Owens v. Colvin

Filing 20

OPINION and ORDER. Signed by Judge James P. Jones on 5/22/14. (flc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ABINGDON DIVISION
CRYSTAL GAIL OWENS,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

Case No. 1:13CV00079
OPINION AND ORDER
By: James P. Jones
United States District Judge

Ginger J. Largen, Morefield & Largen, P.L.C., Abingdon, Virginia, for
Plaintiff; Nora Koch, Acting Regional Chief Counsel, Region III, Jillian Quick,
Assistant Regional Counsel, and Antonia M. Pfeffer, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Social Security Administration,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Defendant.
In this social security case, I affirm the final decision of the Commissioner.

I
The plaintiff Crystal Gail Owens filed this action challenging the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying
her claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social
Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C.A. § 401-434 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013).
Jurisdiction of this court exists under 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g).

Owens filed an application with the Commissioner for DIB on March 3,
2011. After preliminary denials of her claim, she obtained a hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on February 20, 2013, at which Owens was
represented by counsel and during which Owens testified along with a vocational
expert, Cathy Sanders. On March 12, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision
finding that Owens was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Owens
requested review by the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council. The
Appeals Council denied request for review on September 26, 2013, thereby making
the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Owens then filed this
action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision.
The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment, which have
been briefed. Oral argument was held on May 14, 2014. The case is thus ripe for
decision.

II
The plaintiff was 38 years old at the time of the hearing before the ALJ. She
has a high school education with some college training in accounting. She was
working as a cashier in April of 2010 when she became ill and was discovered to
have coronary blockage and underwent heart bypass surgery. She has not worked
since then, although at a post-operative examination by a cardiologist in August of
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2012 she was found to be stable with no further evaluation necessary. (R. at 51820.)1

At the hearing before the ALJ her attorney asserted that the basis for her

claimed disability was fibromyalgia. 2 It is contended by the plaintiff in this action
that the ALJ erred in giving little weight to the opinions in this regard by Jennifer
L. Quesinberry, M.D., Owens’ primary care physician. In addition, it is argued
that the ALJ erred by failing to evaluate the cumulative effect of all of Owens’
impairments.

III
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is under a disability.
Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972). The standard for
disability is strict.

The plaintiff must show that her “physical or mental

impairment or impairments are of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do
[her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy . . . .” 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(2)(A).

1

A later report by the cardiologist of his examination on April 24, 2013, which
report was presented to the Appeals Council, states the same.
2

In an opening statement at the hearing, the attorney advised the ALJ that “[i]n
short, we have a claim for fibromyalgia, based on fibromyalgia. It’s a controversial
problem; there is not going to be objective evidence.” (R. at 63.)
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In assessing disability claims, the Commissioner applies a five-step
sequential evaluation process. The Commissioner considers whether the claimant:
(1) has worked during the alleged period of disability; (2) has a severe impairment;
(3) has a condition that meets or equals the severity of a listed impairment; (4)
could return to Owens past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether she could
perform other work present in the national economy.
404.1520(a)(4) (2013).

See 20 C.F.R. §

The fourth and fifth steps of the inquiry require an

assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity, which is then compared
with the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant work and of
other work present in the national economy.
In accordance with the Act, I must uphold the Commissioner’s findings if
substantial evidence supports them and the findings were reached through the
application of the correct legal standard. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th
Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be
somewhat less than a preponderance.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th
Cir. 1966). It is the role of the ALJ to resolve evidentiary conflicts, including
inconsistencies in the evidence. Seacrist v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1056-57
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(4th Cir. 1976). It is not the role of the court to substitute its judgment for that of
the Commissioner. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
I have carefully reviewed the record evidence and conclude that the ALJ’s
decision in this case is supported by substantial evidence and was reached through
application of the correct legal standards.

IV
The administrative record shows the following facts.
In July of 2010, after her heart surgery, Owens visited Dr. Quisenberry, her
long-time primary care physician, complaining of anxiety and panic attacks. She
was prescribed Paxil and at her next visit she reported that the medicine made “a
tremendous difference” and that “her mood was significantly better.” (R. at 557.)
A year later, in May of 2011, Owens was again seen by Dr. Quisenberry on her
complaints that while “her mood is doing fairly well with the Paxil,” she has had
“muscle pain for the past year – particularly in her back, arms and legs.” (R. at
614.) Dr. Quesinberry at that time diagnosed her with fibromyalgia.
Owens was referred by Dr. Quesinberry for mental health counseling at the
local public mental health agency. Owens advised her counselor there that she had
not done well emotionally since her heart surgery and that her anxiety was

