Campbell v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Norman K. Moon on September 16, 2015. (ca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
LYNCHBURG DIVISION

JOSEPH D. CAMPBELL, SR.

CASE NO. 6:14-cv-00022
Plaintiff,

v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.

JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross Motions for Summary Judgment
(docket nos. 14 and 16), the Report & Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge
Robert S. Ballou (docket no. 28, hereinafter “R&R”), Plaintiff’s Objections to the R&R (docket
no. 31, hereinafter “Objections to R&R”), and the Defendant’s Response to the Objection to the
R&R (docket no. 33). Pursuant to Standing Order 2011-17 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the
Court referred this matter to U.S. Magistrate Judge Ballou for proposed findings of fact and a
recommended disposition. Judge Ballou filed his R&R, advising this Court to deny Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and grant the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff timely filed his Objections, obligating the Court to undertake a de novo review of those
portions of the R&R to which objections were made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Farmer v.
McBride, 177 F. App’x 327, 330 (4th Cir. 2006). For the following reasons, I will overrule
Plaintiff’s Objections and adopt Judge Ballou’s R&R in full.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 14, 2011, Plaintiff Joseph Campbell (“Plaintiff”) protectively filed an
application for supplemental security income (“SSI”) payments and disability insurance benefits
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(“DIB”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–433, 1381–1383f. To
receive SSI benefits, Plaintiff must show her disability began on or before the date she applied
for benefits, and has lasted or could be expected to last for at least twelve continuous months. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1382(a), 1383(a)(1); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.202(a), 416.905(a). To receive DIB, plaintiff
must show her disability began before the date she was or will be last insured (here, December
31, 2015), and that the disability existed for twelve continuous months.

42 U.S.C. §§

423(a)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B), (d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.101(a), 404.131(a).
Plaintiff was born on July 11, 1959, and was considered a person approaching advanced
age under the Act on her alleged onset date. See Administrative Record (hereinafter “R.”), at 30,
244; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c). He has limited education, completing only the eighth grade, but
has past relevant work experience as a transmission’s mechanic’s helper. R. 10, 30, 239, 249.
Plaintiff claims his disability began on February 4, 2011, when he claims work became
too difficult after his heart attack in April 2010. R. at 50–51. Since his heart attack, Plaintiff has
had a total of three stints inserted. R. 52. Plaintiff alleges he also suffered from cardiac disease,
obesity, asthma, anxiety, depression, expressive language disorder, reading disorder, and
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, R. 21, 54–55, 365–435, 496–509, 608–14. During the
relevant period of disability, Plaintiff has mild limitations on the ability to provide personal care
for himself and can prepare simple meals, do laundry and clean. R. 22, 79, 258–61. This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
A. The ALJ’s Decision
The state agency denied Plaintiff’s application at the initial and reconsideration levels of
administrative review, and on September 14, 2012, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mark

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O’Hara held a hearing to consider Plaintiff’s disability claim. R. 18. Counsel representing
Plaintiff and a vocational expert both appeared at the hearing. R. 18.
Determining disability, and thus eligibility for Social Security benefits, involves a fivestep inquiry. Walls v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2002). In this process, the
Commissioner asks whether: (1) the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) the
claimant has a medical impairment (or combination of impairments) that are severe; (3) the
claimant’s medical impairment meets or exceeds the severity of one of the impairments listed in
Appendix I of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, and the impairment meets the duration
requirement in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909; (4) the claimant is able to perform her past
relevant work; and (5) the claimant can perform other specific types of work. Johnson v.
Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 n.1 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).
The claimant has the burden of production and proof in Steps 1–4. See Hunter v.
Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). If the claimant meets that burden, at Step
5 the burden shifts to the Commissioner “to produce evidence that other jobs exist in the national
economy that the claimant can perform considering his age, education, and work experience.”
Id. If a determination of disability can be made at any step, the Commissioner need not analyze
subsequent steps. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
The ALJ found Plaintiff suffers from severe impairments of cardiac disease, obesity, and
asthma. R. 20. He also found he meets the insured status requirements of the Act through
December 31, 2015, and did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the requested
closed period. R. 20. The ALJ further found that “all other impairments” were “non-severe
because they did not exist for a continuous period of 12 months, were responsive to medication,
did not require significant medical treatment, or did not result in any continuous exertional or

