Robey v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert S. Ballou on March 16, 2016. (sfc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
LYNCHBURG DIVISION
SHRONDA L. ROBEY,

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Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 6:14-CV-29

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Shronda Robey (“Robey”) challenges the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”) determining that she was not disabled and therefore not
eligible for supplemental security income (“SSI”), and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”)
under the Social Security Act (“Act”). 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–433, 1381–1383f. Robey alleges that
the ALJ erred on multiple grounds, each of which are addressed below. I conclude that
substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision on all grounds. Accordingly, I
GRANT the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 23), and DENY
Robey’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 18.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court limits its review to a determination of whether substantial evidence supports
the Commissioner’s conclusion that Robey failed to demonstrate that she was disabled under the
Act.1 Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence is such relevant

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The Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Disability
under the Act requires showing more than the fact that the claimant suffers from an impairment which affects his

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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of
more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Craig
v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). The final decision of the
Commissioner will be affirmed where substantial evidence supports the decision. Hays v.
Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
CLAIM HISTORY
Robey filed for SSI and DIB on April 18, 2012, claiming that her disability began on
March 31, 2011. R. 179–194. The Commissioner denied the applications at the initial and
reconsideration levels of administrative review. R. 55–71, 73–93. On February 11, 2014, ALJ
Brian P. Kilbane held a video hearing to consider Robey’s disability claim. R. 29–54. Robey
was represented by an attorney at the hearing, which included testimony from vocational expert
Andrew Beale. Id.
On February 27, 2014, the ALJ entered his decision analyzing Robey’s claim under the
familiar five-step process,2 and denying Robey’s claim for disability. R. 14–28. The ALJ found
that Robey suffered from the severe impairments of affective disorder, anxiety disorder and
substance addiction disorder. R. 16. The ALJ further found that Robey retained the RFC to
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with the following non-exertional limitations:
ability to perform daily activities or certain forms of work. Rather, a claimant must show that his impairments
prevent him from engaging in all forms of substantial gainful employment given his age, education, and work
experience. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
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The five-step process to evaluate a disability claim requires the Commissioner to ask, in sequence,
whether the claimant: (1) is working; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment that meets or equals the
requirements of a listed impairment; (4) can return to his past relevant work; and if not, (5) whether he can perform
other work. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 654 n.1 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520);
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460–62 (1983). The inquiry ceases if the Commissioner finds the claimant
disabled at any step of the process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of
proof at steps one through four to establish a prima facie case for disability. The burden shifts to the Commissioner
at the fifth step to establish that the claimant maintains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”), considering the
claimant’s age, education, work experience, and impairments, to perform available alternative work in the local and
national economies. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Taylor v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 1975).

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simple, unskilled work on a sustained basis in a competitive work environment where there is no
more than occasional interaction with co-workers and the general public. R. 18. The ALJ
determined that Robey could not return to her past relevant work as a short order cook, fork lift
operator and receptionist (R. 26), but that Robey could work at jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy, such as cleaner, mail sorter and vehicle cleaner. R. 27. Thus,
the ALJ concluded that Robey was not disabled. R. 28. On June 24, 2014, the Appeals Council
denied Robey’s request for review (R. 1–5), and this appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Robey has a history of depression, mood disorder, substance addiction disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). R. 19. Robey asserts that the ALJ made multiple errors in this
case relating to those mental impairments, including failing to perform a function-by-function
analysis of her impairments, failing to properly account for her moderate impairment with
concentration, failing to properly analyze the listings, and failing to properly weigh the opinion
of her treating physician.3 Having reviewed the record, I find that the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence.
Function-by-Function Analysis
Robey generally argues that the ALJ did not perform a function-by-function analysis
prior to determining her RFC and thus, his decision did not properly consider the combination of
her functional limitations. Robey specifically argues that the ALJ improperly generalized her
anxiety and affective disorders under a broad severe impairment of anxiety and depression,
without accounting for the unique limitations arising from each of her mental conditions. Pl. Br.
Summ. J. p. 12. Robey points to medical records reflecting her panic attacks, general

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Robey’s arguments relate only to her mental impairments and limitations; thus, I will not discuss her
alleged physical impairments in this opinion.

