Snyder v. Colvin

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Pamela Meade Sargent on 03/29/2016. (Bordwine, Robin)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
BIG STONE GAP DIVISION
RONNIE DALE SNYDER, SR.,
Plaintiff
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant

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Civil Action No. 2:14cv00021
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY: PAMELA MEADE SARGENT
United States Magistrate Judge

I. Background and Standard of Review
Plaintiff, Ronnie Dale Snyder, Sr., (“Snyder”), filed this action challenging
the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, (“Commissioner”),
determining that he was eligible for disability insurance benefits, (“DIB”), under
the Social Security Act, as amended, (“Act”), 42 U.S.C.A. § 423 (West 2011),
beginning on May 29, 2011. Jurisdiction of this court is pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). This case is before the undersigned magistrate judge by transfer based on
consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
The court’s review in this case is limited to determining if the factual
findings of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence and were
reached through application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen,
829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence has been defined as
“evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a
particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may
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be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642
(4th Cir. 1966). ‘“If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the
case before a jury, then there is “substantial evidence.’”” Hays v. Sullivan, 907
F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Laws, 368 F.2d at 642).
The record shows that Snyder filed his application for DIB on October 20,
2010, alleging disability as of June 25, 2010, due to problems with his right
shoulder and arm, headaches, neck pain, anxiety, depression and memory
problems. (Record, (“R.”), at 171-72, 192-201, 218.) The claim was denied
initially, but, on reconsideration, Snyder was granted benefits starting May 29,
2011. (R. at 91-93, 97-99, 102-07.) Snyder then requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge, (“ALJ”). (R. at R. at 109-10.) A hearing was held on
November 16, 2012, at which Snyder was represented by counsel. (R. at 34-54.)
By decision dated December 10, 2012, the ALJ found that Snyder was
entitled to DIB benefits beginning on May 29, 2011, but he found that he was not
disabled before that date. (R. at 19-28.) The ALJ found that Snyder met the
nondisability insured status requirements of the Act for DIB purposes through
December 31, 2014. (R. at 21.) The ALJ also found that Snyder had not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since June 25, 2010, his alleged onset date. (R. at 21.)
The ALJ found that the medical evidence established that Snyder suffered from
severe impairments, namely rotator cuff tear of the right shoulder, status-post
surgery; osteoarthritis; and degenerative disc disease, but he found that Snyder did
not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed at or medically equal

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to one listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 22.) The ALJ
found that Snyder had the residual functional capacity to perform light work,1
except that he could only occasionally push, pull or reach in all directions with his
dominant right upper extremity. (R. at 22-26.) The ALJ found that Snyder was
unable to perform his past relevant work. (R. at 26.) Based on Snyder’s age prior to
May 29, 2011, education, work history and residual functional capacity and the
testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that, prior to May 29, 2011, other
jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Snyder could
perform, including jobs as an usher or attendant and a counter and rental clerk. (R.
at 27.) Thus, the ALJ found that Snyder was not under a disability as defined by
the Act, and was not eligible for DIB benefits, prior to May 29, 2011. (R. at 28.)
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g) (2015).
After the ALJ issued his decision, Snyder pursued his administrative
appeals, but the Appeals Council denied his request for review. (R. at 1-5.) Snyder
then filed this action seeking review of the ALJ’s partially unfavorable decision,
which now stands as the Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981
(2015). The case is before this court on Snyder’s motion for summary judgment
filed January 19, 2015, and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment
filed February 20, 2015. Snyder’s counsel has requested oral argument, but based
on my ruling below, I will deny that request.

1

Light work involves lifting items weighing up to 20 pounds at a time with frequent
lifting or carrying of items weighing up to 10 pounds. If someone can perform light work, he
also can perform sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (2015).

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II. Analysis
The Commissioner uses a five-step process in evaluating DIB claims. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2015). See also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-62
(1983); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1981). This process requires
the Commissioner to consider, in order, whether a claimant 1) is working; 2) has a
severe impairment; 3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of a
listed impairment; 4) can return to his past relevant work; and 5) if not, whether he
can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If the Commissioner finds
conclusively that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in this process, review
does not proceed to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (2015).
As stated above, the court’s function in this case is limited to determining
whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the ALJ’s findings.
The court must not weigh the evidence, as this court lacks authority to substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner, provided her decision is supported by
substantial evidence. See Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456. In determining whether
substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, the court also must
consider whether the ALJ analyzed all of the relevant evidence and whether the
ALJ sufficiently explained his findings and his rationale in crediting evidence. See
Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1997).
Thus, it is the ALJ’s responsibility to weigh the evidence, including the
medical evidence, in order to resolve any conflicts which might appear therein.

