaint, adding a federal law claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2003).1
The City removed the case to this court and Taylor has now moved to remand one
of his claims to state court. The motion has been briefed and is ripe for decision.

II
A federal district court has removal jurisdiction in any civil action over
which the court has original jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a) (West 2006),
amended by Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub.
L. 112-63, § 103, 125 Stat. 759 (2011). Federal question jurisdiction is invoked by
a plaintiff pleading a cause of action created by federal law, such as a claim under
§ 1983. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 2006); Grable & Sons Metal Prods. Inc. v.
Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 311 (2005).

1

It appears that the plaintiff filed two copies of the Amended Complaint in the
state court, one before the entry of the order permitting him to amend and one after both
the order was entered and the City filed its first Notice of Removal in this court. To
ensure that removal was effective, the City filed a second Notice of Removal.
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The removal power covers the entire action in which a federal claim is
raised. The court may allow the removal of an action even where it includes an
otherwise nonremovable claim:
If a civil action includes (A) a claim arising under the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States (within the meaning of section
1331 of this title, and (B) a claim not within the original or
supplemental jurisdiction of the district court or a claim that has been
made nonremovable by statute, the entire action may be removed if
the action would be removable without the inclusion of the claim
described in subparagraph (B).
28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(c)(1) (West 2006), amended by Federal Courts Jurisdiction
and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112-63, § 103, 125 Stat. 759 (2011).
The questions of removal and remand must be considered in light of the
court’s power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
Where a court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, it has supplemental
jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West 2006).
A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under the following
conditions:
(1)

the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2)

the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims
over which the district court has original jurisdiction,

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(3)

the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction, or

(4)

in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c) (West 2006).
Taylor’s present complaint contains two counts. The first alleges that the
City violated a state statute, Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1507 (2008 & Supp. 2011), by
denying Taylor’s right to access the state-mandated grievance procedure and seeks
an injunction under state law requiring the City to proceed with the grievance
process.

The second count asserts that the City’s refusal to allow the state-

mandated grievance procedure amounts to a deprivation of Taylor’s due process
rights.

Taylor seeks money damages and an order enjoining the City from

terminating employees by coerced resignations.
In all respects, these two claims arise out of the same set of facts and
circumstances. Taylor claims he was terminated, forced to resign, and denied
access to the grievance procedure. Both the state and federal claims are based on
those facts. This court thus has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim
pursuant to § 1367(a). See Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S. C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 615
(4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims where both federal and state law claims arose out of the same loan
by defendants).
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There is no reason for the court to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. No novel or complex issue of state law is raised. The state law claim,
while interrelated with the federal claim, does not predominate over the federal
claim. The federal claim has not been dismissed. Finally, there are no exceptional
circumstances meriting refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

III
For the reasons stated, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand
(ECF No. 6) is DENIED.
ENTER: March 8, 2012
/s/ James P. Jones
United States District Judge

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