Hartman v. Colvin

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joel C. Hoppe on 9/29/17. (kld)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Harrisonburg Division
EDWARD W. HARTMAN,
Plaintiff,

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v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 5:16-cv-00034
MEMORANDUM OPINION
By:
Joel C. Hoppe
United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Edward W. Hartman asks this Court to review the Commissioner of Social
Security’s (“Commissioner”) final decision denying his applications for disability insurance
benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social
Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434, 1381–1383f. The case is before me by the
parties’ consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). ECF No. 6. Having considered the administrative
record, the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, and the applicable law, I find that the
Commissioner’s final decision is supported by substantial evidence and must be affirmed.
I. Standard of Review
The Social Security Act authorizes this Court to review the Commissioner’s final
decision that a person is not entitled to disability benefits. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3);
Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). The Court’s role, however, is limited—it
may not “reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its]
judgment” for that of agency officials. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012).
Instead, the Court asks only whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) applied the correct
legal standards and whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s factual findings. Meyer v.
Astrue, 662 F.3d 700, 704 (4th Cir. 2011).

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“Substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It is
“more than a mere scintilla” of evidence, id., but not necessarily “a large or considerable amount
of evidence,” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial evidence review takes
into account the entire record, and not just the evidence cited by the ALJ. See Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487–89 (1951); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir.
1984). Ultimately, this Court must affirm the ALJ’s factual findings if “conflicting evidence
allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled.” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434
F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir.
1996)). However, “[a] factual finding by the ALJ is not binding if it was reached by means of an
improper standard or misapplication of the law.” Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir.
1987).
A person is “disabled” if he or she is unable to engage in “any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); accord 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a),
416.905(a). Social Security ALJs follow a five-step process to determine whether an applicant is
disabled. The ALJ asks, in sequence, whether the applicant (1) is working; (2) has a severe
impairment; (3) has an impairment that meets or equals an impairment listed in the Act’s
regulations; (4) can return to his or her past relevant work based on his or her residual functional
capacity; and, if not (5) whether he or she can perform other work. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461
U.S. 458, 460–62 (1983); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The applicant bears the

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burden of proof at steps one through four. Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. At step five, the burden
shifts to the agency to prove that the applicant is not disabled. See id.
II. Procedural History
Hartman filed for DIB on November 16, 2010, and for SSI on January 18, 2011.
Administrative Record (“R.”) 18, ECF No. 10. In June 2008, Hartman crashed his All-Terrain
Vehicle (“ATV”) and suffered subarachnoid hemorrhage because of a ruptured aneurysm, which
the attending physician termed “a slight brain injury.” R. 377. After surgery to clip the ruptured
aneurysm, Hartman returned to work at a turkey farm until May 19, 2010. R. 234, 297. Hartman
alleges that he has been disabled since that time because of the subarachnoid hemorrhage, back
and hip pain, chronic headaches, and short-term memory and anger issues. See R. 178, 182, 230,
234. The Commissioner twice rejected Hartman’s applications in 2011. R. 18.
On June 13, 2012, Hartman appeared with counsel at a hearing before ALJ Drew Swank.
R. 34–62. That July, ALJ Swank issued a written opinion finding that Hartman retained the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 1 to perform “medium” exertion 2 work so long as he was
“further limited to simple, unskilled work” and avoided “exposure to concentrated hazards.” R.
22. Based on this RFC, ALJ Swank concluded that Hartman was not disabled because he could
return to his old job as “a turkey farm helper” or, alternatively, he could perform a wide range of
“unskilled medium” occupations available in the national economy. R. 27–28.
On appeal to this Court, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommended that the
Commissioner’s final decision be reversed because the restriction to “simple, unskilled work” in
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A claimant’s RFC represents “the individual’s maximum remaining ability to do sustained work
activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis” despite the combined limiting
effects of his or her medically determinable impairments. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (July 2,
1996) (emphasis omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.

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“Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying
objects weighing up to 25 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c), 416.967(c).

