Worley v. Colvin

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Pamela Meade Sargent on 03/29/2016. (Bordwine, Robin)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
BIG STONE GAP DIVISION
BRITTANY N. WORLEY,
Plaintiff
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant

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Civil Action No. 2:14cv00020
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY: PAMELA MEADE SARGENT
United States Magistrate Judge

I. Background and Standard of Review
Plaintiff, Brittany N. Worley, (“Worley”), filed this action challenging the
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, (“Commissioner”),
determining that she was not eligible for disability insurance benefits, (“DIB”),
under the Social Security Act, as amended, (“Act”), 42 U.S.C.A. § 423 et seq.
(West 2011). Jurisdiction of this court is pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This case
is before the undersigned magistrate judge by transfer based on consent of the
parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Oral argument has not been requested;
therefore, the matter is ripe for decision.
The court’s review in this case is limited to determining if the factual
findings of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence and were
reached through application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen,
829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence has been defined as
“evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a
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particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may
be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642
(4th Cir. 1966). ‘“If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the
case before a jury, then there is “substantial evidence.’”” Hays v. Sullivan, 907
F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Laws, 368 F.2d at 642).
The record shows that Worley protectively filed her application for DIB on
July 30, 2010, alleging disability as of July 14, 2010, due to multiple sclerosis,
depression, learning disability, numbness and weakness in her legs and severe back
pain. (Record, (“R.”), at 172-73, 215, 240.) The claim was denied initially and on
reconsideration. (R. at 87-89, 95, 98-100.) Worley then requested a hearing before
an administrative law judge, (“ALJ”). (R. at R. at 102-03.) A hearing was held by
video conferencing on September 25, 2012, at which Worley was represented by
counsel. (R. at 36-60.)
By decision dated October 3, 2012, the ALJ denied Worley’s claim. (R. at
17-29.) The ALJ found that Worley met the nondisability insured status
requirements of the Act for DIB purposes through March 31, 2014. (R. at 19.) The
ALJ also found that Worley had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
July 14, 2010, her alleged onset date. (R. at 19.) The ALJ found that the medical
evidence established that Worley suffered from severe impairments, namely
chronic low back pain with lower extremity weakness; possible multiple sclerosis;
major depressive disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder; borderline intellectual
functioning; personality disorder; and obesity, but he found that Worley did not

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have an impairment or combination of impairments listed at or medically equal to
one listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 19-22.) The ALJ
found that Worley had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work 1
with lifting and carrying of items weighing up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10
pounds frequently and standing and walking up to two hours and sitting up to six
hours in an eight-hour workday. (R. at 22.) The ALJ also found that Worley could
frequently operate foot controls, occasionally climb ramps or stairs, balance, stoop,
kneel, crouch and crawl, but could never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. (R. at
22.) The ALJ further found that Worley would need to avoid concentrated
exposure to vibration, as well as moderate exposure to hazards, such as moving
machinery and unprotected heights, and be limited to simple, routine and repetitive
tasks in a low-stress job with only occasional decision making, changes in work
settings and interaction with the public or co-workers. (R. at 22.) The ALJ found
that Worley had no past relevant work. (R. at 27.) Based on Worley’s age,
education, work history and residual functional capacity and the testimony of a
vocational expert, the ALJ also found that other jobs existed in significant numbers
in the national economy that Worley could perform, including jobs as a printed
circuit board touch-up screener, an addresser and an ampoule sealer. (R. at 28-29.)
Thus, the ALJ found that Worley was not under a disability as defined by the Act
and was not eligible for DIB benefits. (R. at 29.) See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)
(2015).
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Sedentary work involves lifting items weighing up to 10 pounds at a time and
occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers and small tools. Although a
sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking or standing is
often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking or standing are required
occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (2015).

