Soulsby v. Soulsby

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Elizabeth K. Dillon on 6/12/2017. (jat)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
HARRISONBURG DIVISION
RODNEY SOULSBY, II,

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Plaintiff,
v.
ASHLYN D. SOULSBY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 5:17-cv-0056
By: Elizabeth K. Dillon
United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Rodney Soulsby, II, proceeding pro se, seeks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (Dkt. No. 1).1 The court concludes that Soulsby is financially eligible to
proceed in forma pauperis, but will nonetheless dismiss his complaint in its entirety for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
“Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power
that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress
pursuant thereto.” Brickwood Contractors., Inc. v. Datanet Eng’g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385,
390 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541
(1986)). Hence, “questions of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point
during the proceedings and may (or, more precisely, must) be raised sua sponte by the
court.” Id.

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Plaintiff Soulsby filed another lawsuit in this court approximately one day before this one, in
which he asserts claims against this same defendant (Ashlyn D. Soulsby) and a state court judge. Soulsby
v. Ludwig, No. 5:17-cv-00054 (W.D. Va.). There, he alleges that the judge improperly granted him
adoption of his (now ex-wife’s) son, in a proceeding in which Soulsby did not participate and in which he
claims his signature seeking adoption was forged. Soulsby’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis was
granted in that case and summonses have been issued for the two defendants.

Generally speaking, a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a civil
action only if it raises a question of federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or it is between
citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, id. § 1332.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Evans v.
B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 646 (4th Cir. 1999). If he cannot do so, then the court
must dismiss his complaint. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
Soulsby’s complaint invokes this court’s diversity jurisdiction and states that he is
a citizen of Florida and the defendant is a citizen of Virginia. (Compl. 1–3, Dkt. No. 2.)
This court’s diversity jurisdiction generally allows the exercise of jurisdiction if the
parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy is more than
$75,000. Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mt. State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101, 103 (4th Cir.
2011). Typically, “the ‘sum claimed by the plaintiff controls’ the amount in controversy
determination.” JTH Tax, Inc. v. Frashier, 624 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting St.
Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938)). Based on the
amounts sought in the complaint, it does not appear that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000.
The only evidence as to an amount in controversy is that Soulsby is currently
court-ordered to pay approximately $1800 per month in child support and has been
required to do so since January 2016, or a period of approximately 18 months. Even if he
is claiming all of those funds are not owed by him, the total amount at issue as of the
filing of his complaint is $32,400. So, jurisdiction appears to be lacking.
Even if the required ongoing monthly payments could somehow satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement, though, Soulsby’s complaint asks this court to

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modify his child support obligation and a child custody arrangement set forth in a state
court decree. (Compl. 4 (requesting, in his prayer for relief, that the court “modify child
support based on the current income of both parties” and modification of “child
visitation”). It is well established that a federal court’s “diversity jurisdiction does not
include the power to grant divorces, determine alimony or support obligations, or
determine child custody rights.” Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.
1982). This is what is known as “the domestic relations exception.” Id. The relief
sought by Soulsby falls squarely within this prohibition on federal court jurisdiction;
therefore, the court does not have jurisdiction to consider his claims.
Wasserman and other cases have recognized that the mere fact that a cause of
action is asserted against an ex-spouse or involves familial disputes does not cause a case
to fall within the domestic relations exception. 671 F.2d at 834–35; Raftery v. Scott, 756
F.2d 335, 338 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that district court properly exercised diversity
jurisdiction of ex-husband’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against
former wife, who he alleges sought to destroy his relationship with his son).2 But where,
as here, a party is “seek[ing] a declaration of present or future rights as to custody or
visitation,” a federal court should decline to exercise jurisdiction. Wasserman, 671 F.2d
at 835. Accordingly, the court concludes that, even if Soulsby’s ongoing payments
could satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, the court
must nonetheless decline jurisdiction over Soulsby’s complaint.

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The Supreme Court of Virginia later noted that it disagreed with the analysis and result on the
substantive claim in Raftery, and it held that Virginia does not allow a claim of alienation of affection in the
guise of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. McDermott v. Reynolds, 530 S.E.2d 902,
904 (Va. 2000). The McDermott court would have had no reason to address the jurisdictional analysis in
Raftery and did not do so.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will dismiss Soulsby’s complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. An appropriate order will follow.
Entered: June 12, 2017.

/s/ Elizabeth K. Dillon
Elizabeth K. Dillon
United States District Judge

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