Fannon v. Astrue
Filing
18
OPINION. Signed by Judge James P. Jones on 5/15/12. (sc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
BIG STONE GAP DIVISION
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
STEVEY GUY FANNON,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Case No. 2:11CV00045
OPINION
By: James P. Jones
United States District Judge
Ginger J. Largen, Morefield & Largen, P.L.C., Abingdon, Virginia, for
Plaintiff. Nora Koch, Acting Regional Chief Counsel, Region III, Sandra
Romagnole, Assistant Regional Counsel, and Robert Kosman, Special Assistant
United States Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Social Security
Administration, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Defendant.
In this social security case, I affirm the final decision of the Commissioner.
I
Plaintiff Stevey Guy Fannon filed this action challenging the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying his claim
for supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits pursuant to Title XVI of the
Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1381-1383 (West 2012). Jurisdiction
of this court exists pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West 2011).
Fannon filed for benefits on October 1, 2008, alleging that he became
disabled on January 15, 2008.
His claim was denied initially and upon
reconsideration. Fannon received a hearing before an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”), during which Fannon, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert
testified. The ALJ denied Fannon’s claim, and the Social Security Administration
Appeals Council denied his Request for Reconsideration. Fannon then filed his
Complaint with this court, objecting to the Commissioner’s final decision.
The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment, which have
been briefed and argued. The case is ripe for decision.
II
Fannon was born on September 7, 1957, making him an individual closely
approaching advanced age under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.963 (2011).
Fannon has an eighth grade education and has worked in the past as a carpenter, a
concrete finisher, and a window replacer. He originally claimed he was disabled
due to pain in his hands and hips.
Fannon sought treatment from G. Jane Williams, FNP, from January 2006
through December 2007. Fannon’s complaints included insomnia, chest pain, hand
pain, elbow pain, chronic back pain, chronic bronchitis, high cholesterol, and
osteoarthritis of the hips. Williams prescribed Klonopin, Lortab, and Vytorin. She
-2-
reported that Fannon’s neurological functioning was within normal limits and that
he had an appropriate psychological status.
In January 2009, William Humphries, M.D., performed a consultative
examination at the request of the state agency. Fannon complained of bilateral
hand pain, left wrist pain, shortness of breath, and bilateral hip pain. He indicated
that he had not undergone surgery or injection into the hand or hip regions. (R. at
285-86.) Dr. Humphries noted that Fannon was not taking any medication aside
from Advil at the time of the examination. (R. at 286.) He reported that Fannon
had “slight” to “mild” musculoskeletal deficiencies, full grip strength, clear lungs,
and no neurological or emotional abnormalities. (R. at 287-88.) Dr. Humphries
opined that Fannon was capable of performing a range of light work with some
restrictions such as no repetitive production-type work, no crawling, and only
occasional climbing and kneeling.
In March 2009, Fannon sought treatment from Charlene Grigsby, M.D., for
complaints of sinus congestion and coughing. Fannon reported that he had not
taken any medication for his nerves, cholesterol, or pain issues for the past three to
four months. (R. at 299.) Upon examination, Dr. Grigsby noted clear lungs and
normal psychological, neurological, and musculoskeletal functioning.
She
diagnosed Fannon with hand pain, hip joint pain, anxiety, acute sinusitis, and
-3-
esophageal reflux.
Dr. Grigsby renewed Fannon’s prescriptions, noting that
Fannon’s request for anxiety medication would be deferred. (R. at 301.)
There is no record of any follow-up visits with Dr. Grigsby over the next
two years. However, Dr. Grigsby submitted a letter dated November 17, 2010,
indicating that Fannon had been a patient “for quite some time.” (R. at 318.) Dr.
Grigsby noted that Fannon had considerable arthritis of the spine and several major
joints, and that his impairments met Listings 1.02A and 1.02B, which pertain to
major dysfunction of the joints.
In December 2010, Fannon underwent a series of X rays at Holston Valley
Imaging Center. These X rays revealed mild superior joint space narrowing about
the right hip, mild osseous proliferation in the left shoulder, mild to moderate
osteoarthritis of the hands, and degenerative arthritis of the right elbow.
Elizabeth A. Jones, M.A., a senior psychological examiner, conducted a
mental evaluation of Fannon in December 2010. Fannon denied any delusions,
hallucinations, suicidal thoughts, or symptoms of depression, but stated that he did
not like crowds. (R. at 375.) He also reported sleep difficulties that were most
likely due to excessive caffeine and late meals. Jones noted that Fannon had no
history of mental health treatment. She diagnosed Fannon with anxiety disorder
-4-
and reading disorder, and assessed a GAF score of 70.1 Jones opined that Fannon
would have only mild limitations in his ability to interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.
At the administrative hearing held in March 2011, Fannon testified on his
own behalf. Fannon confirmed that he did not require a wheelchair, walker,
crutches, or any other type of assistive walking device. Donald Anderson, a
vocational expert, also testified. He classified Fannon’s past work as a carpenter as
medium, skilled; and his past work as a concrete finisher as heavy, skilled.
After reviewing all of Fannon’s records and taking into consideration the
testimony at the hearing, the ALJ determined that he had severe impairments of
degenerative joint disease of the hip, hands, feet, knees, and left wrist, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease with ongoing cigarette smoking, peripheral
neuropathy in the right lower extremity, and a reading disability, but that none of
these conditions, either alone or in combination, met or medically equaled a listed
impairment.