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non-exertional functional limitations.” R. 20. Specifically, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s
drusen of the optic nerve head was non-severe due to the fact that Plaintiff’s optometrist opined
that it caused minimal decrease in activities. R. 20. Plaintiff’s anxiety, depression, cognitive
impairment, attention deficit hyperactivity, expressive language disorder, and reading disorder
were determined to be non-severe due to not requiring significant medical treatment and not
resulting in any continuous exertional or non-exertional functional limitations. R. 20. The ALJ
determined that Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not result in severe impairment of the four
broad functional areas. R. 21.
Although he found Plaintiff “unable to perform any past relevant work as a transmission
mechanic’s helper” and “has some limitation due to his impairments,” the ALJ determined that
“the totality of the evidence fails to substantiate that his limitations are of the degree and
intensity alleged and that they are of a nature to preclude him from performing basic work
activities, at least at the limited light exertional level.” R. 24–30. Furthermore, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff has the “residual functional capacity to perform light work . . . except
that he would be limited to occasional crawling and climbing of ladders, ropes and scaffolds and
would need to avoid concentrated exposure to workplace hazards.” R. 21; see also 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1567(b), 416.967(b).
B. The Summary Judgment Motions
Plaintiff argued in his motion for summary judgment that the ALJ improperly found that
his anxiety, depression, and cognitive deficits were not severe impairments for three reasons.
First, Plaintiff alleged that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of his treating counselor.
Specifically, Plaintiff contended that the anxiety induced limitations and functional deficits
coupled with his cardiac problems would have more than a minimal effect on his ability to work.

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Second, the ALJ failed to consider all of his impairments in combination. Finally, the ALJ
improperly discounted his credibility.
The Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment countered that substantial objective
medical evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff retained the residual functional
capacity to work, notwithstanding his cardiac disease, obesity, asthma, and non-severe medical
impairments. In essence, the Commissioner contended that Plaintiff’s arguments improperly
sought the Court to re-weigh the evidence and decide the case differently. First, the ALJ
properly determined, in light of the entire record, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to
perform work at the light exertional level with certain exceptions. Second, the ALJ properly
determined that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were not severe because Plaintiff failed to meet
his burden and these impairments do not significantly limit Plaintiff ability to do “basic work
activities.” C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a); 416.920 (a). The ALJ thoroughly considered the four broad
functional areas. Third, the ALJ properly rejected Ms. Rice’s non-medical source opinion on
Plaintiff’s medical functioning applying the proper factors and determined that (1) Ms. Rice
failed to provide any support for her opinions; (2) medical evidence failed to support Ms. Rice’s
opinion; and (3) the brevity of the time that Ms. Rice counseled the Plaintiff. Lastly, the ALJ
properly discounted the Plaintiff’s credibility through the two-part credibility evaluation. At step
two, the ALJ compared Plaintiff’s testimony with the available medical evidence and
inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s own statements.
C. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
Magistrate Judge Robert S. Ballou recommends denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment, and granting the Commissioner’s motion. In his R&R, the Judge Ballou addressed
Plaintiff’s contentions that the ALJ erred by finding that his anxiety, depression and cognitive

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deficits were not severe by: (1) improperly rejecting the opinion of his treating counselor; (2)
failing to consider all of his impairments in combination; and (3) by improperly discounting his
credibility.
Judge Ballou comprehensively reviewed Plaintiff’s work history and medical evidence on
record before the ALJ, Plaintiff’s hearing testimony, and the ALJ’s findings. After extensively
detailing Plaintiff’s claim history, Judge Ballou notes:
Having reviewed the record, I find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
conclusion that Campbell is not disabled, and Campbell’s assertions of error
essentially ask the court to re-weigh the evidence, which this court cannot do.
R&R 3.
Judge Ballou found the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff’s anxiety, depression, and
cognitive deficits were not severe impairments because he had never been hospitalized due to
mental health reasons, had fairly normal mental status examinations, and was examined by a
psychologist only at the request of his attorney. R&R 4–5. Judge Ballou found that the record
supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s anxiety, depression, and cognitive deficits are nonsevere because they are situational in nature, have been treated conservatively, and will not result
in continuous extertional or non-extertional limitations for a period of 12 months. R&R 9. This
conclusion is supported by the treatment record of Plaintiff’s doctor, Dr. Wodicka. R&R 9.
Judge Ballou also found that the ALJ properly rejected Ms. Rice’s opinion because it was
conclusory and unsupported by either the longitudinal record or the limited findings on mental
status examinations.

