Brown et al v. The City of Lynchburg et al
Filing
55
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Senior Judge Norman K. Moon on January 28, 2025. (ca)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
LYNCHBURG DIVISION
SHANTA LYNETTE BROWN
and
AQUASHA SANDIDGE,
1/28/2025
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CASE NO. 6:23-cv-00054
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs,
v.
JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON
THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG, et al.,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs Shanta Brown and Aquasha Sandidge sue the City of Lynchburg and three City
of Lynchburg police officers for harms arising out of a police-citizen encounter. During the
encounter, Brown and Sandidge intervened in the arrest of a family member (their son and
brother, respectively), and they were subsequently detained for obstruction of justice and assault
against a police officer. Brown and Sandidge allege in a 20-count complaint that their arrest
violated their rights under the United States Constitution and Virginia common law. After
disposing of several of these claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), see Dkt. 29 (Order on Motion to
Dismiss), the Court now considers the remaining claims at summary judgment.
As against the City, Plaintiffs assert claims for an unconstitutional pattern of excessive
force under Monell (Counts 7-8). As against the individual police officers, Plaintiffs assert
claims for unlawful seizure, excessive force, and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Counts 1-6), as well as claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution under Virginia common law (Counts 15-20). The City and the officers move
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separately for summary judgment on all counts, with the officers claiming qualified immunity.
See Dkt. 42 (Officers’ motion); Dkt. 44 (City’s motion).
Upon consideration of Defendants’ motions, the factual record, and the applicable law,
the Court finds that no dispute of material fact exists as to any of the Plaintiffs’ claims and that
Defendants are each entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, in an order that will
accompany this memorandum opinion, and for the reasons stated below, the Court will GRANT
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, Dkts. 42 and 44, and DISMISS all other pending
motions as moot. See, e.g., Dkts. 37, 40 (pending motions in limine).
I.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute
is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and “[a] fact is
material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Variety Stores, Inc.
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018). The nonmoving party must “show
that there is a genuine dispute of material fact . . . by offering sufficient proof in the form of
admissible evidence.” Id. (quoting Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216
(4th Cir. 2016)). The district court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party” and “refrain from weighing the evidence or making credibility
determinations.” Id. “Although the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere
speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).
The moving party bears the burden of establishing that summary judgment is
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warranted. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). If the moving party meets this
burden, then the nonmoving party must set forth specific, admissible facts to demonstrate a
genuine issue of fact for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986). The non-movant may not rest on allegations in the pleadings; rather, it must present
sufficient evidence such that reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence for
the non-movant. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–24; Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty, Md., 48
F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may
consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
II.
Background
The Court makes the following findings of fact after construing any disputed evidence in
the light most favorable to Brown and Sandidge. 1
A. Plaintiffs’ Encounter with Police
On the night of April 28, 2020, Lynchburg Police Department (“LPD”) Officer Zachary
Miller (“Officer Miller”) monitored traffic in his patrol vehicle from a parking lot on 12th Street
1
On summary judgment the Court must “take the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable” to the non-moving parties, here Brown and Sandidge. Graham v. Gagnon,
831 F.3d 176, 184 (4th Cir. 2016). “The operation of these principles to the record here is straightforward: the
officers are assumed to have possessed the information they would have had if events unfolded” as Brown and
Sandidge assert. Id. (“The importance of summary judgment in qualified immunity cases does not mean that
summary judgment doctrine is to be skewed from its ordinary operation to give special substantive favor to the
defense.”).
However, these principles have limited application in the instant case, for two reasons. First, the facts of
this case are largely undisputed, because the relevant police-citizen interactions were captured by the officers’ body
cameras and the recorded audio and video have been submitted to the Court. See Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop
2, 633 F.3d 272, 276–77 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)) (cleaned up) (“When
documentary evidence ‘blatantly contradicts’ a party’s account ‘so that no reasonable jury could believe it,’ a court
should not credit that party’s version on summary judgment.”); see also McKenna v. Police Chief, No.
1:22CV00002, 2022 WL 15046725, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 26, 2022) (In the instant case, the “facts are largely
undisputed, particularly those of the police officers’ encounters with the plaintiff[s], because they were captured by
[the officers’] body camera[s] and the recorded audio and video have been submitted to the court.”). Second,
Plaintiffs fail to submit any comprehensive statement of facts in their summary judgment briefing, see Dkt. 47 at 12, thus obliging the Court to draw facts from the body camera footage and from Defendants’ statement of facts and
discovery evidence.
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in downtown Lynchburg, Virginia. Dep. Miller at 13-14. Around 10:00 pm, Officer Miller
observed a vehicle driving past which lacked a front license plate, so Miller pulled out and
followed the vehicle. Miller followed the vehicle a short distance before it pulled into the parking
lot of the Kemper Lofts apartment complex on Kemper Street. Miller Dash Cam at 00:24-44.2.
As the vehicle entered the parking lot and came to a stop, Officer Miller parked behind the
vehicle and activated his emergency lights. Id.
Officer Miller exited his patrol car and spoke to the driver at the driver-side window. The
driver was a young black male, eighteen-year-old Terron Pannell. Dkt. 1, ¶ 15. The vehicle was
parked nose-first in the parking space, so that the vehicle faced the apartment complex.
“Hey man. Office Miller, Lynchburg Police Department. Reason I pulled you over is
where’s your front tag at, man?” said Miller. Miller Body Cam at 00:22-00:28.
“This is my friend’s car, I’m just taking my kids something to eat, sir,” said Pannell.