Taking into account Fannon’s limitations, the ALJ determined that Fannon
retained the residual functional capacity to perform a range of light work that
1
The GAF scale is a method of considering psychological, social and occupational
function on a hypothetical continuum of mental health. The GAF scale ranges from 0 to 100,
with serious impairment in functioning at a score of 50 or below. Scores between 51 and 60
represent moderate symptoms or a moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school
functioning, whereas scores between 41 and 50 represent serious symptoms or serious
impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning. See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (4th ed. 1994).
-5-
involved only occasionally balancing, kneeling, crouching, stooping/bending,
climbing ramps/stairs, or operating foot controls with the lower extremities. The
ALJ stated that Fannon could not crawl or climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and
that he was to avoid concentrated exposure to dust, fumes, odors, chemicals, gases,
or hazards. The ALJ also restricted Fannon from work that required good reading
skills or repetitive/continuous use of the hands in production-type work. The
vocational expert testified that someone with Fannon’s residual functional capacity
could work as a collator operator, an advertising material distributor, or a bagger.
The vocational expert testified that those positions existed in significant numbers
in the national economy. Relying on this testimony, the ALJ concluded that
Fannon was able to perform work that existed in significant numbers in the
national economy and was therefore not disabled under the Act.
Fannon argues the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence
because the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the medical opinion of Dr. Grigsby
and failed to appropriately consider Fannon’s mental impairments. For the reasons
below, I disagree.
III
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he is under a disability.
Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972). The standard for
-6-
disability is strict. The plaintiff must show that his “physical or mental impairment
or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous
work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy . . . .” 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(2)(A) (West 2011).
In assessing SSI claims, the Commissioner applies a five-step sequential
evaluation process. The Commissioner considers whether the claimant: (1) has
worked during the alleged period of disability; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has
a condition that meets or equals the severity of a listed impairment; (4) could
return to his past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether he could perform other
work present in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (2011). If it
is determined at any point in the five-step analysis that the claimant is not disabled,
the inquiry immediately ceases. Id.; McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69
(4th Cir. 1983). The fourth and fifth steps of the inquiry require an assessment of
the claimant’s residual functional capacity, which is then compared with the
physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant work and of other
work present in the national economy. Id. at 869.
In accordance with the Act, I must uphold the Commissioner’s findings if
substantial evidence supports them and the findings were reached through
application of the correct legal standard. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th
-7-
Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be
somewhat less than a preponderance.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th
Cir. 1966). It is the role of the ALJ to resolve evidentiary conflicts, including
inconsistencies in the evidence. Seacrist v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1956-57
(4th Cir. 1976). It is not the role of this court to substitute its judgment for that of
the Commissioner. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
Fannon argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. He presents two arguments.
First, Fannon argues that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the opinion
of Dr. Grigsby. Specifically, Fannon asserts that the ALJ failed to give proper
weight to Dr. Grigsby’s opinion that his osteoarthritis met the requirements of
Listings 1.02A and 1.02B, which pertain to major joint dysfunction.
A treating physician’s medical opinion will be given controlling weight
when it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in
[the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (2011). However, the ALJ has “the
discretion to give less weight to the testimony of a treating physician in the face of
-8-
persuasive contrary evidence.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001).
When deciding the weight given to a treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ
considers factors such as the length and nature of the treating relationship. 20
C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2).
In the present case, the ALJ considered the opinion of Dr. Grigsby but gave
little weight to her assessment for several reasons. First, Dr. Grigsby’s treating
relationship with Fannon was limited — her opinion apparently was based on a
one-time clinical examination and there are no records of any follow-up visits. Dr.
Grigsby stated that her opinion was based on imaging studies; however, Fannon
did not undergo X-ray studies until three weeks after Dr. Grigsby reached her
conclusion. Second, Dr. Grigsby’s opinion is inconsistent with her own evaluation
as well as the other medical evidence of record. For instance, Dr. Grigsby stated
that Fannon had considerable arthritis of the spine and several major joints; yet she
noted normal musculoskeletal functioning upon evaluation.
(R. at 300.) Dr.
Grigsby’s opinion is also refuted by the findings of Dr. Humphries, who noted only
“slight” or “mild” functional deficiencies and concluded that Fannon was capable
of performing a range of light work despite his musculoskeletal impairments. (R.
at 287-88.) Furthermore, Fannon’s conservative treatment history weighs against
Dr. Grigsby’s findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3) (2011).
-9-
Second, Fannon argues that the ALJ failed to appropriately consider his
mental impairments. This argument has no merit. There is nothing in the record to
indicate that the ALJ ignored or improperly discounted Fannon’s mental
impairments.
The ALJ considered Fannon’s anxiety disorder in detail, and
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that this impairment was not
severe. (R. at 11-12.) For instance, Jones noted that Fannon denied any delusions,
hallucinations, suicidal thoughts, or symptoms of depression, and that Fannon had
no history of mental health treatment. (R. at 375.) Jones also assessed a GAF
score of 70, indicating only mild functional limitations in mental work-related
activities. Additionally, the ALJ accounted for Fannon’s reading disorder in the
residual functional capacity assessment, effectively limiting him to jobs that did
not require good reading skills. Accordingly, I find that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s conclusions.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment will
be denied, and the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted. A
final judgment will be entered affirming the Commissioner’s final decision
denying benefits.
-10-
DATED: May 15, 2012
/s/ James P. Jones
United States District Judge
-11-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?