Smalls v. Binner et al

Filing 100

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert S. Ballou on 11/13/2015. (kab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
DANVILLE DIVISION
GWENDOLYN SMALLS, Individually
and as Administratrix of the Estate of
LINWOOD RAYMOND LAMBERT,
JR., deceased
Plaintiff,
v.
CHIEF OF POLICE, JAMES W. BINNER,
COLONEL, Individually and in his official
Capacity, et al.
Defendants.

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) Case No.: 4:15-cv-00017
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) ORDER
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) By: Robert S. Ballou
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United States Magistrate Judge
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants have filed two motions for sanctions (Dkt. Nos. 56 and 66) to strike certain
portions of Plaintiff’s pleadings. Specifically, Defendants object to Plaintiff’s memorandum
opposing Defendant’s request for a protective order regarding the scope of discovery. In that
memorandum, Plaintiff equated the facts of this case to recent national events involving alleged
excessive force by police. Defendants also object to two instances in the Amended Complaint in
which the death of Linwood Lambert while in police custody was referred to as “murder.”1 I find
that Defendants have not shown that the questionable portions of Plaintiff’s memorandum of law
or amended complaint violate Rule 11, and thus, DENY the motions for sanctions. I do find,
however, that the memorandum of law and amended complaint contain assertions which are

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Paragraph 98 of the Amended Complaint also uses the word “murder” to describe Lambert’s death.
Though Defendants did not raise this paragraph in their motion, this opinion and the accompanying order apply
equally to Paragraph 98.

immaterial to any claim or defense asserted in this action and will direct that those portions of
the pleadings be struck pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
Factual Background
Plaintiff, Gwendolyn Smalls, Administratrix of the Estate of Linwood Raymond
Lambert, Jr., deceased (hereinafter “Lambert”), brought this action against the Town of South
Boston, Virginia, its police chief and three officers for the death of Lambert while in police
custody. Plaintiff alleges that, in the early morning hours of May 4, 2013, three South Boston
police officers took Lambert to the Halifax Regional Hospital for a mental health evaluation and
treatment. While they were outside the doors to the emergency room, Defendants “tasered”
Lambert multiple times. The responding officers then left the hospital with Lambert in a police
car without seeking medical treatment for him. Approximately one hour later, Defendants
returned to the hospital with an unresponsive Lambert, who was pronounced dead shortly
thereafter.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges a total of eleven counts including several claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1988 for excessive force, denial of medical care, conspiracy, and
improper training of police officers. Plaintiff also asserts state law claims for assault and battery,
excessive force, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants raised
the defense of qualified immunity and sought to limit any discovery strictly to the qualified
immunity issues. In response, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition and stated in the
opening paragraph:
In this case, the South Boston Police Department (“SBPD”) joins the
growing and ignominious fraternity of police departments from Waller
County, Cleveland, Baltimore, North Charleston and Staten Island, unified
by the all too frequent occurrence that police encounters with African
American citizens result in the death of those citizens.

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ECF 26, 1.
Plaintiff filed her amended complaint with leave of court on August 10, 2015 (Dkt. No.
46). In paragraphs 98, 112, and 185, Plaintiff asserts that the actions of the three officers
involved with Lambert resulted in his “murder.” Defendants’ motion for sanctions asks the court
to strike these offending statements and award costs and attorney’s fees in obtaining this order.
Analysis
Defendants contended at oral argument that the offensive assertions violated Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(b)(1) and (3), which provide that:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented
party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1)

it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation;
***

(3)

the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

Rule 11 sanctions may be appropriate when parties violate one of the provisions of Rule
11(b). Motions for sanctions are to be “filed sparingly.” Metro. Reg’l Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am.
Home Realty Network, Inc., 2015 WL 1242690, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2015) (quoting Thomas
v. Treasury Mgmt. Ass’n, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 364, 366 (D. Md. 1994)). To avoid sanctions, an
“allegation merely must be supported by some evidence.” Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943
F.2d 1363, 1377 (4th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff acknowledges that comparing the events in this case to incidents involving
alleged police misconduct in other states is not relevant to any claim asserted in the amended

