Doe v. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center Commission
Filing
243
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Elizabeth K. Dillon on 9/26/2022. (jv)
Case 5:17-cv-00097-EKD-JCH Document 243 Filed 09/26/22 Page 1 of 13 Pageid#: 6680
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
HARRISONBURG DIVISION
JOHN DOE 5, JOHN DOE 6, and JOHN
DOE 7, by and through their next friend,
NELSON DELORES LOPEZ, on behalf of
themselves and all persons similarly situated
Plaintiffs,
v.
SHENANDOAH VALLEY JUVENILE
CENTER COMMISSION,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 5:17-cv-00097
By: Elizabeth K. Dillon
United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION
John Does 5, 6, and 7 (Does) are immigrant minors detained at the Shenandoah Valley
Juvenile Center (SVJC), which is owned and operated by the Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center
Commission (Commission). The Does represent a class of similarly situated detainees, each
deemed an “Unaccompanied Alien Child” (UAC), who allege SVJC has denied them
constitutionally adequate health care in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. SVJC moves to dismiss
the plaintiffs’ third amended complaint for lack of standing under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 229.) For the reasons stated below, the court will
deny the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and take defendant’s motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under advisement pending an evidentiary hearing to further
consider the standing issue.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background 1
The Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center (SVJC) is a secure residential detention facility
in Staunton, Virginia, owned and operated by the Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center
Commission (Commission). (Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38–39, Dkt. No. 228.) The Commission is a
public body pursuant to Virginia Code § 16.1-315. SVJC houses both noncitizen immigrant
minors deemed UACs and citizen youth between the ages of ten and seventeen. (Id. ¶ 43.)
Minors deemed UACs are transferred to SVJC by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services when UACs “behavior[], primarily
aggression and self-harm, appear to make them a danger to themselves or others or suggest that
they are a flight risk.” (Id. ¶ 53.) ORR and SVJC have a cooperative agreement that outlines
SVJC’s responsibilities as a “care provider.” (Id. ¶ 54.) These responsibilities include, among
other things, physical care, educational services, necessary mental health interventions, “[a]t
least one individual counseling session per week,” and “[g]roup counseling sessions at least
twice a week.” (Id.)
The plaintiffs are immigrant youths who have been deemed UACs by ORR. (Id. ¶ 1.) At
the time the third amended complaint was filed, the Does were detained at SVJC. (Id.) The
Does represent a class comprised of UACs currently detained at SVJC as well as UACs who may
be detained there in the future. (Id.)
Doe 5 is a 15-year-old from Honduras. (Id. ¶ 7.) He fled Honduras to escape gang
violence in 2020. (Id. ¶ 8.) Upon entering the United States, he was apprehended and detained.
(Id. ¶ 10.) After an escape attempt at a facility, Doe 5 threatened to harm himself and
For the purposes of this motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court takes the allegations in the third
amended complaint as true.
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subsequently spent four days in the hospital. (Id. ¶ 11.) He was then transferred to SVJC. (Id. ¶
12.) At SVJC, Doe 5 has a counselor, who he sees “once a week for five to 15 minutes at a
time,” and he has “spoken with a psychiatrist once…for approximately 20 minutes.” (Id. ¶¶ 12–
13.) Doe 5 complains that his counselor focuses only on behavior management; the counselor
does not give him advice on “how to cope with any of [his] underlying issues or concerns. (Id. ¶
13.) Further, his psychologist only prescribed him medication; the psychiatrist “did not ask him
how he was doing.” (Id. ¶ 14.)
Doe 6 is a 16-year-old from Guatemala. (Id. ¶ 15.) He left Guatemala to help his family.
(Id. ¶ 16.) Doe 6 was apprehended at the border and sent to a psychiatric hospital for a week.
(Id. ¶ 18.) While there, he “believes he was diagnosed with a mental health condition,” but he
does not know which one. (Id.) In May 2021, Doe 6 was apprehended and detained at the
border while attempting to return to Guatemala. (Id. ¶ 20.) He was detained at a facility in
Texas until being transferred to SVJC, apparently for fighting with other youth. (Id. ¶¶ 20–21.)
