Moore's Electrical & Mechanical Construction, Inc. v. SIS, LLC et al
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Norman K. Moon on October 20, 2015. (sfc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
LYNCHBURG DIVISION
MOORE’S ELECTRICAL & MECHANICAL
CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 6:15-cv-00021
MEMORANDUM OPINION
v.
SIS, LLC,
JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON
AND SIS-PITTSBURGH, LLC,
Defendants.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Moore’s Electrical & Mechanical Construction, Inc. (“Moore’s”) filed this
action against SIS, LLC (“SIS”) and SIS-Pittsburgh, LLC (“SIS-Pittsburgh”) alleging breach of
contract claims against SIS and SIS-Pittsburgh and, pursuant to the official Code of Georgia §
13-6-11, seeking attorney fees from SIS.
The dispute arises from a series of contracts between Moore’s, SIS, and SIS-Pittsburgh.
SIS agreed to provide Moore’s with accounting software and support services for that software.
SIS-Pittsburgh, in a later contract, agreed to provide the support services in place of SIS.
Because SIS has not yet filed an answer, and because substantial discovery has not occurred,
many facts surrounding the contract dispute are unknown or unclear.
This matter is presently before the Court upon Defendants’ motion to dismiss, stay, or
transfer, or, alternatively, to extend time to respond. The parties presented argument to the Court
on October 16, 2015.
SIS argues that this action should be dismissed, stayed, or transferred to the Northern
District of Georgia, pursuant to the first-to-file rule, because SIS filed suit against Moore’s in
Georgia on June 17, 2015, over a month before Moore’s filed suit in this court. Alternatively,
SIS requests an extension of time to respond to Moore’s complaint. Moore’s opposes SIS’s
motion, arguing that the first-to-file is inapplicable. Moore’s emphasizes that SIS-Pittsburgh—a
named defendant in this court—is not a party to the Georgia suit. For that reason, Moore’s
argues, the first-to-file rule is inapposite. Alternatively, Moore’s argues that, because the first-tofile rule is discretionary, this Court should refuse to apply it because SIS “raced to the
courthouse” by preemptively filing suit in Georgia.
For the following reasons, I will grant Defendants’ motion and will stay the case.
II.
A.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
The Parties
Moore’s is a Virginia corporation, with its principal place of business in Altavista,
Virginia. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 1. SIS is a Delaware limited liability corporation, with its principal place
of business in Duluth, Georgia. Id. at ¶ 2. SIS-Pittsburgh, a subsidiary of SIS, is a Georgia
limited liability corporation, with its principal place of business in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Id.
at ¶ 3.
In 2013, Moore’s determined that it needed to upgrade its accounting software and
related support services. Aff. Andrew Moore ¶ 16. Moore’s submitted inquiries to potential
contractors regarding its needs. Id. at ¶ 17. In response to these inquiries, SIS sent employees
from several locations to Moore’s headquarters in Altavista, Virginia. Id. at ¶ 18. SIS proposed
to review Moore’s accounting processes and to develop solutions for Moore’s accounting
software needs. Id.
B.
Professional Services Agreements, Work Orders, and Project Change Orders
1
Neither SIS nor SIS-Pittsburgh has filed an answer to Moore’s complaint. As such, facts taken from Moore’s
complaint and recited here may later be disputed, clarified, or supplemented by SIS or SIS-Pittsburgh.
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On April 10, 2013, Moore’s and SIS entered into a Professional Services Agreement
(“PSA”) whereby SIS agreed to provide an analysis of the possible implementation of
accounting software for Moore’s. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 7. On April 15, 2013, SIS issued to Moore’s
Work Order No. 001, which detailed the analysis to be provided by SIS and set a price of
$24,790. Id. at ¶ 8. Moore’s asserts that it paid SIS in full pursuant to Work Order No. 001. Id. at
¶ 10.
On May 30, 2013, Moore’s entered into a second PSA with SIS, requiring that SIS
provide accounting software to Moore’s and related support services. Id. at ¶ 11. The software
was to be installed at Moore’s headquarters in Altavista, Virginia. Id. On June 21, 2013, SIS
issued Work Order No. 006_001 which detailed the services to be provided and which set a price
of $343,170. Id. at ¶ 13; see also Pl.’s Br. Opp’n, Ex. B.
