Chapman v. Willis et al

Filing 153

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Michael F. Urbanski on 5/23/2014. (tvt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
HARRISONBURG DIVISION
LOUIS ROY CHAPMAN,

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Plaintiff,
v.
ROMA WILLIS,
Counselor- Augusta Correctional Center,
Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 7:12cv00389

By: Hon. Michael F. Urbanski
United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION
By Order dated May 9, 2014, this court took under advisement certain portions of defendant
Roma Willis’ (“Willis”) motion in limine, Dkt. No. 118, and plaintiff Louis Roy Chapman’s
(“Chapman”) motion in limine and objections to exhibit list, Dkt. No. 120, pending further filing by
the parties. The parties have completed their filings and these matters are now ripe for decision.
For the reasons set forth herein, the court rules as follows:
I.
The court GRANTS defendant’s motion to exclude any reference to or evidence pertaining
to polygraph examinations. Chapman concedes that any evidence related to passing or taking a
polygraph examination cannot be introduced to prove the truth of the polygraph result. Indeed,
Fourth Circuit precedent makes clear that “[p]olygraph results are generally inadmissible.” United
States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 346 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Brevard, 739 F.2d 180, 182
(4th Cir. 1984)). However, because “testimony concerning a polygraph examination is admissible
where it is not offered to prove the truth of the polygraph result,” id. (quoting United States v.
Allard, 464 F.3d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 2006)), the court may revisit this ruling should circumstances

arise at trial that permit the introduction of such evidence for a purpose other than proving the truth
of the polygraph result.
II.
Second, the court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to exclude evidence of the number of his
felony convictions. Impeachment by evidence of a criminal conviction is governed by Federal Rule
of Evidence 609, which states in relevant part as follows:
(a) In General. The following rules apply to attacking a witness’s character for
truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction:
(1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death or by
imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence:
(A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case or in a criminal
case in which the witness is not a defendant[.]
Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(A). 1 Here, Chapman has been convicted of more than one offense
punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, i.e., felonies. Specifically, in 1994
he was convicted of one count malicious wounding, one count of attempted malicious wounding,
three counts of abduction, and four counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. All of
these convictions relate to single episode of violence.
Willis cites United States v. Burston, 159 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 1998), in support of her
argument that she should be permitted to introduce the number of Chapman’s felony convictions
for impeachment purposes. In Burston, the Eleventh Circuit observed that:
The implicit assumption of Rule 609 is that prior felony convictions
have probative value. Their probative value, however, necessarily
varies with their nature and number. Evidence of a murder
conviction says something far different about a witness' credibility
than evidence of a conviction for a minor drug offense, although
both may constitute a prior felony conviction. Furthermore,
evidence of fifteen murder convictions says something different
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Plaintiff’s convictions did not involve a dishonest act or false statement and are not older than ten
years, thus subsections 609(a)(2) and 609(b) are inapplicable.
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about a witness’ credibility than evidence of only one such
conviction.
United States v. Burston, 159 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation and footnote
omitted); see also id. at 1336 (“[T]he implicit assumption of Rule 609 is that prior convictions have
probative value, and that probative value is likely to vary depending on the number and type of
convictions.”).
While multiple felony convictions may generally have greater probative value than a single
conviction, they also have greater potential for undue prejudice. Thus, as explicitly directed by Rule
609(a)(1)(A), the court must conduct the proper balancing inquiry under Federal Rule of Evidence
403. Indeed, Burston itself recognizes that “[e]vidence that is otherwise admissible under Rule
609(a)(1) is to be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice . . . .” 159 F.3d 1336. Indeed, in United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 2005),
another authority cited by Willis, then Judge Sotomayor made clear that district courts are obligated
to undertake a careful, individualized Rule 403 analysis in every Rule 609(a)(1)(A) ruling. Id. at 621
(“What is crucial is that the district court perform the Rule 403 analysis[.]”).
Although there may be a presumption that the number of plaintiff’s felony convictions be
admitted for impeachment purposes, courts have, after undertaking a Rule 403 analysis, exercised
their discretion to exclude such information. For example, in Chatman v. Buller, No. 12-CV-182JHP, 2013 WL 4832811 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2013), the court acknowledged the general principle in
favor of admitting the number of a witness’s felony convictions, but nevertheless excluded such
evidence under Rule 403. Id. at *7-9. In Emery v. Harris, No. 1:10-CV-01947-JLT PC, 2014 WL
467081 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2014), the court took a similar approach. In that case, the court excluded
any evidence of the “date, name, nature, or number” of the plaintiff’s felonies, while allowing the
defendant to introduce evidence establishing that the plaintiff was a convicted felon. Id. at *2. The