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the RFC did not necessarily reflect ALJ Swank’s findings that Hartman had “moderate”
limitations maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace, and could concentrate for two-hour
segments throughout an eight-hour workday. See Hartman v. Colvin, 5:13cv109, 2015 WL
877360, at *7–8 (W.D. Va. Jan. 15, 2015). The District Court adopted that recommendation and
remanded Hartman’s case for further administrative proceedings. Id. at *1. On remand, the
Appeals Council vacated ALJ Swank’s decision and instructed a different ALJ to hold a hearing
and issue a new decision based on all the evidence in the current record. See R. 619, 732–33.
On January 6, 2016, Hartman appeared with counsel for a hearing before ALJ R. Neely
Owen. See R. 645–85. Hartman, his longtime girlfriend, a vocational expert (“VE”), and an
impartial clinical psychologist all testified at the hearing. See R. 619, 645–85. ALJ Owen issued
an unfavorable decision on March 3, 2016. R. 619–37. He found that Hartman had “the
following severe impairments: a central nervous system disorder, a major depressive disorder,
mild cognitive disorder, and a pain disorder.” 3 R. 621. None of these impairments met or
medically equaled one of the presumptively disabling impairments listed in the Act’s regulations.
R. 622–23.
The ALJ next evaluated Hartman’s RFC based on all of his medically determinable
impairments. See R. 624–35. He determined that Hartman could physically perform “medium
work,” but must be limited to “simple, repetitive, routine, one or two-step tasks in a low stress
environment involving a slow pace with no quotas . . . and minimal public contact.” R. 624. The
ALJ noted that this RFC ruled out Hartman’s return to all of his past relevant work, including the
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ALJ Owen deemed all other impairments alleged in the record, including migraine headaches, carpal
tunnel syndrome, spinal impairments, and a left ankle and foot impairment to be non-severe. R. 622. He
explained that “they did not exist for a continuous period of twelve months, were responsive to
medication, did not require significant medical treatment, or did not result in any continuous exertional or
non-exertional functional limitations.” Id. Hartman does not specifically challenge these findings. See
Pl.’s Br. 2–6, ECF No. 15.

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job on the turkey farm. R. 635. Finally, relying on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that
Hartman had not been disabled after May 19, 2010, because he still could perform several
“medium” and “sedentary” 4 occupations that were available nationally and in Virginia, such as
hospital cleaner, assembler, and stacker or packer. R. 636; see R. 681–83. The Appeals Council
denied Hartman’s request to review that decision, R. 616–18, and this appeal followed.
III. Discussion
On appeal, Hartman asks the Court to review whether “the ALJ’s conclusion adequately
consider[s] Mr. Hartman’s pain.” Pl.’s Br. 2. See generally id. at 2–6. His argument focuses on
ALJ Owen’s finding that, although Hartman’s “medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause” his alleged pain and other symptoms, Hartman’s “statements,
and those of his girlfriend and former supervisor, concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects” of those alleged symptoms were “not entirely credible in light of the
longitudinal medical record as a whole,” R. 627; see Pl.’s Br. 3–5; R. 652–58, 663–67, 683–84.
In particular, Hartman objects that the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination is not supported
by substantial evidence because he “disregard[ed] treating physicians’ documentation of pain
and exacerbating psychological factors,” Pl.’s Br. 5, and erroneously found that Hartman’s “pain
naturally arising from his disorders” was “adequately controlled by medication and treatment so
long as he properly follow[ed] the regimen and protocol of care provided,” id. at 4; see R. 627–
37. He asserts that he is entitled to disability benefits because “his testimony as to his limitations
arising from pain should be found fully credible.” Pl.’s Br. 5.

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“Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying
[objects] like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which
involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties.
Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a). A person who can perform “medium” work can also perform
“sedentary” work. See id. §§ 404.1567(c), 416.967(c).