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complaint and the facts of the other cases are not admissible to prove any essential element of
any claim asserted in this action. Likewise, Plaintiff agrees that no claim asserted requires that
she prove that any officer engaged in criminal conduct of any type. Defendants have presented
no evidence that any of the offending pleadings have resulted in any delay in discovery or any
increase in the cost to the parties. Counsel for Defendants has suggested that recent media
attention to the events involving the death of Lambert have caused concern for officer safety.
However, there is no suggestion that this concern relates specifically to the statements at issue in
these sanctions motions. Thus, I can find no basis under Rule 11(b)(1) in which sanctions would
be appropriate.2
Defendants argue primarily that the language used in both the memorandum of law and
the amended complaint is incendiary and thus, not necessary. Defendants have not challenged
the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted by Plaintiff, except as to Count IX for conspiracy,
which relates mainly to events that occurred after Lambert’s death. Likewise, at this stage of the
pleadings, Defendants do not contend that the other ten counts of the Amended Complaint are
frivolous or baseless. Thus, I can find no basis for imposing sanctions under Rule 11(b)(3).
Therefore, both motions for sanctions are DENIED
Rule 12(f)
Rule 12(f) allows the court, on its own, to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The
opening paragraph of Plaintiff’s memorandum of law (Dkt. No. 26) and her use of the word
murder in her amended complaint are to be stricken from the pleadings in this case because these
items are immaterial and impertinent to the particular issues before the court.

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I make no finding whether Rule 11(d) precludes the imposition of sanctions for statements made in a
memorandum in opposition to a discovery motion.

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“Information is ‘immaterial’ for the purposes of Rule 12(f) if it has ‘no essential or
important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded’ and is ‘impertinent’
if it does ‘not pertain, and [is] not necessary, to the issues in question.’” 5C Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1382 (3d ed. 2004).
First, Plaintiff’s claims in this action, from a legal standpoint, are unrelated to law
enforcement’s interactions with African American citizens in other states; therefore, events from
other states are immaterial to the resolution of the case before this court. Second, in a civil
complaint alleging a § 1983 violation, assault and battery, wrongful death, excessive force, false
arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, an implication that the decedent was
murdered by the defendants is both immaterial and impertinent. While Plaintiff has made
multiple serious claims, none of these claims requires proof of premeditation or any intent to
cause Lambert’s death.3 The factual averments that the officers’ actions constituted murder are
not boilerplate language and serve no purpose in notifying Defendants of the claims against
them. Use of the word “murder” could not have been chosen for any other purpose but to
inflame the passions of the court and the public and it adds absolutely no value to the resolution
of this case.
The court should utilize Rule 12(f) sparingly, as motions under the Rule are generally
viewed with disfavor. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir.
2001). Rule 12(f) is used, however, to strike pleadings where “‘the challenged allegations have
no possible relation or logical connection to the subject matter of the controversy and may cause
some form of significant prejudice to one or more of the parties to the action.’” Bandy v.
Advance Auto Parts, Inc., No. 7:11-CV-00365, 2012 WL 831027, at *2 (W.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2012)

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The pleadings contain no assertions that any of the officers named in this action have been charged with
any crime (much less convicted) relating to their involvement with Lambert.

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(quoting Bailey v. Fairfax County, No. 1:10–cv–1031, 2010 WL 5300874, *4 (E.D. Va. Dec. 21,
2010)) (quoting 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §
1382 (3d ed.2004)).
I have invoked Rule 12(f) to strike portions of the pleadings which have no place in this
action given the claims alleged and the defenses raised. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Nimoityn, et al.,
No. CIV.A. 14-980, 2014 WL 6908013, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2014) (striking references to the
defendants as murderers because these allegations “[did] nothing to illuminate the real issues
before the Court”). As this case progresses, discovery of the facts, the pleadings filed and the
argument before the court shall remain focused solely on those matters relevant to the claims and
defenses asserted. To do otherwise is prejudicial to the parties.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motions for sanctions are DENIED for the reasons outlined above.
Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees is also DENIED. The court hereby orders that the second
sentence of the first paragraph of Plaintiff’s docket entry number 26 be stricken. Additionally,
the word “murder” is to be stricken from paragraphs 98, 112 and 185 of the Amended
Complaint. Dkt. No. 46. “Murder” is to be replaced with the word “death.”
Entered: November 13, 2015

Robert S. Ballou
Robert S. Ballou
United States Magistrate Judge

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