Mullins v. Colvin
Filing
17
OPINION AND ORDER Sustaining 16 Objections to Report and Recommendation; Rejecting 15 Report and Recommendations; denying 9 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 11 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge James P. Jones on 2/16/2018. (lml)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
BIG STONE GAP DIVISION
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MELANIE L. MULLINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
Case No. 2:16CV00021
OPINION AND ORDER
By: James P. Jones
United States District Judge
Lewey K. Lee, The Lee Law Firm of Wise, P.C., Wise, Virginia, for Plaintiff;
Naomi Mendelsohn, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Social Security
Administration, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Defendant.
The Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) has filed
objections to the Report and Recommendation (“Report”) of the magistrate judge
recommending that the plaintiff’s disability claims be remanded to the
Commissioner for further development.
The plaintiff, Melanie L. Mullins, seeks disability insurance and
supplemental security income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social
Security Act (“Act”). Following a hearing and decision by an administrative law
judge (“ALJ”), her claims were partially denied and Mullins thereafter filed this
action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), requesting review of the
Commissioner’s decision. The case was referred to the magistrate judge pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The magistrate judge filed her lengthy and detailed
Report on January 8, 2018, and the Commissioner filed timely objections on
January 19, 2018. Those objections are now before me for de novo determination.1
In accordance with the Act, I must uphold the Commissioner’s findings if
substantial evidence supports them and the findings were reached through the
application of the correct legal standard. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th
Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be
somewhat less than a preponderance.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th
Cir. 1966). It is not the role of the court to substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
Mullins, then 21 years old, suffered a work place accident to her right knee
in 2009, resulting in a tear of the lateral meniscus. Thereafter she underwent a
number of surgeries to the knee, without lasting success. She claims that she was
disabled within the meaning of the Act as of May 1, 2011. The ALJ awarded her
1
A party may respond to objections to a magistrate judge’s recommended
disposition within 14 days, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), but no such response has been filed
in this case.
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benefits beginning August 26, 2015, but ruled that she was not disabled prior to
that date.
The ALJ found from the evidence that since 2011 Mullins had suffered from
“severe” impairments, meaning that they caused significant limitations in her
ability to perform basic work functions. Admin. Tr. 26, ECF No. 6. Those severe
impairments were “right-knee strain status-post multiple surgeries, obesity,
depression, and anxiety.” Id. After an exhaustive review of the medical evidence,
the ALJ found that prior to August 26, 2015, Mullins had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full range of light work available in the national
economy, and thus was not disabled. Id. at 34-35, 36-37. The ALJ did find that
Mullins was disabled within the meaning of the Act as of August 26, 2015.
The magistrate judge based her recommendation that the case be remanded
for further administrative development on three perceived errors by the ALJ. First,
she found that two state agency evaluators, Louis Perrott, Ph.D., and Stonsa N.
Insinna, Ph.D., had placed additional mental work-related restrictions on Mullins
that were not adopted by the ALJ, and second, that Drs. Perrott and Insinna did not
have the benefit of later mental health records and thus their opinions should not
have been relied upon by the ALJ. Report 32, ECF No. 15.
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Finally, the magistrate judge found that the ALJ erred in finding that a
functional capacity evaluation by a physical therapist in June of 2013 supported his
conclusions. Id. at 32-33.
In objecting to these findings, the Commissioner points out that the claimed
“additional restrictions” were not part of the experts’ RFC evaluation, but rather
part of a worksheet used to assist in assessing the claimant’s RFC. Moreover, it is
argued that the ALJ was not required to include any limitations contained in a state
agency RFC assessment, based on the ALJ’s own evaluation of the credible
evidence. The Commissioner also contends that because the ALJ considered the
later mental health records in reaching her decision, and articulated sufficient
reasons for that decision, the fact that the state agency evaluators did not have the
benefit of the later information is without legal significance.
As to the remaining ground relied upon by the magistrate judge, the
Commissioner argues that while the ALJ found that the physical therapist’s report
supported the plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ was not required to accept all of the report’s
opinions, particularly since a physical therapist is not an “acceptable medical
source” under the Social Security Administration’s rulings and regulations. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f)(1), 416.927(f)(1); Social Security Ruling 06-3p, 2006 WL
2329939, at *2 (Aug. 9, 2006). In addition, it is contended that the other evidence
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considered and accepted by the ALJ, including that from acceptable medical
sources, supported the ultimate finding concerning Mullins’ physical RFC.
After careful review of the record, I agree with the Commissioner’s
arguments and find that the objections should be sustained. I find that the ALJ’s
decision was supported by substantial evidence as to the plaintiff’s RFC prior to
August 26, 2015, and thus should be affirmed.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:
1.
Defendant’s Objections to Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 16,
are SUSTAINED;
2.
The recommendation of the magistrate judge, ECF No. 15, is not
accepted;
3.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 9, is DENIED;
4.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 11, is
GRANTED; and
5.
The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
ENTER: February 16, 2018
/s/ James P. Jones
United States District Judge
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