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nervousness, bipolar disorder and PTSD. Pl. Br. Summ. J. p. 12–13. Robey also argues that the
ALJ did not specify which limitations arose from her severe substance abuse disorder. Pl. Br.
Summ. J. p. 14.
The ALJ must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports his
conclusions when developing the RFC. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (SSA) (July 2, 1996).
Specifically, the ALJ is instructed to cite specific medical facts and non-medical evidence
supporting his conclusion, discuss the individual’s ability to perform sustained work activities in
an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis, describe the maximum amount of
each work-related activity the individual can perform, and explain how any material
inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence were considered and resolved. SSR 96-8p, 1996
WL 374184, at *7. In the recent Fourth Circuit opinion Mascio v. Colvin, the court rejected a
“per se rule requiring remand when the ALJ does not perform an explicit function-by-function
analysis,” agreeing instead with the Second Circuit that “‘[r]emand may be appropriate ... where
an ALJ fails to assess a claimant’s capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory
evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful
review.’” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Cichocki v. Astrue, 729
F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013)). “The Mascio Court held remand was necessary, in part, because
the ALJ failed to indicate the weight given to two residual functional capacity assessments which
contained relevant conflicting evidence regarding the claimant’s weight lifting abilities.”
Newcomb v. Colvin, No. 2:14–CV–76, 2015 WL 1954541, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 29, 2015).
Here, the ALJ’s decision includes the narrative discussion required by SSR 96-8p, and
contains sufficient information to allow meaningful review. Unlike the ALJ in Mascio, the ALJ
in this case did not fail to consider conflicting medical evidence. Further, the court is “not left to

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guess about how the ALJ arrived at his conclusions” because the ALJ’s findings include a
detailed summary of Robey’s medical records, the medical opinions, Robey’s hearing testimony
and the ALJ’s conclusions. R. 18–26. The ALJ did not err by generalizing Robey’s mental
impairments under the severe impairments of affective disorder, anxiety disorder and substance
abuse disorder. The ALJ found Robey’s mental impairments to be severe and analyzed them in
detail in his RFC analysis. The ALJ spent nine pages discussing the evidence in the record that
supports his findings on Robey’s limitations. Id. The ALJ reviewed Robey’s alleged symptoms
in detail and explained why they lacked support in the record. R. 23–24. The ALJ considered the
conflicting medical opinions in the record and provided an explanation as to why he gave great
weight to some opinions and no weight to others. R. 25–26. Finally, the RFC delineates Robey’s
specific non-exertional limitations arising from her mental impairments. Thus, I find that the
ALJ properly performed the required function-by-function analysis in this case.
Listings 12.04, 12.06 and 12.09
Robey also asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to discuss whether her mental limitations
met the paragraph A criteria of Listing 12.04 or 12.06, and instead focused only on the paragraph
B and C criteria. Pl. Br. Summ. J. p. 7–11. Robey asserts that the ALJ’s failure to discuss the
paragraph A criteria of those listings caused him to incorrectly analyze the extent of her anxiety
and depression and improperly assess her credibility. Id. I find that the ALJ properly analyzed
whether Robey’s severe mental impairments met or medically equaled a listing.
A “listed impairment” is one considered by the Social Security Administration “to be
severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any gainful activity, regardless of his or her
age, education, or work experience.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). “When satisfied, the listings of
impairments automatically result in a finding of disability. The listings are designed to reflect