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court believes the same approach is properly applied in this case as well. Indeed, the balancing
factors set forth in United States v. Estrada – a case cited by Willis – support such a result.
First, it is important to note that the decisions cited by Willis relate to impeachment evidence
of government witnesses testifying against criminal defendants. See Estrada, 430 F.3d at 619
(“[D]istrict courts should consider, when undertaking the balancing analysis under Rule 609(a)(1),
whether the witness is testifying for the defendant or the government.”). In that context, there is
little risk of undue prejudice. Indeed, the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 609 observe that “[t]he
probability that prior convictions of an ordinary government witness will be unduly prejudicial is low
in most criminal cases.” Id. at 619 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 609 Advisory Committee’s Note (1990)).
Here, however, there is a risk that Chapman will have his claim questioned by the jury simply based
on his status as a convicted felon. Allowing the defense to argue that Chapman is a nine-time felon
can only increase the factfinder’s skepticism. As such, the risk of undue prejudice for Chapman is
higher than it is for the government when a prosecution witness is impeached pursuant to Rule
609(a)(1)(A). Accordingly, in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts have proven more willing to
exclude the number of a plaintiff witness’s felony convictions than with government witnesses
against criminal defendants. See Emery, 2014 WL 467081, at *9 (disallowing evidence of the
number of a § 1983 plaintiff’s felony convictions); Chatman, 2013 WL 4832811, at *9 (same).
Second, Chapman’s crimes are crimes of violence, which are well-recognized as being lower
on the “scale of probative worth” than other crimes falling with Rule 609(a)(1)(A), such as theft and
escape crimes. Estrada, 430 F.3d at 618 (citing United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir.
1977)). Most importantly, although Chapman has multiple felony convictions, they all relate to a
single incident. Thus, although Chapman violated multiple criminal statutes with his actions, he has
not evinced the repeated willingness to violate the law over an extended period of time that is
typically demonstrated by multiple felony convictions. As such, Chapman’s number of felony
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convictions has relatively less probative value than those of an individual who has engaged in
multiple episodes of lawbreaking over a period of time.
To be sure, Willis remains able to impeach Chapman with his status as a convicted felon. As
such, the relevant question is whether the probative value of the additional information of the
number of Chapman’s felony convictions is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.
That is a very different question from whether the probative value of any information regarding
Chapman’s felonies is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. In short, the court
believes that because all of Chapman’s felony convictions resulted from a single episode of violence,
the probative value of the number of his felony convictions in this civil case is substantially
outweighed by the potential for undue prejudice.
III.
Third, because defendant no longer intends to call plaintiff’s prior probation officer, Krista
Curry, to testify as to plaintiff’s “prior fixation on women,” the court DENIES as moot plaintiff’s
motion to exclude that evidence.
IV.
Finally, the court TAKES UNDER ADVISEMENT plaintiff’s objections to the
defendant’s exhibit list as to the counselor log notes from 2003-2008. The court has reviewed these
documents, which were filed under seal by defendant pursuant to the court’s order. The court
cannot discern the purpose for which the documents will be offered at this time and, as such, will
permit plaintiff to renew his objection to the admissibility of these notes at trial. Additionally,
because defendant has withdrawn Special Agent L.W. Dury’s Report of Investigation from her list
of potential exhibits, plaintiff’s motion as to that exhibit is OVERRULED as moot.

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An appropriate Order will be entered this day. The Clerk is directed to send a certified copy
of this Memorandum Opinion to counsel of record.
Entered: May 23, 2014

/s/ Michael F. Urbanski

Michael F. Urbanski
United States District Judge

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