Doe 6 has a counselor at SVJC “with whom he hardly speaks”; he has met with his counselor
“four or five times for approximately 10 to 30 minutes.” (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.) On several occasions,
his counselor has been “too busy, or not in the office” when Doe 6 has requested a meeting. (Id.
¶ 20.) Doe 6 also complains about his counselor’s focus on behavior management. (Id.) He has
not talked to his counselor about “instances of self-harm because his counselor only wants to
speak with him after [he] is involved in a behavioral incident.” (Id. ¶ 25.) Doe 6 “has not met
with a psychiatrist, but believes he has an upcoming appointment with one.” (Id. ¶ 24.) While at
SVJC, Doe 6 has been “subjected to physical assault…at least twice.” (Id. ¶ 26.)
Doe 7 is a 15-year-old from Honduras. (Id. ¶ 28.) He fled Honduras in the wake of
hurricanes hoping to help provide for his family. (Id. ¶ 29.) Upon arriving in the United States,
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Doe 7 was apprehended and then detained at a facility in Texas. (Id. ¶ 31.) In May 2021, he was
transferred to SVJC, apparently for fighting other youth. (Id. ¶ 32.) Doe 7 “believes he has been
diagnosed with a mental health condition, but does not recall what it is.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Doe 7 has a
counselor “whom he sees on a weekly basis.” (Id. ¶ 33.) During counseling sessions, Doe 7’s
counselor talks with him about his behavior, facilitates calls to his mom, and sometimes lets him
listen to music. (Id.) He also has a psychiatrist, who he meets with over video. (Id. ¶ 34.) His
psychiatrist has prescribed him medication to help him calm down and sleep. (Id.) Doe 7 has
been subject to physical assault by staff at SVJC and witnessed staff assault another youth at the
facility. (Id. ¶¶ 35–36.)
Plaintiffs allege that SVJC staff members are “unable to recognize and properly react to
the obvious needs of youth who have experienced known, serious trauma.” (Id. ¶ 57.) SVJC
allegedly “takes a ‘one size fits all’ approach” to mental health treatment rather than tailoring
treatment to an individual child’s needs. (Id. ¶ 58.) “Each child is assigned a counselor, with
whom they usually meet once a week, although some of the youth…reported speaking with their
counselors less frequently.” (Id.) “Some, but not all, of the youth…have also met with a
psychiatrist”; however, the psychiatrist is focused on medication management rather than
psychotherapy. (Id. ¶ 59.) “Only one youth described anything resembling regular group
therapy.” (Id. ¶ 60.) SVJC follows this approach despite youth who “engage, have engaged, or
have threatened to engage in self-harm.” (Id. ¶ 61.)
Additionally, plaintiffs allege regularly occurring physical assault by SVJC staff in
response to “minor behavioral incidents.” (Id. ¶ 63.) They allege these “applications of force
add to the severe psychological trauma” the youth already suffer. (Id.) Further, plaintiffs allege
SVJC has the “policy or practice of confining immigrant detainees to their rooms for lengthy
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periods of time and/or using handcuffs to restrain them.” (Id. ¶ 65.) As punishment, SVJC
allegedly strip the youth of all their personal items, including blankets, overnight. (Id. ¶ 67.) In
conclusion, plaintiffs plead that “[i]solating, punishing, and failing to provide clearly-needed
mental health treatment to children who are severely traumatized or may be self-harming is
extremely damaging to their well-being and violates well-established professional standards,”
and they have been “harmed by the lack of…appropriate, trauma-informed mental health care
treatment.” (Id. ¶¶ 70–71.) Thus, the Commission has violated their “Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment[]” rights to adequate medical care. (Id. ¶ 80.)
B. Plaintiffs’ Next Friend, Nelson Delores Lopez
The plaintiffs seek to proceed in this litigation by and through their next friend, Nelson
Delores Lopez. (Id. ¶ 4.) Lopez is an adult resident of Virginia who “has met with John Does 5–
7, and they consent to [him] serving as their next friend.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Further, plaintiffs contend
“Lopez is well-suited to serve in this role,” due to his status as a law student intern and past
experience as a “community advocate” and “paralegal at an immigration legal services
organization.” (Id. ¶ 6.) As a paralegal, “Lopez frequently visited detained immigrant adults and
children to educate them about their legal rights and assist them in navigating the immigration
legal system.” (Id.)
