Huffman v. Newman et al
Filing
40
OPINION AND ORDER granting 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge James P. Jones on 5/18/2016. (lml)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ABINGDON DIVISION
JAMIE HUFFMAN, ADMINISTRATRIX
AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM
MICHAEL HUFFMAN, DECEASED,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRED P. NEWMAN, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 1:15CV00033
OPINION AND ORDER
By: James P. Jones
United States District Judge
Dennis E. Jones, Abingdon, Virginia, for Plaintiff; Henry S. Keuling-Stout,
Keuling-Stout, P.C., Big Stone Gap, Virginia, for Defendants.
Following a fatal police shooting, the representative of the deceased’s estate
has sued the shooting officer and the sheriff, his employer, under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, claiming unconstitutional use of excessive force. She has also asserted a
pendent state law wrongful death claim. The defendants have moved for summary
judgment, invoking qualified immunity. For the reasons explained below, I will
enter summary judgment on behalf of the defendants.
I.
The following undisputed facts are taken from the affidavits, party
admissions, and other evidence submitted to the court as part of the summary
judgment record.
On June 27, 2014, shortly before noon, plaintiff Jamie Huffman called 911
regarding her husband, William Michael Huffman, known as Michael. She told
the operator that Michael had been drinking and had gone into the bathroom. She
stated that she thought he had a gun and that a pistol was missing from the gun
cabinet. Mrs. Huffman had heard a noise and was afraid to enter the bathroom.
While speaking with the 911 operator over a landline, Mrs. Huffman used her
mobile phone to call Sheila Cooke, who lived next door to the Huffmans. 1
In response, Cooke came to the Huffman’s house and went into the
bathroom, and Mrs. Huffman followed. Michael sat on the toilet talking to Cooke,
who was sitting across from him on the bathtub. Mrs. Huffman observed a shell
casing on the floor of the bathroom, which she showed to Cooke. Michael stated
that he had shot at a stray cat from the bathroom window. Mrs. Huffman described
Michael as calm; he did not make any threatening statements or gestures.
Mrs. Huffman told the 911 operator that she still wanted an officer to
respond to the residence because Michael had been making suicidal statements.
Mrs. Huffman walked to the kitchen and remained on the phone with the 911
1
The defendants submitted several exhibits that are inadmissible hearsay,
including transcripts and recordings of two unsworn witness interviews conducted by
police investigating the shooting. One of those interviews was of Cooke, who allegedly
told the interviewer that the officers had warned Michael three or four times prior to
Michael getting up from his chair and that Michael “could have made a motion in that
direction [of the officers]” after he stood up. (Interview of Shelia Cooke 8, 11, ECF No.
32-1.) I do not consider that evidence in reaching my decision to grant summary
judgment. The parties did not submit any deposition transcripts.
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operator. She told the operator that her husband was experiencing withdrawal
from pain medication. Cooke and Michael exited the bathroom and entered the
living room, where Michael sat in a recliner chair. His pistol was next to him,
resting between his right leg and the arm of the chair. Mrs. Huffman told the 911
operator where the gun was located.
Defendant Thomas Gregory Caldwell, a Deputy Sheriff of Washington
County, Virginia, responding to the 911 call, then arrived at the Huffman home
along with Virginia State Police Master Trooper Rick Fore. Deputy Caldwell
asked Michael, still sitting in the recliner, if he had a firearm, to which Michael
replied, “Huh.” (Huffman Aff. ¶ 9, ECF No. 28-1.) Deputy Caldwell repeated the
question, and Michael answered, “No.” (Id.) Deputy Caldwell then asked Michael
about the gun next to him and requested that Michael lay it down, but Michael
responded, “No.” (Id.) Deputy Caldwell ordered Michael to give him the gun at
least two times, but Michael did not comply. Cooke told Michael that if he would
give up his gun, she would get him a beer; he refused her request. Deputy
Caldwell asked Michael, “[W]ould you like to tell me what’s going on?” (Id.)
Michael replied that he had been trying to shoot a stray cat out of his bathroom
window.
A beer bottle and prescription pill bottles were on a table next to
Michael.
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Deputy Caldwell motioned for Mrs. Huffman to step outside with him. Mrs.
Huffman walked onto the porch and Deputy Caldwell stood in the front doorway.
The recliner in which Michael was seated had its back to the front door, ten to
twelve feet from the door. Mrs. Huffman told Deputy Caldwell that Michael had
been depressed; had issues with prescription drugs and alcohol; and had gone into
the bathroom and fired a gun, prompting her to call 911. Michael then rose from
the recliner with the pistol in his right hand. Deputy Caldwell again ordered
Michael to drop the gun. Michael did not do so, but instead began moving to his
left.
At that point, Deputy Caldwell fired one shot from his pistol, striking
Michael.2 Deputy Caldwell then secured Michael’s firearm, handed it to Trooper
Fore, and began administering first aid. Michael was transported by ambulance
and helicopter to Bristol Regional Medical Center, where he died as a result of the
gunshot wound.
