Hudson v. Pittsylvania County, Virginia et al

Filing 107

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Michael F. Urbanski on 8/4/14. (ham)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
DANVILLE DIVISION
BARBARA HUDSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA and
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF
PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA,
Defendants.

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) Civil Action No. 4:11cv043
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)
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) By: Michael F. Urbanski
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United States District Judge
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)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on defendants’ Motion to Dissolve and/or Modify the
Permanent Injunction Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt.
No. 103) in light of the May 5, 2014 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Town of
Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
I.
Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows relief from a judgment on the
grounds that “the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). “The significant portion of Rule 60(b)(5) is the final ground, allowing relief
if it is no longer equitable for the judgment to be applied. This is based on the historic power of a
court of equity to modify its decree in the light of changed circumstances.” 11 Charles A. Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2863 (2d ed. 1995). As Justice Cardozo stated in
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932), “[w]e are not doubtful of the power of a
court of equity to modify an injunction in adaptation to changed conditions.” One such changed
circumstance is a change in controlling law. See Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Emp. Dep’t, AFL-CIO v.
Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 650 n.6 (1961) (“There are many cases where a mere change in decisional law

has been held to justify modification of an outstanding injunction.”). Moreover, the Permanent
Injunction Order in this case provides that the court “will retain jurisdiction over this matter for the
purposes of enforcement of the injunction. . . .” Dkt. No. 84.
Because of the pending appeal in this case, however, the court may not simply proceed to
rule on the Rule 60(b)(5) motion. “Generally, a timely filed notice of appeal transfers jurisdiction of
a case to the court of appeals and strips a district court of jurisdiction to rule on any matters
involved in the appeal.” Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 258 (4th Cir. 2014). In Fobian v.
Storage Technology Corp., 164 F.3d 887 (4th Cir. 1999), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized a limited exception to this rule for matters “in aid of the appeal,” and set forth a
procedure the district court must employ in considering such Rule 60(b) motions.
[W]hen a Rule 60(b) motion is filed while a judgment is on appeal,
the district court has jurisdiction to entertain the motion, and should
do so promptly. If the district court determines that the motion is
meritless, as experience demonstrates is often the case, the court
should deny the motion forthwith; any appeal from the denial can be
consolidated with the appeal from the underlying order. If the
district court is inclined to grant the motion, it should issue a short
memorandum so stating. The movant can then request a limited
remand from this court for that purpose.
Id. at 891. Under the procedure set out in Fobian, therefore, the court has jurisdiction to entertain
defendants’ Rule 60(b)(5) motion during the pendency of the appeal.
II.
A.
In Town of Greece, the Court disavowed reliance on dicta in County of Allegheny v. ACLU
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989), for the proposition that legislative prayer
must be generic or nonsectarian. 134 S. Ct. at 1821. Central to the Court’s decision in Town of
Greece is the principle that the government, whether county officials or courts, ought not dictate the
content of prayers offered at local government meetings. Following Town of Greece, the court is
inclined to grant defendants’ motion to modify the Permanent Injunction Order in this case to a
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very limited extent, i.e., to make it clear, consistent with Town of Greece, that opening prayers
offered at the start of Pittsylvania County Board of Supervisors meetings need not be generic or
nonsectarian.
B.
The court would deny defendants’ request to dissolve the injunction, however. The Court in
Town of Greece recognized that “[t]he inquiry [concerning the proper scope of legislative prayer]
remains a fact-sensitive one that considers both the setting in which the prayer arises and the
audience to whom it is directed.” Id. at 1825. Considering the facts of this case, which stand in
stark contrast to those in Town of Greece, the court remains convinced that a modified injunction is
appropriate and necessary to remedy a violation of the Establishment Clause.
There are several critical points of distinction between the facts of Town of Greece and the
prayer practice of the Board of Supervisors of Pittsylvania County. First and foremost, unlike in
Town of Greece, where invited clergy and laypersons offered the invocations, the Board members
themselves led the prayers in Pittsylvania County. Thus, in contrast to Town of Greece, where the
town government had no role in determining the content of the opening invocations at its board
meetings, the government of Pittsylvania County itself, embodied in its elected Board members,
dictated the content of the prayers opening official Board meetings. Established as it was by the
Pittsylvania County government, that content was consistently grounded in the tenets of one faith.
Further, because the Pittsylvania County Board members themselves served as exclusive prayer
providers, persons of other faith traditions had no opportunity to offer invocations. Put simply, the
Pittsylvania County Board of Supervisors involved itself “in religious matters to a far greater degree”
than was the case in Town of Greece. 134 S. Ct. at 1822. In so doing, the prayer practice in
Pittsylvania County had the unconstitutional effect, over time, of officially advancing one faith or
belief, violating “the clearest command of the Establishment Clause . . . that one religious

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denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244
(1982).
Not only did the Pittsylvania County Board members determine the content of the opening
prayers at Board meetings, the Board members often directed the assembled citizens to participate in
the prayers by asking them to stand. For example, on September 20, 2011, the Pittsylvania County
supervisor delivering the opening prayer directed: “If you don’t want to hear this prayer, you can
leave. Please stand up.” Second Suppl. Decl. of Rebecca K. Glenberg, Dkt. No. 24, at ¶ 5. In Town
of Greece, the majority opinion noted that such a request from the government makes a difference.
134 S. Ct. at 1826. (“The analysis would be different if town board members directed the public to
participate in the prayers.”).
In sum, the active role of the Pittsylvania County Board of Supervisors in leading the
prayers, and, importantly, dictating their content, is of constitutional dimension and falls outside of
the prayer practices approved in Town of Greece. Thus, while Town of Greece calls for a limited
modification of the existing injunction in this case, it does not support its dissolution.
III.
For these reasons, the court is inclined to grant defendants’ Rule 60(b)(5) motion in part and
deny it in part. The court cannot issue an Order modifying the existing injunction, even to a limited
extent, however, given the pendency of the appeal in this case. Pursuant to the procedure outlined
in Fobian, the parties may request a limited remand from the Fourth Circuit for this purpose.
Entered: August 4, 2014

/s/ Michael F. Urbanski

Michael F. Urbanski
United States District Judge

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