R&R 10–11. In addition, Judge Ballou found that the ALJ’s conclusion

that Plaintiff’s impairments did not severely affect his four functional areas was supported by
substantial evidence.

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Judge Ballou determined that the ALJ properly considered all of the evidence relating to
Plaintiff’s alleged physical and mental impairments and correctly combined this evidence in
developing his residual functional capacity.
Lastly, Judge Ballou determined that the ALJ properly weighed Plaintiff’s statements
with the objective medical evidence found in the record and thus should not be disturbed.
Thus, Judge Ballou concluded that all of the ALJ’s determinations were supported by
substantial evidence.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ if they are supported by
substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). Substantial
evidence requires more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance, of evidence. Mastro
v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001). A finding is supported by substantial evidence if it is
based on “relevant evidence [that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Where
“conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled,” the
Court must defer to the Commissioner’s decision. Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653.
In determining whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, a
reviewing court may not “re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or
substitute [its] judgment” for that of the ALJ. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996)
(citation omitted). “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether
a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the Secretary (or the
Secretary’s designate, the ALJ).” Id. (quoting Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir.

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1987)). “Ultimately, it is the duty of the [ALJ] reviewing a case, and not the responsibility of the
courts, to make findings of fact and to resolve conflicts in the evidence.” Hays v. Sullivan, 907
F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).

Thus, even if the court would have made contrary

determinations of fact, it must nonetheless uphold the ALJ’s decision, so long as it is supported
by substantial evidence. See Whiten v. Finch, 437 F.2d 73, 74 (4th Cir. 1971). Ultimately, the
issue before this Court is not whether Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the ALJ’s determination
is reinforced by substantial evidence, and whether it was reached through correct application of
the law. Craig, 76 F.3d at 589.
III. DISCUSSION
Although Plaintiff groups all of its objections under the recent Fourth Circuit opinion Mascio
v. Colvin,1 Plaintiff has several objections that fall outside the scope of Mascio.2

Due to this

improper grouping, I will separate each objection to provide a meaningful review of the ALJ’s
decision. Ultimately, Plaintiff’s objections ask this Court to re-weigh the evidence and come to a
different conclusion than the ALJ. That is not the function of this Court, and therefore I will
deny all of Plaintiff’s Objections to the R&R.
A. ALJ’s Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Cognitive Impairments
Plaintiff’s first objection argues that Magistrate Judge Ballou erred in finding that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s cognitive impairments were
not severe. R. 21–22. Specifically, Plaintiff objects that the ALJ did not properly evaluate Dr.
Conley’s August 2012 opinion and asks this Court to review the ALJ’s analysis at step two of the
sequential evaluation process.

1

780 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 2015).

2

For example, the first objection, discussed below, relates to the ALJ’s finding concerning Plaintiff’s cognitive
functioning and anxiety at step two, which is outside the scope of the Mascio decision.

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At step two of the process, the ALJ must determine whether Plaintiff has any “severe”
impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Plaintiff has the burden of
demonstrating that his impairments are severe. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
While impairments are usually deemed non-severe if they do not significantly limit the person’s
ability to perform “basic work activities,” mental impairments require the ALJ to use a special
technique to determine severity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(d)(1); 416.920a(d)(1). Thus, mental
impairments will be severe if it causes more than mild limitations in one of four broad functional
areas: (1) daily living, (2) social functioning, (3) concentration, persistence, or pace, and (4)
decomposition. Id.
As Judge Ballou outlined, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s cognitive impairments
were not severe was supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ clearly considered each
functional area as required. R. 22. Regarding daily living, Plaintiff admitted that he had no
problem with this functional area. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff stated that he could prepare simple
meals, do laundry, and clean. Id. Regarding social functioning, Plaintiff reported no issues as he
is able to go shopping take his kids to school, does not need assistance when going places, and
has no problem getting along with people. Id. Regarding, concentration, persistence, or pace,
Plaintiff reported that he could handle his own finances and follow spoken instructions, as
indicated by his ability to pass the written portion of the driver’s exam to become licensed. Id;
R. 259–60. Lastly, Plaintiff has never experienced decompensation for an extended duration.
He has never been hospitalized for any of his psychiatric impairments and has not experienced
any increases in his symptoms. R. 22.
As for Dr. Conely’s August 2012 opinion, the ALJ clearly considered the finding of
examiner J.C. Conley, Ph.D.; however, the ALJ noted that this was based on a one-time

