Johns v. Raiford et al
Filing
28
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Norman K. Moon on 11/3/2014. (kab)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
LAMEEK SHALAM JOHNS,
Plaintiff,
v.
T. RAIFORD, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 7:13cv00511
MEMORANDUM OPINION
By: Norman K. Moon
United States District Judge
Plaintiff, Lameek Shalam Johns, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants “unlawfully” increased his
security classification.1 I conclude that Johns has failed to state a claim of constitutional magnitude
and, therefore, will dismiss his complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
I.
Johns alleges that on March 1, 2013, after an Institutional Classification Authority (“ICA”)
hearing, the defendants increased his security classification from Level 6 to Level S and that he was
transferred to Red Onion State Prison (“ROSP”), a Level S facility, without ever receiving a
finalized copy of the ICA Hearing Report. Johns alleges that he appealed the ICA determination to
no avail. On July 24, 2013, after an “Internal Status Review,” the ICA recommended that Johns
remain as a ROSP “Special Management O” offender. Johns again appealed to no avail. Johns
argues that he was unlawfully classified as security Level S by people who did not have the
authority to classify him as such.
II.
In order to prevail on a procedural due process claim, an inmate must first demonstrate that
he was deprived of life, liberty, or property by governmental action. Bevrati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500,
1
Johns has also filed several motions which I construe as motions to amend his complaint to add new requests
for relief (Docket Nos. 22 and 27), new defendants (Docket No. 23), and new facts (Docket No. 24). I will grant those
motions and consider the complaint as amended.
502 (4th Cir. 1997). Although prisoners are afforded some due process rights while incarcerated,
those liberty interests are limited to “the freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the
sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its
own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Changes “in a
prisoner’s location, variations of daily routine, changes in conditions of confinement (including
administrative segregation), and the denial of privileges [are] matters which every prisoner can
anticipate [and which] are contemplated by his original sentence to prison.” Gaston v. Taylor, 946
F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1991). Prisoners generally do not have a constitutionally recognized liberty
interest in a particular security classification or in being confined in any particular type of prison.
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1983). Because Johns’ change in security classification does
not deprive him of any constitutionally protected right, I conclude that Johns has failed to state a
claim actionable under § 1983.
III.
For the reasons stated, this action is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1).2
ENTER: This 3rd day of November, 2014.
2
Johns has also filed motions to consolidate and for a temporary restraining order, which I will deny as moot.
2
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