Scott et al v. Clarke et al

Filing 84

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Norman K. Moon on 11/15/2013. (mab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
CHARLOTTESVILLE DIVISION

CYNTHIA B. SCOTT , ET AL.,

CIVIL ACTION NO . 3:12-CV -00036
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM OPINION

v.
HAROLD W. CLARKE , ET AL.,
Defendants.

NORMAN K. MOON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs, all prisoners residing at Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women (“FCCW”),
filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Plaintiffs assert that FCCW fails to provide adequate medical care and that Defendants are
deliberately indifferent to this failure. Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment and preliminary
and permanent injunctions ordering FCCW to provide adequate medical care to Plaintiffs and all
other similarly situated women residing at FCCW.
FCCW is a facility of the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Corrections (the
“VDOC”). Most of the individual Defendants are VDOC employees who are being sued in their
official capacities, and on December 11, 2012, I denied the individual state employees’ motion
to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1

1

On February 6, 2013,

The individual state employee Defendants are Harold W. Clarke, the Director of the Virginia Department of
Corrections (the “VDOC”); David Robinson, VDOC’s Chief of Corrections Operations; Frederick Schilling,
VDOC’s Director of Health Services; and Phyllis A. Baskerville, the Warden at Fluvanna Correctional Center for
Women (“FCCW”). The original complaint named “John/Jane Doe, M.D., Acting Medical Director, Fluvanna
Correctional Center for Women,” and the amended complaint named “Paul C. Ohai, M.D., Medical Director,
Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women.” The medical director was not a party to the individual state employee
Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint was granted, and an amended
complaint was filed.2
On July 15, 2013, Plaintiffs were granted leave to file a second amended complaint. The
second amended complaint recognized the VDOC’s transfer of responsibility, on or about May
1, 2013, for medical care services at FCCW from Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc.
(“Armor”) to Corizon Health, Inc. (“Corizon”).

The second amended complaint names as

defendants Corizon and Mark Militana, M.D., Corizon’s on-site Medical Director at FCCW.
Armor filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that, because Armor’s contract with VDOC had
expired and that Corizon (which had formerly been the contractual provider of medical services
at FCCW during part of the time covered in Plaintiffs’ complaint and amended complaints) had
assumed the contract to provide medical services at FCCW, Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief against Armor should be denied as moot. I granted Armor’s motion to dismiss.
Dr. Militana has now filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, arguing
that it “only identif[ies] him as the Medical Director at FCCW since on or after May 1, 2013,”
and “make[s] no mention of any allegations of wrongdoing by” him. However, the second
amended complaint expressly alleges that Corizon’s medical staff at FCCW functions “[s]ubject
to the supervision and oversight of Dr. Militana” and that Corizon, under Dr. Militana’s direct
supervision and oversight, has adopted and perpetuated the same pattern and practice of
constitutionally deficient medical care that existed when Corizon assumed the contract from its
predecessor, Armor (patterns and practices that Corizon instituted as Armor’s predecessor). As
Plaintiffs seek only declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the

2

As previously noted, the amended complaint identified Paul C. Ohai as a defendant; otherwise, the amended
complaint varied from the original complaint only in slight clarifications of various allegations.

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United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is appropriate that any such relief would be
entered against Dr. Militana, and the motion to dismiss must be denied.
I.
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, I apply the pleading standard refined by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8. The non-moving party must have alleged facts that “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” i.e., facts that “have nudged their claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim is plausible if the complaint contains “factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged,” and if there is “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The following long-held
rule still stands: “in evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court accepts all well-pled
facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the [non-moving party] in
weighing the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com,
Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
II.
As I have observed in previous opinions entered in this case, Plaintiffs’ complaint and
amended complaints are replete with exhaustive, detailed allegations of a systemic failure on an
on-going basis of FCCW medical staff and agents of the VDOC to provide medical care to the
women incarcerated at FCCW that satisfies the minimum standards mandated by the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that, as a
result of this ongoing, systemic failure, women at FCCW have suffered and continue to suffer
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adverse physical and mental effects from the failure to provide medical care (or the provision of
deficient care) in deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. Although the specific
instances of deficient care (or non-existent care under circumstances in which care was clearly
needed and required) alleged as the foundation for Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims pre-date
the May 1, 2013, commencement of Dr. Militana’s tenure as Medical Director at FCCW,
Plaintiffs have expressly alleged that Corizon, under Dr. Militana’s direct supervision and
oversight, has adopted and perpetuated the same pattern and practice of deficient medical care
that existed when Corizon assumed the VDOC contract to provide medical services at FCCW.
Were the complaint to fail to state a claim against Dr. Militana, then it would necessarily
fail to state a claim against Corizon. Corizon has not raised a motion to dismiss, and nothing in
Dr. Militana’s motion suggests that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Corizon. To
grant Dr. Militana’s motion to dismiss would require that I disregard Plaintiffs’ specific and
detailed allegations that Corizon, under Dr. Militana’s daily oversight and supervision, has
adopted and continues the same wrongful practices and deliberate indifference to the serious
medical needs of Plaintiffs and the entire population of prisoners at FCCW.
III.
For the stated reasons, the motion to dismiss will be denied.
accompanies this memorandum opinion.
Entered this

15th

day of November, 2013.

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An appropriate order