Officer Miller asked for Pannell’s license, and Pannell admitted that he did not have a
license. Miller then asked for Pannell’s name and social security number, in order to conduct a
record search and prepare a summons, and he wrote Pannell’s information down on his notepad.
Miller Body Cam 00:50-01:20. During this time, two women exited the front door of the
apartment building. Officer Grooms also arrived on the scene as a backup officer—which is LPD
protocol for after-hours stops. Miller Body Cam 01:13-01:24.
As Officer Miller returned to his patrol car with Pannell’s information in hand, the two
women who had exited the apartment building approached Pannell’s vehicle. Miller Body Cam
01:20-01:50. The women would be later identified as Shanta Brown and Aquasha Sandidge,
mother and sister to Pannell, the driver.
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1. Brown and Sandidge Intervene
Officer Grooms, standing on the passenger side of Pannell’s vehicle, asked the women to
stop. “Can I have y’all stay back for a minute?” said Grooms. Grooms Body Cam 00:25-00:30.
The two women did not stop and proceeded to walk along the sidewalk from the passenger side
of the vehicle, where Grooms stood, toward the driver side vehicle, coming within feet of
Pannell’s driver-side door. “Can I have you stay back from the car for me?” Grooms repeated.
“I’m his mother,” said Brown.
“That doesn’t matter, I asked you to stay back,” said Grooms. Grooms Body Cam 00:2500:38
With Brown and Sandidge proceeding forward, Grooms hurried behind Pannell’s vehicle
to confront the women on the driver’s side of the car, where the women were now speaking with
Pannell. Grooms Body Cam 00:25-00:30-00:44. Reaching the driver’s side, Grooms spoke to the
women again. “I’m asking you to stay back from the car. Can you step back from the car ma’am?
This officer we’ll be able to explain to you what’s going on,” she said, referring to Officer
Miller.
Meanwhile, Officer Miller, observing these interactions from his patrol car, stood out of
his seat. “Hey, get away from the car! Ma’am, . . . I’ll come talk to you, okay?” Miller Body
Cam 01:10-01:52.
Brown and Sandidge partially acquiesced, stepping away from the driver’s side door and
appearing to look at the area of Pannell’s vehicle where a front tag would have been displayed.
“Yes, please do,” said Brown.
Grooms followed them back to the passenger’s side of the vehicle, while Miller still
observed from his patrol car.
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“Alright, just hang out by the door over there, please. And I’ll come talk to you, okay?”
said Miller, pointing to the door of the apartment complex from which the women had exited,
which was a distance removed from Pannell’s vehicle but still within earshot and sight of the
scene. Miller Body Cam 01:20-01:52.
Brown and Sandidge, however, stopped short of the door and only walked as far as the
parking spot next to Pannell’s vehicle. Grooms Body Cam 01:00-01:04.
2. Seeking Consent to Search
Officer Miller made several calls on his radio from the front seat of his patrol car.
“See if you can get consent,” he radioed to Officer Grooms. Miller Body Cam 02:2702:29.
“10-4,” said Grooms. Grooms Body Cam 01:38.
Grooms returned to the driver’s side of the car to speak with Pannell. Grooms asked for
Pannell’s information and engaged in conversation. Brown followed her and observed the
interaction. Grooms Body Cam 01:38-02:00. Officer Miller, seeing that Brown and Sandidge had
again approached the driver’s side of the vehicle, shouted from his patrol vehicle. “Ma’am can
y’all please stand by the door over there, please?” Miller Body Cam 03:00-03:05.
“Honey, I’m not even over there. She’s right there. I’m not even by the car,” said Brown.
Grooms Body Cam 02:00-02:07.
“Can you just please stand by the door?” Miller Body Cam 03:00-03:15.
“What’s the difference between here and there?” said Brown. Grooms Body Cam 02:0702:12.
“Listen, can you please just stand by the door? That’s all I’m asking. Just please stand by
the door, okay, because then I gotta keep my eyes on you—I’m trying to do a job.” Miller Body
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Cam 03:00-03:15.
“Oh, let me tell you. I’m an officer myself.” Grooms Body Cam 02:10-02:18. (Brown
was employed as a Correctional Officer, see Dkt. 1 at 10).
“Then you understand where I’m coming from, correct?”
“I do, but I’m not doing anything illegal. I do, but I don’t. I’m an officer, too.” Grooms
Body Cam 02:10-02:30.
“All I’m asking you to do is just please step over there, at least on the other side of the
car.” Miller Body Cam 03:00-03:15.
Brown and Sandidge again walked away from the driver’s side of the vehicle, but they
hardly went as far as the passenger side. Indeed, they still remained several car spaces away from
the door of the apartment complex, where Miller had directed them to go. Grooms Body Cam
02:30-02:36. Meanwhile, Pannell denied Officer Grooms consent for the officers to search the
vehicle, and Officer Grooms relayed this to Officer Miller. “Hey, that’s a no.” Grooms Body
Cam 02:37-02:41.
3. Arrival of Officer Reed
Noting Pannell’s refusal of consent, Officer Miller made a second radio call to request
that Officer Seth Reed come to the scene to conduct a free-air canine sniff of the vehicle. Miller
Dep. at 57. Officer Miller testified that he “routinely” asks for a K9 officer when conducting
traffic stops in the City of Lynchburg, especially if the person, after running a record search, is
shown to have been involved with drugs. Miller Dep. at 49, 52. Pannell’s record showed that he
had a “simple possession of weed as a juvenile.” Miller Dep. at 51.
After running the record search and getting more information from Pannell (i.e., his
address), Officer Miller took out his clipboard and began writing up a summons for the traffic
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violation. Miller Body Cam 05:55-06:16. A little more than a minute later, Officer Reed arrived
and approached Officer Miller’s passenger-side vehicle, where Miller filled him in on the
situation.