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impairments that, for the most part, ‘are permanent or expected to result in death.’” Casillas v.
Astrue, 3:09–CV–00076, 2011 WL 450426, at *4 (W.D. Va. Feb. 3, 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1525(c)(4)).
To meet or equal a § 12.00 listing for a mental disorder, a claimant must satisfy criteria
under both Paragraph “A” and “B” of the particular listing. Paragraph A delineates the required
medical diagnosis or clinical evidence of a mental impairment. Paragraph B criteria for each
§ 12.00 listing requires a showing of at least two functional limitations, such as (1) marked
restriction of activities of daily living, (2) marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning,
(3) marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, or, (4) repeated
episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App’x 1,
§§ 12.04B, 12.06B, 12.08B & 12.10B. The Commissioner defines degrees of limitations under
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a, 416.920a, rating limitations on a five point scale of “none, mild,
moderate, marked, and extreme.”
Here, the ALJ determined that Robey had the severe mental impairments of affective
disorder, anxiety disorder and substance abuse addiction disorder. The ALJ reviewed whether
those disorders met listings 12.04, 12.06 and 12.09, specifically discussing the “paragraph B”
and “paragraph C” criteria of each.4 The ALJ discussed the rating and degree of each functional
limitation as required by the regulations and found that Robey did not have the required
limitations to meet or equal the listings.
Robey argues that the ALJ erred because his listing analysis did not discuss the paragraph
A criteria for each listing. Paragraph A sets forth the medically documented symptoms of each
mental impairment necessary to meet the listing. Robey is correct that the ALJ did not discuss in

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The paragraph B criteria of Listings 12.04, 12.06 and 12.09 are identical, thus the ALJ discussed them in
combination. R. 17–18. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App’x 1, §§ 12.04B, 12.06B, 12.09.

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his decision whether she met the paragraph A criteria for listings 12.04, 12.06 and 12.09.
However, because the ALJ determined that Robey did not meet the requirements of paragraphs B
or C for each listing, any error by the ALJ is harmless. See Nations v. Colvin, No. 1:14cv190MOC, 2015 WL 1893655, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015) (quoting Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S.
521, 530 (1990) (“For a claimant to show that his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all
of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no
matter how severely, does not qualify.”)) Robey could not have been deemed disabled even if
the criteria for paragraph A were met because the criteria for paragraphs B and C were not met.
Robey argues that by failing to specifically state which paragraph A criteria she met for
each listing, the ALJ failed to properly consider the severity of her mental impairments and their
impact on her functioning. However, the ALJ found that Robey’s affective disorder, anxiety
disorder and substance abuse disorders were severe impairments, and thus had more than a
minimal impact on her ability to function. The ALJ analyzed and rated Robey’s ability to
function under the four broad functional areas set forth in paragraph B and C of the listings.
After concluding that Robey’s mental impairments did not meet a listing, the ALJ proceeded to
analyze Robey’s mental impairments in detail in step four of the analysis, including reviewing
her medical records, reviewing and weighing all physicians’ opinions in the record, and
reviewing and assessing Robey’s testimony and her credibility. Thus, to the extent the ALJ
committed error by failing to address paragraph A of each listing, that error is harmless. See
Smith v. Astrue, 457 F. App’x 326, 328 (4th Cir. 2011) (A cursory explanation at step three is
satisfactory so long as the decision as a whole demonstrates that the ALJ considered the relevant
evidence of record and there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion.) Ultimately, the
role of this court is to examine the record to determine if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

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conclusion. I find, as set forth in more detail below, that the ALJ’s decision as a whole
demonstrates that he considered the relevant evidence of record and there is substantial evidence
to support his conclusion.
Treating Physician Opinion
Robey also argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinion of her treating nurse
practitioner Folashade Odedina, DNP, that she was incapable of employment. Ms. Odedina
treated Robey for her mental health issues approximately once every two months beginning in
March 22, 2012. On January 13, 2014, Ms. Odedina provided a mental medical source statement
noting clinical findings of depressed mood, crying spells, mood swings, hopelessness and
helplessness feelings, and poor self image. R. 539. She listed Robey’s prognosis as fair. Id. Ms.
Odedina declined to assess Robey’s mental abilities and aptitudes needed to do work, noting,
“unable to assess-recommends having occupational assessment done from specialized
individual.” R. 541. Ms. Odedina noted that Robey would find many demands of work stressful,
and would likely be absent from work more than four days per month. R. 543. She also noted
that Robey’s substance abuse contributes to her limitations by intensifying her poor judgment.
R. 544. The ALJ gave Ms. Odedina’s opinion little to no weight, finding it conclusory with little
explanation as to the evidence relied upon, and unsupported by the record as a whole, including
Ms. Odedina’s own treatment notes. R. 26.
Robey disagrees with the ALJ’s assessment of Ms. Odedina’s opinion. Specifically,
Robey argues that the ALJ improperly relied upon isolated instances of improvement in her
medical records, rather than considering all of the evidence with regard to her mental illness. Pl.
Br. Summ. J. p. 18. Robey also argues that the ALJ improperly substituted his own lay judgment
for that of Ms. Odedina.