The autopsy report revealed that the bullet fired by Deputy Caldwell entered
Michael’s body at the left side of the abdomen and traveled to the right side of the
abdomen. The bullet’s trajectory was “left to right, slightly downward and slightly
front to back.” (Mem. P. & A. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 2, 1, ECF No. 284.) A photograph of Michael taken immediately after the shooting shows that the
2
Mrs. Huffman recalls that after firing the shot, Deputy Caldwell said, “[D]rop it,
or I will pop you again.” (Huffman Aff. ¶ 14, ECF No. 28-1.)
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gunshot wound was located on his left side, between his armpit and hip. (Reply to
Pl.’s Resp., Ex. A, ECF No. 33-4.)
At no time prior to the shooting did Michael point his gun at anyone or make
any verbal threats. 3
Mrs. Huffman asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of excessive force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well as a state law wrongful death claim
pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-50. She has named as defendants both Deputy
Caldwell and Fred P. Newman, the Sheriff of Washington County. 4
The
defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing that they are entitled to
qualified immunity and that the undisputed facts warrant judgment in their favor as
a matter of law. Newman also contends that as a matter of law, he cannot be held
liable for Michael’s death under a theory of supervisory liability or negligent
training. The motion has been briefed and orally argued and is ripe for decision.
For the following reasons, I find that summary judgment is warranted.
3
In a sworn statement filed in support of summary judgment, Deputy Caldwell
indicated that immediately before he fired, Michael had turned the barrel of his gun
toward him. State Trooper Fore’s affidavit states that Michael was turning left toward
the officers, “bringing the gun around,” when Deputy Caldwell fired. (Fore Aff. Ex. C
1-2, ECF No. 23-1.) Although Mrs. Huffman was on the porch at the time of the
shooting, she has sworn in her affidavit in opposition to summary judgment, that “[a]t no
time did Michael point the firearm at anyone.” (Huffman Aff. ¶ 19, ECF No. 28-1.)
Because there is thus a dispute as to the gun’s exact position and movement, for purposes
of ruling on the summary judgment motion, I accept the version of facts most favorable
to Mrs. Huffman, the nonmovant.
4
Both defendants were named in their individual and official capacities, but I
previously dismissed the official capacity claims. (Order, Aug. 31, 2015, ECF No. 15.)
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II.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To raise a genuine issue of material fact
sufficient to avoid summary judgment, the evidence must be “such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In making this determination, “the
court is required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.
1994).
Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but
an important mechanism for weeding out claims and defenses that have no factual
basis. Id. at 327. It is the affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent
factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial. Drewitt v.
Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993).
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A.
Section 1983 Excessive Force Claim.
Deputy Caldwell contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity with
respect to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
Under federal law, police officers
performing discretionary functions “are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
“Qualified immunity protects law
enforcement officers from bad guesses in gray areas and ensures that they are
liable only for transgressing bright lines.” Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 476 (4th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Qualified immunity is
immunity from suit rather than merely immunity from liability; therefore, the
question of qualified immunity should be decided before trial. Id.
A court deciding the applicability of qualified immunity must determine
“whether a constitutional violation occurred” and “whether the right violated was
clearly established.” Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 385 (4th Cir. 2013); see also
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009).
If I find that no
constitutional right was violated, even when viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, my analysis ends, because the plaintiff cannot prevail as a
matter of law. See Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 526 (4th Cir. 2003).
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Here, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated Michael’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. Specifically, the plaintiff
alleges that Deputy Caldwell used excessive force when he shot Michael. The
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure encompasses
seizures accomplished by excessive force. Id. at 527.
A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force “should be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness standard.’”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
The Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness test is objective. Id. at 397. “The question is whether a reasonable
officer in the same circumstances would have concluded that a threat existed
justifying the particular use of force.” Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125, 129 (4th
Cir. 2001).
The court must determine whether the officer’s actions were
reasonable at the time of the incident, without the benefit of hindsight, and with the
understanding that officers must often make split-second decisions in rapidly
changing circumstances. Id.
When considering an excessive force claim, I “must balance the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Three factors guide us in this balancing: 1) the severity of the crime at issue; 2)
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the extent to which the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others; and 3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Lee v. Bevington, No. 15-1384, 2016 WL
2587380, at *6 (4th Cir. May 5, 2016) (unpublished). In this case, Michael was
not suspected of committing a crime and was not attempting to evade arrest at the
time of the shooting, so only the second factor applies. While “[t]he intrusiveness
of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched,” an officer is constitutionally
permitted to use deadly force when there is “probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.”
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1985).
The Fourth Circuit “has consistently held that an officer does not have to
wait until a gun is pointed at the officer before the officer is entitled to take
action.” Anderson, 247 F.3d at 131. Indeed, “an officer is not required to see an
object in the suspect’s hand before using deadly force.” Id. The Fourth Circuit has
noted that “[w]hen a suspect confronts an officer with a weapon, we have deemed
the officer’s use of deadly force reasonable.” Ayala v. Wolfe, 546 F. App’x 197,
200 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).
