Painter v. Blue Ridge Regional Jail Authority et al

Filing 60

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. Signed by Senior Judge Norman K. Moon on July 31, 2018. (ca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

7/31/2018

LYNCHBURG DIVISION

CASE NO. 6:17-cv-00034

KATHERINE PAINTER,
Plaintiff,
v.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

BLUE RIDGE REGIONAL JAIL AUTHORITY,
ET AL.,

JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON

Defendants.
Plaintiff Katherine Painter (“Plaintiff”) has moved for default judgment against the lone
remaining Defendant in this case, Timothy Farrar (“Defendant”). (Dkt. 42). Defendant
previously worked as a correctional officer at the Blue Ridge Regional Jail. Plaintiff alleges that
while she was at the jail he sexually assaulted and harassed her several times. She brings suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for injuries resulting from
the sexual assaults. Defendant has failed to appear or defend the case in any way. In November
2017, the Clerk docketed an entry of default. (Dkt. 40). In late May 2018, the Court held an
evidentiary hearing on damages. (Dkt. 57). Due to issues regarding notice, the Court withheld
ruling on the motion for default judgment until now. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment will
be granted, and damages will be awarded in the amount of $732,888.
I.
1.

Findings of Fact

In the spring of 2015, Plaintiff, a 31 year old female, was imprisoned at the Lynchburg

Adult Detention Center. (Compl. ¶ 16; H’rg Tr. at 8).1

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Upon default, the plaintiff’s factual allegations are accepted as true for all purposes,
excluding the determination of damages. See Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778,
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2.

Defendant was an employee at the jail who worked the night shift in the “intake

department.” (Compl. at ¶ 17).
3.

Shortly after her arrival, Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch. (Compl. at ¶ 18). Under

this classification, she was prevented from wearing normal clothes. Id. at ¶ 19. Instead, she was
given only a “suicide blanket” to cover herself and stay warm. Id.
4.

On one occasion, Defendant threatened to take her blanket away from her. (Compl. at

¶ 20). Further, he would withhold toilet paper and snacks unless she revealed herself to him. Id.
at ¶¶ 21, 22. He would also watch her use the bathroom from outside her cell. Id. at ¶ 23.
5.

Plaintiff had a gastrointestinal (“GI”) tract disorder, which Defendant knew about. He

obtained access to her medication and then used it as a means to extort sexual favors. (Compl. at
¶¶ 24–31).
6.

In April 2015, Defendant withheld Plaintiff’s medication until she performed oral sex on

him. (Compl. at ¶ 31). Due to her GI sickness and the need for her medication, she relented and
performed oral sex on him. Id. at ¶¶ 31–39. She was in too much pain from her sickness and too
afraid of the consequences to deny him. Id. at ¶ 39. Electronic records show that the door to her
cell was open for nine minutes on the night of the incident. Id. at ¶ 40. Another correctional
officer and an inmate in a neighboring cell overheard the sexual assault. Id. at ¶ 41–49.
7.

After the incident, she felt upset, discouraged, drained, and “lesser of a person.” (H’rg Tr.

at 13).

780 (4th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation—other
than one relating to the amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and
the allegation is not denied.”). Facts pertaining to damages come from the Court’s evidentiary
hearing on May 9, 2018. (Dkt. 57). Citations to the transcript are to a provisional rough draft
provided by the Court Reporter.
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8.

In May 2015, Defendant again withheld Plaintiff’s medication in exchange for sexual

favors—this time engaging in forced vaginal intercourse. (Compl. at ¶¶ 59–61). She informed
him that she could not perform oral sex, as he requested, because she had just had a dental
procedure completed. Id. ¶¶ 56–57. He replied “that he was going to do ‘something,’ stood
Plaintiff up, [] forcibly bent her body over a wooden bench in her cell,” and raped her. Id. at ¶¶
59–60.
9.

After the incident, Plaintiff felt discouraged, shame, and as though she had “no self-

worth.” (H’rg Tr. at 18). She cried herself to sleep that night because of the shame and the pain
of experiencing such violence. Id. at 20.
10.

Plaintiff reported the incidents to another inmate, her mother, and her significant other at

the time. (Compl. at ¶¶ 63–64, 70, 76). She received mental health counseling for the remainder
of her time in jail. (H’rg Tr. at 21).
11.

As a result of the sexual assaults, Plaintiff suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder

(“PTSD”), acute anxiety, and depression. (Compl. at ¶ 94; H’rg Tr. at 24). She has difficulty
sleeping, out of fear of reliving the incident, and takes medication to go to sleep and deal with
her depression. (H’rg Tr. at 23).
12.

Plaintiff currently receives drug addiction and behavioral counseling monthly at Horizon

Behavioral Health Center from a nurse practitioner. (H’rg Tr. at 23).
13.