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examination of Plaintiff. R. 21. When evaluating Dr. Conely’s opinion, the ALJ weighed
several factors: (1) whether relevant medical evidence supports the opinion, (2) how well
explained the opinion is, (3) how consistent the opinion is with the record as a whole, and (4)
whether the opinion is from a specialist in the relevant field. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927. In weighing
the factors, the ALJ noted that Dr. Conley did not review any of Plaintiff’s medical records and
that Dr. Conley’s opinion was contradicted by Plaintiff’s treatment record showing no significant
ongoing memory, attention, or cognitive deficits on examination. R. 29. Therefore, the ALJ had
substantial evidence to determine that the record did not support Dr. Conley’s opinion. Mastro v.
Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001).
B. The ALJ’s Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Anxiety and Depression
Plaintiff’s second objection argues that Magistrate Judge Ballou erred in finding that the
ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression was not severe was supported by
substantial evidence. R. 21–22. Plaintiff contests the fact that his depression and anxiety were
categorized as merely situational.
Once again, Plaintiff is asking this Court to review the ALJ’s determination at step two.
At step two of the process, the ALJ must determine whether Plaintiff has any “severe”
impairments.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); 416.920(a)(4)(ii).

Plaintiff has the burden of

demonstrating that his impairments are severe. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
While impairments are usually deemed non-severe if they do not significantly limit the person’s
ability to perform “basic work activities,” mental impairments require the ALJ to use a special
technique to determine severity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(d)(1); 416.920a(d)(1). Thus, mental
impairments will be severe if it causes more than mild limitations in one of four broad functional
areas: 1) daily living, 2) social functioning, 3) concentration, persistence, or pace, and 4)
decomposition. Id.

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As Judge Ballou outlined and the ALJ clearly reviewed, Plaintiff’s personal doctor, Dr.
Wodicka, repeatedly noted that Plaintiff’s anxiety is situational, remote, and related to stress
concerning his family. R. 496–98, 610, 612. Furthermore, Dr. Wodicka has treated Plaintiff’s

depression and anxiety solely with medication and never referred him to a mental health provider
until the Court did. R. 496–509, 608–14. In addition, Dr. Wodicka’s treatment notes do not
reflect any functional limitations arising from these conditions; however, his notes do routinely
note that Plaintiff is alert and oriented to time, place and person. R. 497, 501, 503, 506, 507,
612, 614.
In addition to Dr. Wodicka’s treatment, the ALJ, as Judge Ballou notes, also considered
state agency Drs. Jennings’ and Perrott’s reports which supported the ALJ’s conclusions
concerning Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression.

R. 105–06, 121–22.

Therefore, the ALJ’s

conclusion that Plaintiff’s depression and anxiety were non-severe was supported by substantial
evidence.
C. The ALJ’s Application of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)
Plaintiff’s third objection argues that Magistrate Judge Ballou erred in finding that the ALJ’s
conclusion that Plaintiff’s “anxiety and depression were not severe as no more than minimal
functional limitations resulted” was supported by substantial evidence. Objections to R&R 10.
Functionally, Plaintiff is trying to duplicate his previous objection, however, this time grounding
the objection in the recent Fourth Circuit opinion, Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir.
2015).
As Judge Ballou explicitly notes, this objection lacks merit. R&R 13 n.5. In Mascio, the
Fourth Circuit declined to accept a per se rule requiring remand where the ALJ does not perform
an explicit function-by-function analysis, but the court did find that “[r]emand may be
appropriate . . . where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant’s capacity to perform relevant functions,
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despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ’s analysis
frustrate meaningful review.” Id. at 636 (citing Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir.
2013)).

