Reece v. Jones

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Jackson L. Kiser on 7/27/2017. (mlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
DANVILLE DIVISION
SARAH TOUART REECE,
Plaintiff,
v.
DR. MARK R. JONES,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:17-cv-00036
MEMORANDUM OPINION
By: Hon. Jackson L. Kiser
Senior United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Sarah Touart Reece’s Motion to Amend the
Complaint [ECF No. 6] and Defendant Dr. Mark R. Jones’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 8].
Although the Pretrial Order (and Roseboro Notice) filed in this case both advised Plaintiff of the
possible result for failing to defend against Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff did not
respond to the Motion. I heard oral arguments from both parties on July 25, 2017, and the matter
is now ripe for disposition. For the reasons stated herein, I will grant Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss and deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, as the proposed amendment is futile.
I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed suit against “Dr. Mark Jones, Pittsylvania County Schools”1 (“Defendant”)

in Pittsylvania County General District Court using this Court’s blank pro se complaint. On May
22, 2017, Defendant removed the action to this Court.
Plaintiff alleges only the following:
In 2015, I began requesting a grievance procedure, which was
uniform and in compliance with codes set by the general Assembly
[sic]. I requested this procedure and that it be followed multiple
times from 2015 to 2017. In 2017 I was dismissed. I was denied
1

Presumably Dr. Jones is superintendent of the Pittsylvania County Schools (“PCS”). It is unclear if
Plaintiff is seeking to sue Dr. Jones, PCS, or both.

due process and therefore lost the benefit of a full retirement
because I was dismissed well before the age of retirement. I was
dismissed w/o being given a grievance process in accordance with
the General Assembly.
(Compl. ¶ III [ECF No. 1-2.] She contends these actions violated her Due Process and Fifth
Amendment rights.
In her Motion to Amend the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to change “2015” to “2014.” (See
Mot. to Amend Compl., May 25, 2017 [ECF No. 6].)
On May 26, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). [ECF No.
8.] The clerk sent Plaintiff a Roseboro notice that same day, setting a response deadline of June
12, 2017. Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s Motion.2
After removal of this case, I entered a Pretrial Order which stated, in relevant part:
“EXCEPT FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, IF BRIEFS IN OPPOSITION TO THE
MOTIONS ARE NOT FILED, IT WILL BE DEEMED THAT THE MOTION IS WELL
TAKEN.” (Order, May 23, 2017 [ECF No. 4] (emphasis in original).) Despite this admonition,
Plaintiff never filed a brief in opposition.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
As an initial matter, pro se complaints are held to “‘less stringent standards than the

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
2

She has filed several “notices,” but nothing directed to the substance of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

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court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In determining facial plausibility, the court must accept all factual
allegations in the complaint as true. Id. The Complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and sufficient “[f]actual
allegations . . . to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the Complaint must “allege facts sufficient to
state all the elements of [the] claim.” Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765
(4th Cir. 2003). Although “a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations,” a pleading that merely offers “labels and conclusions” or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III.

DISCUSSION
“In order to prevail [on a procedural due process claim, Plaintiff] must show ‘(1) a

cognizable liberty or property interest; (2) the deprivation of that interest by some form of state
action; and (3) that the procedures employed were constitutionally inadequate.’” Shirvinski v.
U.S. Coast Guard, 673 F.3d 308, 314 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d
515, 528 (4th Cir. 2011)).
Plaintiff’s Complaint is woefully insufficient, even granting her the leeway afforded to
pro se parties. Her Complaint is a textbook example of the “plaintiff-unlawfully-harmed-me”
pleadings that Iqbal and Twombly sought to end. Moreover, even taking her Complaint at face
value and filling in some necessary holes with supposition (i.e., that she was employed by
Pittsylvania County Public Schools and that she requested a grievance with Defendant), her
Complaint is still insufficient. She claims she requested a grievance for three years prior to her

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termination; what, exactly, was she grieving?3 Clearly, she could not be requesting a grievance
regarding her termination. Was she requesting a grievance over something that was even subject
to the state’s grievance procedure? See Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-306 (2016); 8 Va. Admin. Code
20-90-40 (2016) (“Grievability”).4

She never alleges the source of her alleged right to a

grievance procedure, the nature of the complaint that preceded her request for a grievance, nor to
whom she made the request. More fundamentally, she failed to make any allegations regarding
actions taken or not taken by Dr. Jones, making it impossible to decipher what, if any, recourse
she has against the only named defendant.
Typically, considering Plaintiff’s pro se status, I would afford her the opportunity to
amend her Complaint to address these deficiencies. That would, unfortunately, be a futile effort.
At the hearing on this matter, I asked Plaintiff what event that compelled her to request a
grievance. According to her, she filed a grievance because the school district was not following
the grievance procedure. Were Plaintiff to amend her Complaint and add such an allegation, she
would still fall short of pleading that she was entitled to a grievance at all. See Kendall v.
Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 528 (requiring the deprivation of a cognizable liberty or property
interest as a necessary element of a procedural due process claim). As such, the amendment she
proposed in her Motion to Amend and the amendment Plaintiff identified in court would not save
her action. Such an amendment would be futile and will not be allowed. See Laber v. Harvey,
438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (noting that leave to amend may be denied when the
amendment would be futile).
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Although Plaintiff claims she “was dismissed [without] being given a grievance process” (Compl. ¶ III),
she does not allege that she requested a grievance regarding her termination.

4

I note that some complaints that are covered by Virginia’s grievance procedure may not implicate a
federal constitutional due process right. In that situation, although a teacher may be entitled to the
grievance procedure she seeks, there may be no constitutional recourse for the state’s failure to provide it.
See, e.g., Kendall, 650 F.3d at 528.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks any factual support for her claim and Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss will be granted. The amendments Plaintiff proposes to cure the defects in her Complaint
would not save her claim, and thus the proposed amendments would be futile. Accordingly,
leave to amend will not be granted, and this case will be dismissed without prejudice.5
The clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and all counsel of record.
Entered this 27th day of July, 2017.

s/Jackson L. Kiser
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5

Plaintiff’s initial attempt to file this case in Virginia state court indicates that she may wish to challenge
the grievance procedure as implemented by the Pittsylvania County Public Schools. This ruling will
permit her to pursue that route if she so chooses.

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