“Consent denied. . . . Has lots of marijuana history,” said Miller. Miller Body Cam 07:4007-50.
“How many people are in there?” asked Reed.
“Just one.” Miller Body Cam 07:50-08:00.
Reed left Miller’s window and approached Pannell’s vehicle. On his way, he addressed
Officer Grooms. “Hey Grooms, I’m gonna pull him out.” Reed Body Cam 00:40-00:51. Then
arriving at Pannell’s driver-side window, he said, “How you doing, man? I’m gonna have you
step out of the car and stand with my partner, okay?” Reed Body Cam 00:50-00:56.
As Officer Reed spoke to Pannell, Brown came around the front of Pannell’s vehicle and
stood with her arms crossed, roughly at the driver-side headlight of the vehicle. “Is he being
detained? Because he ain’t gotta get outta that car,” said Brown. Reed Body Cam 00:54-01:00.
“He does have to get out of the car if we ask,” said Reed.
“We read up on it; he don’t have to get out of that car.”
“Ma’am, you have nothing to do with this traffic stop.”
“That’s my son.”
“Okay, we’ll need you to stand over there.” Reed pointed to the front door of the
apartment complex. “I’m a canine officer and I’m gonna be conducting a scan on the vehicle.”
Reed Body Cam 01:00-01:12. Reed paused momentarily while Brown continued to argue.
Pannell was still seated in the driver’s seat. “Mom, I fear for my life now!” he said. Reed Body
Cam 01:12-01:24.
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Returning his focus to Pannell, Reed repeated his command. “Okay, you need to step out
of the car.” He opened Pannell’s door. “Step out of the car.”
“I’m scared, bruh . . . . Please don’t touch me,” said Pannell.
“I am gonna touch you if you don’t step out of the car,” said Reed.
This back and forth repeated several times over before Reed stepped toward Pannell and
grabbed him by the arm. Reed Body Cam 01:20-01:43. Noticing the escalating scene from his
patrol car, Miller threw down his clipboard and joined Reed at the open door of Pannell’s
vehicle. Miller Body Cam 08:40-08:47. So did Grooms. “Hey just step out of the car and make it
easy,” said Grooms. Grooms Body Cam 07:45-07:53. Reed and Miller then took hold of
Pannell’s left arm and pulled. Pannell resisted. “I’m scared of y’all!”
“Step out of the car!” the officers repeated.
When Pannell did not comply, the officers pulled forcefully, and Pannell fell to the
ground. Reed Body Cam 01:40-01:55. The scene erupted in screams, both from Pannell and from
Brown and Sandidge. Brown rapidly approached the driver’s side door to the point that she came
in contact with Grooms, knocking Grooms’ body camera off her uniform.
“See what I’m saying!” said Brown. “I want all your badge information!” Grooms Body
Cam 08:00-08:06.
“What the fuck is y’all doing?” Sandidge screamed.
4. Arrest of Brown and Sandidge
After placing Pannell in handcuffs, the officers stood him up and walked him back to a
patrol car. “What am I getting detained for? I didn’t resist arrest or nothing,” said Pannell. Reed
Body Cam 01:55-02:20. Once at the patrol car, the officers asked Pannell to spread his legs so
that they could conduct a pat down. Miller Body Cam 09:33-09:42. Whether Pannell complied or
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resisted is not clear from the video; Defendants claim that he was “thrashing around and kicking
backwards.” See Dkt. 43 at 6. In any case, Pannell and the officers engaged in a brief struggle
that led to the officers exerting substantial force and taking Pannell back to the ground. Grooms
Body Cam 09:40-09:50. “Stop! Stop!” yelled Miller, attempting to control Pannell on the
ground. Miller Body Cam 09:42-09:52.
Brown ran urgently toward her son. She came upon the scuffle in seconds. As she knelt
down to reach Pannell, Officer Miller pushed her back with one arm. Grooms Body Cam 09:5009:55. With Brown briefly repelled backward by Miller’s shove, Officer Grooms then stepped in
between Brown and the officers, presenting herself as a wall, insisting that the women step back.
But Sandidge and Brown reengaged and proceeded to struggle with Grooms, all the while
screaming at the officers who were wrangling Pannell on the ground. Miller Body Cam 09:5210:03.
“Mom! Mom!” screamed Pannell. Miller Body Cam 09:50-10:05.
Though Grooms succeeded in gradually moving Brown and Sandidge away from Pannell
and back toward the apartment complex, the women continued to press their cause, and tensions
remained high. At this point Officer Miller stood up and approached them, speaking over
Grooms’ shoulder. “Walk away, or you’re going to go to jail, too.” Miller Body Cam 10:0510:20. “Just walk away!”
Just as Brown and Sandidge appeared to turn around and take up a more removed
position on the sidewalk, Officer Reed, still kneeling on Pannell, ordered Miller to detain Brown
and Sandidge. “Throw them in handcuffs.” Miller Body Cam 10:19-10:21. In that same span of
seconds, Detective Robbin Miller, a plainclothes officer, arrived on the scene at a run. Grooms
Dash Cam 10:18-10:20. Reed told Detective Miller to assist Officer Miller in detaining Brown
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and Sandidge. “They go in handcuffs,” Reed pointed. “Both of them.” Grooms Dash Cam 10:1810:20; Reed Body Cam 03:12-03:20.
