Goard v. Crown Auto, Inc. et al

Filing 56

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Norman K. Moon on March 21, 2016. (sfc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
LYNCHBURG DIVISION

JACQUELIN GOARD,

CIVIL NO. 6:15-CV-00035
Plaintiff,
v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CROWN AUTO, INC., D/B/A AUTO VILLA,
MIDNIGHT EXPRESS AUTO RECOVERY, INC. ,
JONATHAN HOWARD, JOSEPH MCKINLEY, AND
JOHN DOES 1-3

JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON

Defendants.
This matter is before the Court upon Defendants Jonathan Howard, Joseph McKinley,
Edward Cook and Ryan Ball’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. Dkt. 27 & 55. Plaintiff’s
lawsuit alleges that Jonathan Howard, Joseph McKinley, Edward Cook, and Ryan Ball, who are
police officers for the Lynchburg Police Department, assisted, encouraged, facilitated, and
caused the unlawful repossession of Plaintiff’s vehicle in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants assert that qualified immunity shields them from liability for these actions. Because
Plaintiff alleges a violation of her clearly established constitutional rights, I will deny
Defendants’ motion.
I.

Factual Allegations
On January 31, 2015, Goard went to Auto Vila1 to purchase a Honda Accord. Compl. ¶

20. On or about June 17, 2015, Goard’s mother visited Goard at her apartment. Compl. ¶ 40.
As her mother arrived, Matthew Snyder, an employee of Midnight Express, pulled a tow truck
1

Auto Villa and Crown Auto are presumably the same company. Although, it is irrelevant for this opinion.
1

behind her vehicle in order to block her exit. Compl. ¶ 41. After unsuccessfully repossessing the
vehicle due to Goard’s objection, several police vehicles and five police officers, including
Jonathan Howard, Joseph McKinley, Edward Cook, and Ryan Ball, arrived at the scene. Compl.
¶¶ 47, 48, 49, 55. The officers reviewed the documents of the repossession company and
declared that Goard should turn over her Honda Accord. Compl. ¶¶ 54, 56. However, Goard
continued to object to the repossession.

In the face of these continued objections, Goard

contends that she was told by officers, including Cook, Howard, Ball, and McKinley, that if she
did not turn over the vehicle to Snyder, she would be arrested or go to jail. Compl. ¶¶ 55, 56, 57.
As a result of these threats, Goard claims that she relinquished possession of her vehicle to
Midnight Express. Compl. ¶ 59.
II.

Standard of Review
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint to determine

whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim: “it does not resolve contests surrounding the
facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of North
Carolina v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). Although a complaint “does not need
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his entitle[ment]
to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations omitted). A court need not “accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts” or
“accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Eastern Shore
Markets, Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). “Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
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555, with all allegations in the complaint taken as true and all reasonable inferences drawn in the
plaintiff’s favor. Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2005).
Rule 12(b)(6) does “not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Consequently,
“only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
III.

Discussion
a. Goard has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “two—and only two—allegations are required in order to state a

cause of action under the statute. First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived
him [or her] of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of
that right acted under color of state or territorial law.” Gomez v. Toldeo, 446 U.S. 635, 640
(1980).
The second requirement applies with simplicity to the facts of this case and so I will start
there. When an on-duty police officer actively participates in a creditor’s repossession, as clearly
alleged in Goard’s complaint, “the officers are participating in the removal of the debtor’s
property while cloaked in the mantle of their authority as agents of the state.” Wallace v.
Chrysler Credit Corp., 743 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (W.D. Va. 1990); see also Lugar v. Edmonson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982); Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3rd Cir. 1998).
Therefore, Goard’s complaint satisfies the second requirement set forth in Gomez.
As for the first requirement, Goard’s complaint also provides sufficient factual details to
“state[] a plausible claim for relief” of a violated constitutional right. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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662, 679 (2009). Goard alleges that Cook, Ball, Howard, and McKinley deprived her of federal
rights protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
More specifically, the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments protect against “meaningful interference with an individual’s
possessory interest in that property.” Soldal v. Cook Cnty. Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972).
Furthermore, the Third Circuit has held that “it is . . . well established that possessory interests in
property invoke procedural due process protections” and these “procedures [must] guarantee
protection[s] against erroneous or arbitrary seizures.” Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3rd
Cir. 1998) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972) and Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600, 605–06 (1974)). Specifically, the Abbott Court held that were officers are involved in
the repossession of property and then threatened to arrest the property owner if they do not
relinquish possession a deprivation of a Constitutional right has been sufficiently alleged. Id. at
147.
In addition to Abbott, the District Court of Maryland has decided a case with similar
factual circumstances to the case at hand at the equivalent procedural stage. Morozov v. Howard
Cnty Md., No. MJG-10-1515, 2012 WL 2048296 (D. Md. June 5, 2012). In Moronzov, the
vehicle owner objected to the repossession of the vehicle. Id. at *1. Due to this objection, the
repossession company called the police. Id. Upon arriving to the scene, the police threatened to
arrest the vehicle owner. Id. Ultimately, the owner gave over the keys to the vehicle. Id.
Because the “possessory interest in a vehicle is sufficient to invoke the protection of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments,” the court held that plaintiff’s claim survived a motion to dismiss.
Id. at *3–4. Similarly, in this case, Goard’s complaint suggest that Howard, Ball, Cook, and
4