C. Relevant Procedural History
Preceding the complaint and this motion, the plaintiffs, through other named
representatives, filed a complaint asserting claims of 1) excessive force, 2) excessive conditions
of confinement, and 3) inadequate mental health treatment against the Commission. On
December 13, 2018, this court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission on the
inadequate mental health treatment claim, finding there was no dispute of material fact when
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applying the deliberate indifference standard to the record. Doe by and through Lopez v.
Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 355 F. Supp. 3d 454, 468–69 (W.D. Va. 2018). Further,
this court dismissed the excessive force and conditions of confinement claims with prejudice on
July 23, 2019. (Dkt. No. 204.)
Plaintiffs appealed the ruling on the mental health treatment claim. In Doe 4 by and
through Lopez v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, the Fourth Circuit reversed this court,
holding that the proper standard to apply to the minors’ mental health treatment claim is the
professional judgment standard, not the deliberate indifference standard. 985 F.3d 327, 338–44
(4th Cir. 2021).
Plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint, again claiming the Commission
unconstitutionally denied them of adequate mental health treatment in violation of § 1983.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which was fully briefed and argued.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing
Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ next friend, Nelson Lopez, cannot proceed on plaintiffs’
behalf because there is no “significant relationship” between them. Defendant contends that
Lopez has an “interest in the case and past experience with detainees” but has no relationship at
all with these plaintiffs. (Dkt. No. 230 at 6.) Plaintiffs argue a significant relationship is present
because “[Lopez] met with the [p]laintiffs in person and secured their consent to his participation
in the case as their representative.” (Dkt. No. 232 at 6.) Further, “[Lopez] is not pursuing
vindication of an abstract legal construct,” rather, “he has a long history of working in support of
immigrants’ rights.” (Id.)
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Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes minors to sue by a next
friend if the minor lacks a general guardian or a duly appointed representative. Fed. R. Civ. P.
17(c)(2). “The question of next friend standing….is jurisdictional and thus fundamental.”
Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 607 (4th Cir. 2002). “The burden is on the ‘next friend’” to
“establish the propriety of his status.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 164 (1990). A next
friend must 1) provide an adequate explanation why the real party in interest cannot appear on
his own behalf to prosecute the action and 2) be truly dedicated to the best interest of the person
on whose behalf he seeks to litigate. Id. at 163. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has added a
third requirement to proceed as a next friend: The next friend must have a significant relationship
with the real party in interest. 2 Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 604. The Hamdi court declined to decide
how significant of a relationship is needed, holding only that no preexisting relationship
whatsoever is insufficient. 3 Id. But the court qualified: “We do not have here the situation of
someone who has no significant relationships. If we did, this might be a different case.” Id. at
606.
Looking to the third amended complaint, it is unclear the extent of Lopez’s relationship
with the plaintiffs. Have the parties met once or on several occasions? For how long? In their
briefing, plaintiffs state that Lopez has assisted detainees at SVJC. What other relationships do
the plaintiffs have? Further legal questions also exist. In the class action context, must a next
friend have a significant relationship with all the named plaintiffs? Or must each individual
The court reasoned that the significant relationship requirement helps ensure goals of Article III standing
such as concrete adverseness between parties, restricting the federal forum to persons with a real stake in the
litigation, and keeping policy-laden proceedings in the political arena. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 60407 (4th Cir. 2002).
2
In Hamdi, a Federal Public Defender and a private citizen, who were found to have no relationship with
the plaintiff at all, were denied standing as next friends. In a subsequent case, the plaintiff’s father was allowed to
proceed as a next friend. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002).
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named plaintiff have their own next friend? Considering the plaintiffs’ unique status as detained
unaccompanied noncitizen minors, there is a need for an evidentiary hearing to determine the
extent of Lopez’s relationship with the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’ other relationships, if any,
before the court answers the question of Lopez’s standing to proceed as the plaintiffs’ next
friend.