The Mascio Court remanded that case solely because the ALJ did not address whether

the claimant could perform certain functions throughout the full workday or address conflicting
evidence in the record which prevented meaningful review. Id.; see also Newcomb v. Colvin, No.
2:14-CV-76, 2015 WL 1954541, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 29, 2015) (“The Mascio Court held
remand was necessary, in part, because the ALJ failed to indicate the weight given to two
residual functional capacity assessments which contained relevant conflicting evidence regarding
the claimant’s weight lifting abilities.”). In this case, the ALJ’s opinion clearly contains
sufficient analysis to allow meaningful review. As mentioned above, the ALJ clearly considered
the four functional areas and Plaintiff has failed to identify any functions that the ALJ did not
address. Cf. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 637 (plaintiff clearly identified functions that the ALJ failed to
address). Furthermore, the ALJ specifically noted that he had considered the impact of
Plaintiff’s obesity in combination with his co-existing impairments. R. 24. Therefore, the ALJ
adequately performed the function-by-function analysis through a combination of impairments as
required.
D. The ALJ’s Rejection of Ms. Rice’s Opinion
Plaintiff’s fourth objection argues that Magistrate Judge Ballou erred in finding that the
ALJ’s rejection of Ms. Rice’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence.3
As Judge Ballou notes, under the regulations, a counselor, such as Ms. Rice, is not an
“acceptable medical source;” rather she is considered a “non-medical source.” SSR 06–03p,
2006 WL 2329939, at *2. Therefore, an ALJ may consider her opinion only to the extent that

3

Plaintiff also contends in this objection that Dr. Conley’s opinion was also improperly rejected. As mentioned
above, this is the second time that Plaintiff makes this objection which was clearly disposed with in Part A.

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the opinion “provide[s] insight into the severity of the impairment(s) and how it affects the
individual’s ability to function.” Id. at *4. In determining whether to consider a “non-medical
source” opinion, the ALJ must consider the nature and extent of the relationship between the
non-acceptable medical source and the claimant, the source’s qualifications, the source’s area of
specialty or expertise, the degree to which the source presents relevant evidence to support her
opinion, whether the opinion is consistent with other evidence, and any other factors that tend to
support or refute the opinion. Id.
In this case, the ALJ appropriately applied these factors and provided substantial
evidence based on the record for why he rejected Ms. Rice’s opinion.4 R. 29–30. The ALJ
concluded that Ms. Rice’s opinion was conclusory and unsupported by the longitudinal record.
R. 29. Furthermore, the ALJ noted that Ms. Rice had limited findings on mental status
examinations and that she had only been treating Plaintiff for six months prior to rendering the
opinion. Id. The ALJ also properly considered the discrepancy between Ms. Rice’s severe
findings and Plaintiff’s fairly benign treatment notes.5 See e.g., Forsyth v. Astrue, No. CBD-092776, 2011 WL 691581, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 18, 2011) (finding the ALJ properly reduced the
controlling weight of a physician whose conclusions were inconsistent with other physicians’
and his own treatment record).
Consequently, the ALJ correctly considered all relevant factors in rejecting Ms. Rice, a
non-medical source opinion. See SSR 06–03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2–4.

4

Most notably, Ms. Rice failed to provide any of her counseling notes to substantiate her opinion. R. 29.

5

For example, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s records did not reflect a debilitating condition, and that he has not
needed psychiatric hospitalization or intensive outpatient treatment. R. 30.