On June 26, 2014, Moore’s and SIS-Pittsburgh entered into change orders 013A, 013B,
and 013C. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 15. Under these change orders, SIS-Pittsburgh agreed to provide the
support services, formerly provided by SIS, for Moore’s accounting software. Id. at ¶ 16. It is not
clear from the pleadings or briefings why SIS-Pittsburgh took over for SIS, or what services, if
any, that SIS continued to provide Moore’s.
C.
Alleged Breach of Contract by SIS and SIS-Pittsburgh
In its complaint, Moore’s alleges that SIS breached its contract because the accounting
software it provided was inadequate and malfunctioned. Id. at ¶ 22. Moreover, Moore’s claims
that SIS failed to properly provide consulting and support services for the accounting software.
Id. at ¶ 21. Moore’s contends that SIS-Pittsburgh breached its contract with Moore’s because it
provided inadequate support services. Id. at ¶ 33–34. Moore’s claims that SIS and SISPittsburgh’s alleged breach has resulted in $250,000 damages. Id. at ¶ 37.
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D.
The Georgia Lawsuit
On June 17, 2015, SIS filed suit against Moore’s in the Superior Court of Gwinnett
County, Georgia, alleging breach of contract. Def.’s Mem. Supp. 1–2; Pl.’s Br. Opp’n 5. On July
27, 2015, Moore’s filed a notice of removal in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. Def.’s Mem. Supp. 2; Pl.’s Br. Opp’n 5. On July 30, Moore’s filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue in the action pending in the
Northern District of Georgia. Def.’s Mem. Supp. 2; Pl.’s Br. Opp’n 6. Moore’s motion to dismiss
is currently pending. Discovery in the Georgia lawsuit has been stayed pending the outcome of
Moore’s motion to dismiss. Pl.’s Br. Opp’n 6.
On July 27, 2015—the same day it filed its notice of removal in the Northern District of
Georgia—Moore’s filed suit in this court.
III.
A.
FIRST-TO-FILE RULE DOCTRINE
The First-to-File Rule: Overview
The first-to-file rule provides that “when multiple suits are filed in different Federal
courts upon the same factual issues, the first or prior action is permitted to proceed to the
exclusion of another subsequently filed.” Allied-Gen. Nuclear Servs. v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., 675 F.2d 610, 611 n.1 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp. v. United
States Indus. Chems., Inc., 140 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1944)). This principle of judicial comity
among coequal federal courts is often referred to as the first-to-file rule. See, e.g., Harris v.
McDonnell, C.A. No. 5:13cv00077, 2013 WL 5720355, at *3 (W.D. Va. Oct. 18, 2013). “The
policy underlying the first-to-file rule is the avoidance of duplicative litigation and the
conservation of judicial resources.” Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 708,
724 (E.D. Va. 2005).
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B.
Discretionary and Equitable Nature of the Rule
When a case falls within the ambit of the rule, district courts generally stay or dismiss the
later-filed case. See Volvo Const. Equip. N. Am., Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., 386 F.3d 581, 594–95
(4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. Modern Welding Co., 502 F.2d 178, 180 n.2 (4th
Cir. 1974)) (“[T]he first suit should have priority, absent the showing of balance of convenience
in favor of the second action.”). The rule is not, however, “to be mechanically applied;
ultimately, invoking the first-to-file rule is an equitable, case-by-case, discretionary
determination.” Harris, 2013 WL 5720355, at *3 (citing Elderberry of Weber City, LLC v.
Living Ctrs.-S.E., Inc., No. 6:12-CV-00052, 2013 WL 1164835, at *4 (W.D. Va. March 20,
2013)); see also CACI Intern., Inc. v. Pentagen Techs Int’l., 70 F.3d 111, 1995 WL 679952, at *6
(4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (“[The Fourth] Circuit has no unyielding ‘first-to-file’ rule.”); US
Airways, Inc. v. U.S. Airline Pilots Ass’n, No. 3:11-cv-371-RJC-DCK, 2011 WL 3627698, at *1
(W.D.N.C. Aug.17, 2011) (noting that application of the rule is discretionary, not mandatory).
