LHF Productions, Inc. v. Does 1-25

Filing 79

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Elizabeth K. Dillon on 3/20/2019. (jv)

3/20/2019

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
HARRISONBURG DIVISION
LHF PRODUCTIONS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
DASH FOOD MART, et al.,
Defendants.

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S/J.Vasquez

Civil Action No. 5:16-cv-00027
By: Elizabeth K. Dillon
United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this copyright-infringement case, plaintiff LHF Productions, Inc., alleged that
defendants copied and distributed unauthorized copies of the film London Has Fallen using a
file-sharing service known as BitTorrent. (Second Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 33.) The court granted
LHF’s motions for default judgment against defendants Shady Oak Farm, Latoya Boykins, and
Sarah Hall. (Dkt. Nos. 76, 77.) The court awarded LHF default judgment against Sarah Hall in
the amount of $1,550. (Dkt. No. 77.) Sarah Hall, proceeding pro se, has filed a letter in
response. (Dkt. No. 78.)
“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). In her letter, Hall references
the case number and recognizes that she “was recently accused of downloading the movie
London Has Fallen by LHF Production” and ordered to pay $1,550. She asks the court to
“please reconsider this” because she only works weekend shifts at her job, has six children, and
states that it would be impossible for her to pay the ordered amount. Hall also states that she is
“honestly unaware of this situation” and has tried talking to her children to see if they or any of
their friends could have been responsible, “but no one know [sic].” (Dkt. No. 78.) Given the

substance of Hall’s filing and her pro se status, the court shall construe her response as a motion
to vacate default judgment.
In addition, attached to Hall’s letter is a letter addressed to the court from Viola Jones, a
nurse practitioner. The letter from Jones states that Hall is a patient in her office and “has
multiple health issues” as well as “cognitive delays.” Jones also believes, in her professional
opinion, that Hall “does not have the ability to complete something like this,” presumably
referring to the illegal downloading. (Dkt. No. 78-1.)
The court “may set aside a final default judgment under Rule 60(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(c). “To bring [herself] within Rule 60(b), the movant must make a showing of timeliness, a
meritorious defense, a lack of unfair prejudice to the opposing party, and exceptional
circumstances.” Werner v. Carbo, 731 F.2d 204, 206–07 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing Compton v.
Alton S.S. Co., 608 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1979)). Once the movant has done so, under Rule
60(b),
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party . . . from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been
reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) is an “extraordinary remedy” that “is only to be granted in
exceptional circumstances.” In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., No. 98-1893, 1998 WL 904717, at *1
(4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1998). “The disposition of motions under Rule 60(b) ordinarily is a matter

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within the discretion of the district court which will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing
of abuse of that discretion.” Werner, 731 F.2d at 206.
Hall does not identify the subsection of Rule 60(b) upon which she relies, but, construing
her motion liberally, it appears she is moving to set aside the default judgment under subsections
one or six. The court may grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6) if a party shows “extraordinary
circumstances suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay;” otherwise, “[i]f a party is partly
to blame for the delay, relief must be sought within one year under subsection (1) and the party’s
neglect must be excusable.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S.
380, 393 (1993) (citations omitted).
Rule 60(b)(6) “has been described as the catch-all clause because it provides the court
with a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case and vests power in
courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to
accomplish justice where relief might not be available under any other clause in 60(b).”
Compton, 608 F.2d at 106–07 (internal quotations and citations omitted). This subsection “is
properly invoked only when there are extraordinary circumstances justifying relief, when the
judgment may work an extreme and undue hardship, and when the asserted grounds for relief are
not recognized in clauses (1)–(5) of the Rule.” Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 63 (2d Cir.
1986) (internal citations omitted).
Subsection six does not apply here. Hall has not shown extraordinary circumstances that
suggest she was faultless in delaying her response. When she states that she “was unaware of
this,” she seems to be denying the allegations against her rather than arguing that she was
unaware of the allegations. She also provides no explanation for her delayed response.
Additionally, the fact that she works weekend shifts, has six children, and claims that it would be

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impossible for her to pay the ordered amount does not rise to the level of “extreme and undue
hardship” or “extraordinary circumstances” required to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). (Dkt.
No. 78.) Thus, she has not established that she was faultless in her delay to respond or that there
are extraordinary circumstances justifying relief.
Under Rule 60(b)(1), “the movant ‘must demonstrate inter alia that [she] was not at fault
and that the nonmoving party will not be prejudiced by the relief from judgment.’” Wilson v.
Thompson, 138 F. App’x 556, 557 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben, 957
F.2d 126, 132 (4th Cir. 1992)). “A party that fails to act with diligence will be unable to establish

that [her] conduct constituted excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1).” Robinson v. Wix
Filtration Corp. LLC, 599 F.3d 403, 413 (4th Cir. 2010). “When the party is at fault, the [court’s
interest in finality and efficiency] dominate[s] and the party must adequately defend its conduct
in order to show excusable neglect.” Heyman v. M.L. Mktg. Co., 116 F.3d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor Contracting Corp., 843 F.2d 808, 811 (4th
Cir. 1988)).
Hall also is not entitled to relief under subsection one. She has not shown, or even
alleged, that she acted with diligence, especially because she does not provide any explanation
for her failure to respond. Moreover, Hall has not even made the preliminary showing that she
has a meritorious defense such that she may seek relief under Rule 60(b). Werner, 731 F.2d at
206. Simply stating that she is “unaware of this situation” and that her children and their friends
deny illegally downloading the movie is insufficient. Therefore, for these reasons, Hall’s motion

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to vacate the default judgment will be denied.
An appropriate order will follow.
Entered: March 20, 2019.

/s/ Elizabeth K. Dillon
Elizabeth K. Dillon
United States District Judge

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