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Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to give Ms. Odedina’s opinion little to
no weight. As a nurse practitioner, Ms. Odedina is not an acceptable medical source as defined
by the Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513, 416.913 (defining acceptable medical sources as licensed
physicians, licensed or certified psychologists, and—for limited purposes—licensed
optometrists, licensed podiatrists, and qualified speech-language pathologists). The opinions of
non-acceptable medical sources are not entitled to any particular weight, and the ALJ is not
required to explain the weight given to such opinions unless it might affect the case’s outcome.
See Adkins v. Colvin, No. 4:13-CV-00024, 2014 WL 3734331, at *3 (W.D. Va. July 28, 2014);
see also Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 590 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding no error in ALJ's failure to
expressly weigh physical therapist’s opinion). Nevertheless, the ALJ “has a duty to consider all
of the evidence available in a claimant’s case record, includ[ing] such evidence provided from
‘other’ nonmedical sources…” Ingle v. Astrue, 1:10CV141, 2011 WL 5328036, at *3 (W.D.N.C.
Nov. 7, 2011) (citing Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 06–03p, 2006 WL 2329939 (SSA)(Aug. 9,
2006); 20 CFR §§ 404.1513(d), 416.913(d)). Here, the ALJ considered Ms. Odedina’s
professional qualifications, the length and nature of her examining relationship with Robey, the
weight of the evidence supporting her opinion, and her opinion’s consistency with the other
relevant evidence in the record. As the ALJ discussed, Ms. Odedina’s opinion was conclusory
and did not provide clinical evidence to support her conclusions or explain or substantiate her
restrictive findings.5 Further, Ms. Odedina declined to assess Robey’s specific abilities to

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Ms. Odedina’s opinion is essentially a checkbox form. Courts in the Fourth Circuit have recognized the
limited probative value of such checkbox opinion forms. Leonard v. Astrue, No. 2:11cv00048, 2012 WL 4404508,
at *4 (W.D. Va. Sept. 25, 2012) (citing Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Such check-the-box
assessments without explanatory comments are not entitled to great weight, even when completed by a treating
physician.”)).

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perform work tasks, indicating that she would not be a reliable source for that information.
R. 541.
Additionally, as the ALJ noted, Ms. Odedina repeatedly documented that Robey had
unremarkable mental status examination findings, including normal social interactions, fair to
good concentration, and intact thought processes. R. 20–25, 291, 297, 309, 343, 353–54, 364–65,
368, 378, 495. Ms. Odedina’s records also reflect that Robey’s symptoms improved with
psychotropic medications. R. 290, 296, 343, 364, 368, 378, 493, 525–26. Specifically, Robey
reported that she was “doing well with current medications” (March 2012, R. 307), was pleased
with the combination of her psychotropic medications (April 2012, R. 296), and had a
significantly improved mood with medication adjustment (May 2012, R. 290). In January 2013,
Robey reported that counseling and medication management had been helpful, she felt
“markedly better” with her current medications and had better relationships. R. 283. Robey
continued to report improvement in her condition and benefit from her medications during office
visits from June 2012 through October 2013. R. 290, 349, 353, 360, 364, 368, 378, 493, 496,
501, 527, 536.
The ALJ also noted that Ms. Odedina’s opinion was contradicted by the opinions of the
state agency physicians. On September 20, 2012, state agency physician Jeanne Buyck, Ph.D.
reviewed Robey’s medical records and found that she had mild restrictions with activities of
daily living, moderate difficulties maintaining social functioning, and moderate difficulties
maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. R. 59. She concluded that despite her limitations,
Robey was capable of carrying out detailed instructions, performing activities within a schedule,
maintaining regular attendance and being punctual. R. 61. She also found that Robey could
sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision and make simple work-related decisions.