McKinley: (1) arrived on the scene, (2) threatened to arrest Goard, and (3) ultimately caused
Goard to turn over possession of the vehicle to Midnight Express. Compl. ¶¶ 47–57. Therefore,
Goard’s complaint states a “plausible claim” upon which relief can be granted unless qualified
immunity protects the Defendants’ actions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
b. Defendants’ have failed to establish Qualified Immunity
Howard, Ball, Cook, and McKinley assert that qualified immunity shields them from
liability for their actions.

Dkt. 28 at 4. Qualified immunity protects “government officials

performing discretionary functions . . .

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). To be entitled
to qualified immunity, a defendant must show either that [1] his conduct did not violate the
plaintiff's constitutional rights, or that even if there was a constitutional violation, [2] the right in
question was not clearly established at the time that the defendant acted.2 Henry v. Purnell, 652
F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir.2011) (en banc); Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d
292, 306 (4th Cir.2006). “The burden of proof and persuasion with respect to a defense of
qualified immunity rests on the official asserting that defense.” Meyers v. Baltimore Cty., 713
F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir.2013).
The right to due process prior to the seizure of one’s property is subject to Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 (1972) (holding that
Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes unconstitutionally deprived persons of

2

The Supreme Court has held that this two-prong inquiry is no longer mandatory and can be done in either order.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). However, the two-prong inquiry is “beneficial” in this factual
scenario and therefore, I will follow it. Id.
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property without due process of law because they denied the right to be heard before taking the
property away); Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (providing Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment protection to the removal of a mobile home by police officers). Courts have also
routinely denied qualified immunity in officer-assisted repossession. See Marcus v. McCollum,
394 F.3d 813, 816–17 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding factual allegations to survive summary judgment
where police threatened property owner with jail); Abbott, 164 F.3d at 141 (discussed above);
Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2012) (reversing grant of qualified immunity
because self-help repossession became unlawful after breach of the peace); Brees v. Courtesy
Ford, Inc., 45 F. App’x 711 (9th Cir. 2002) (no qualified immunity for police who assisted in
unlawful repossession); Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1981)
(denying summary judgment were the “officer assist[ed] in effectuating a repossession over the
objection of a debtor or so intimidate[d] a debtor as to cause him to refrain from exercising his
legal right to resist a repossession”); see also Morozov, No. MJG-10-1515, 2012 WL 2048296, at
*4–5 (D. Md. June 5, 2012) (discussed above); Woynar v. City of Daytona Beach, No. 6:10-cv1458, 2012 WL 1110064, at *5–11 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2012) (denying qualified immunity
because active participation in self-help repossession can be an unreasonable seizure); Steibel v.
Vill. of Prairie Du Rocher, No. 07-0197, 2007 WL 2819292, at *3–4 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2007)
(holding no qualified immunity for police who ordered individual to turn over keys). Therefore,
as discussed above, Goard’s complaint contains sufficient allegations of constitutional violations
to satisfy the first prong of the qualified immunity inquiry. Compl. ¶¶ 47–57.
As for the second prong, Howard, Cook, Ball, and McKinley’s actions must have
“violat[ed] [] a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.”
6

Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 118 (4th Cir. 2013).

