Lambert v. Colvin
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert S. Ballou on 9/29/2015. (lab)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
TRUBIE LAMBERT, JR.,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 7:14cv00179
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Plaintiff Trubie Lambert, Jr. (“Lambert”) challenges the decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”) determining that he was not disabled prior to October 16,
2012 and therefore not eligible for supplemental security income (“SSI”) and disability insurance
benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act (“Act”). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–433, 1381–1383f.
Specifically, Lambert alleges that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by improperly
evaluating his mental impairments and failing to analyze the cumulative effect of his medical
impairments prior to October 16, 2012. I find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision in all respects. Accordingly, I DENY Lambert’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.
No. 18), and GRANT the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 16.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court limits its review to a determination of whether substantial evidence supports
the Commissioner’s conclusion that Lambert failed to demonstrate that he was disabled under
1
This case is before me by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
1
the Act.2 See Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it
consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a
preponderance.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal citations and
alterations omitted). The final decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed where substantial
evidence supports the decision. See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
CLAIM HISTORY
Lambert protectively filed for DIB on January 3, 2011 and SSI on July 26, 2011,
claiming that his disability began on February 2, 2010. R. 90–96, 449–54. The Commissioner
denied Lambert’s applications at the initial and reconsideration levels of administrative review.
R. 25–37, 38–50, 455–64. On April 1, 2013, ALJ Anne V. Sprague held a hearing to consider
Lambert’s disability claim. R. 473–97. Lambert was represented by an attorney at the hearing,
which included testimony from Lambert and vocational expert Robert Jackson. Id.
On April 9, 2013, the ALJ entered her decision analyzing Lambert’s claim under the
familiar five-step process3 and denying Lambert’s claim for benefits. R. 11–24. The ALJ found
2
The Act deems a person disabled for SSI purposes “if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.”
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Disability under the Act requires showing more than the fact that the claimant suffers
from an impairment which affects her ability to perform daily activities or certain forms of work. Rather, a claimant
must show that her impairments prevent him from engaging in all forms of substantial gainful employment given her
age, education, and work experience. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
3
The five-step process to evaluate a disability claim requires the Commissioner to ask, in sequence,
whether the claimant: (1) is working; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment that meets or equals the
requirements of a listed impairment; (4) can return to her past relevant work; and if not, (5) whether he can perform
other work. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 654 n.1 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520);
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460–62 (1983). The inquiry ceases if the Commissioner finds the claimant
disabled at any step of the process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one
through four to establish a prima facie case for disability. The burden shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step to
establish that the claimant maintains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”), considering the claimant’s age,
education, work experience, and impairments, to perform available alternative work in the local and national
economies. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). See Taylor v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 1975).
2
that Lambert suffered from fibromyalgia, carpal tunnel syndrome, cervical radiculopathy,
osteoarthritis, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder. R. 14–15. The ALJ found that these
impairments, either individually or in combination, did not meet or medically equal a listed
impairment. R. 15–16. The ALJ further found that Lambert retained the RFC to perform light
work, 4 except:
[Lambert] can only occasionally reach overhead with the bilateral
upper extremities. He is limited to pushing and pulling bilaterally
with his bilateral upper extremities to 10 pounds frequently and 20
pounds occasionally. He can never climb ladders, ropes, and
scaffolds. He can occasionally crawl, and he can frequently kneel,
crouch, stoop, balance, or climb ramps and stairs. He is limited to
simple, routine, repetitive tasks with no more than occasional
social interaction.
R. 16. The ALJ determined that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy
prior to October 16, 2012, such as packer and inspector. R. 22–23. The ALJ determined that no
jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy beginning on October 16, 2012 due
to the change in Lambert’s age category to an individual of advanced age. R. 24. Thus, the ALJ
concluded that Lambert became disabled on October 16, 2012. R. 24. On February 27, 2014,
the Appeals Council denied Lambert’s request for review (R. 4–7), and this appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Lambert argues that the ALJ gave no consideration to his mental impairments and that he
improperly analyzed the cumulative effect of his impairments. For the reasons that follow, I find
that Lambert’s arguments have no merit.
4
An RFC is an assessment, based upon all of the relevant evidence, of what a claimant can still do despite
her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. Descriptions and observations of a claimant’s limitations by him and by
others must be considered along with medical records to assist the Commissioner in deciding to what extent an
impairment keeps a claimant from performing particular work activities. Id.
3
Mental Impairments
Lambert challenges the ALJ’s review of his mental impairments for the time period of
February 2, 2010 through October 15, 2012. Lambert contends that the ALJ gave no
consideration to his mental health impairments and improperly concluded that his mental
impairments were not severe because of his conservative treatment. The ALJ in fact determined
Lambert suffered from severe depressive disorder and anxiety disorder. R. 14–15. The court
instead construes Lambert’s argument as contending that the RFC for his mental impairments is
not supported by substantial evidence.