C.
First Consideration: Competing Actions Must Be Substantively the Same or
Sufficiently Similar
In determining whether to stay or dismiss a later-filed case, courts must first consider
whether the two competing actions are substantively the same or sufficiently similar to come
within the rule. See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Mortg. Guar. Ins. Corp., C.A. No. 1:12-cv359-AJT-JFA, 2012 WL 2673151, at *4 (E.D. Va. July 5, 2012). To determine whether the
competing actions are substantively the same or sufficiently similar, courts have considered three
factors: (1) the chronology of the filings; (2) the similarity of the parties involved; and (3) the
similarity of the issues at stake. Nutrition & Fitness, Inc. v. Blue Stuff, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 357,
360 (W.D.N.C. 2003); see also U.S. Airways, 2011 WL 3627698, at *2 (collecting cases). “The
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actions being assessed need not be identical if there is substantial overlap with respect to the
issues and parties.” Byerson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 627, 635–36 (E.D. Va.
2006).
D.
Second Consideration: “Special Circumstances”
If the competing actions are substantively the same or sufficiently similar, the secondfiled action generally should be dismissed or stayed unless “special circumstances [that] warrant
an exception” to the rule exist. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pactiv Corp., C.A. No.
5:09cv00073, 2010 WL 503090, at *2 (W.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2010) (internal citations, quotation
marks, and alterations omitted); see also Harris, 2013 WL 5720355, at *4–5. One such special
circumstance exists where the facts suggest either a race to the courthouse or an attempt to forum
shop. See, e.g., Quesenberry v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., Inc., C.A. No. 1:09cv00022, 2009 WL
648658, at *3 (W.D. Va. March 10, 2009) (observing that “the facts put before the court could
lead to . . . an inference” of attempting to “preempt any coercive action by the plaintiffs” or “to
forum shop.”); Nutrition & Fitness, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 360 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (noting that courts
“may still make the discretionary determination that the rule should be ignored as a result
of . . . forum shopping, anticipatory filing, or bad faith filing.”); PBM Prods., Inc. v. Mead
Johnson & Co., No. 3:01-CV-199, 2001 WL 841047, at *2 (E.D. Va. April 4, 2001) (departing
from the rule because prior-filed action “was an attempt by [defendant] to ‘race to the
courthouse’ . . . .”).
A second special circumstance exists where “little if anything has been done to advance
[the first-filed] action for trial.” Affinity Memory, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 954 (citing Brierwood Shoe
Corp. v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 479 F. Supp. 563, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)); see also Elderberry
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of Weber City, 2013 WL 1164835, at *4 (“[C]ourts also consider how far each case has
progressed” in determining whether to apply the first-to-file rule.).
E.
Third Consideration: Balance of Convenience
Finally, courts consider “whether the balance of convenience weighs in favor of allowing
the second-filed action to proceed.” Elderberry, 2013 WL 1164835, at *4. In so considering,
courts rely on the same factors relevant to a transfer of venue motion. See Pactiv, 2010 WL
503090, at *2 (“[T]he factors pertinent to the balance of convenience analysis are ‘essentially the
same as those considered in connection with motions to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a).’”) (quoting Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Fox Entm’t Grp., Inc., 522 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir.
2008)). These factors are: (1) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of venue; (2)
convenience to witnesses and relative ease of access to evidence; (3) convenience to the parties;
and (4) the interests of justice, including the relative congestion of court dockets and a preference
for holding trial in the community most affected. Cross v. Fleet Reserve Ass’n Pension Plan, 383
F. Supp. 2d 852, 856 (D. Md. 2005) (citation omitted).
IV.
A.
DISCUSSION
Competing Actions Are Substantively the Same or Sufficiently Similar
The first issue is whether the competing actions are substantively the same or sufficiently
similar to fall within the ambit of the first-to-file rule.