“To be clearly established, a

right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he
is doing violates that right.” Reichle, 132 S.Ct. at 2093 (quotations and alteration omitted); see
al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2083; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97
L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 331 (4th
Cir.2009). “The law is clearly established such that an [official's] conduct transgresses a bright
line when the law has been authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court, the appropriate United
States Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the State.” Wilson, 141 F.3d at 114; cf. Reichle,
132 S.Ct. at 2094 (assuming without deciding that controlling federal court of appeals authority
could be a dispositive source of clearly established law within a given circuit); Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 741–42, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (concluding that binding circuit
precedent, a state agency regulation, and a Justice Department report combined to create clearly
established law).
“It is true that the Fourth Circuit has not, itself, specifically considered whether a
reasonable officer could have believed that active involvement in a private vehicle repossession
would be lawful.” Moronzov, 2012 WL 2048296, at *5. However, “reasonable police officers
should know from the established precedent in Fuentes that their role is not to be participants in
property deprivations without notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Abbott, 164 F.3d at 149.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s Soldal opinion, discussed above, also provides sufficient
precedent that a police officer cannot actively participate in self-help repossession. Soldal, 506
U.S. at 61; see also Brian S. Batterton, Self-Help Repossession Versus the Fourth Amendment,
Legal & Liability Risk Management Institute (Dec. 2012) (discussing how to follow the law in

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self-help repossession cases after Soldal).3 In addition to the United States Supreme Court
precedent, the Virginia Code also clearly states that self-help repossession can only proceed
“without judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of the peace.” Va Code § 8.9A-609;
Universal Credit Co. v. Taylor, 164 Va. 624, 630–31 (1935) (“The right to possession of chattels
may be exercised without recourse to the courts, provided this can be done peaceably. It is only
when a right of one is denied or resisted by another, that such party must resort to appropriate
legal proceedings to enforce that right.”); see also Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681 (6th Cir.
2012) (reversing grant of qualified immunity because self-help repossession became unlawful
after breach of the peace).
The combination of case law from the United States Supreme Court in Soldal and
Fuentes and the Virginia Code (supplemented through Universal Credit Co.) provide sufficient
basis to find this violation “clearly established.” Therefore, the second prong is satisfied because
“the overarching lesson of the case law is that officers may act to diffuse a volatile situation, but
may not aid the repossessor in such a way that the repossession would not have occurred but for
their assistance.”Marcus v. McCollum, 394 F.3d 813, 818–19 (10th Cir. 2004); see also
Universal Credit Co., 164 Va. at 630–31.4 Because I do not have specific evidence or testimony
concerning these Defendants (or the Lynchburg Police Department), I can only generalize that
3

This proves that even looking at this prong through an objective—reasonable person in the officer’s position—test
that the Supreme Court precedent was readily available to a reasonable police officers. Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d
307, 312 (4th Cir. 1992); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815 (discussing that the reasonable person standard looks at the
information reasonably available to him).
4
Even if the foregoing authorities were insufficient, the Fourth Circuit has “repeatedly” held that:
it is not required that a right violated already have been recognized by a court in a specific context
before such right may be held ‘clearly established’ for purposes of qualified immunity. Thus, the
absence of a judicial decision holding [that due process is violated] under similar circumstances
does not prevent a court from denying a qualified immunity defense. As the Supreme Court has
emphasized, officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in
novel factual circumstances.
Meyers v. Baltimore Cty., Md., 713 F.3d 723, 734 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted); e.g.,
Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 392-93 & n.6 (4th Cir. 2013).
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these Supreme Court decisions were readily available to a reasonable police officers. See
Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d
1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that a “district court’s refusal to consider the [qualified
immunity] question subjected [the Defendant] to further pretrial procedures, and [] effectively
denied him qualified immunity”). Therefore, I cannot find, as a matter of law, that the
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Moronzov, 2012 WL 2048296, at *5 (denying
qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage).
IV.

Conclusion
As described above, Defendants’ motion will be denied. Goard’s complaint states a

claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, the Defendants
have failed to meet their burden for the defense of qualified immunity. Meyers v. Baltimore Cty.,
713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir.2013).
21st
Entered this _____ day of March, 2016.

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