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R. 61. Dr. Buyck concluded that Robey was capable of following 1–3 step directions, completing
simple work tasks, completing an average work day, adjusting to ordinary changes, following
work rules and maintaining safety. R. 62. Dr. Buyck also found that Robey would do best in
environments with limited social demands. R. 61. On February 21, 2013, state agency physician
Nancy Heiser, Ph.D., reviewed Robey’s records and concurred with Dr. Buyck’s findings. R. 78–
81. The ALJ adopted the opinions of the state agency physicians that Robey was capable of
performing simple work with 1–3 step instructions and limited social demands. R. 26. Thus, the
ALJ’s decision to give Ms. Odedina’s opinion little weight is supported by substantial evidence
in the record.
Robey also argues that if the ALJ disagreed with Ms. Odedina’s opinion, he had a duty to
recontact her to request additional information. Pl. Br. Summ. J. p. 19–20. This is incorrect.
Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96–5p states that “if the evidence does not support a treating
source’s opinion on any issue reserved to the Commissioner and the adjudicator cannot ascertain
the basis of the opinion from the case record, the adjudicator must make ‘every reasonable effort’
to recontact the source for clarification of the reasons for the opinion.” SSR 96–5p, 1996 WL
374183 (SSA) (July 2, 1996). Robey’s argument attempts to expand this provision to require
that an ALJ recontact a treating physician every time the ALJ finds insufficient evidence in the
record to support that physician’s conclusions. That is not the standard. The opinion of Ms.
Odedina did not trigger the ALJ's duty to recontact because it did not contain a conflict or
ambiguity that must be resolved, and the record was not inadequate to determine if Robey was
disabled. See, e.g. Groseclose v. Comm'r, No. SAG–13–0200, 2013 WL 5487857, at *2 (D. Md.
Sept. 27, 2013); Majica v. Astrue, No. 06–2900, 2007 WL 4443247, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18,
2007). The ALJ noted no ambiguities or confusion regarding the content of Ms. Odedina’s

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opinion. Rather, he concluded that her conclusions were not supported by the objective medical
evidence.
The ALJ carefully considered all of the evidence in the record, as is evident from his nine
page recitation of the treatment records, Robey’s testimony, and the opinion evidence. The ALJ
gave great weight to the opinions of those physicians that he felt were supported by the record,
and gave detailed reasons for his decisions to give little weight to Ms. Odedina’s opinion. The
ALJ followed the procedure dictated by the social security regulations and substantial evidence
supports his decision
Concentration, Persistence and Pace
Robey also asserts that the ALJ did not properly account for her moderate impairment
with concentration, persistence and pace, relying upon the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Mascio v.
Colvin, 780 F. 3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015). In Mascio, the Fourth Circuit held that an ALJ does not
generally account for a claimant’s limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace by
restricting the claimant to simple, routine tasks or unskilled work. The court noted, “the ability to
perform simple tasks differs from the ability to stay on task. Only the latter limitation would
account for a claimant’s limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace.” Id. at 638; see also
Sexton v. Colvin, 21 F. Supp. 3d 639, 642–43 (W.D. Va. 2014) (citing Wiederholt v. Barnhart,
121 Fed. App’x 833, 839 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that a “limitation to simple, unskilled work
does not necessarily” accommodate a person’s difficulty in concentrating on or persisting in a
task, or maintaining the pace required to complete a task). In Mascio, the Fourth Circuit found
that the ALJ did not explain why Mascio’s moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or
pace did not translate into a limitation in his RFC. The court noted, however, that the ALJ may
find that the concentration, persistence or pace limitation would not affect Mascio’s ability to

