Reichler v. The Town of Abingdon
Filing
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AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER. Defendants Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 4, is GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an Amended Complaint within 14 days from the date of entry of this Opinion and Order. Signed by Senior Judge James P. Jones on 06/10/2022. (am)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ABINGDON DIVISION
STACEY LYNN REICHLER,
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Plaintiff,
v.
THE TOWN OF ABINGDON,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:21CV70637
AMENDED
OPINION AND ORDER
JUDGE JAMES P. JONES
Thomas E. Strelka, L. Leigh R. Strelka, N. Winston West, IV, Brittany M.
Haddox, and Monica L. Mroz, STRELKA EMPLOYMENT LAW, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Plaintiff; Ramesh Murthy and Cameron S. Bell, PENN STUART & ESKRIDGE,
Abingdon, Virginia, for Defendant.
In this employment discrimination case, the plaintiff asserts claims against her
former employer pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging
hostile work environment, sex discrimination, and wrongful retaliation.
The
defendant has moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to adequately allege facts
supporting such claims. Because I find that the plaintiff has failed to allege that she
has satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement, I will grant the defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend.
I.
The Complaint alleges the following facts.
The plaintiff, Stacey Lynn
Reichler, served as the Director of Human Resources for the Town of Abingdon,
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Virginia (Town). She asserts that she was terminated on February 21, 2020, three
days after meeting with counsel for the Town to report allegations of sex-based
harassment and hostile work environment against the then-Town Manager.
Reichler alleges that she performed her job duties well and received positive
performance evaluations. Nevertheless, she claims that the Town Manager targeted
her and that he treated her differently than male employees. For instance, in October
2019, he denied her request for tuition reimbursement, despite her belief that the
Town provided male police officers with this benefit. That same month, the Town
Manger forbade her from using Town vehicles after she borrowed a vehicle to visit
another Town employee at the hospital while her car was in the shop, despite the
fact that male Town employees were permitted to use the vehicles. She was also
reprimanded after an approved request for leave to attend her son’s graduation from
a military officer training program after he discovered that she did not actually attend
the event because her son had sustained an injury. Following these incidents, she
claims that the Town Manager “began digging into [her] personal life and
monitoring her social media.” Compl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 1-1. He “installed a camera
and microphone” outside her office “for no other reason but to spy on” her. Id. ¶ 18.
On January 9, 2020, the Town Manager demoted Reichler from her role as a
department head, and a little over a month later, she was fired. She contends that
three other female department heads were similarly demoted or terminated around
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this time. On January 27, 2020, the Town Manager summoned Reichler to his office
for a meeting, where he berated her about “her spending on previous business trips”
and “her time off request regarding her son’s graduation.” Id. ¶ 27. He called her a
liar, and said, “nobody likes you, nobody trusts you, and I have serious trust issues
with you!” Id. ¶ 28. He called her “incompetent” and claimed that she didn’t “know
how to budget.” Id. ¶ 29. She received a written disciplinary report after the
meeting.
In addition, Reichler claims that the Town Manager made demeaning and
condescending comments towards her and about women in the workplace. He
referred to female employees as “busy bodies, bossy, catty, liars,” and said that he
“[didn’t] like working with women because they’re catty.” Id. ¶ 46. During a staff
meeting on January 23, 2020, he told the Town’s female Director of Tourism, to
“[s]hut up” and called her ideas “stupid.” Id. ¶ 42. He told Reichler and another
female employee, that “you all . . . are going to have to get used to not being treated
the same” because he “need[ed] to focus on retaining employees who matter — IT
and the Police.” Id. ¶ 44. Reichler interpreted this comment to mean that he valued
employees in departments that were predominately male. He further told female
staff and female Town Council members that he “[knew] how to handle [them].” Id.
¶ 45. On February 23, 2020, the Town’s female Special Events Coordinator, met
with Reichler and told her that during a meeting earlier that month, the Town
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Manager responded to her comment that the meeting was getting off-track by saying,
“Man, you’re really bossy.” Id. ¶ 49.
