Hurst v. Zych
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Norman K. Moon on 07/31/2014. (kab)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
GERALD L. HURST,
Petitioner,
v.
C. ZYCH, WARDEN,
Respondent.
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Civil Action No. 7:13cv00336
MEMORANDUM OPINION
By: Norman K. Moon
United States District Judge
Petitioner, Gerald L. Hurst, a federal inmate housed at USP Lee, Virginia, proceeding pro
se, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging a
disciplinary infraction which resulted in, inter alia, loss of twenty-seven days of Good Conduct
Time (“GCT”). The United States has moved for summary judgment and Hurst has responded
thereto, making this matter ripe for disposition.
For the reasons stated, I will grant the
government’s motion for summary judgment.
I.
On September 1, 2011, Hurst was charged with a disciplinary infraction for fighting with
his cellmate. According to the Incident Report, the two inmates were alone in their cell at the
time of the incident and medical assessment indicated that both inmates sustained injuries which
were consistent with being involved in a fight. In addition, the Incident Report states that staff
reported that they heard banging coming from the cell and observed Hurst and the other inmate
standing on opposite sides of the cell with blood on the floor and toilet. Staff also indicated that
both inmates initially refused to submit to hand restraints when ordered. Hurst was charged with
violating Code 224, “Less Serious Assault,” and Code 307, “Refusing an Order.”
A copy of the Incident Report was delivered to Hurst on September 1, 2011 and Hurst
was advised of his rights by the investigating lieutenant. Hurst told the investigator that he
“wasn’t fighting.”
A Unit Discipline Committee (“UDC”) Hearing was held on September 2, 2011 and
Hurst provided a statement at the hearing, indicating that he “slipped in [the] corner of [the]
cell.” The UDC referred the charges to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) for further
hearing and recommended 27 days loss of GCT, 90 days of disciplinary segregation (“DS”), 120
days loss of visiting, telephone, commissary, and TRULINCS1 privileges, if Hurst was found to
have committed the charges.
On September 2, 2011, Hurst was provided a “Notice of Discipline Hearing Before the
DHO” form which advised Hurst that his charges had been referred to the DHO and gave him
the opportunity to request a staff representative and any witnesses. Hurst requested Lt. Curl as a
staff representative but did not request any witnesses. Hurst was also notified of the rights he
would have at the disciplinary hearing.
A disciplinary hearing was held on September 12, 2011. Hurst was advised that his
requested staff representative either declined or was unable to appear and Hurst was given the
opportunity to postpone the hearing to allow him to obtain another staff representative. Hurst
opted to proceed at his hearing without a staff representative.
At the hearing, Hurst denied the charges and stated that he “never fought.” In addition to
Hurst’s statement and the Incident Report, the DHO considered the Special Investigative Service
(“SIS”) investigation, memorandums written by three staff members, and the Inmate Injury
Reports. Based on the evidence, the DHO found that Hurst committed the “prohibited act [of
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The Trust Fund Limited Inmate Communication System (TRULINCS) allows inmates to send electronic
messages to persons in the community.
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Code] 299 most like [Code] 201,” “Conduct Which Disrupts or Interferes with the Security or
Orderly Running of the Institution or the Bureau of Prisons”, most like “Fighting With Another
Person.” The DHO sanctioned Hurst with 30 days of DS, 27 days loss of GCT, and 180 days
loss of visiting and commissary privileges.
On September 15, 2011, Hurst was advised of the DHO’s findings, the specific evidence
relied upon, the action and the reasons for the action, and his right to appeal the disciplinary
action within twenty calendar days. Hurst appealed to the Regional and Central Office levels,
and the disciplinary action was upheld.
Hurst filed the instant habeas petition arguing that the evidence was insufficient to
support the DHO’s finding. Hurst seeks expungement of the disciplinary action from his record
and restoration of the 27 days of GCT.
II.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that a court should grant summary
judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “As to materiality . . . [o]nly disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the
entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In
order to preclude summary judgment, the dispute about a material fact must be “‘genuine,’ that
is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id.; see also JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001).
However, if the evidence of a genuine issue of material fact “is merely colorable or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In
considering a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, a court must view the record as a
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whole and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791,
798 (4th Cir. 1994).
A court must grant a motion for summary judgment if, after adequate time for discovery,
the nonmoving party fails to make a showing “sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The nonmoving party cannot defeat a properly supported motion for
summary judgment with mere conjecture and speculation. Glover v. Oppleman, 178 F. Supp. 2d
622, 631 (W.D. Va. 2001) (“Mere speculation by the non-movant cannot create a genuine issue
of material fact.”).
The trial judge has an “affirmative obligation” to “prevent ‘factually
unsupported claims and defenses’ from proceeding to trial.” Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at
317).
III.
Hurst alleges that he did not commit the violation he was found guilty of and argues that
there was insufficient evidence to support the DHO’s finding. I find that there is some evidence
in the record to support the DHO’s finding and, therefore, will grant respondent’s motion for
summary judgment.
When an inmate challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a revocation of
GCT, due process requirements are met when “the findings of the prison disciplinary board are
supported by some evidence in the record.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst.,Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). The “some evidence” standard is a lenient one, requiring no more
than a “modicum of evidence,” and is met if there is any evidence in the record that could
support the decision. Id. at 455-56. This standard requires “only that the decision not be
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arbitrary or without support in the record.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir.
1999). Ascertaining whether the standard has been satisfied, “does not require examination of
the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the
evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could
support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, at 455-56. “The Federal
Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one
reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 457.
In this case, the DHO considered Hurst’s statement, the Incident Report, the SIS
investigation, the reports by staff members, and the Inmate Injury Reports. I find that there is
“some evidence” in the record to support the DHO’s finding and, therefore, I will grant
respondent’s motion for summary judgment.
ENTER: This 31st day of July, 2014.
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