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Hartman does not identify the testimony that he says ALJ Owen should have accepted as
true. See id. His brief also largely fails to describe the kind and degree of “pain” that allegedly
prevents him from working, and it does not identify any functional “limitations arising from
pain” that the ALJ might have overlooked in reaching the opposite conclusion. See id. at 3–5;
Hartman, 2015 WL 877360, at *7 (“Although this Court reviews the RFC determination for
substantial evidence, the claimant bears the burden of showing that an omitted limitation should
have been included.”). ALJ Owen indicated that Hartman’s testimony “as to the limitations he
has by reason of his impairments” focused on “the level of pain and discomfort” attributable to
his chronic headaches and ankle impairment, as well as the degree to which that pain limited
Hartman’s mental and physical capacities to work on a sustained basis. R. 683–84 (mentioning
Hartman’s “pain and discomfort” in the context of asking the VE about maintaining workplace
attendance, stamina, and concentration, persistence, or pace, on a normal work schedule); see R.
633, 652–53, 656–58, 665. Accordingly, broadly construing his argument, Hartman suggests that
the ALJ’s RFC finding does not reflect his testimony about his physical “pain and exacerbating
psychological factors.” See Pl.’s Br. 3–5.
A person’s RFC represents his “maximum remaining ability to do sustained work
activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis” despite his medical
impairments. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (emphasis omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1545, 416.945. It is a factual finding “made by the Commissioner based on all the relevant
evidence in the [claimant’s] record,” Felton-Miller v. Astrue, 459 F. App’x 226, 230–31 (4th Cir.
2011) (per curiam), and it must reflect the combined limiting effects of impairments that are
supported by the medical evidence or the claimant’s credible complaints, see Mascio v. Colvin,
780 F.3d 632, 638–40 (4th Cir. 2015). In discharging his duty to provide a narrative assessment

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of the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must make specific findings about the impact of the claimant’s
medical impairments and credible, related symptoms (such as pain) on his ability to work on a
sustained basis in an ordinary workplace setting. See Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636; accord Monroe v.
Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 187–88 (4th Cir. 2016).
The ALJ cannot reject the claimant’s subjective description of his pain “solely because
the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate” that description. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2); see also Hines, 453 F.3d at 563–64. Rather, the ALJ must
consider “all the available evidence in the record” in evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s
allegations that he is disabled by pain caused by a medical impairment. 5 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1529(c), 416.929(c). Ultimately, the ALJ’s specific reasons for the weight assigned to the
claimant’s subjective complaints need only be legally adequate and supported by substantial
evidence in the record. See Mascio, 780 F.3d at 639; Bishop v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 583 F.
App’x 65, 68 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Eldeco, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 132 F.3d 1007, 1011 (4th Cir.
1997)).
ALJ Owen’s RFC finding limits Hartman to “medium work” and “simple, repetitive,
routine, one or two-step tasks in a low stress environment involving a slow pace with no quotas .
. . and minimal public contact.” R. 624. At the beginning of his RFC analysis, the ALJ reviewed
statements made by Hartman, as well as his longtime girlfriend and his former supervisor at the

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The Social Security Administration now cautions that this “credibility” analysis should be limited to
matters concerning the claimant’s work-related symptoms and should “not assess an individual’s overall
character or truthfulness in the manner typically used during an adversarial court litigation.” SSR 16-3p,
2016 WL 1119029, at *10 (Mar. 16, 2016). Statements that are internally inconsistent or that are
inconsistent with the other evidence of record, however, may lead the ALJ to “determine that the
individual’s symptoms are less likely to reduce his or her capacities to perform work-related activities.”
Id. at *7.

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turkey farm, describing Hartman’s medical impairments and related functional limitations. 6 See
R. 625–27. Most of those statements focused on Hartman’s cognitive deficits and difficulty
regulating his mood and behavior since the ATV accident. R. 625–27; see R. 297, 654–68.
However, the ALJ specifically cited Hartman’s and his girlfriend’s January 2016 testimony that
Hartman had “severe headaches,” that he “could not walk” because of his “bad feet and ankles,”
that he “end[s] up sitting around because he hurt[s] too badly” after mowing the lawn, that he
“could not pay attention to a half hour television show because he was unable to sit still,” and
that “nothing” has helped his pain. R. 625–26; see R. 652–53, 656–58, 664, 666–67. ALJ
Owen’s written decision also includes a thorough and accurate summary of the treatment notes
and other medical evidence bearing on Hartman’s allegation that he experiences debilitating
headaches and musculoskeletal pain. R. 627–35.
The ALJ gave two reasons for finding that Hartman’s statements describing his pain and
related functional limitations were “not entirely credible in light of the longitudinal medical
record as a whole.” R. 627; see R. 627–35. First, he found that “repeated physical examinations
ha[d] failed to reveal significant ongoing psychological signs or neurologic deficits or decreased
strength or range of motion, as would be expected” given the “significant functional limitations”
that Hartman and his girlfriend had alleged. R. 634; see R. 627–34 (summarizing treatment notes
and findings on neurophysical examinations throughout the relevant period). This finding is
supported by substantial evidence in the record. For example, although Hartman often endorsed
nondescript “pain” or “tenderness” on physical examinations, his doctors repeatedly observed