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E. The ALJ’s Credibility Determination of the Plaintiff
Plaintiff’s fourth objection argues that Magistrate Judge Ballou erred in finding that the
ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff made inconsistent statements or statements contradicted by
other evidence in the record, which significantly undermined his credibility, was supported by
substantial evidence. R. 28. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s credibility analysis
fails under Fourth Circuit case law because it misstates the record or is irrelevant to the issue of
Plaintiff’s credibility. Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 649 (4th Cir. 2015).
It is not the role of this Court to determine whether Plaintiff’s testimony was fully
credible. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Rather, the question for the Court is
whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standard in assessing Plaintiff’s credibility, and
whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Id.; see also Shifflet v. Colvin,
No. 13-112, 2015 WL 1893438, at *9 (W.D. Va. Apr. 27, 2015) (credibility determinations
should be disturbed only if “exceptional circumstances” exist).
The ALJ determines whether a claimant is disabled by a two-step process. Id. at 594; see
SSR 96–7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996). First, the ALJ must find “objective medical
evidence showing the existence of a medical impairment(s) which results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities, and which could reasonably be expected to
produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 594 (quotations and emphasis
omitted). If such evidence is found, the ALJ must then evaluate “the intensity and persistence of
the claimant’s [symptoms], and the extent to which [they] affect[ ] her ability to work.” Id. at
595. Among other factors, when evaluating the claimant’s credibility the ALJ should consider
all evidence in the record, including “[d]iagnosis, prognosis, and other medical opinions
provided by treating or examining physicians or psychologists.” SSR96–7p, 1996 WL 374186,

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at *5.

The ALJ’s determination “must contain specific reasons” that “make clear to the

individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the [ALJ] gave to the individual's
statements and the reasons for that weight.” Id. at *4. By the same token, in Mascio, the Court
determined that the ALJ only provided vague boilerplate statements rather than explaining how
he decided which of Mascio’s statements to believe and which to discredit. 780 F.3d at 640.
This “lack of explanation” resulted in the Court remanding the case. Id.
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to produce some symptoms of the general type that have been alleged,
but the claimant’s contentions as they relate to the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
those symptoms are not credible to the [sic] in light of the longitudinal medical records as a
whole.” R. 25. Supporting this finding with specific reasoning, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s
routine, conservative treatment, his medication’s ability to control symptoms, and minimal
findings on examination and diagnostic testing. R. 28.
In addition, the ALJ provided specific reasoning in three areas6 where Plaintiff made
inconsistent statements or statements contradicted by other evidence of record: 1) Plaintiff
testified that he cannot read and write, but took a written driver’s test by himself, and represented
that he completed the disability paperwork which provided that he could read, understand
English, and write more than his name in English; 2) Plaintiff denied drinking alcohol recently,
but his records show occasional alcohol use; and 3) Plaintiff testified of continuous symptoms
with his myocardial infarction when the medical evidence rebuts these claims as there were
minimal findings on examination and diagnostic testing. R. 28–29.

6

These are the three areas in which Plaintiff objects the ALJ improperly undermined his credibility.

15

While Judge Ballou found that the inconsistencies, specifically the alcohol use
statements, were tenuous,7 it is apparent that the ALJ applied the proper legal standard and
reviewed the medical record in detail to provide “specific reason[ing]” to his credibility
determination with objective medical evidence. SSR96–7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4; Mascio,
780 F.3d at 640. Furthermore, credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ, not the
court, and courts normally should not interfere with these determinations if they are supported
through specific reasons, as this case provides. See e.g., Chafin v. Shalala, No. 92-1847, 1993 WL
329980, at *2 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 1993) (per curiam) (citing Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456
(4th Cir. 1990) and Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964)); Melvin v. Astrue, 6:06
CV 00032, 2007 WL 1960600, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 5, 2007) (citing Hatcher v. Sec'y of Health &
Human Servs., 898 F.2d 21, 23 (4th Cir. 1989)). Accordingly, as enumerated above, I find that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility determination and I will not disturb this
finding. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 658–59 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
IV. CONCLUSION
After undertaking a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which Plaintiff
objected, I find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions. Accordingly, I will
enter an order overruling Plaintiff’s Objections (docket no. 31), adopting the Magistrate Judge’s
R&R in full (docket no. 28), granting the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(docket no. 16), denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 14), and
dismissing and striking this action from the active docket of the Court.

7

As Judge Ballou notes and I agree, it is “highly unlikely, given the medical evidence of the record, that a
remand to the agency would change the Commissioner’s finding of nondisability” in this case even if the one
credibility inconsistency is deemed incorrect. Tanner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 602 F. Appx. 95, 101 (4th Cir. 2015)
(unpublished).

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The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to send a certified copy of this Memorandum
Opinion and the accompanying Order to all counsel of record, and to United States Magistrate
Judge Robert S. Ballou.

16th
Entered this _____ day of September, 2015.

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