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work, in which case it would have been appropriate to exclude it from the hypothetical tendered
to the vocational expert. 780 F.3d at 638; see also Hutton v. Colvin, Civ. Action No. 2:14-cv-63,
2015 WL 3757204, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. June 16, 2015).
Mascio does not broadly dictate that a claimant’s moderate impairment in concentration,
persistence, or pace always translates into a limitation in the RFC. Rather, Mascio underscores
the ALJ’s duty to adequately review the evidence and explain the decision, especially where, as
the ALJ held in Mascio, a claimant’s concentration, persistence, or pace limitation does not
affect the ability to perform simple, unskilled work. The ALJ has the responsibility to address the
evidence of record that supports that conclusion.
Here, the ALJ found that Robey had moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence
and pace. R. 17. However, the ALJ noted that Robey claimed to need special reminders to take
care of personal needs and grooming, yet described her hobbies and interests as reading, dancing
and watching TV. R. 17. Robey indicated that she could pay attention for about 10–20 minutes,
and did not finish what she started, but could follow written and spoken instructions “good.”
R. 17. The ALJ also noted medical records that reflected that Robey denied any problems with
concentrating, and describing Robey’s attention as “fair-to-good.” R. 20, 23.
The ALJ considered the opinion of Ms. Odedina, which is set forth in detail above, with
clinical findings of depressed mood, crying spells, mood swings, hopelessness and helplessness
feelings, and poor self image. R. 539. Ms. Odedina declined to assess Robey’s mental abilities
and aptitudes needed to do work, noting, “unable to assess-recommends having occupational
assessment done from specialized individual.” R. 541. Ms. Odedina noted that Robey would
find many demands of work stressful, and would likely be absent from work more than four days
per month. R. 543. She also noted that Robey’s substance abuse contributes to her limitations by

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intensifying her poor judgment. R. 544. Overall, Ms. Odedina’s opinion did not address Robey’s
alleged problems with concentration, other than to check boxes indicating that Robey would find
demands for speed, precision, complexity, making decisions, exercising independent judgment,
working with other people regularly, remaining at work for a full day and fear of failure at work
stressful. R. 543.
The ALJ also reviewed the state agency physicians’ opinions that Robey had a moderate
impairment with concentration, persistence and pace; however, she was capable of performing a
range of work involving following 1–3 step instructions, completing simple work tasks,
completing an average work day, adjusting to ordinary changes, following work rules, and
maintaining safety, and would do best in environments with limited social demands. R. 26, 59–
61, 78–81. Specifically, Drs. Buyck and Heiser concluded that despite her limitations, Robey
was capable of carrying out simple and detailed instructions, performing activities within a
schedule, maintaining regular attendance and being punctual. R. 61. They also found that Robey
could sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision and make simple work-related
decisions. R. 61. Drs. Buyck and Heiser concluded that Robey was capable of following 1–3 step
directions, completing simple work tasks, completing an average work day, adjusting to ordinary
changes, following work rules and maintaining safety, but would do best with limited social
demands. R. 62. The ALJ gave these opinions great weight and incorporated their findings into
the RFC by limiting Robey to simple, unskilled work on a sustained basis in a competitive work
environment where there is no more than occasional interaction with co-workers and the general
public. R. 18.
Thus, this is not a situation like Mascio, where the ALJ summarily concluded that a
limitation of simple, unskilled work accounts for the claimant’s moderate impairment in

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concentration, persistence and pace with no further analysis or consideration. Rather, the
medical evidence supports the conclusion that, despite her moderate limitation in concentration,
persistence, or pace, Robey is capable of performing the basic mental demands of simple,
unskilled work with occasional social interaction. This court is not “left to guess about how the
ALJ arrived at his conclusions.” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 637; see also Massey v. Colvin, No.
1:13cv965, 2015 WL 3827574, at *7 (M.D.N.C. June 19, 2015); Hutton v. Colvin, No. 2:14-cv63, 2015 WL 3757204, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. June 16, 2015).
Credibility
Robey also claims the ALJ erred when he failed to find her fully credible regarding the
extent of her mental limitations. Robey argues that the ALJ did not provide sufficient
explanation for how he determined which of her statements to discredit, took portions of the
record out of context, and relied upon irrelevant factors. Specifically, Robey disagrees with the
ALJ’s consideration of medical records noting that her medications helped at times and records
reflecting no complaints. Pl. Br. Summ. J. p. 22–23.
It is for the ALJ to determine the facts and resolve inconsistencies between a claimant’s
alleged impairments and his ability to work. See Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th
Cir. 1996). Robey’s subjective allegations of pain and mental limitations are not conclusive.
Rather, the ALJ must examine all of the evidence, including the objective medical record, and
determine whether Robey met her burden of proving that she suffers from an underlying
impairment which is reasonably expected to produce her claimed symptoms. Craig v. Chater, 76
F .3d 585, 592–93 (4th Cir. 1996). The ALJ then must evaluate the intensity and persistence of
the claimed symptoms and their effect upon Robey’s ability to work. Id. at 594–95. Here, the
ALJ thoroughly identified the evidence forming the basis of his credibility determination and