Acting on this order, Officer Miller was the first to approach Brown and Sandidge, and
he ordered them to put their arms around their backs. Miller Body Cam 10:21-10:28. Brown
resisted. “No, I ain’t going . . . !” As Brown dodged Miller’s advances, the officer repeated his
command, and the two went to the ground. Miller Body Cam 10:21-10:48. “Get off of me!”
screamed Brown. Detective Miller, joining the scene, attempted to assist Officer Miller in
controlling Brown, but he quickly turned his attention to Sandidge. When Sandidge resisted,
Detective Miller and Sandidge also went to the ground. The scuffle appears to have involved
some combination of Sandidge pushing Detective Miller, and the two tripping over Officer
Miller and Brown, who were already on the ground. Reed Dash Cam 03:35-04:00.
“She is pregnant!” someone screamed.
“Then she shouldn’t be fighting!” said Detective Miller.
As the officers struggled to place Sandidge and Brown in handcuffs, a crowd gathered in
the parking lot. “Stay back!” said Officer Miller. “Everybody stay back.” Miller Body Cam
11:20-11:28. One man emerged from the apartment complex front door, coming within feet of
Plaintiffs and the arresting officers. Officer Miller approached him, pushed him away, and told
the man to go back inside. Brown and Sandidge, meanwhile, now secured in handcuffs, had
hardly capitulated. They protested loudly while a car alarm honked, sirens rang, and the flashing
lights of a dozen police cars illuminated the parking lot. Miller Body Cam 11:28-12:50. Roughly
twelve minutes had passed since the time Officer Miller initiated his traffic stop, and roughly
eight minutes had passed since Officer Reed first attempted to force Pannell’s exit from the car.
Yet the scene had transformed from a routine traffic stop to a disorderly clash between police,
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Pannell and his family, and concerned onlookers.
Eventually, the officers escorted Brown and Sandidge to separate police cruisers. Miller
Body Cam 12:50-13:40. After nearly six minutes of struggle, Pannell was also placed in a patrol
car—with the assistance of at least six different police officers. Grooms Dash Cam 12:45-18:34.
Pannell conceded, while being placed in the patrol car, that he smoked weed and that he had
weed on him. Miller Body Cam 17:40-17:54.
“All that for weed. All that for weed,” said Officer Miller.
B. Legal Proceedings
Thereafter, Brown and Sandidge faced various criminal charges arising under Virginia
law. Brown was charged with two felony counts of assault and battery against a police officer
(one count as to Officer Miller and one count as to Officer Reed). She was also charged with one
misdemeanor count of obstructing justice. Dkt. 43-17 at 3-5.
Sandidge was charged with one felony count of assault and battery against a police
officer as to Detective Miller, and one misdemeanor count of obstructing justice. Dkt. 43-17 at 12.
Brown was released on bond, while Sandidge was incarcerated for six days at the
Lynchburg Adult Correction Center. Dkt. 1 at 10. Thereafter, both women lived under conditions
of bond for approximately three years, awaiting trial. Id. Brown alleges that she lost her job as a
correctional officer due to the pending charges and was forced to take work as a grocery store
cashier. Id.
Three years later, in March 2023, the matters went to trial. Brown was acquitted by a jury
of her peers on all counts. Dkt. 43-18. The charges against Sandidge were dismissed upon the
prosecution’s motion for nolle prosequi. Dkt. 1, ¶ 81. Brown and Sandidge brought the instant
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action in September 2023 seeking civil relief.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs present fifteen claims following Defendants’ motion to dismiss. As against the
police officers, Plaintiffs assert claims for unlawful seizure, excessive force, and malicious
prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts 1-6), as well as claims for assault, battery, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution under Virginia common law (Counts 15-20). As
against the City, Plaintiffs assert claims for an unconstitutional pattern of excessive force under a
Monell theory of municipal liability (Counts 7-8).
Upon Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court finds that no dispute of
material fact exists and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We begin
with Plaintiffs’ federal claims against the officers, before turning to their state law claims against
the officers and, finally, their claims for municipal liability against the City.
III.
Section 1983 Claims and Qualified Immunity
The Officer Defendants raise qualified immunity in defense to Plaintiffs’ Section 1983
claims. “Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in a § 1983 suit so long
as their conduct did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” E.W. by and through T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178
(4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The doctrine
“balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they
exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009). As applied, qualified immunity gives “ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502
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U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, under this framework, we must determine whether the facts—viewed in the light
most favorable to Plaintiffs—show that Officer Miller and/or Officer Reed violated Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights, and whether those rights were clearly established at the time of the officers’
conduct, such that a reasonable officer would have known that the conduct was unconstitutional.
See Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 317 (4th Cir. 2019).
The question of whether a right is clearly established is a question of law for the Court to
decide. Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 1992). The question of whether a
reasonable officer would have known that the conduct at issue violated that right, on the other
hand, is a question of fact which “cannot be decided on summary judgment if disputes of the
historical facts exist.” Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 317–18 (4th Cir. 2019). We may consider
either prong of the analysis first, and “it is often the better approach to determine first whether
the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all,” Dolgos, 884 F.3d at 178,
since “an officer [who] did not violate any right . . . is hardly in need of any immunity and the
analysis ends right then and there.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011).
Ultimately, Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that a constitutional violation
occurred, while Defendants bear the burden of showing that the law was not clearly established.
Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 2007).
A. Unlawful Seizure
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . .
. against unreasonable seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. To establish an unreasonable seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they were arrested without
probable cause. See Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Dunaway v.
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New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)).