The Commissioner’s regulations provide a framework for evaluating mental impairments,
and the ALJ employed that framework in this case. Specifically,
[i]n evaluating mental impairments, the ALJ employs a specific
technique that considers four functional areas essential to the
ability to work: activities of daily living; ability to maintain social
functioning; concentration, persistence, and pace in performing
activities; and deterioration or decompensation in work or worklike settings (Psychiatric Review Technique “PRT” findings). 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a, 416.920a (2011). The ALJ's decision must
show the significant history and medical findings considered and
must include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in
each of the four functional areas. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(e)(4),
416.920a(e)(4) (2011).
Felton–Miller v. Astrue, 459 F. App’x 226, 231 (4th Cir. Dec. 21, 2011) (unpublished). The ALJ
must account for any such limitations in the RFC. See generally Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632
(4th Cir. 2015).
In this case, the ALJ addressed each of the four functional areas and expressly found that
Lambert has only mild limitation in activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining
social functioning, moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, and
no episodes of decompensation. R. 15. The ALJ reviewed all four of these functional areas
4
within the context of Lambert’s depression and anxiety, which she determined to be severe in
nature. R. 16. Moreover, the ALJ specifically reviewed Lambert’s mental health evidence
before and after the date of disability in October 2012. R. 17–20. The ALJ reviewed Lambert’s
complaints of depression and anxiety to Ms. Martin multiple times from 2010 through 2012, and
noted his hospitalization for psychiatric symptoms and counseling at Mount Rogers. Id.
Lambert does not specify how the ALJ failed to consider his mental impairments, but it is
not obvious in the court’s review; the ALJ appears to have thoroughly reviewed the records both
before and after the date of disability and provided explanation for how these records factored
into her conclusions. See Taylor v. Astrue, No. CIV.A. BPG-11-0032, 2012 WL 294532, at *6
(D. Md. Jan. 31, 2012) (finding ALJ met obligations of SSR 98-6p where ALJ provided a
narrative of the evidence on file and explained why the evidence was not compelling). To the
extent Lambert contends that the ALJ did not consider his mental health evidence prior to the
determined date of disability, the ALJ explicitly considered evidence prior to October 2012 and
was required to do so given Lambert’s continuing symptoms of mental health. See, e.g.,
McGinnis v. Astrue, 709 F. Supp. 2d 468, 473 (W.D. Va. 2010) (remanding a denied claim to
review additional records because the claimant’s severe depression and intellectual difficulties
likely did not change within the few months after the ALJ’s decision). The ALJ considered
Lambert’s mental health evidence.
Moreover, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. Lambert’s mental health
record is relatively minimal compared to his physical record. Lambert denied depression during
an appointment in November 2008 (R. 179) and did not mention any psychological symptoms in
medical appointments in 2006 and 2008. R. 181–90. Rollin Hawley, M.D. noted Lambert
looked depressed during a neurological consultation appointment on April 7, 2009. R. 191.
5
During an August 16, 2010 appointment for shoulder pain, primary care provider Mary A.
Martin, ANP diagnosed Lambert with depression based on reports of mood changes, anger, and
sleeping problems. R. 243. On November 1, 2010, Lambert reported he felt more depressed to
Ms. Martin and that he continued to have irritability. R. 232. On February 7, 2011, Lambert
reported to Ms. Martin that medication helped his depression, but that he still felt anxious and
angered easily; Ms. Martin recommended anger management and anxiety counseling. R. 223–
24. At a May 23, 2011 appointment with Ms. Martin, Lambert reported anxiety, mood changes,
and temper; he felt one of his medications was not working and denied suicidal or homicidal
thoughts. R. 214.
Licensed Clinical Psychologist Angelia Berry, Psy.D. performed a consultative
examination of Lambert on May 27, 2011. R. 251–55. Lambert’s mental status examination
showed largely normal results, with logical and coherent thought content and grossly intact
short- and long-term memory. R. 253–54. Dr. Berry diagnosed Lambert with moderate major
depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. R. 254. For his functional assessment, Dr.
Berry wrote:
It is likely that he is capable of understanding directions, including
simple and more detailed and complex directions. Memory of
complex instructions may be mildly impaired due to deficits in
working memory. He may experience mild to moderate deficits
interacting appropriately with others due to symptoms of anxiety.
He is likely capable of making work-related decisions and
engaging in complex problem solving and decision-making tasks.
His ability to cope effectively with daily stressors is likely to be
moderately impaired.