B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
1. Legal Standards
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) “challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint, considered with the assumption
that the facts alleged are true.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The principle that the
allegations in a complaint must be accepted as true is “inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and the
court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id.
2. Section 1983 Monell Claim
Plaintiffs bring their third amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
allows individuals to sue parties acting under the color of state law for civil rights violations. See
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 (1980). Indeed, plaintiffs alleging a violation of § 1983
“must show that (1) they were deprived of a federal statutory or constitutional right; and (2) the
deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir.
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2003). A local government entity may be liable under section 1983 if “it follows a custom,
policy, or practice by which local officials violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights.” Owens v.
Baltimore City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014). An official policy or
custom can take the form of (1) an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2)
the decision of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) an omission, such as a failure to
properly train officers, that “manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens”; or (4) a
practice that is so “persistent and widespread” as to constitute a “custom or usage with the force
of law.” Lytle, 326 F.3d at 471. Under any theory, a plaintiff must “(1) identify[] the specific
‘policy’ or ‘custom’; (2) fairly attribute[e] the policy and fault for its creation to the
municipality; and (3) find[] the necessary ‘affirmative link’ between identified policy or custom
and specific violation.” Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1389 (4th Cir. 1987).
To serve as the basis for their claim under § 1983, plaintiffs allege that defendant
deprived them, as state detainees, of constitutionally adequate mental health treatment in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 “[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and
holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume
some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989). This responsibility includes providing for a
person’s mental health needs. See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (“We see
no underlying distinction between the right to medical care for physical ills and its psychological
or psychiatric counterpart.”) On appeal in this case, the Fourth Circuit held that the professional
judgment standard announced in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), governs “the
In the complaint, plaintiffs assert “violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” (Third Am.
Compl. ¶ 80, Dkt. No. 228.) Plaintiffs bring an action against state, not federal, actors. Such an action is properly
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Hornsby, 666 F.3d 296, 310 (4th Cir. 2012).
4
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adequacy of mental health care provided to [] detained immigrant child[ren].” Doe 4, 985 F.3d
at 339. Under the Youngberg standard, “‘liability may be imposed only when the decision by the
professional’ represents a ‘substantial departure from accepted professional judgment.’” Id.
(quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320–23). The Fourth Circuit more fully explained the
professional judgment standard:
To be clear, this standard requires more than negligence.
“[E]vidence establishing mere departures from the applicable
standard of care is insufficient to show a constitutional violation[.]”
The evidence must show “such a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the
decision on such a judgment.” Under this standard, courts do not
determine the “correct” or “most appropriate” medical decision.
“Instead, the proper inquiry is whether the decision was so
completely out of professional bounds as to make it explicable only
as an arbitrary, nonprofessional one.” By applying this standard, a
court “defers to the necessarily subjective aspects of the decisional
process of institutional medical professionals and accords those
decisions the presumption of validity due them.” Nonetheless, a
decision earns this deference only if it reflects an actual exercise of
medical judgment.
Id. at 342–43 (internal citations omitted). While the Doe 4 court noted that the Fourth Circuit
had yet to truly define the contours of the professional judgment standard, it is clear the standard
is objective, rather than subjective, and “a court must do more than determine that some
treatment has been provided—it must determine whether the treatment provided is adequate to
address a person's needs under a relevant standard of professional judgment.” Id. at 343–44.
In sum, to properly allege a § 1983 claim against defendant, plaintiffs must plead facts
showing that defendant had a “policy” or “custom” that caused plaintiffs to receive mental health
treatment that substantially departed from accepted professional judgment.
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a. Constitutional Harm
To proceed under § 1983, plaintiffs must first plead sufficient facts to show they have
been deprived of their constitutional rights. Defendant argues that the plaintiffs have not
sufficiently alleged that their constitutional right to adequate mental health treatment has been
denied by defendant. That is, plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient facts to show that defendant
“substantially departed from accepted professional judgment.” The court disagrees.
As the Fourth Circuit explained, the treatment provided by SVJC must be “based on a
medical judgment concerning the individual’s specific needs, not based on policy or what
services were ordinarily offered at the facility.” Doe 4, 983 F.3d at 343 (citation omitted).