Probable cause is determined from the totality of the circumstances known to the officer
at the time of the arrest. Gilmore, 278 F.3d at 367; see also Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 398
(4th Cir. 2003). These circumstances take two main shapes: “the suspect’s conduct as known to
the officer, and the contours of the offense thought to be committed by that conduct.” Id. (citing
Pritchett, 973 F.2d at 314. Therefore, probable cause “could be lacking in a given case . . . either
because of an arresting officer’s insufficient factual knowledge, or legal misunderstanding, or
both.” Id. At bottom, there need only be “enough evidence to warrant the belief of a reasonable
officer that an offense has been or is being committed; evidence sufficient to convict is not
required.” Id.; see also Wilson, 337 F.3d at 398 (4th Cir. 2003) (probable cause exists when the
facts and circumstances would lead a reasonable person to believe the suspect “has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense”); Gooden v. Howard County, 954 F.2d 960, 965
(4th Cir. 1992) (“In cases where officers are hurriedly called to the scene of a disturbance, the
reasonableness of their response must be gauged against the reasonableness of their perceptions,
not against what may later be found to have actually taken place.”).
Here, Plaintiffs were arrested for assault and for obstruction of justice. Thus, Plaintiffs
must show that the officers lacked probable cause to make an arrest with respect to each charge,
considering what the officers knew of the Plaintiffs’ conduct and its conformity with the
applicable laws. We conclude that Plaintiffs cannot make such a showing, and that the officers
operated with probable cause.
1. Assault
As to assault, Brown and Sandidge were arrested and charged according to Va. Code §
18.2-57, which criminalizes “an assault and battery against another[,] knowing or having reason
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to know that such other person is . . . a law-enforcement officer.” Va. Code § 18.2-57(C). This
statute “proscribes a very broad range of conduct,” considering that “it is a mainstay of Virginia
jurisprudence that the common law crime of assault and battery may be accomplished by the
slightest touching or without causing physical injury to another.” United States v. Carthorne, 726
F.3d 503, 514 (4th Cir. 2013).
Here, based upon the totality of the facts and circumstances known to Reed and Miller at
the time (namely, Brown and Sandidge’s actions—verbal and physical—plus the setting of the
interaction), we find that the officers had a reasonable belief that Plaintiffs had committed, were
committing, or were about to commit assault—as supported by the following factual cues.
The first factual cue occurred when Brown and Sandidge rushed over to intervene after
the officers forcibly removed Pannell from the vehicle. As the scene erupted in screams, from
both Plaintiffs and Pannell, Plaintiffs (especially Brown) rapidly approached Pannell’s driver’s
side door to the point that Brown came in contact with Grooms, knocking Grooms’ body camera
off her uniform. See Grooms Body Cam 07:55-08:10; Miller Dash Cam 09:50-10:00; Reed Body
Cam 01:40-01:55. (This would have been enough for Grooms to press an assault charge had she
desired.) Plaintiffs proceeded to struggle with Officer Grooms and protest the officers’ actions in
agitation. “See what I’m saying!” said Brown. “I want all your badge information!” Grooms
Body Cam 08:00-08:06. “What the fuck is y’all doing?” Sandidge screamed.
Second, when Pannell was taken to the ground a second time (for apparently refusing to
be strip-searched), Plaintiffs (especially Brown) again rushed the scene in an agitated manner.
Brown came close enough to Pannell and the arresting officers that Officer Miller was able to
push Brown away with one arm, without moving from Pannell. See Reed Dash Cam 02:5503:05. Once Officer Grooms stepped in between Brown and the officers, presenting herself as a
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wall, Sandidge and Brown only reengaged and proceeded to struggle with Grooms, all the while
screaming at the officers who were wrangling Pannell on the ground. See Miller Body Cam
09:52-10:03; Reed Dash Cam 03:05-03:15.
Finally, once Officer Miller and Detective Miller approached Brown and Sandidge to
place them in handcuffs, both Brown and Sandidge resisted, physically and verbally. “No, I ain’t
going!” Brown declared, as she forcibly resisted and repelled Miller’s advances. Miller repeated
his command, and the two went to the ground. Miller Body Cam 10:21-10:48. Likewise, when
Sandidge resisted Detective Miller, he and Sandidge also went to the ground. The scuffle appears
to have involved some combination of Sandidge pushing Detective Miller, and the two tripping
over Officer Miller and Brown, who were already on the ground. Reed Dash Cam 03:35-04:00.
These circumstances are far and away sufficient to support the officers’ reasonable belief
that Plaintiffs had committed, were committing, or were about to commit assault. Between
Plaintiffs’ agitated manner, Plaintiffs’ repeated occasions of rushing the officers, and the
subsequent physical scuffle that ensued, the Court finds that Officer Miller and Officer Reed had
probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for violating Va. Code § 18.2-57(C), for which they were later
charged.
Plaintiffs submit counterarguments that invariably boil down to an argument that no
contact actually occurred. See, e.g., Dkt. 47 at 2 (“Miller himself in his deposition . . . testified
that . . . [he] did not observe Brown contact him, the contact he felt could have been accidental or
incidental and that his belief that he was assaulted was founded upon his own ‘speculation.’”).
The Court rejects this contention, first because several portions of video footage show contact
occurring, and second because whether contact actually occurred is beside the point. Virginia’s
Section 18.2-57(C) “proscribes a very broad range of conduct,” since the common law crime of
17
assault and battery “may be accomplished by the slightest touching or without causing physical
injury to another.” United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 514 (4th Cir. 2013). Here, Plaintiffs
had already forcefully contacted Officer Grooms, and Officer Miller had already once been
required to push them away. The officers were thus manifestly justified in believing that
Plaintiffs had committed, were committing, or were about to commit assault.
2. Obstruction of Justice
Next, Brown and Sandidge were charged with obstruction of justice under Va. Code §
18.2-460, which provides that a person is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor where she “without
just cause knowingly obstructs . . . any law-enforcement officer . . . in the performance of his
duties as such or fails or refuses without just cause to cease such obstruction when requested to
do so by . . . law-enforcement officer.” Va. Code § 18.2-460.
