Reeves v. GEM Management LLC et al
Filing
3
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER granting MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis 1 filed by Yvonne Reeves. Signed by District Judge Michael F. Urbanski on 3/7/14. (mka)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
YVONNE REEVES,
Plaintiff,
v.
GEM MANAGEMENT, LLC, et. al.,
Defendants.
)
)
) Civil Action No. 7:14cv0088
)
)
) By: Michael F. Urbanski
)
United States District Judge
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Yvonne Reeves, proceeding pro se, brings this action alleging that defendants racially
discriminated against her by refusing to adequately address maintenance problems in her
apartment, including mold, which the court construes as a claim for discrimination in violation of
the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, et. seq.1 Reeves seeks leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. The court will grant Reeves’ application to proceed without prepayment of fees,
but will dismiss her complaint for the reasons set forth below.
Reeves brings suit against GEM Management, LLC (“GEM”) and three GEM property
managers. She alleges that defendants ignored her requests to remove mold from her apartment,
which she claims was growing in the bath tub, as well as under the carpet, and defendants also
refused to move her into another apartment. Reeves states that defendants indicated the “budget
wouldn’t allow for the repair of mold” in her apartment. However, Reeves alleges that
defendants cleaned mold from the apartments of four or five white residents, replaced carpets in
1
Reeves’ allegations in this case are similar to the allegations in her previous suit, Reeves v. Campbell, Case No.
7:13cv00001, filed in this court on January 3, 2013 and dismissed on August 13, 2013 for failure to state a claim for
racial discrimination in violation of the FHA.
the apartments of three white residents, and also permitted a white resident to change apartments
due to a mold issue.
Under the FHA, it is unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities
in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”
42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). To set forth a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHA, a plaintiff
must show either (1) that the act or practice complained of was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose, or (2) that it had a discriminatory impact. See Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates, 736
F.2d 983, 986-987 (4th Cir. 1984). Principals and employers can be held vicariously liable under
the FHA in accordance with traditional agency principles. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280
(2003); Walker v. Crigler, 976 F.2d 900, 904-906 (4th Cir. 1992).
Reeves’ complaint fails to set out a plausible claim for racial discrimination under the
FHA. She merely alleges that defendants did not adequately comply with her requests to clean
mold in her apartment and move to a different apartment. She also alleges that defendants
cleaned mold from the carpets of white tenants, and permitted white tenants to change
apartments. However, Reeves never refers to the FHA, does not establish that the defendants’
actions or inactions were motivated by discriminatory purpose or had a discriminatory impact,
and does not sufficiently allege that she was subjected to disparate treatment on the basis of race.
Indeed, while Reeves’ alleges that certain white tenants received services that she did not,
Reeves does not allege that she was denied services specifically because of her race. 2
While it is incumbent upon courts to liberally construe the claims of pro se litigants,
United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted), they are not obligated to
2
Although not alleged herein, the court assumes that Reeves is a member of a protected class as she stated in her
previous lawsuit that her race is “Black-American.” Case No. 7:13cv00001, Dkt. No. 3.
2
hear claims where there is no basis for relief. Here, Reeves fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.3 Dismissal of her case is therefore warranted under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
An appropriate Order will be entered this day.
Entered: March 7, 2014
/s/ Michael F. Urbanski
Michael F. Urbanski
United States District Judge
3
Reeves also fails to state any 42 U.S.C. § 1983 discrimination claim because she has not alleged that defendants
are state actors. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
3
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