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intensified by her family’s financial problems.3 (R. at 631-634.) In later notes by
the counselor, it was reported that “family stressors” contributed to Owens’ mental
health issues, including her husband’s alcoholism. (R. at 734.)
In a report of a visit in August of 2011, Dr. Quisenberry noted that Owens’
depression was stable. Dr. Quisenberry stated that she had “recommended that this
patient apply for disability as I do feel with her underlying medical condition that
she is unable to sustain work gainfully.” (R. at 639.) A follow-up visit was
scheduled in three months. At that visit, on November 8, 2011, Owens complained
that she had chronic and severe left shoulder pain and “joint stiffness all over and
myalgias [muscle pain],” although “the medication helps.” (R. at 638.) Owens
also reported to Dr. Quesinberry that she felt that her depression was “primarily
situational due to financial difficulties.” (R. at 638.)
In a visit on February 6, 2013, Owens delivered to Dr. Quesinberry a
Fibromyalgia and Myofascial Pain Syndrome Functional Questionnaire from
Owens’ attorney, which Dr. Quesinberry completed. On this check-box form, Dr.
Quesinberry checked most of the form’s listed symptoms, including cognitive
impairment, lack of coordination, depression, dizziness, unaccountable irritability,
chronic fatigue syndrome, myofascial pain syndrome, difficulty communicating,
TMJ dysfunction, chronic fatigue, and pain at all body locations.
3

She also

She told the counselor that she owed over $100,000 to medical providers
resulting from her heart surgery, as well owing back taxes and other debts. (R. at 632.)
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indicated that Owens’ pain was daily and severe and that she could not work an
eight-hour day. In answer to the question, “Identify the clinical findings, the
laboratory and test results that show your patient’s medical impairments,” Dr.
Quesinberry wrote simply, “clinical exam.” (R. at 715.)
Owens was earlier referred by Dr. Quesinberry to Song Zang, M.D., a
specialist in endocrinology and rheumatology, who saw her on April 6, 2012. Dr.
Zang reported Owens to be a current smoker, five feet four inches tall, weighing
189.5 pounds, and complaining of pain “all over.” (R. at 721.) Dr. Zang assessed
her with fibromyalgia. He encouraged her to exercise regularly and told her that
pain pills were “not the long term solution.” (R. at 723.)
During the pendency of the administrative proceedings, and at the request of
the state disability determination agency, Owens was seen and evaluated by
Christopher M. Carusi, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, on October 2, 2012. Dr.
Carusi diagnosed Owens with “Adjustment Disorder with Depression, Chronic.”
(R. at 652.) He found that she was only mildly impaired in work-related mental
activities.

However, he estimated that Owens had a Global Assessment of

Functioning (“GAF”) score of only 40. 4

4

A GAF score is supposed to indicate an individual’s overall level of functioning
at the time of examination. A score of 40 would indicate a major impairment. See Am.
Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32–34 (4th ed.
1994).
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The ALJ found that while Owens was limited to a degree, her daily activities
were inconsistent with her complaints of disabling limitations. He accorded little
weight to Dr. Quesinberry’s opinions, as well as to Dr. Carusi’s assigned GAF
score. On the other hand, he also afforded less weight to medical opinions that
were unfavorable to Owens’ claim of disability. He did not accept the opinions of
two state agency psychological consultants, Louis Perrott, Ph.D., and Richard J.
Milan, Ph.D., who opined after a review of the medical evidence that Owens’
mental impairments were mild and thus non-severe. Instead, the ALJ determined
that Owens had severe impairments of “fibromyalgia, depression, obesity, and
adjustment disorder,” among other things. (R. at 42.)
The ALJ also did not credit the opinions of state agency medical consultants
(Robert McGuffin, M.D., and Steven Jackson, M.D.) who opined that Owens had
the excertional ability to perform light work; instead, he accepted the opinion of
medical consultant Michael Hartman, M.D., who found that she had the more
limited ability to work at the sedentary level. Accordingly, the ALJ determined
that Owens had the severe impairments of “cervical spine degenerative changes,
left shoulder osteoarthritis, lumbar spine moderate discogenic changes and
degenerative facet changes.” (R. at 42.)
While the ALJ did rely in part on evidence of Owens’ activities of daily life,
that was not error since a Social Security claimant’s routine non-work activities of
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life may support a finding that a residual functional capacity to work exists. See
Yost v. Barnhart, 79 F. App’x 553, 555 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished).

These

activities supported the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Quesinberry’s generous view of her
patient’s limitations. Furthermore, while an ALJ may not reject medical evidence
for no reason or for the wrong reason, see King v. Califano, 615 F.2d 1018, 1020
(4th Cir. 1980), an ALJ may, under the regulations, assign no or little weight to a
medical opinion, even one from a treating source, if he sufficiently explains his
rationale and if the record supports his findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)
(2013).
Accordingly, I find that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence.
CUMULATIVE IMPAIRMENTS.
Owens also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to analyze the combined
effect of her several impairments.
I disagree. The ALJ expressly recognized in his decision his obligation to
consider the plaintiff’s impairments in combination as required by 20 C.F.R. §
404.1523 (2013). (R. at 41, 43.) The ALJ’s lengthy and detailed decision fully
reviewed and analyzed the extensive medical evidence in this case. While that
evidence permitted a different resolution of the issues, I cannot find that the ALJ’s
determination was improper.
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V
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
denied, and the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. A final
judgment will be entered affirming the Commissioner’s final decision denying
benefits.
It is so ORDERED.
ENTER: May 22, 2014
/s/ James P. Jones
United States District Judge

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