Virginia courts have interpreted this statute narrowly. Cromartie v. Billings, 837 S.E.2d
247, 256 (Va. 2020). “Merely making the officer’s task more difficult but not impeding or
preventing the officer from performing that task is not obstruction.” Id. (quoting Ruckman v.
Commonwealth, 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (Va. Ct. App. 1998)). Nor does obstruction “occur when a
person [merely] fails to cooperate fully with an officer.” Jordan v. Commonwealth, 643 S.E.2d
166, 171 (Va. 2007) (quoting Ruckman, 505 S.E.2d at 389). “Obstruction ordinarily implies
opposition or resistance by direct action.” Cromartie, 837 S.E.2d at 256. “The act done must be
with an intention on the part of the perpetrator to obstruct the officer himself, not merely to
oppose or impede the process.” Id. (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 126 S.E. 74, 77 (Va.
1925)). At an absolute minimum, something she did must have “obstructed” an attempted action
of one of the officers. Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176, 186 (4th Cir. 2016).
Here, many of the facts that supported a finding of probable cause for assault also support
18
probable cause for obstruction of justice, because assaulting a police officer while he is
conducting the arrest of another person likely impedes that officer’s task. Thus, we reiterate the
circumstances noted above—viz., Plaintiffs’ agitation and hostility, Plaintiffs’ repeated occasions
of rushing the officers, and Plaintiffs’ contribution to the physical scuffle that ensued—and find
that these circumstances would likewise lead a reasonable officer to believe that Plaintiffs were
engaged in obstruction.
Further relevant circumstances include Plaintiffs’ persistent failure to comply with the
officers’ orders. Officer Grooms, Officer Miller, and Officer Reed each requested, at various
stages of the encounter, that Plaintiffs stay back from the scene and stand by the door to the
apartment complex. Officer Miller and Officer Grooms made this request at the very beginning
of the interaction, and the three officers each repeated it throughout the encounter. Yet the
officers’ orders went unheeded as Plaintiffs questioned the worth of the officers’ directive
(“What’s the difference between here and there?” said Brown. Grooms Body Cam 02:07-02:12),
asserted their own authority to remain as watchdogs over the investigation into Pannell (“I’m his
mother . . . Oh, let me tell you. I’m an officer myself.” Grooms Body Cam 00:25-00:38; 02:1002:18.), and ultimately violated the officers’ orders numerous times by never actually going
where they were directed and, more importantly, encroaching upon the officers’ interactions with
Pannell at critical times. These facts suggest that Plaintiffs had no intention of complying with
the officers’ attempts to maintain an orderly traffic stop, such that the officers reasonably
believed Plaintiffs were obstructing justice or were about to obstruct justice and needed to be
restrained.
Together, the circumstances illustrated above constitute “enough evidence to warrant the
belief of a reasonable officer” that obstruction had been or was being committed; “evidence
19
sufficient to convict is not required.” See Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002)
Moreover, a finding of probable cause for obstruction on these facts squares with Fourth Circuit
caselaw on the matter. Compare Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625 (4th Cir.2002) (holding that
officer had probable cause to detain person for obstruction where she arrived on the scene
agitated and physically encroached upon a nascent police investigation, while the larger scene
appeared highly volatile, with uncertain numbers of angry, potentially hostile, and likely armed
individuals in the immediate vicinity); with Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 402 (4th Cir. 2003)
(holding that officer had no probable cause to detain Wilson for obstruction when he was “at all
times composed, polite, and circumspect;” Wilson “remained at a distance, on his own driveway
or out in the street . . . and never attempted to approach” either the officer or the person being
detained; and there was no evidence that the scene appeared to be “anything other than highly
secure.”). 2
Plaintiffs argue that they cannot, as a matter of law, obstruct justice where they intervene
in an unlawful seizure: “One cannot be guilty of obstructing justice by interfering the illegal
conduct of a police officer. If . . . Pannell was unlawfully detained, then Brown did not obstruct
justice by protesting at the scene, but in fact furthered justice with her actions.” See Dkt. 47 at 2
(emphasis added). However, Plaintiffs submit no legal authority for this proposition, and further,
2
For further cases assessing probable cause for obstruction, see generally Bostic v. Rodriguez, 667 F. Supp.
2d 591 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (interpreting substantially identical North Carolina obstruction statute and finding that
officer had probable cause to detain Bostic for obstruction due to his “persistent badgering, yelling, and handwaiving” which may have been intended to prevent the officer from explaining the citation, delivering the citation,
and clearing the traffic stop); Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that officers did not have
probable cause to arrest mother for obstruction when she stood at the door of her home, told police not to come in,
and went into her kitchen to seek her son, for whom the police had a warrant); Smith v. Tolley, 960 F. Supp. 977,
994–95 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding that officers had probable cause to arrest Smith for obstruction when the officers
arrived at Smith’s home to serve his wife with arrest warrant, at which point Smith began a “series of
confrontational actions” insisting the police officers were violating the law, refused to answer the officers’
questions, and began videotaping the interaction, all reflective of Smith’s agitation and hostility toward the officers’
attempt to serve a warrant).
20
the Court finds that their submission is an incorrect statement of law. First, Plaintiffs lack legal
standing to argue that Pannell’s detention was unlawful, as they can only challenge government
action relevant to their own rights: “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may
not be vicariously asserted.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978) (quoting Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969))); accord Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204,
219 (1981) (“[R]ights such as those conferred by the Fourth Amendment are personal in nature .