Plaintiff wants to attend a clinic to treat her PTSD, however the closest clinic is 50 miles

away from her residence in Lynchburg. (H’rg Tr. at 25–26). Such treatment would occur weekly
and cost upwards of $100 per visit. Id. at 26. Further, there are weekly group therapy sessions for
women with PTSD that cost $30 per session. Id.

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14.

Her PTSD also prevents her from enjoying time with her family. She no longer enjoys

outdoor activities such as picnics, swimming, or bike riding. (H’rg Tr. at 27).
15.

In April 2017, she filed suit against Defendant, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

constitutional injuries under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (Dkt. 1).
16.

In August 2017, she effectuated service by posting a copy of the summons and complaint

on the door of Defendant’s usual place of abode. (Dkt. 32).
17.

In late May 2018, she mailed him notice of the complaint, the Clerk’s entry of default,

and her motion for default judgment. (Dkt. 59).
18.

Defendant is not an infant, incompetent, or currently engaged in military service. (Dkt.

43-2 at ECF 2).
II. Conclusions of Law
“Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the entry of a default
judgment when a defendant fails ‘to plead or otherwise defend’ in accordance with the Rules.”
United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1982). In reviewing motions for default
judgment, courts have referred to the following factors:
(1) when and against what party the default was entered; (2) identification of the
pleading to which default was entered; (3) whether the defaulting party is an
infant or incompetent person; (4) that the defendant is not in military services; and
(5) that notice has been served on the defaulting party, if required by Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55(b)(2).
JTH Tax, Inc. v. Smith, No. 2:06-CV-76, 2006 WL 1982762, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 23, 2006). The
Fourth Circuit has “repeatedly expressed a strong preference that, as a general matter, defaults be
avoided and that claims and defenses be disposed of on their merits.” Colleton Preparatory
Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 616 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, the entry

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of default judgment is committed to the discretion of the trial court. See Moradi, 673 F.2d at 727
(citing Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir. 1974)).
To begin, Defendant was served in August 2017, and he has failed to comply with his
duty to respond under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See (Dkt. 32); Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(1)(A). He has failed to appear, answer, or file a responsive pleading. In November 2017,
the Clerk docketed an entry of default against Defendant. (Dkt. 40). Plaintiff then moved for
default judgment, but had failed to comply with all the requirements under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(e)(1)(2)(B) and Va. Code § 8.01-296(2)(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1)(2)(B)
(permitting service of process by following the state law procedures where the district court is
located); Va. Code § 8.01-296(2)(b) (providing for “substituted service,” when a defendant
cannot be found at his or her usual place of abode, by posting a process on the front door of the
defendant’s abode). Under Va. Code § 8.01-296(2)(b), entering a default judgment is permitted
after “substituted service,”
provided that not less than 10 days before judgment by default may be entered,
the party causing service or his attorney or agent mails to the party served a copy
of such process and thereafter files in the office of the clerk of the court a
certificate of such mailing.
Va. Code § 8.01-296(2)(b) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Hirsch v. Johnson, No. 1:14-CV-332
JCC/MSN, 2015 WL 3537173, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 4, 2015) (requiring the plaintiffs to comply
with Va. Code § 8.01-296(2)(b)’s mailing requirement before granting their motion for default
judgment). At the time of the evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff had not yet complied with this
mailing requirement. She has since mailed Defendant notice,2 provided a “certificate of such
mailing” to the Court, and more than 10 days have passed. (Dkts. 59). Accordingly, notice has
2

The notice included copies of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Clerk’s entry of default, and
Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. (Dkts. 59-1).

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been properly served on the Defendant under Va. Code § 8.01-296(2)(b). Further, Defendant is
not an infant, incompetent, or currently engaged in military service. (Dkt. 43-2 at ECF 2). Thus,
there is no apparent reason for Defendant’s failure to respond. In short, Plaintiff has
demonstrated that she is entitled to default judgment, and so her motion will be granted.
Although the Court finds that default judgment is appropriate, it does not automatically
follow that Plaintiff is entitled to damages. Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778,
780–81 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The district court correctly concluded that acceptance of these
undisputed facts [for the purposes of entry of default judgment] does not necessarily entitle the
Appellants to the relief sought . . . .”). “If the court determines that Defendant is in default, a
court may examine a plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether it alleges a cause of action.” JTH
Tax, Inc., 2006 WL 1982762, at *2. “[T]he appropriate inquiry is whether or not the face of the
pleadings supports the default judgment and the causes of action therein.” Anderson v. Found.
for Advancement, Educ. & Employment of Am. Indians, 187 F.3d 628 (Table) (4th Cir. 1999)
(citing Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)).
Once the Court determines whether the Plaintiff alleges a cause of action, then the Court
proceeds to a determination of damages. Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780–81. In a case such as this, where
there is no sum certain, Rule 55(b)(2) provides that only after an evidentiary hearing can the
Court award damages. See Agri-Supply Co. v. Agrisupply.com, 457 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662 (E.D.
Va. 2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(B) (“The court may conduct hearings . . . when, to enter or
effectuate judgment, it needs to: . . . determine the amount of damages . . . .”).
For the purposes of default judgment, the Court concludes Plaintiff has properly pled an
Eighth Amendment violation. Under § 1983, a defendant acting under color of state law who