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In May 2012, Hartman’s former supervisor told Hartman’s attorney that he “made accommodations for
[Hartman’s] condition” after the aneurysm surgery but that he terminated Hartman’s employment in May
2010 because his “ability declined” and “he just wasn’t able to do much anymore.” R. 297; see R. 626.
The only specific work-related accommodation mentioned in this statement is that the former supervisor
“stayed with [Hartman] on the job for several days because he required observation due to the danger of
spasms.” R. 297.

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that he possessed full strength in both extremities, walked with a “normal” gait, and only
occasionally exhibited “limited” or “decreased” range of motion in his back and left ankle. See,
e.g., R. 415–16, 525–27, 531, 540–51, 879, 904, 907, 921, 1022, 1037, 1041; accord R. 890
(treating physician’s note that there was “no clinical or laboratory evidence of an inflammatory
myositis or arthritis” in October 2012, and that a September 2012 myelogram of Hartman’s
lumbar spine showed only “mild diffuse disc bulge at L5-S1 with mild to moderate bilateral
neuroforaminal stenosis”), 897–98 (March 2013 CT scan of Hartman’s pelvis showing “mild
degenerative” changes in the lumbar spine and no evidence of sacroiliitis). Both of Hartman’s
neurologists also opined that Hartman’s chronic headaches likely are attributable more to muscle
tension and underlying anxiety than to fluid on the brain or other acute intracranial abnormality.
See R. 879, 896, 989–93, 1037, 1050.
A factor, though not itself determinative, in the credibility assessment is whether the
objective evidence shows an impairment that could cause the severity of the pain. A claimant’s
allegations of pain “need not be accepted to the extent they are inconsistent with the available
evidence, including objective evidence of the underlying impairment, and the extent to which
that impairment can reasonably be expected to cause the pain the claimant alleges [he] suffers.”
Craig, 76 F.3d at 595. The ALJ reached a different conclusion than Hartman about the severity
of his chronic headaches and musculoskeletal pain, but the ALJ nonetheless acknowledged that
Hartman’s complaints of pain appeared throughout the medical record and, in his RFC
assessment, accounted for them to a degree by limiting Hartman’s mental and physical activities.
See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1457–58 (4th Cir. 1999) (“An individual does not have to
be pain-free in order to be found ‘not disabled.’”).

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Second, the ALJ found that Hartman’s treatment since May 2010 had “been routine,
conservative, and unremarkable” because “no surgery other than ankle arthroscopy had been
recommended.” R. 634–35. While Hartman’s podiatrist actually did recommend a second ankle
surgery in November 2015, see R. 1042, the ALJ’s finding that Hartman’s treatment had been
“routine, conservative, and unremarkable” overall is nonetheless supported by substantial
evidence in the record. See R. 78 (state-agency physician noting that Hartman’s treatment before
April 2011 had “been routine and conservative”), 629–35 (summarizing, accurately, the mixed
results from Hartman’s subsequent treatment with pain medications, muscle relaxants, steroid
injections, nerve blocks, and physical therapy). In October 2012, for example, one of Hartman’s
physicians referred him to Ward Gypson, M.D., for “conservative management of back pain.” R.
889. Dr. Gypson prescribed muscle relaxants and steroid injections, which Hartman later said
were “helpful” and reduced his joint pain for at least some time. R. 1021, 1023. In June 2013, a
psychologist at the University of Virginia’s Pain Management Center recommended that
Hartman practice “self-regulation skills,” such as meditation and activity pacing, to help cope
with his chronic headaches and generalized pain. R. 1007. In October 2015, Hartman told his
neurologist Michael Valente, D.O., that hydrocodone “seems to help his intense headaches.” R.
1049. The ALJ did not express doubt that Hartman experienced chronic headaches and
musculoskeletal pain, but he did question the severity of those symptoms based on the treatment
Hartman received. R. 634. Thus, although Hartman’s treatment history certainly depicts a person
seeking relief for his chronic pain, the nature of that treatment and the partial relief afforded by
conservative measures provide adequate grounds for the ALJ to question the severity of
Hartman’s symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); Gregory v. Colvin, No.
4:15cv5, 2016 WL 3072202, at *5 (W.D. Va. May 6, 2016) (“It was reasonable for the ALJ to