. . .”), reh’g granted, 664 F.2d 1241 (1981). Thus, Plaintiffs can neither vicariously assert
Pannell’s rights nor establish that Pannell’s detention was unlawful.
Second, even if Pannell’s detention was unlawful, Plaintiffs would not be then licensed to
intervene in police conduct. To the contrary, our system of law provides for the person whose
rights were violated to take up their cause in court, and/or for bystanders to serve as witnesses
and proponents in support of such a person’s cause. Otherwise, all police investigations would be
subject to the scrutiny and intervention of any bystander who believed the police had done
wrong, no matter how well-founded the police action. Plaintiffs here seek to take up Pannell’s
rights and Pannell’s cause as a justification for their own obstruction. This cannot lie.
Accordingly, as explained above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts to
show that the officers violated their Fourth Amendment right against unlawful seizure, because
the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for assault and obstruction of justice. The
officers are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
B. Excessive Force
“The Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable seizures bars police officers from
using excessive force to seize a free citizen.” E.W. by and through T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172,
179 (4th Cir. 2018). This constitutional command “requires a careful balancing of the nature and
21
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 179 (4th Cir. 2018). In
conducting this inquiry, courts analyze excessive force claims under an “objective
reasonableness standard.” Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415, 424 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 389 (1989)).
Objective reasonableness means that courts must examine the officer’s actions “in light
of the facts and circumstances confronting her, without regard to her underlying intent or
motivation.” Dolgos, 884 F.3d at 179 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. 397). The reasonableness of a
particular use of force must be judged “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (“Not every push or
shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the
Fourth Amendment.”). Though it focuses on the objective facts, a court’s inquiry “must be
filtered through the lens of the officer’s perceptions at the time of the incident in question.”
Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 1994).
Courts tend to evaluate three factors for excessive force claims: (1) the severity of the
crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and (3) whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.
Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 179 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). “But these factors
are not exclusive,” and courts may identify “other objective circumstances potentially relevant to
a determination of excessive force.” Id. (finding it “prudent to consider also the suspect’s age
and the school context”). An additional factor relevant here is whether the officers’ use of force
was necessary in light of an escalating situation external to the arrestees.
Here, the instances of force used include Officer Miller and Detective Miller placing
22
Brown and Sandidge in handcuffs after a physical struggle which led to Brown, Sandidge,
Detective Miller, and Officer Miller all going to the ground. We conclude that the use of force
was not excessive.
First, both Brown and Sandidge exhibited behavior which led the officers to conclude
that handcuffs would be necessary to detain their ongoing intervention in the officers’
investigation of Pannell. See Section A(2), supra (finding probable cause to believe Plaintiffs
were engaged in obstruction when, inter alia, they refused to comply with police orders to leave
the scene).
Second, both Brown and Sandidge resisted arrest once Officer Reed gave the order to put
them in handcuffs. When Officer Miller first approached Brown and Sandidge and ordered them
to put their arms around their backs, neither complied. Brown actively resisted. “No, I ain’t
going . . . !” Miller Body Cam 10:21-10:28. Miller repeated his command, and the video shows
Miller and Brown struggling in close quarters, with Brown actively yelling and dodging or
repelling Miller’s advances. In this tumult, the two went to the ground. Miller Body Cam 10:2110:48. “Get off of me!” screamed Brown. “What the fuck are you arresting me for?”
Detective Miller, joining the scene, turned his attention to Sandidge. While Sandidge did
not at first appear as a confrontational—she appeared to be holding a phone attempting to record
the situation—neither did she comply and allow Detective Miller to place her in handcuffs.
When Sandidge more forcefully resisted by twisting and spinning around, Detective Miller and
Sandidge also went to the ground. The scuffle appears to have involved some combination of
Sandidge pushing Detective Miller, and the two tripping over Officer Miller and Brown, who
were already on the ground. Reed Dash Cam 03:35-04:00.
These circumstances, filtered through the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the
23
scene,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, strongly suggest that Brown and Sandidge were actively and
fervently resisting arrest, such that the use of force involved was not excessive. Although
Plaintiffs were being arrested for a relatively modest crime and did not appear to present serious
threats of physical harm to the officers (considering they were two unarmed females up against
two armed male officers, plus other backup officers), the Court finds, nonetheless, that the
officers could have reasonably perceived the situation as threatening due to the escalating tension
of the larger environment. Before and during the officers’ attempt to place Sandidge and Brown
in handcuffs, a crowd had gathered in the parking lot. The video shows at least six to seven
onlookers approaching the tumult, verbally interceding and physically encroaching, and it is
possible there were far more than this number. It was late evening. At one point a man emerged
from the apartment complex front door, coming within feet of Plaintiffs and the arresting
officers. Though the man and the other onlookers never manifested violence, the officers had no
way of knowing which, if any, onlookers may have sought to interfere, perhaps violently. We
find that the growing environment of chaos and hostility, in part fostered by Plaintiffs’
interference with police action and their resistance to arrest, provides an additional justification
for the officers’ use of force.
Based on these factors, and resisting any temptation to scrutinize the officers’ actions
with the benefit of hindsight, the Court concludes that the officers’ use of force was reasonable
and not excessive. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts to show that the officers
violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful force, and the officers are entitled to
qualified immunity on this claim.
C. Malicious Prosecution
“A malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 is properly understood as a Fourth
24
Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates certain elements of the common
law tort.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Lambert v. Williams, 223
F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 2000)). To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by
probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff’s favor. Id. (citing Durham
v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 188 (4th Cir.2012)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot prevail on a
malicious prosecution claim if the officer-defendants had probable cause for Plaintiffs’ arrest.