Moore’s concedes that SIS filed its Georgia lawsuit first. Moore’s argues, however, that
the parties involved and the issues at stake in the competing actions are so dissimilar as to render
the first-to-file rule inapplicable. Moore’s emphasizes that the actions lack complete identity of
parties—SIS-Pittsburgh is a named defendant in this action, but is absent from the Georgia case.
Moreover, while Moore’s acknowledges that the dispute between Moore’s and SIS features the
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same contract at issue in the Georgia case, it notes that the dispute between Moore’s and SISPittsburgh features a different contract. Whether SIS-Pittsburgh or Moore’s breached that
separate contract is thus, Moore’s argues, an issue not presented in the Georgia court.
While it may be true that the parties and the issues in this case are not identical, courts
have long held that neither the parties involved nor the issues at stake need be completely
identical for the first-to-file rule to apply. See, e.g., Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248,
254, 57 S. Ct. 163, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936) (“[W]e find ourselves unable to assent to the suggestion
that before proceedings in one suit may be stayed to abide the proceedings in another, the parties
to the two causes must be shown to be the same and the issues identical.”); Dragon Capital
Partners L.P. v. Merrill Lynch Capital Servs. Inc., 949 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(quotation marks and citations omitted) (“Courts have repeatedly ruled that parties and issues
need not be identical in order for one action to be stayed or dismissed in deference to an earlier
action.”). Although SIS and SIS-Pittsburgh are not literally the same party, they are, for the
purposes of this lawsuit, sufficiently similar. SIS-Pittsburgh is a subsidiary of SIS, and SISPittsburgh coordinated with SIS to provide services to Moore’s. SIS and SIS-Pittsburgh are also
closely connected to the facts which gave rise to this lawsuit—SIS-Pittsburgh agreed to take over
for SIS and provide similar, if not identical, services to Moore’s. SIS and SIS-Pittsburgh are
therefore closely related and are sufficiently similar such that the first-to-file rule applies. In any
event, strict identity of parties is not required.
With regard to similarity of issues, the dispute between Moore’s and SIS is the same in
both the Virginia and Georgia cases. In both cases, the issues are whether Moore’s or SIS
breached their contracts, and, if so, whether they are entitled to damages. The only difference
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between the cases is that Moore’s is the Plaintiff in this case while SIS is the Defendant, and vice
versa.
The addition of SIS-Pittsburgh presents a closer question. It is true that the issue of
whether SIS-Pittsburgh breached its contract, or whether Moore’s breached its contract with SISPittsburgh, is not presented in the Georgia case. Although formally based on a different contract,
the dispute between Moore’s and SIS-Pittsburgh is, however, substantively the same as the
dispute between Moore’s and SIS. In both disputes, the issue is whether SIS and SIS-Pittsburgh
adequately provided support services for Moore’s accounting software. Moreover, SISPittsburgh assumed the role of providing the services SIS was contractually obligated to provide
to Moore’s.2 Finally, SIS-Pittsburgh coordinated with SIS in providing support services to
Moore’s. The dispute between Moore’s and SIS and the dispute between Moore’s and SISPittsburgh is, therefore, substantively the same, or is at least sufficiently similar, to trigger the
first-to-file rule.
B.
No “Special Circumstances” Exist
If the competing actions are substantively the same or sufficiently similar, the secondfiled action generally should be dismissed or stayed unless “special circumstances warrant[ing]
an exception” to the rule exist. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pactiv Corp., C.A. No.
5:09cv00073, 2010 WL 503090, at *2 (W.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2010) (internal citations, quotation
marks, and alterations omitted). In particular, courts have lessened the application of the first-tofile rule where evidence suggests the first-filed party engaged in forum shopping or raced to the
courthouse. See, e.g., Quesenberry v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., Inc., C.A. No. 1:09cv00022, 2009 WL
2
As discussed, supra, it is unclear whether SIS continued to provide any services to Moore’s. It is also unclear
whether SIS-Pittsburgh agreed to provide exactly the same services to Moore’s as SIS agreed to provide.