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deprives a U.S. citizen of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution is liable for damages. 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
It is well-established that “the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the
conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted). There can be little doubt that sexual abuse is repugnant to
contemporary standards of decency, and that allegations of sexual abuse can
amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,
118 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Accordingly, those inmates who are
sexually assaulted by guards, or whose sexual assaults by other inmates are
facilitated by guards, have suffered grave deprivations of their Eighth
Amendment rights.”); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (“Being violently assaulted in
prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Jackson v. Holley, 666 F. App’x 242, 244 (4th Cir. 2016). Here, Defendant was employed by
Blue Ridge Regional Jail Authority and acted under color of state law when he repeatedly and
knowingly sexually assaulted Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶¶ 99, 101). These sexual assaults inflicted
serious bodily harm and emotional distress on her. Id. at ¶¶ 103–104. Accordingly, the Court
now turns to the appropriate relief requested in this case.
Plaintiff requests compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. First, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages. At the evidentiary
hearing on damages, Plaintiff testified regarding her ongoing mental health issues, the emotional
damages she has sustained, and the pain and suffering she endured as a result of the sexual
assaults. (H’rg Tr. at 13, 20, 23, 27). Currently, Plaintiff only gets mental health treatment
monthly by visiting a nurse practitioner at Horizon Behavioral Health Center. Id. at 23. Plaintiff
specifically referenced the need for indefinite weekly therapy sessions to treat her PTSD and to
improve and maintain her mental health. Id. at 23, 26. These weekly one-on-one sessions cost
$100 each, in addition to weekly group therapy sessions which cost $30 each. Id. at 26. The
closest PTSD treatment center is 50 miles away from her current residence. Id. at 25–26.

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Attending these sessions for the rest of her life would cost $432,888.3 See Park v. Shiflett, 250
F.3d 843, 854 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding the district court’s award of compensatory damages for
future medical costs under § 1983).
Plaintiff also testified in detail regarding the emotional damages she has sustained and the
pain and suffering she has experienced as a direct result of Defendant’s sexual assaults. (H’rg Tr.
at 13, 20, 23, 27). She now struggles with PTSD, depression, and anxiety. Id. at 21, 23–24, 27.
She seeks $200,000 for these damages. The Court finds her requests for relief to be appropriate
in light of the graphic sexual assaults she endured and the specific physical injuries she
sustained. Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[A plaintiff] may not recover
for emotional or mental damages without a showing of a specific physical injury.” (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e))); Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A]lleged sexual
assaults qualify as physical injuries as a matter of common sense.”); cf. Slicker v. Jackson, 215
F.3d 1225, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Indeed, it is by now well settled that compensatory damages
may be awarded based on physical pain and suffering caused by a defendant’s use of excessive
force, apart from any damages based on monetary loss.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff will be awarded $632,888 in total compensatory damages.
Second, Plaintiff is also entitled to punitive damages. The Court may “assess punitive
damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by
evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally

3

Plaintiff is currently 31 years old with a life expectancy of 51 more years. See Actuarial
Life Table, Social Security Administration, https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c6.html
(last visited July 24, 2018). Additionally, the IRS mileage rate for obtaining medical care is 18
cents per mile. 2018 Standard Mileage Rates¸ Internal Revenue Service, https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-drop/n-18-03.pdf (last visited July 31, 2018). “This court and numerous others routinely
take judicial notice of information contained on state and federal government websites.” United
States v. Garcia, 855 F.3d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 2017).
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protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Such damages are awarded
for “outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.”
Id. at 54. The Court strains to think of a clearer example demonstrating a “callous indifference”
to a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights than that of extorting sexual favors in exchange for
medical treatment. See, e.g., Carrington v. Easley, No. 5:08-CT-3175-FL, 2011 WL 2132850, at
*5 (E.D.N.C. May 25, 2011) (“There is no question that [the correctional officer’s] actions in
leading plaintiff to a small bathroom, forcing him to strip naked, and then . . . attempting to
perform fellatio on him, demonstrated a reckless and callous disregard to plaintiff’s rights under
the Constitution and federal law.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff will be awarded $100,000 in punitive
damages.
III. Conclusion
The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against Defendant Farrar.
Judgment will be entered in her favor and she will be awarded $632,888 in compensatory
damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. Upon Plaintiff’s timely and proper motion the Court
will award attorney’s fees and costs.
The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to send a certified copy of these findings of fact
and conclusions of law and accompanying Order to all counsel of record.
31st
Entered this _____ day of July, 2018.

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