Hensley v. Astrue

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER denying 9 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Deborah Kate Hensley; granting 12 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Michael J Astrue. Signed by Judge James P. Jones on 11/12/2013. (lml)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
BIG STONE GAP DIVISION
DEBORAH KATE HENSLEY,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY, 1
Defendant.

Case No. 2:13CV00003
OPINION AND ORDER
By: James P. Jones
United States District Judge

Ginger J. Largen, Morefield & Largen, P.L.C., Abingdon, Virginia, for
Plaintiff; Nora Koch, Acting Regional Chief Counsel, Region III, Patricia Stewart,
Assistant Regional Counsel, and Alexander L. Cristaudo, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Social Security Administration,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Defendant.
In this Social Security disability case, I affirm the decision of the
Commissioner.

I
Plaintiff Deborah Kate Hensley filed this action challenging the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying
her claim for a disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social
1

Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner on February 14, 2013, and
is substituted for Michael J. Astrue as the defendant in this suit pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 25(d).

Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-434 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013).
Jurisdiction of this court exists under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g).
Hensley filed for DIB administratively on September 16, 2008.

After

preliminary denials of her claims, she obtained a hearing before an administrative
law judge (“ALJ”) on January 28, 2011, at which she was represented by her
present counsel and during which she testified along with an impartial vocational
expert.2

On February 14, 2011, the ALJ issued a partially favorable written

decision finding that Hensley became disabled under the Act on August 22, 2010,
but not before that date.

Hensley requested review by the Social Security

Administration’s Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied her request for
review on December 19, 2012, thereby making the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner. Hensley then filed this action seeking judicial
review of the Commissioner’s decision.
The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment, which have
been briefed and orally argued. The case is ripe for decision.

II
Hensley claimed that she had been unable to work since July 23, 2008, based
upon both exertional and nonexertional impairments, including depression,
2

The record indicates at one point that the hearing was on January 28, 2012, (R.
30), but that is clearly a mistake.
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anxiety, back pain, and degenerative joint disease. At the time of the hearing
before the ALJ she was 55 years old. She has a high school education and worked
for thirty-five years as a senior stock keeper for a large manufacturing company.
In his written decision, the ALJ reviewed Hensley’s medical history and the
testimony presented at the hearing and set forth at length the reasons for her factual
findings. She found that Hensley was disabled within the meaning of the Act as of
August 22, 2010, by applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines (the “Grids”), see
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 (2013), based upon her age, but was not disabled
before that date. Before that date, the ALJ found that Hensley had the residual
functional capacity to perform light work, as defined by the regulations, with
limitations appropriate to her impairments.

Based upon the testimony of the

vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Hensley had been capable of
performing jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
It is contended in the present case that the ALJ erred in failing to evaluate all
of Hensley’s impairments and in placing insufficient weight on the opinion of
Hensley’s treating psychiatrist, Ronald S. Smith, M.D.

III
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is under a disability.
Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972). The standard for
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disability is strict.

The plaintiff must show that her “physical or mental

impairment or impairments are of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do
[her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy . . . .” 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In assessing disability claims, the Commissioner applies a five-step
sequential evaluation process. The Commissioner considers whether the claimant:
(1) has worked during the alleged period of disability; (2) has a severe impairment;
(3) has a condition that meets or equals the severity of a listed impairment; (4)
could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether she could perform
other work present in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (2013).
The fourth and fifth steps of the inquiry require an assessment of the claimant’s
residual functional capacity, which is then compared with the physical and mental
demands of the claimant’s past relevant work and of other work present in the
national economy.
In accordance with the Act, I must uphold the Commissioner’s findings if
substantial evidence supports them and the findings were reached through the
application of the correct legal standard. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th
Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales,
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402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be
somewhat less than a preponderance.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th
Cir. 1966). It is the role of the ALJ to resolve evidentiary conflicts, including
inconsistencies in the evidence. Seacrist v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1056-57
(4th Cir. 1976). It is not the role of the court to substitute its judgment for that of
the Commissioner. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
I have carefully reviewed the record evidence and conclude that the ALJ’s
decision in this case is supported by substantial evidence and was reached through
application of the correct legal standard.
DR. SMITH’S OPINIONS.
The plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not adequately consider the opinions
of Dr. Smith, her treating psychiatrist. A treating physician’s medical opinion will
be given controlling weight when it is “well-supported by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (2013).
However, the ALJ has “the discretion to give less weight to the testimony of a
treating physician in the face of persuasive contrary evidence.” Mastro v. Apfel,
270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, no special weight is afforded to a

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medical opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether a
claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (2013).
The ALJ did not reject Dr. Smith’s findings in total, and gave them “some
weight.” (R. 22.) He did reject Dr. Smith’s opinions that Hensley would have
poor ability to interact with supervisors, deal with stress, and maintain attention
and concentration, based upon other evidence in the record. (Id.) The ALJ noted
that Hensley had been diagnosed with generalized anxiety and depression in 2005,
but continued to work until 2008 with approximately the same level of severity of
symptoms. (R. 21.) The ALJ also noted that the medical records from Dr. Smith
never showed evidence of acute psychological distress or limitations and that
Hensley always received conservative treatment. (R. 22.)
Moreover, as explained in the ALJ’s opinion, two reviewing state agency
psychologists found no evidence in Hensley’s medical history of acute
psychological dysfunction and opined that her mental impairments resulted in no
more than moderate limitations. (R. 68-70; 89-91.)

While the evidence could

have been resolved differently, I find that the ALJ’s decision not to fully accept Dr.
Smith’s opinions was supported by substantial evidence.
COMBINED EFFECT OF IMPAIRMENTS.
The plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to consider the combined effect of
her impairments. However, the ALJ did accept that Hensley had a number of
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severe impairments and numerated these impairments in her hypothetical question
to the vocational expert. (R. 48-50.) The vocation expert opined that even with
these limitations, the plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform work
that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. (Id.) The ALJ did not
err in accepting that opinion and finding the plaintiff not disabled prior to August
22, 2010.

IV
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
denied, and the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. A final
judgment will be entered affirming the Commissioner’s final decision denying
benefits.
It is so ORDERED.

ENTER: November 12, 2013
/s/ James P. Jones
United States District Judge

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