Applying these standards, I find that Deputy Caldwell’s use of deadly force
was objectively reasonable because the totality of the circumstances known to
Caldwell at the time of the shooting would lead a reasonable officer to believe that
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Michael posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm to Deputy Caldwell or
others. Deputy Caldwell had been called to the residence because Michael had
been making suicidal statements in recent days, had been drinking that morning,
and had just fired a gun in the residence. Michael was in possession of a firearm
that he refused to relinquish despite repeated requests and commands from Deputy
Caldwell and others. Immediately before the shooting, Michael stood up from his
chair with the gun in his hand, a short distance away from the officer. Under those
circumstances, a reasonable police officer would have perceived an imminent
threat. Deputy Caldwell was not required to wait until the gun was pointed at him.
“The Constitution simply does not require police to gamble with their lives in the
face of a serious threat of harm.” Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 641 (4th Cir.
1996). For these reasons, I find that Deputy Caldwell is entitled to qualified
immunity.
The plaintiff argues that Michael had a right to lawfully possess a firearm in
his own home. While that may be true, he did not have a right to brandish the
firearm in front of law enforcement officers after repeatedly being told to drop it.
The plaintiff also contends that factual disputes preclude the entry of summary
judgment because the witnesses differ as to where Michael’s gun was pointed,
where he was going, and whether he had turned toward Deputy Caldwell at the
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time Caldwell fired his weapon.5 But the mere existence of factual disputes does
not prevent a party from prevailing on an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. Rather, the moving party
only needs to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. Id.
Here, Deputy Caldwell is entitled to qualified immunity based on the undisputed
facts, regardless of the factual disputes described. Because the facts contained in
the record do not make out a constitutional violation, Deputy Caldwell is entitled
to summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim asserted by the plaintiff
under § 1983.
The plaintiff’s claim against Sheriff Newman fails for the same reason; no
violation of Michael’s Fourth Amendment rights occurred, so Sheriff Newman
cannot be held liable for any failure to adequately train or supervise Deputy
Caldwell. See Anderson v. Caldwell Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 524 F. App’x 854, 862
(4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (explaining that “[n]o actionable claim against
supervisors or local governments can exist without a constitutional violation
5
In the brief in opposition to summary judgment, Mrs. Huffman’s attorney states
that when Michael “beg[a]n to rise” from his chair, Deputy Caldwell said “drop it” and
“immediately” shot Michael “in the back.” (Mem. P. & A. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.
3, ECF No. 28.) Mrs. Huffman’s affidavit does not support those contentions. While she
did state that Michael had been “shot in the back” (Huffman Aff. ¶ 15, ECF No. 28-1),
the plaintiff’s own evidence shows to the contrary. More importantly, her sworn
statement does not claim that Deputy Caldwell shot Michael “immediately” after he rose
from his chair and was warned by the officer. Her actual statement is that “[w]hile I was
talking to Officer Caldwell, Officer Caldwell said ‘drop it’ and fired his gun.” (Id. at ¶
14.) She does not dispute the numerous prior warnings made to Michael before the
shooting as related by both Deputy Caldwell and Trooper Fore.
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committed by an employee”). Moreover, there is no vicarious liability under
§ 1983.
Supervisory officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional
conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). The plaintiff attempts to bring her claim within
the “official policy” theory of liability articulated in Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978), by alleging that “the excessive force
to which [Michael] was subject[ed] was an institutionalized practice of the
Washington County Sheriff’s Office.” (Compl. ¶ 32, ECF No. 1.) However, the
plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence in support of that bald assertion. Like
Deputy Caldwell, Sheriff Newman is entitled to summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
B.
State Law Wrongful Death Claim.
The plaintiff also asserts a claim against the defendants under the Virginia
Death by Wrongful Act statute, Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-50.
This court has
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
To prevail under the Death by Wrongful Act statute, a plaintiff must
establish that the decedent’s death was caused by a “wrongful act, neglect, or
default.” Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-50(A). Under Virginia law, “[a] wrongful act
imports lack of justification or excuse.” McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002,
1009 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Pike v. Eubank, 90 S.E.2d 821, 827 (Va. 1956)). In
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this case, as explained above, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the shooting
was justified.
The plaintiff admits that before shooting, Deputy Caldwell repeatedly told
Michael to drop his weapon. It is undisputed that Deputy Caldwell did not fire
until Michael rose up with the gun in his hand. As stated above, Deputy Caldwell
acted reasonably under the circumstances, and as a matter of law, his actions do
not amount to an actionable tort. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to prevail
as to the plaintiff’s wrongful death claim, and I will grant summary judgment in
their favor on that count.
IV.
This is a tragic case. I fully understand Mrs. Huffman’s anguish over what
she considers her husband’s unnecessary loss of life. I am also certain that Deputy
Caldwell deeply regrets that he found it necessary to take someone’s life.
Nevertheless, I find that Deputy Caldwell acted reasonably and with justification,
and cannot be held legally liable for Michael’s death. For the foregoing reasons, it
is ORDERED that defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 18) is
GRANTED. A separate final judgment will be entered forthwith.
ENTER: May 18, 2016
/s/ James P. Jones
United States District Judge
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