Reichler, in her capacity as HR manager, reached out to one of the Town’s
attorneys to report the Town Manager’s misconduct on behalf of herself and others.
Another of the Town’s attorneys met with Reichler on February 18, 2020, where she
informed him about the Town Manager’s behavior and requested that he investigate
the allegations. The attorney told Reichler that he would “look into the situation.”
Id. ¶ 55. That same day, the Town Manager requested that Reichler return her master
key for the office building, and she was provided a new key that granted her access
only to the first floor and her office. On February 21, 2020, the Town Manager
terminated Reichler, explaining the decision was based on “errors and overpayments
to the Town’s employee health plan coverage.” Id. ¶ 58. She was immediately
escorted out of the building by the Chief of Police. She was not permitted to resign
from her position, as she contends the Town allowed for terminated male employees.
The Town Manager also contested her request for unemployment benefits from the
Virginia Employment Commission and denied her request to keep her health
insurance for an additional month.
On February 22, 2020, Reichler sent the Town Council a letter that reiterated
her complaints about the Town Manager. She also claimed that “[he] and others in
the Town of Abingdon took great pains to prevent her from obtaining new
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employment” and “gave her a poor recommendation when potential new employers
contacted them.” Id. ¶ 63.
On June 11, 2020, Reichler filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She received a right-to-sue letter
dated January 6, 2021. She then received a second notice, dated January 7, 2021,
advising that the EEOC was rescinding the prior right-to-sue letter, explaining that
it “was issued in error and is invalid” and that the EEOC was forwarding her charge
to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Id. Ex. B, at 22.
On April 5, 2021, prior to receiving any notice from the DOJ, Reichler filed
suit against the Town in state court in Roanoke, Virginia, “out of an abundance of
caution,” to preserve the timeliness of her lawsuit. Id. ¶ 3. Her Complaint asserts
three claims: hostile work environment (Count 1); sex discrimination (Count 2); and
retaliation (Count 3). After being served with the Complaint, the Town removed the
case to the Roanoke division of this court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. On
December 20, 2021, the Town moved to transfer the case to the Abingdon division
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404, and to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The court
The plaintiff asserts that the Town “filed its motion pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the
Federal Rules.” Pl.’s Br. Opp’n 1, ECF No. 11. However, the Town’s motion expressly
relies on Rule 12(b)(6). Mot. Dismiss 1, ECF No. 4.
1
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granted the Town’s request to transfer the case to the Abingdon division on January
5, 2022.
In support of its Motion to Dismiss, the Town argues first that the plaintiff
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, as the EEOC rescinded her right-tosue letter and made clear that the earlier notice was invalid, and secondly, that she
has not alleged sufficient facts to make her claims plausible.
In response, Reichler contends that she has adequately plead facts to support
her three causes of action. She concedes that she did not allege exhaustion in her
Complaint but argues that the DOJ ultimately issued her a right-to-sue letter, dated
November 17, 2021, mooting the exhaustion issue. She attached a copy of the letter
with her brief. Pl.’s Br. Opp’n Ex. C, Notice of Right to Sue, ECF No. 11-3. The
plaintiff also points out that she did not serve this lawsuit on the defendant until after
the DOJ issued the notice. The Town maintains that despite this new evidence, a
plaintiff must allege exhaustion in the complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. The
parties have fully briefed the issues and the matter is now ripe for decision.2
II.
As a threshold matter, I must address the administrative exhaustion issue.
Before suing under Title VII, a plaintiff is required to file a charge of discrimination
2
I will dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not significantly
aid the decisional process.
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with the EEOC and to exhaust the administrative procedures under 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5, including obtaining a notice of right to sue. The exhaustion requirement is
not a “a formality to be rushed through,” but is “an integral part of the Title VII
enforcement scheme.” Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 2005).
In this case, because the plaintiff is suing a government entity, the EEOC must refer
the matter to the Attorney General of the United States to issue the notice of rights.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(d)(2); Fells v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., No. 2:08CV74, 2008 WL
11512344, at *2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 28, 2008).
The Town argues that because Reichler failed to allege in the Complaint that
she exhausted her administrative remedies, the Motion to Dismiss must be granted.
