Middleton v. United States of America
Filing
13
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Norman K. Moon on 5/7/13. (hnw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
LYNCHBURG DIVISION
EVELYN L. MIDDLETON,
CASE NO. 6:13-cv-00002
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON
Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant United States of America’s (“Defendant”)
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). After
reviewing Plaintiff’s pro se complaint and considering the parties’ filings, I find that a hearing on
Defendant’s motion is unnecessary,1 and I will grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss for the
following reasons.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s complaint is her third filed in this Court within the last year, and her eleventh
lawsuit related to a dispute over her retirement account with a former private employer and
subsequent federal agency decisions. In her most recent complaint, Plaintiff alleges that various
individuals employed by the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) “breached their
fiduciary duties to her by disseminating misleading information, which denied plaintiff rights
and benefits under The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).” Since I have
described Plaintiff’s core factual allegations twice before, see Middleton v. United States, No.
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“In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), the Court may determine a motion without an oral
hearing.” W.D. Va. Civ. R. 11(b).
1
6:12-CV-00041, 2012 WL 5426842 (W.D. Va. Nov. 7, 2012); Middleton v. United States, No.
6:12-CV-00022, 2012 WL 4458475 (W.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2012), I will summarize Plaintiff’s most
recent allegations only briefly. Between 2001 and 2005, Plaintiff filed with the DOL complaints
about fraud and misrepresentations related to a 403(b) retirement account. In pursuing her
complaints, Plaintiff spoke to or corresponded with multiple benefit advisers and supervisors
employed by the DOL. According to Plaintiff, the DOL informed her that it did not believe that
her complaints warranted agency action, but that she was free to bring a private ERISA claim.
Dissatisfied with her interactions with the DOL, Plaintiff filed a complaint about the handling of
her case with the DOL’s Office of Inspector General. Ultimately, Plaintiff asserts that the DOL
employees she dealt with “breached their duties to plaintiff by disseminating misleading
information to her that she was forced to ignore,” by making false statements, and by trying “to
jeopardize her complaints” about the administration of her 403(b) account.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint . . . [I]t
does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of
defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). A court
considering dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) must take the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 489 (4th Cir. 1991). Courts are not, however,
“bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). Rather, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain enough factual
allegations to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. In
evaluating “plausibility,” the court may not rely on mere “labels and conclusions” or a plaintiff’s
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“formulaic recitation of a cause of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 555. Instead, the
factual allegations must be enough to raise “a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
Thus, a “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
In order to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim, federal courts
have an obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally. See, e.g., Boag v. MacDougall, 454
U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is
particularly appropriate where . . . there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v.
Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th
Cir. 1978)). Nevertheless, “[p]rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are
not . . . without limits.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by sovereign immunity, and I will therefore grant
Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that the United
States may only be sued where its immunity has been explicitly waived. Kerns v. United States,
585 F.3d 187, 193–94 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Absent a statutory waiver, sovereign immunity shields
the United States from a civil tort suit.”). Waivers of sovereign immunity are construed strictly
in favor of the government. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992). If
sovereign immunity has not been waived, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475–76 (1994). The Plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994).
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In this case, Plaintiff has not identified, either explicitly or implicitly, any waiver of
sovereign immunity that would permit this Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction. Even
construing Plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally, the only arguable source of any such waiver
rests in ERISA.2 Section 1132 of Title 29 grants plan participants the right to bring a civil action
to redress ERISA violations, but it “does not provide a waiver of sovereign immunity which
would permit the suit to be brought against the United States.” Shanbaum v. United States, 32
F.3d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s action must be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
In both of Plaintiff’s prior cases in this district, Defendant has requested that I impose on
Plaintiff the same system of pre-filing review imposed by the Eastern District of Virginia.
Although both times I denied Defendant’s request, I warned Plaintiff that if she persisted in filing
suits that mirror her previous suits and that lack adequate legal or factual foundation, I would
institute pre-filing review. Because Plaintiff has again filed a suit that simply restates her earlier
complaints and utterly lacks any legal or factual support, I will grant Defendant’s request to
institute the same pre-filing review ordered by the Eastern District of Virginia. Plaintiff will not
be permitted to file in the Western District of Virginia any actions that are related to her
retirement account or any individual’s or agency’s handling of her complaints about that account,
unless she obtains pre-authorization from a District Court judge upon a finding that the case
could be meritorious and is not vexatious or repetitive.
If Plaintiff wishes to file a related action, she must submit a motion requesting leave to
file, a proposed complaint, and a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and the accompanying
Order implementing the system of pre-filing review to the Clerk, who is directed to file the
2
In one of Plaintiff’s previous actions, I found that sovereign immunity also barred Plaintiff from bringing suit
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Middleton v. United States, No. 6:12-CV-00041,
2012 WL 5426842, at *2–3 (W.D. Va. Nov. 7, 2012).
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submission conditionally on the Court’s miscellaneous docket. The Court will then determine if
leave should be granted for the filing of the action. If the Court approves the filing and allows
Plaintiff to proceed with an action, Plaintiff may be required to seek leave of Court to file any
motion within such action. Leave would be freely granted when the interests of justice so
dictate. If Plaintiff were allowed to proceed with an action, and it was later determined that
Plaintiff’s Complaint was baseless, vexatious, or repetitive, Plaintiff would be subject to the
possibility of sanctions, after an opportunity to show cause, as justice so dictates.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss shall be granted, and Plaintiff’s
case shall be struck from the Court’s active docket. 3 An appropriate order accompanies this
memorandum opinion.
The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to send a certified copy of this memorandum
opinion and the accompanying order to Plaintiff and all counsel of record.
7th
Entered this ________ day of May, 2013.
3
On April 8, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion to continue, the grounds for which were largely restatements of the
allegations contained in her Complaint. Plaintiff’s motion was construed as a response brief in opposition to
Defendant’s motion to dismiss for the purposes of this opinion. In light of my decision to grant Defendant’s motion
to dismiss, Plaintiff’s motion to continue shall be denied as moot.
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