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See Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456; Taylor v. Weinberger, 528 F.2d 1153, 1156 (4th Cir.
1975). Furthermore, while an ALJ may not reject medical evidence for no reason
or for the wrong reason, see King v. Califano, 615 F.2d 1018, 1020 (4th Cir. 1980),
an ALJ may, under the regulations, assign no or little weight to a medical opinion,
even one from a treating source, based on the factors set forth at 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c), if he sufficiently explains his rationale and if the record supports his
findings.
Snyder argues that the ALJ erred by improperly determining his residual
functional capacity and failing to find that he was disabled prior to May 29, 2011.
(Plaintiff’s Memorandum In Support Of His Motion For Summary Judgment,
(“Plaintiff’s Brief”), at 4-6.) As stated above, the ALJ found that Snyder had the
residual functional capacity to perform light work, except that he could only
occasionally push, pull or reach in all directions with his dominant right upper
extremity. (R. at 22.) Snyder argues that the ALJ’s finding as to his residual
functional capacity is not supported by substantial evidence, in that his treating
physician, Dr. Thomas Whitman, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, limited his lifting
to items weighing no more than 5 pounds with no work above waist level with the
right upper extremity. (Plaintiff’s Brief at 5-6.) Snyder further argues that, based
on his age, education and prior work, if he were limited to sedentary work, 2 he
2

Sedentary work involves lifting items weighing up to 10 pounds at a time and
occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers and small tools. Although a
sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking or standing is
often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking or standing are required
occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (2015).

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would have been disabled prior to May 29, 2011, under the Medical Vocational
Guidelines, (“Grids”), found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. See 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 201.09. (Plaintiff’s Brief at 6.)
While the Commissioner agrees that Dr. Whitman temporarily limited
Snyder to lifting no more than 5 pounds, she argues that, within a year of Snyder’s
alleged onset date, Dr. Whitman’s opinions supported the ALJ’s finding that
Snyder could perform light work. (Defendant’s Brief In Support Of Her Motion
For Summary Judgment, (“Commissioner’s Brief”), at 6-9.) My review of the
record does not support the Commissioner’s position or the ALJ’s finding.
In the ALJ’s opinion, the ALJ stated that he was giving the opinions of
physical therapist Charles E. Williams and Dr. Whitman “great weight.” (R. at 26.)
The ALJ, however, incorrectly states that these opinions support his finding that
Snyder had the residual functional capacity to perform light work, except that he
could only occasionally push, pull or reach in all directions with his dominant right
upper extremity. The record reveals that both of these health care providers limited
Snyder to lifting and carrying up to 30 pounds to waist level. (R. at 624, 668.)
Williams further restricted Snyder’s lifting bilaterally from waist to shoulder to 10
pounds and his overhead lifting to up to 25 pounds with the right arm only. (R. at
624.) Dr. Whitman further restricted Snyder’s lifting to 10 pounds overhead. (R. at
668.)
As stated above, it is the ALJ’s responsibility to weigh the medical evidence,

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and the ALJ’s weighing of the medical evidence should not be overturned, if he
sufficiently explains his rationale and the record supports his findings. See King
615 F.2d at 1020. In this case, the ALJ said he was giving “great weight” to the
opinions of Williams and Dr. Whitman, but then he necessarily rejected their
opinions, at least in part, when he found that, contrary to their opinions, Snyder
could perform light work with only occasional pushing, pulling and reaching with
his right arm. While, under the regulations, an ALJ may reject any or all of a
medical provider’s opinions, he may not do so without any explanation.
Based on the above, I find that the ALJ’s finding with regard to Snyder’s
residual functional capacity is not supported by substantial evidence, and I will
remand Snyder’s claim to the Commissioner for further development consistent
with this opinion.
An appropriate Order and Judgment will be entered.
ENTERED: March 29, 2016.
s/

Pamela Meade Sargent

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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