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explained his reasons for finding Robey’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of her symptoms to be less than fully credible.
The ALJ determined that Robey’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably
be expected to cause her alleged symptoms. R. 19. However, the ALJ concluded that Robey was
not entirely credible for multiple reasons. The ALJ found that Robey’s alleged severity of her
symptoms lacks support in the record, and reviewed in detail her claimed daily activities
including caring for her grandson by cooking, washing his clothes and getting him ready for
school; preparing complete and simple meals daily for one and a half to two hours at a time;
cleaning house, cleaning laundry, ironing for one and a half to two hours at a time; shopping in
stores monthly for over an hour; paying bills; counting change; handling a savings account; and
using a checkbook. R. 23. The ALJ noted that despite her alleged problems getting along with
others, Robey had never been fired or laid off due to problems getting along with people; rather,
she reported that she left her last job to take care of her grandson. R. 25. Robey also claimed to
need reminders to take care of her personal needs and grooming, but noted hobbies of reading
and dancing, stated she could pay attention for ten to twenty minutes at a time, and could follow
spoken and written instructions “good.” R. 23.
The ALJ also noted Robey’s inconsistent statements in the record with regard to getting
along with her family, and her ability to use her right hand due to carpal tunnel syndrome and
need for a brace. R. 24. The ALJ noted that Robey’s records reflected that her conditions were
generally alleviated with medication and that on several occasions she did not specify any
complaints to her physicians. The ALJ considered Robey’s recent history of illegal drug use,
and found that it “lessened the persuasiveness of her assertion that she is incapable of working
solely due to her conditions.” R. 24. The records reflect that Robey was smoking marijuana

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during her alleged period of disability. R. 25. The ALJ thoroughly explained the reasoning
behind his credibility determination, and substantial evidence supports his conclusions on this
point.
Credibility determinations are emphatically the province of the ALJ, not the court, and
courts normally should not interfere with these determinations. See, e.g., Chafin v. Shalala. No.
92–1847, 1993 WL 329980, at *2 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 1993) (per curiam) (citing Hays v. Sullivan,
907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir.1990) and Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th
Cir.1964)); Melvin v. Astrue, 6:06 CV 00032, 2007 WL 1960600, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 5, 2007)
(citing Hatcher v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d 21, 23 (4th Cir. 1989)). It is part of
the ALJ’s prerogative as a fact finder to consider the evidence as a whole in determining a
claimant’s credibility. Where, as here, the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by
substantial evidence, it should not be disturbed. See Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 658–59
(4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Craig, 76 F.3d at 589). Accordingly, I decline to do so here. 6

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Robey also argues that the ALJ failed to appropriately weigh the testimony of her friend Curtis Revell,
who testified at the administrative hearing. Pl. Br. Summ. J. p. 4. The ALJ recounted Mr. Revell’s testimony in his
decision and considered his statement that he ended his relationship with Robey because he “couldn’t take what she
was going through,” and he was “scared” for himself and was “being brought down” by Robey. R. 19. Contrary to
Robey’s assertion, the regulations do not require the ALJ to assign a specific weight to Mr. Revell’s testimony. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(4) (“In addition to evidence from acceptable medical sources listed in paragraph (a) of this
section, we may also use evidence from other sources….for example, spouses, parents and other caregivers…”).
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that it is unnecessary to discuss the
testimony of lay witnesses where it is inconsistent with other evidence in the record. See Laws v. Celebrezze, 368
F.2d 640, 644 (4th Cir. 1966). Here, the ALJ properly considered the evidence in the record, including Mr. Revell’s
testimony, and provided a sufficient explanation for the RFC. The ALJ did not err by failing to expressly weigh Mr.
Revell’s testimony when explaining his disability determination.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I find that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s
decision. Accordingly, I GRANT summary judgment to the defendant and DISMISS this case
from the court’s docket.
Enter: March 16, 2016

Robert S. Ballou
Robert S. Ballou
United States Magistrate Judge

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