Further, “[a court] must determine whether the treatment provided is adequate to address a
person’s needs under a relevant standard of professional judgment.” Id. at 344. And finally, the
Fourth Circuit left it to this court “to determine in the first instance to what extent, if any, the
trauma-informed approach should be incorporated into the professional judgment standard in this
particular case.” Id. at 346.
Plaintiffs allege that they have been harmed by “the lack of provision of appropriate,
trauma-informed mental health care treatment . . .”. (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 71.) The fact that
SVJC provides plaintiffs with mental health care, albeit through a “one size fits all” approach (id.
¶ 58), shows that plaintiffs do have mental health care needs. This is corroborated by allegations
that Does 5, 6, and 7 have manifested mental illness. (Id. ¶ 11 (Doe 5, when captured during an
attempt to escape a detention facility in Texas, threatened to harm himself and was hospitalized);
¶ 18 (Doe 6 was sent to a psychiatric hospital upon turning himself in when he crossed the
border, during which time he believes he was diagnosed with a mental health disorder and
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prescribed medication); ¶ 34 (Doe 7 believes he has been diagnosed with a mental health
condition, but he does not recall the specifics).)
Plaintiffs further allege that Doe 6 and Doe 7 have been subjected to physical assaults by
staff, and Doe 7 witnessed staff assault another class member. (Id. ¶¶ 26–27, 35–36.) “Such
applications of force add to the severe psychological trauma from which the immigrant youth
already suffer and which goes untreated due to the lack of appropriate mental health care at the
facility.” (Id. ¶ 63.) Plaintiffs also complain of aggravating effects upon their mental health due
to excessive room confinement. (Id. ¶¶ 65–67, 69–70.) Defendant contends that allegations of
excessive force and room confinement are not relevant, but the Fourth Circuit held that “these
forms of punishment also tie into Appellants’ claim of inadequate health care.” Doe 4, 985 F.3d
at 331. When children “act out due to untreated trauma, SVJC has shown a pattern and practice
of quickly resorting to these harsh and punitive measures, retraumatizing these children and
worsening their underlying conditions.” Id.
For these reasons, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the denial of their constitutional right
to adequate mental health treatment by defendant.
b. Policy or Custom of SVJC
Plaintiffs plead, and primarily argued at the hearing on this motion, that SVJC employs a
“one-size-fits-all” approach to mental health treatment that apparently focuses on behavior
management and medicine management rather than tailoring treatment to an individual
detainee’s needs. (See Third Am. Compl. ¶ 58.) Plaintiffs’ mental health issues have been
recognized and acknowledged in this litigation. See Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 330 (“SVJC recognizes
that most of the unaccompanied children it cares for have experienced severe trauma.”). Despite
this, it is alleged that SVJC “has a policy or practice of denying [Does] and class members access
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to appropriate mental health treatment and counseling with licensed mental health professionals,
in violation of well-established professional standards,” and “has a policy or practice of
confining the immigrant detainees to their rooms for lengthy periods of time and/or using
handcuffs to restrain them.” (Id. ¶¶ 56, 65.) The alleged duration and frequency of these
practices suggest that they can be attributed to defendant. See Doe v. Shenandoah Valley
Juvenile Ctr. Comm’n, 355 F. Supp. 3d 454, 469–71 (W.D. Va. 2018) (denying summary
judgment to defendant with respect to excessive force and excessive room confinement claims
based on duration and frequency of complained-of conduct, establish “awareness and tacit
approval on the part of the Commission that the Center engages in a pattern of conduct with
regard to force, restrains and room confinement that is unconstitutional”).
While the details are somewhat sparse and, at times, contradictory, plaintiffs’ allegations
are sufficient to plausibly allege an unconstitutional policy or custom.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court will deny defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim and take defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under advisement pending an evidentiary hearing regarding Lopez’s standing as next friend. The
court will issue an appropriate order.
Entered: September 26, 2022.
/s/ Elizabeth K. Dillon
Elizabeth K. Dillon
United States District Judge
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