The Town relies on cases from this circuit that have recognized the “right-to-sue
letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite that must be alleged in a plaintiff’s complaint.”
Davis v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 48 F.3d 134, 140 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Landry v.
SAIC, No. 1:12CV673 (JCC/TRJ), 2012 WL 2951639, at *3–4 (E.D. Va. July 19,
2012).3 And both parties rely on a district court case from this circuit, Hardy v.
Lewis Gale Medical Center, 377 F. Supp. 3d 596 (W.D. Va. 2019), in support of
their positions. The Town argues that Hardy establishes that the plaintiff may
survive a failure-to-exhaust challenge where a right-to-sue letter was not initially
The Supreme Court subsequently held that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement
is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule, “albeit a mandatory one.” Fort Bend Cnty. v.
Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2019).
3
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included only if she subsequently amends her complaint. Id. at 606. Reichler has
not moved to amend the Complaint to account for new facts raised for the first time
in her brief –– that the DOJ issued a right-to-sue letter. Def.’s Reply Mem. 2, ECF
No. 14. She argues that Hardy only proves the mootness of the defendant’s
argument, as she ultimately did receive her notice of rights.
This issue could easily have been rectified if Reichler had amended her
Complaint to add the DOJ notice after the Motion to Dismiss as permitted by Rule
15(a)(2)(B). Instead, she merely doubles-down on her position that exhaustion has,
in fact, been satisfied. The issue then is whether the facts of this case allow for the
consideration of the extrinsic evidence. I find that they do not.
Ordinarily, when resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “cannot consider
matters outside the pleadings without converting the motion into one for summary
judgment.” Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 116 (4th Cir. 2013). But this
general rule has several exceptions. The court may consider documents attached to
the complaint, Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), as well as those attached to a motion to dismiss,
“so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty.
Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471
F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir.2006)). With regard to the latter, a document is “integral”
if the plaintiff has “explicitly referred to” the document in the complaint. Am.
Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004).
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(“The rationale underlying this exception is that the primary problem raised by
looking to documents outside the complaint — lack of notice to the plaintiff — is
dissipated [w]here the plaintiff has actual notice . . . and has relied upon these
documents in framing the complaint.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)).
This case presents an unusual application of this rule in that it is typically the
defendant who is attempting to introduce the extrinsic evidence. Even still, I find
the same analysis applies where it is the plaintiff who seeks to introduce the
evidence, as the concerns about notice to the opposing party remain relevant.
It is undisputed that Reichler did not “explicitly refer[] to” the DOJ letter in
the Complaint. Am. Chiropractic Ass’n, 367 F.3d at 234. Although she referenced
two related documents — the EEOC right-to-sue letter, dated January 6, 2021, and
the letter rescinding that notice dated January 7, 2021 — she did not rely upon the
DOJ letter in the Complaint. To the contrary, the Complaint was crafted around the
absence of the letter, as she made clear that she intentionally filed the lawsuit
prematurely to preserve her rights. The fact that she waited to serve the defendant
until after receipt of the letter does not change the analysis. While I understand the
plaintiff’s position that she was concerned about the timeliness of her lawsuit if the
EEOC’s rescission proved to be in error or did not toll the 90-day deadline for filing
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after the issuance of notice, the federal rules and Hardy provide a clear solution: she
may amend the Complaint.
In sum, because I may not consider the right-to-sue letter at this stage of the
litigation, and the plaintiff did not allege in the Complaint that she exhausted her
administrative remedies, I will grant the Town’s motion, with leave to amend.4
III.
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 4, is GRANTED; and
2. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an Amended Complaint within 14 days
from the date of entry of this Opinion and Order.
ENTER: June 10, 2022
/s/ JAMES P. JONES
Senior United States District Judge
4
Because of the mandatory nature of administrative exhaustion, I will not opine
on the Town’s argument that the Complaint fails to sufficiently allege facts supporting the
claims of sex discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. However, I would
urge the Town to consider the viability of such an argument, assuming that an amended
complaint is filed, in light of my recitation of the factual allegations made in the present
Complaint.
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