Nevertheless, it appears that, based on the pleadings, briefings, and representations made at oral argument, SISPittsburgh provided substantively the same services to Moore’s as SIS initially agreed to provide.
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648658, at *3 (W.D. Va. March 10, 2009). As a minor consideration, courts consider how
advanced the first-filed action is relative to the second-filed action. See, e.g., Elderberry of
Weber City, 2013 WL 1164835, at *4.
In determining whether a party has raced to the courthouse, district courts in the Fourth
Circuit consider a variety of factors, including whether the parties: (1) were engaged in ongoing,
good-faith settlement discussions when the first-filed action was filed; (2) have concealed filing
a lawsuit; (3) disregarded applicable choice of forum clauses; (4) knew the natural plaintiff was
imminently going to file suit in another jurisdiction; or (5) omitted controversies between the
parties in the lawsuit. See Mad Panda, LLC v. Gunnar Optiks, LLC, No. 5:14-CV-00470-F, 2015
WL 4713243, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 2015) (citing T2 Prods., LLC v. Advantus Corp., No.
3:14-CV00193-GCM, 2014 WL 4181932, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2014)); see also Family
Dollar Stores, Inc. v. Overseas Direct Imp. Co., No. 3:10-CV-278, 2011 WL 148264, at *4, *5
(W.D.N.C. Jan. 18, 2011).
Moore’s asserts that SIS raced to the courthouse in Georgia in response to threatened
litigation by Moore’s. On April 20, 2015, Moore’s counsel sent SIS a letter detailing alleged
material breaches by SIS and asserting that it would not pay additional monies to SIS. Pl.’s Br.
Opp’n, Attach. 5. After receiving Moore’s letter, SIS filed suit in Georgia on June 17, 2015.
Moore’s claims that the proximity between the April 20 letter and the June 17 filing suggests that
SIS raced to the courthouse.
While Moore’s contention that SIS raced to the courthouse in Georgia is plausible, it
fails. Considering the factors articulated in Mad Panda, supra: there were no ongoing, good-faith
negotiations between the parties when SIS filed suit; SIS never concealed that it filed suit from
Moore’s; and the parties did not have a choice of forum clause that SIS disregarded. Most
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importantly, Moore’s April 20 letter did not unequivocally assert that Moore’s intended to
imminently sue. Rather, the letter detailed SIS’s alleged breaches, and merely asserted that
Moore’s intended to stop paying SIS. As the Fourth Circuit has emphasized, “there can be no
race to the courthouse when only one party is running.” Learning Network, Inc. v. Discovery
Commc’ns, Inc., 11 Fed. Appx. 297, 2001 WL 627618, at *4 (4th Cir. June 7, 2001). Moore’s
did not threaten to sue SIS, and therefore SIS could not have raced to the courthouse. Indeed, SIS
waited nearly two months to file suit after Moore’s letter, an amount of time that belies an
assertion that SIS raced to file suit before Moore’s. After receiving a letter asserting that it would
not be paid, SIS filed suit in its home state of Georgia. None of these facts support an inference
that SIS raced to the courthouse.
In addition to considering whether either party has raced to the courthouse, courts also
consider how far the first-filed case has progressed. Although the Georgia case is not far
progressed,3 how far the second-filed case has progressed relative to the first-filed case is only a
minor consideration. See Elderberry of Weber City, 2013 WL 1164835, at *4. On these facts, this
minor consideration is not enough to warrant an exception to the first-to-file rule. Ultimately,
because there is no evidence that SIS raced to the courthouse, a departure from the first-to-file
rule is unwarranted.
C.
Balance of Convenience Does Not Weigh in Favor of Allowing this Action to
Proceed
In evaluating the balance of convenience, courts consider the following factors: (1) the
weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of venue; (2) convenience to witnesses and relative ease
of access to evidence; (3) convenience to the parties; and (4) the interests of justice, including the
3
As of this opinion’s writing, the only action pending in the Georgia case is Moore’s motion to dismiss. Per the
parties’ agreement, discovery is stayed in Georgia pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss.
