McBeth v. Shearer's Foods, Inc.

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 27 Motion to Compel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Pamela Meade Sargent on 3/6/14. (ejs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ABINGDON DIVISION
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

RHONDA T. McBETH,
Plaintiff
v.
SHEARER’S FOODS, INC.,
Defendant

Case No. 1:12cv00086
MEMORANDUM ORDER

This matter is before the undersigned on the plaintiff’s Motion To Compel
Responses To Discovery, (Docket Item No. 27) (“Motion”). The undersigned
heard arguments of counsel by telephone conference call on February 25, 2014.
Based on counsel’s arguments and representations, and for the reasons stated
below, the Motion will be DENIED.

In the Motion, plaintiff seeks to have the court overrule the defendant’s
objections and compel the defendant to provide a full and complete answer to her
Interrogatory No. 1. This interrogatory stated:

Please provide information on the following employees/former
employees of defendant, to include title, with job description and
qualifications, complete salary/wage history and performance
evaluations:
Samantha Atkins or Adkins
Kathy Wolfe
Greg Kennedy
Greg McDavid
Kristina Webb – IT
1 

Brian Hicks – IT
Dave Bowie
Rodney Warren
Gus Wild
Brandy Owens
Paul Smith
Please provide all factors taken into account in determining each of the
above individuals’ salaries and increases.
In addition to general objections that the interrogatory was overly broad and
unduly burdensome and sought information that was neither relevant nor
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, the
defendant objected to the interrogatory as seeking confidential personnel
information about its employees that have no relation to the claims in the plaintiff’s
lawsuit, and who are not “comparators” to the plaintiff. More specifically, the
defendant contends that the 11 individuals named in Interrogatory No. 1 all held
different positions in its organizational structure outside of the Human Resources
Department, in which the plaintiff was formerly employed, had different reporting
relationships and had different managers determining their pay. The plaintiff was
employed as a Human Resources Manager by the defendant from January 2011
through her termination on May 16, 2012. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant
discriminated against her on the basis of her sex by paying her a significantly
lower salary than a male counterpart, awarding her a substantially lower annual
increase in 2011 than many of her male counterparts and retaliated against her by
terminating her for allegedly providing assistance to a former employee of the
defendant in its Oregon office who had a sex discrimination complaint against the
defendant. The defendant contends that the plaintiff’s proper comparators can be
only other members of the Human Resources Department. The plaintiff does not
dispute that most of her Human Resources colleagues were women, and her only
2 

viable male counterpart is Shawn Olsen, whose personnel information already has
been provided to the plaintiff in discovery. The plaintiff argues that she is entitled
to the information sought in Interrogatory No. 1 because she has alleged in her
Complaint that the defendant engaged in a “pattern and practice” of sex
discrimination, thereby making relevant the information of individuals other than
just her typical comparators. I am not persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument.

First, the plaintiff has not provided the court with any controlling case law in
support of her proposition that alleging “pattern and practice discrimination”
automatically opens discovery to information related to individuals outside the
normal realm of comparators. Second, the court has found no such case law that
directly stands for such a proposition.

The Fourth Circuit has held that an

individual plaintiff, like McBeth, cannot pursue a private, nonclass cause of action
based on pattern and practice of discrimination. See Lowery v. Cir. City Stores,
Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 759 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031
(1999). However, Lowery also held that an individual may “use evidence of a
pattern or practice of discrimination to help prove claims of individual
discrimination within the McDonnell Douglas framework.” 158 F.3d at 760-61.
Nonetheless, I find that this is not the same as finding that an individual plaintiff
pursuing an individual discrimination claim, such as the plaintiff in this case, is
automatically allowed access to discovery materials related to individuals outside
the normal realm of comparators.

While it is well-settled that the trial court has wide latitude in controlling
discovery, see Ardrey v. United Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir. 1986);
Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 340 F.3d 187, 195 (4th Cir. 2003), including the
manner in which it orders the course and scope of discovery, see Ardrey, 798 F.2d
3 

at 682 (citing Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’, Etc., 657 F.2d 890,
902 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982)), it may not, through
discovery restrictions, prevent a plaintiff from pursuing a theory or entire cause of
action. See Ardrey, 798 F.2d at 682 (citing Diaz v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356,
1363 (9th Cir. 1985); Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1983)). I
find that there is no evidence that denying the plaintiff’s Motion prevents her from
“pursuing a theory or entire cause of action,” Diaz, 752 F.2d at 1363, because she
is not entitled to pursue a private, individual pattern or practice case, and she has
offered no evidence to the court that denial of the Motion will so prevent the
pursuit of her claim of individual sex discrimination.

For all of the above-stated reasons, the Motion is DENIED, and the plaintiff
is ORDERED to respond to the Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment,
(Docket Item No. 21), within 14 days from the date of entry of this Memorandum
Order.

ENTERED: March 6, 2014.

Pamela Meade Sargent

/s/
 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

4