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After the ALJ issued his decision, Worley pursued her administrative
appeals, but the Appeals Council denied her request for review. (R. at 1-8.) Worley
then filed this action seeking review of the ALJ’s unfavorable decision, which now
stands as the Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (2015). The
case is before this court on Worley’s motion for summary judgment filed January
8, 2015, and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment filed February 12,
2015.
II. Analysis
The Commissioner uses a five-step process in evaluating DIB claims. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2015). See also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-62
(1983); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1981). This process requires
the Commissioner to consider, in order, whether a claimant 1) is working; 2) has a
severe impairment; 3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of a
listed impairment; 4) can return to her past relevant work; and 5) if not, whether
she can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If the Commissioner finds
conclusively that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in this process, review
does not proceed to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (2015).
As stated above, the court’s function in this case is limited to determining
whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the ALJ’s findings.
The court must not weigh the evidence, as this court lacks authority to substitute its

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judgment for that of the Commissioner, provided her decision is supported by
substantial evidence. See Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456. In determining whether
substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, the court also must
consider whether the ALJ analyzed all of the relevant evidence and whether the
ALJ sufficiently explained his findings and his rationale in crediting evidence. See
Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1997).
Thus, it is the ALJ’s responsibility to weigh the evidence, including the
medical evidence, in order to resolve any conflicts which might appear therein.
See Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456; Taylor v. Weinberger, 528 F.2d 1153, 1156 (4th Cir.
1975). Furthermore, while an ALJ may not reject medical evidence for no reason
or for the wrong reason, see King v. Califano, 615 F.2d 1018, 1020 (4th Cir. 1980),
an ALJ may, under the regulations, assign no or little weight to a medical opinion,
even one from a treating source, based on the factors set forth at 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c), if he sufficiently explains his rationale and if the record supports his
findings.
Worley argues that the ALJ improperly determined her residual functional
capacity. (Plaintiff’s Memorandum In Support Of Her Motion For Summary
Judgment, (“Plaintiff’s Brief”), at 5-8.) As stated above, the ALJ found that
Worley had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work with lifting
and carrying of items weighing up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
frequently and standing and walking up to two hours and sitting up to six hours in
an eight-hour workday, could frequently operate foot controls, occasionally climb

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ramps or stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl, but could never climb
ladders, ropes or scaffolds, must avoid concentrated exposure to vibration, as well
as moderate exposure to hazards, such as moving machinery and unprotected
heights, and be limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks in a low-stress job
with only occasional decision making, changes in work settings and interaction
with the public or co-workers. (R. at 22.) Worley argues that the ALJ’s finding as
to her residual functional capacity is not supported by substantial evidence, in that
he did not fully explain his weighing of the medical evidence. (Plaintiff’s Brief at
6-7.) In particular, Worley argues that the ALJ erred by stating that he was giving
“great weight” to the opinions of Dr. Kevin Blackwell, D.O., but then failing to
include all of Dr. Blackwell’s findings in his finding as to Worley’s residual
functional capacity. (Plaintiff’s Brief at 7.)
Based on my review of the record, I agree. In his opinion, the ALJ stated
“The undersigned accords great weight to [Dr. Blackwell’s] opinion because he
examined the claimant, and his conclusions are supported by the findings upon his
examination…. Moreover, his opinion is consistent with the opinions of the State
agency medical consultants….” (R. at 26.) In his assessment based on his medical
consultative examination, Dr. Blackwell found that Worley could lift items
weighing up to 35 pounds occasionally, 15 pounds frequently, could sit for up to
eight hours and stand for up to two hours out of an eight-hour workday with
normal postural changes, could bend and kneel one-third of the day and should
avoid squatting, stooping, crouching, crawling, exposure to unprotected heights,
ladder climbing and continuous operation of foot pedals. (R. at 835.) The ALJ, in

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his opinion, adopted the finding of Dr. Blackwell, except that he found that Worley
could occasionally stoop, crouch and crawl. (R. at 22.) The ALJ offered no
explanation for why he did not adopt Dr. Blackwell’s findings in their entirety in
his residual functional capacity finding. Therefore, I find that the ALJ failed to
sufficiently explain his rationale in weighing the medical evidence of record. See
King, 615 F.2d at 1020.
An appropriate Order and Judgment will be entered.
ENTERED: March 29, 2016.
s/

Pamela Meade Sargent

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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