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relative congestion of court dockets and a preference for holding trial in the community most
affected. Cross v. Fleet Reserve Ass’n Pension Plan, 383 F. Supp. 2d 852, 856 (D. Md. 2005)
(citation omitted).
With regard to the first and third factors, Moore’s and SIS effectively argue to a
stalemate. Moore’s argues that its choice of the Virginia forum should be respected, while SIS
argues that its choice of the Georgia forum should be respected. Likewise, Virginia would be the
more convenient forum for Moore’s, while Georgia would be the more convenient forum for
SIS.
With regard to the second factor—convenience to witnesses and relative ease of access to
evidence—the parties arguments are also in equipoise. Moore’s employees, located in Virginia,
and SIS employees, located in Georgia, are expected to testify at trial. Whether the trial occurs in
Georgia or in Virginia, one party’s witnesses will have to travel and will be inconvenienced. The
convenience to witnesses is thus effectively the same for both parties. Moore’s argues that
physical evidence expected to be presented at trial—namely, the computer software—is located
in Altavista, Virginia. Moore’s has not, however, demonstrated why the parties would need to
physically view and inspect the software. Rather, both parties conceded at oral argument that this
case would be largely a “paper trial,” with the evidence consisting mainly of documents. Thus,
while Virginia might be the slightly more convenient forum, it is not substantially more
convenient.
Factor four relates to the interests of justice. At the outset, it should be noted that the
parties have agreed that the contracts at issue are governed by Georgia law. All things being
equal, it seems most fair and efficient for a Georgia federal district court, rather than a Virginia
federal district court, to construe and apply Georgia state law.
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Moore’s argues, however, that all things are not equal. Moore’s relies on precedent from
the Eastern District of Virginia which suggests that, in considering the interests of justice, courts
must consider docket congestion. See, e.g., Lycos, Inc. v. TiVo, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 685, 695
(E.D. Va. 2007). Moore’s claims that the Georgia case is the 2,656th civil case filed in that court,
while the Virginia case is only the 21st case filed in this court. SIS emphasizes, and Moore’s
admits, however, that “docket conditions are only a ‘minor consideration’ . . . .” Lycos, Inc., 499
F. Supp. 2d 696 (quoting GTE Wireless, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 517, 520 (E.D.
Va. 1999)). On these facts, it is not enough to warrant an exception to the rule.
Ultimately, Moore’s has not shown that the balance of convenience weighs in favor of
litigating the case in Virginia. Both parties would be burdened by litigating in the other party’s
preferred forum. Moreover, there is no indication that litigating in Georgia would affect severely
the parties’ access to evidence. Finally, the interests of justice do not call for the case to be
litigated in Virginia.
V.
CONCLUSION
I find that the first-to-file rule applies, and I do not think a departure from the rule is
warranted. The first-to-file rule ultimately seeks to promote efficiency. As the Supreme Court
has stated, “the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket . . . [and] [h]ow this can best be done calls for
the exercise of judgment . . . .” Landis, 299 U.S. at 254. I believe the appropriate outcome is to
stay this case pending Georgia’s determination of Moore’s motion to dismiss.
Because SIS and SIS-Pittsburgh are so related,4 I think the most efficient result is to
litigate the lawsuit between SIS, SIS-Pittsburgh, and Moore’s in the same forum, whether that be
4
As discussed, supra IV.A., SIS-Pittsburgh is a subsidiary of SIS and ultimately provided similar if not identical
services as did SIS to Moore’s.
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in Georgia or Virginia. The first-to-file rule must, however, be respected. If the Georgia court
grants Moore’s motion to dismiss, or, alternatively, transfers the case to this Court, then the
entire action can proceed in a single forum.
For the above reasons, I will grant SIS and SIS-Pittsburgh’s motion, and will stay the
case pending the Georgia court’s ruling on Moore’s motion to dismiss. The parties are ordered to
advise the Georgia court of this decision, and to file notice with this Court when the Georgia
court rules on Moore’s motion to dismiss. An appropriate order will accompany this
memorandum opinion.
The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to send a certified copy of this memorandum
opinion and the accompanying order to all counsel of record.
20th
Entered this ________ day of October, 2015.
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