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characterize [Plaintiff’s] course of treatment, consisting of pain medication, physical therapy,
and steroid injections, as ‘conservative.’”), adopted by 2016 WL 3077935 (W.D. Va. May 31,
2016).
Considering the objective medical evidence and Hartman’s course of treatment, the ALJ
could reasonably question the severity and functionally limiting effects of Hartman’s symptoms
related to pain. This case does not present the exceptional circumstance where an ALJ’s
credibility determination is based on unreasonable, contradictory, or inadequate findings. See
Bishop, 583 F. App’x at 68 (citing Eldeco, Inc., 132 F.3d at 1011). Moreover, contrary to
Hartman’s assertion, there is no indication that ALJ Owen “disregard[ed] treating physicians’
documentation of pain and exacerbating psychological factors” when evaluating Hartman’s or
his girlfriend’s subjective statements. Pl.’s Br. 5. While several of Hartman’s doctors have
identified a psychosomatic element to his physical pain, the ALJ specifically discussed those
treatment and exam notes in his summary of the longitudinal medical evidence. See R. 625–33
(citing R. 508, 879–80, 1007, 1037–38, 1049–50). Hartman does not “point to any specific piece
of evidence” not considered by the ALJ that might have changed his adverse credibility
determination or his conclusion that Hartman’s medical impairments are not disabling. Reid v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 866 (4th Cir. 2014) (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, I find
that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility determination.
I also find that that ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence in the
record, including medical opinions from a state-agency reviewing physician and an impartial
clinical psychologist, Hartman’s consistently normal physical and neurological exams
throughout the relevant period, and Hartman’s repeated statements to doctors that his headaches
and other pain usually did not interfere with his daily activities. See R. 91–92, 320, 536, 546,

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672–74, 677–78, 1006. In particular, I find that restricting Hartman to “simple, repetitive,
routine, one or two-step tasks in a low stress environment involving a slow pace with no quotas .
. . and minimal public contact,” R. 624, adequately accommodates Hartman’s well-documented
complaints that “stress” and noisy children tended to aggravate the frequency or severity of his
headaches. See, e.g., R. 1007, 1036–37, 1049. Hartman does not argue otherwise. Pl.’s Br. 3–5.
The ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony in response to a hypothetical question
reflecting his RFC determination, R. 636, was also proper. See Fisher v. Barnhart, 181 F. App’x
359, 365 (4th Cir. 2006). The VE testified that a person with Hartman’s vocational profile and
RFC could perform certain “medium” and “sedentary” occupations, such as hospital cleaner,
assembler, and stacker or packer. See R. 681–82. Hartman does not object to the VE’s testimony
or to the ALJ’s finding that these jobs exist in significant numbers nationally or in Virginia.
Accordingly, I find that the Commissioner’s final decision is consistent with the law and
supported by substantial evidence in the current record. See Walls v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 292
(4th Cir. 2002) (holding that a VE’s reliable testimony provides substantial evidence to support
the Commissioner’s final decision).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I find that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s
final decision. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT the Commissioner’s motion for summary
judgment, ECF No. 16, AFFIRM the Commissioner’s final decision, and DISMISS this case
from the Court’s active docket. A separate order will enter.
The Clerk shall send certified copies of this Memorandum Opinion to counsel of record.
ENTER: September 29, 2017

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Joel C. Hoppe
United States Magistrate Judge

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