Progressive Northern Insurance Company v. Jones et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER granting 31 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge James P. Jones on 1/14/2020. (lml)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ABINGDON DIVISION
PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN
INSURANCE COMPANY,
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Plaintiff,
v.
BRYANT JONES d/b/a JONES
TRUCKING, ET AL.,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:18CV00009
OPINION AND ORDER
By: James P. Jones
United States District Judge
John B. Mumford, Jr., and Lindsay L. Rollins, HANCOCK, DANIEL & JOHNSON,
P.C., Glen Allen, Virginia, Robert D. Moseley, Jr., and Megan M. Early-Soppa,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Plaintiff; Charles A. Stacy, THE CHARLES A. STACY
LAW OFFICE & PERSONAL INJURY CENTER, PLLC, Bluefield, Virginia, for Defendant
Michelle Reynolds Streeby, Administrator of the Estate of Michael Eugene Reynolds,
Deceased.
The plaintiff, an automobile liability insurance company, seeks a declaration
pursuant to the diversity jurisdiction of this court that it has no obligation under its
policy to provide coverage, including a duty to defend, arising from an accident in
which the defendant’s decedent was killed. The plaintiff has moved for summary
judgment in its favor, which motion has been fully briefed. For the following
reasons, I will grant summary judgment for the insurance company.
I.
The facts are not in dispute. Michelle Reynolds Streeby, as the Administrator
of the Estate of Michael Eugene Reynolds, Deceased (the “Administrator”) filed a
wrongful death action in a Virginia state court arising from a motor vehicle accident
that killed her decedent. The defendants in the state court action are Bryant Jones,
doing business as Jones Trucking (“Jones”), and Brandon Blevins. It is alleged that
Blevins, the other driver, while acting within the scope of his employment by Jones,
negligently caused the accident that killed Reynolds.
Progressive Northern Insurance Company (“Progressive”) then filed the
present declaratory judgment action, in which it alleges that the tractor and trailer
being operated by Blevins were owned by Jones. It further alleges that Blevins and
B K & K Trucking, Inc. (“B K & K”), of Tazewell, Virginia, were named insureds
under a liability insurance policy issued by Progressive (the “Policy”).1 It contends
that the tractor and trailer owned by Jones and operated by Blevins were not covered
under the Policy at the time of the accident. It thus concludes that Progressive’s
Policy affords no coverage for liability arising from the accident and seeks a
declaration that Progressive had no duty to defend or indemnify Jones, Blevins, or
B K & K. Compl. ¶ 22, ECF No. 1.
In the present action, Progressive has named and served as defendants Jones,
Blevins, B K & K, and the Administrator. Jones, Blevins, and B K & K did not
respond to the suit and have been declared in default. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The
1
The undisputed evidence shows that B K & K is a trucking company owned and
operated by Blevins. Blevins worked part time driving for Jones when his own business
was slow. Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C, Blevins Dep. 11–12, ECF No. 32-3.
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Administrator answered and has opposed Progressive’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, which is ripe for decision.2
II.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no material facts in dispute and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Progressive has submitted a certified copy of the Policy and its Declarations,
which the defendant Administrator does not dispute. Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ.
J. Ex. E, ECF No. 32-5. The Policy specifically provides that it applies only to
covered vehicles that are listed on the Declarations for the Policy. Id. at Policy 1.
Neither the tractor nor the trailer which Blevins was operating at the time of the
accident are so listed. Id. at Declarations 2.
As regards liability coverage, the Policy provides that Progressive
will pay all sums an “insured” legally must pay as damages because of
“bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance
applies, caused by an “accident” and resulting from the ownership,
maintenance or use of a covered “auto”.
We have the right and duty to defend any “suit” for such damages,
even if the “suit” if groundless, false or fraudulent. However, we have
I will dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not significantly
aid the decisional process.
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no duty to defend “suits” for “bodily injury” or “property damage”
to which this insurance does not apply.
Id. at Policy 20.3
The Administrator concedes that the provisions of the Policy cited above
preclude coverage of the accident in light of the fact that the tractor and trailer were
not covered, Def.’s Resp. 2, ECF No. 34, and argues only that the commercial
general liability (“CGL”) portion of the Policy “may” afford coverage, id. However,
as pointed out by Progressive, the CGL form expressly excludes liability coverage
for bodily injury or property damage arising out of “[t]he ownership, maintenance,
use, or entrustment to others of any aircraft, auto, or watercraft owned or operated
by, or rented, leased or loaned to, any insured.” Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J.
Ex. E 50–51, ECF No. 32-5. “Auto” is defined as any “land motor vehicle, trailer,
or semitrailer designed for travel on public roads.” Id. at 46. There is no dispute but
that the tractor and trailer owned by Jones and operated by Blevins at the time of the
accident meet this definition.
Moreover, the Policy provides no coverage for liability arising out of any
activity “other than the insured’s trucking operations.” Id. at 42. Blevins and his
company, B K & K, are the insureds in Progressive’s Policy, id. at 1, and it is
undisputed that Blevins was not acting in pursuant of his own trucking business at
3
This provision is contained in an endorsement to the Policy entitled “Virginia
Changes – Business Auto Coverage Form.” Id.
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the time of the accident, but on the business of Jones, who is not an insured under
the Policy.
“In general, courts interpret insurance policies, like other contracts, in
accordance with the intention of the parties gleaned from the words they have used
in the document.” Transcon. Ins. Co. v. RBMW, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 313, 318 (Va. 2001)
(internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). Generally, “[t]he
interpretation of a contract presents a question of law.” City of Chesapeake v. States
Self-Insurers Risk Retention Grp., Inc., 628 S.E.2d 539, 541 (Va. 2006). Where a
contract “is complete on its face, [and] is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the
court is not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument itself.”
Monticello Ins. Co. v. Baecher, 477 S.E.2d 490, 491 (Va. 1996) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Based on the uncontested facts, the plain language of the Policy, and the legal
standards I must follow, I find that there is no coverage under Progressive’s Policy
for the accident in question and will so declare. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that
the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 31, is GRANTED. 4
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Two issues, not raised by the parties, require brief discussion.
As noted, certain of the parties, including the named insureds under the Policy, are
in default. The court may enter judgment against parties in default, Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b),
and because an interested party has appeared and defended, and in light of the clear record
in this case, I find it appropriate to exercise my discretion to enter judgment against the
defaulted parties. See United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1982).
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A final judgment will be entered herewith.
ENTER: January 14, 2020
/s/ JAMES P. JONES
United States District Judge
A second issue is whether I should abstain from exercising jurisdiction to declare
that the Policy affords no right of indemnity on the ground that the state court has not yet
determined the liability of the insureds. See Trustgard Ins. Co. v. Collins, 942 F.3d 195,
201–205 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that district court erred in declaring insurance policy
coverage where the relevant facts would duplicate factual issues before the state court in
the underlying tort action). However, because my declaration in this case would not intrude
on the prerogatives of the state court in the underlying tort action, I find no obstacle to
making it. See id.
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