See, e.g., Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2005) (“In order for a plaintiff to state a
section 1983 malicious prosecution claim . . . , we have required that the defendant have ‘seized’
plaintiff pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause.”); Street v. Surdyka,
492 F.2d 368, 372–73 (4th Cir. 1974) (“Accordingly, there is no cause of action for ‘false arrest’
under section 1983 unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause.”); Lucas v. Shively, 31 F.
Supp. 3d 800 (W.D. Va. 2014) (“Lucas cannot prevail on any of his federal claims if the
defendants had probable cause for Lucas’ arrest.”), aff’d, 596 Fed. Appx. 236 (4th Cir. 2015)
(unpublished).
Here, as determined above, the officers possessed probable cause to arrest Brown and
Sandidge for obstruction of justice and assault. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot assert claims for
malicious prosecution, and the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on these counts.
***
Accordingly, the Officer Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and judgment as a
matter of law on each of Plaintiffs’ claims arising under Section 1983.
IV.
Common Law Claims
Next, Plaintiffs assert claims under Virginia common law for false imprisonment,
25
malicious prosecution, and assault and battery. See Dkt. 1 (Counts 15-20). Plaintiffs’ claims
invariably fail, however, either because Plaintiffs cannot show the officers lacked probable cause
or because their state law claims are subsumed by their defeated federal claims.
A. Common Law Malicious Prosecution
In Virginia, a plaintiff asserting malicious prosecution must prove that the prosecution
was: (1) malicious; (2) instituted by, or with the cooperation of, the defendant; (3) without
probable cause; and (4) terminated in a manner not unfavorable to the plaintiff.” Hudson v.
Lanier, 255 Va. 330, 497 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1998). “The necessary factual predicates for probable
cause under federal law and Virginia law are essentially the same.” King v. Darden, No. 3:17-cv742, 2019 WL 1756531, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2019), aff’d 812 F. App’x 163 (4th Cir. 2020);
see also Bennett v. R&L Carriers Shared Servs., LLC, 492 F. App'x 315, 324 (4th Cir. 2012)
(stating that probable cause means “knowledge of such facts and circumstances to raise the belief
in a reasonable mind, acting on those facts and circumstances, that the plaintiff is guilty of the
crime of which he is suspected”); see also Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)
(probable cause “is not a high bar”). Furthermore, “[a]ctions for malicious prosecution in
Virginia and the requirements for maintaining such actions are more stringent than those applied
to other tort cases to ensure that criminal prosecutions are brought in appropriate cases without
fear of reprisal by civil actions.” Lewis v. Kei, 281 Va. 715, 708 S.E.2d 884, 889 (2011).
Here, as explained previously, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that show the officers
lacked probable cause for their arrest. Since this a required showing, Plaintiffs’ failure in this
regard is fatal. Plaintiffs’ claims for common law malicious prosecution must therefore be
dismissed and the officers are granted judgment as a matter of law.
26
B. Common Law False Imprisonment
The Virginia Supreme Court has defined false imprisonment as “the direct restraint by
one person of the physical liberty of another without adequate legal justification.” Jordan v.
Shands, 255 Va. 492, 500 (1998). Thus, claims of false imprisonment may be defeated by
showing a sufficient legal excuse, e.g., probable cause, to restrain the plaintiff’s liberty. Jackson
v. Brickey, 771 F. Supp. 2d 593 (W.D. Va. 2011) (citing Zayre of Va., Inc. v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47,
147 S.E.2d 710, 713–14 (1966)).
Here, as with Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims, Plaintiffs fail to show that the
officers lacked probable cause. Accordingly, their false imprisonment claims must be dismissed,
and the officers are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
C. Assault and Battery
Finally, as the officers are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ excessive force
claims under Section 1983, so too must Plaintiffs’ assault and battery claims fail, brought as they
are against the same officers based upon the same conduct. See Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167,
174 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a “parallel state law claim of assault and battery is subsumed
within the federal excessive force claim”); Njang v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 279 F. App’x 209,
216 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished, per curiam) (concluding that Fourth Amendment excessive
force inquiry “also controls [a party’s] actions for battery and gross negligence); Calloway v.
Lokey, 948 F.3d 194, 205 (4th Cir. 2020) (affirming district court's dismissal of state law claims
when Fourth Amendment claim failed).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ assault and battery claims must be dismissed, and the officers are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
27
V.
Monell Claims Against the City
Last, Plaintiffs assert claims against the City for an unconstitutional pattern of excessive
force under Monell. 3 See Dkt. 1 (Counts 7-8). The City has moved for summary judgment, see
Dkt. 44, and Plaintiffs entirely neglected to oppose the motion. Failure to respond to
conspicuous, nonfrivolous arguments in an opponent’s brief constitutes a waiver, and failure to
oppose a motion in toto amounts to waiver of all the arguments therein. See Dkt. 10, ¶7 (Pretrial
Order stating that a motion will be considered unopposed if a party fails to submit opposition
brief); see also Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party
waives an argument by failing to present it in its opening brief.”).
Accordingly, based on Plaintiffs’ failure to oppose the City’s non-frivolous motion for
summary judgment, the Court will enter judgment in favor of the City on Counts 7 and 8.
VI.
Conclusion
In an order that will accompany this memorandum opinion, and for the reasons stated
above, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on all counts. See
Dkt. 42 (Officers’ motion); Dkt. 44 (City’s motion). All other pending motions are dismissed as
moot. See, e.g., Dkts. 37, 40 (pending motions in limine). As a result, all claims are hereby
DISMISSED with prejudice, and this case is stricken from the active docket of this Court.
The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion to the parties.
Entered this 28th day of January, 2025.
3
Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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