R. 255. She gave the opinion that Lambert would likely benefit from psychiatric medication
management and outpatient counseling services. Id.
6
State agency consultant Linda Dougherty, Ph.D. reviewed Lambert’s records on June 14,
2011. R. 32–34. She found moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying
out detailed instructions; working in coordination with or in proximity to others without being
distracted; and completing a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms and performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable
number and length of rest periods. R. 32–33. Dr. Dougherty also noted moderate limitations in
accepting instructions and responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors, getting along
with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, and
traveling to unfamiliar places or using public transportation. R. 33–34.
On September 22, 2011, Andrew Bockner, M.D., reviewed Lambert’s records and
determined Lambert faced moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out
detailed instructions, but that he could understand and remember simple one-to-two step
directions. R. 45–46. Dr. Bockner noted a moderate limitation in maintaining attention and
concentration for extended periods, working in coordination with or in proximity to others
without being distracted by them, completing a normal workday and workweek without
interruptions from psychological symptoms and performing at a consistent pace without an
unreasonable number of rest periods. R. 46. Dr. Bockner clarified that Lambert’s ability to cope
with daily stressors was moderately impaired, but that he could work for at least two hours at a
time between breaks and could concentrate and persist at simple tasks. R. 46. Dr. Bockner also
noted moderate limitations in interacting appropriately with the general public, with supervisors,
and with coworkers or peers due to pain, anxiety, and depression, but determined Lambert could
ask simple questions, request assistance, and work at simple tasks in an environment that did not
require frequent collaboration and communication with others. R. 47.
7
Ms. Martin met with Lambert on September 26, 2011 for a checkup; Lambert reported
that medication helped his depression and that he continued to have anxiety. R. 370–73.
Lambert received an initial assessment for short-term counseling services at Mount Rogers
Community Services Board on October 10, 2011, where he received diagnoses of major
depressive disorder, dysthymia, and alcohol abuse in remission and listed concerns of social
problems, substance related problems, serious mental illness, and occupational/work problems,
among others. R. 256–64. Lambert complained of panic attacks and anxiety in January and May
2012. R. 362–63, 367.
Lambert was admitted to New River Valley Medical Center under a temporary detention
order for threat of suicide on July 19, 2012, where he reported depression due to chronic pain,
anxiety disorder, auditory hallucinations, and some OCD tendencies. R. 348–53. Shelly
McIntrye, M.D. treated Lambert and expressed concern about possible bipolar disorder; she
discharged him on July 23, 2012 with diagnoses of severe major depressive disorder, obsessivecompulsive disorder, and personality disorder. R. 348. On July 24 and August 21, 2012,
Lambert received assessments and counseling at Mount Rogers; after discussing his
decompensation and resulting hospitalization because he could not afford depression medication,
Lambert reported feeling better with no suicidal or homicidal ideation and presented normal
mental status examinations. R. 265–73. On September 24, 2012, Lambert received a checkup
from Ms. Martin and stated he had not taken medications for several months, which caused him
to be unable to sleep; he reported adjusting and feeling better after following-up at Mt. Rogers
and taking medication. R. 384–85. On March 18, 2013, Ms. Martin completed a clinical
assessment of pain for Lambert and noted that his medication severely limited his effectiveness
in the workplace due to distraction, inattention, or drowsiness. R. 400. Lambert received
8
counseling at Mt. Rogers on March 19, 2013, noting Lambert’s depression, agitation,
hopelessness, insomnia, memory lapses, and feelings of suicidal ideation and violent thoughts.
R. 411–42. A temporary detention order again was placed on Lambert on March 21, 2013 after
reports of violent thoughts, with an expected stay of three to five days and a recommendation of
follow-up with his primary care provider. R. 444–48.
Lambert’s testimony and self-reports generally focus on his physical pain rather than his
mental health challenges. At the hearing before the ALJ, Lambert testified that he cannot
concentrate or pay attention sufficiently to operate a cash register, experiences panic attacks two
to three times per week, and that he separated from his wife due to mood swings. R. 490–92. He
reported in his disability application that he attended special education classes in high school. R.
118. Lambert wrote in his function report that he cannot follow spoken instructions due to his
memory, has challenges paying attention for long, does not handle stress well, does not handle
changes in his routine well, and faces panic attacks. R. 141–42. In his disability report on
appeal, Lambert reported his memory was getting worse and he had “bad anxiety attacks.” R.
165. In March 2013, Lambert reported that his physicians were growing concerned about his
depression and his daily panic attacks. R. 174.
While it is clear that Lambert is impaired to some degree in his mental functioning,
substantial evidence supports the RFC. None of the mental health opinions in the record
recommended more severe limitations than those included in the RFC. Lambert’s depression
and anxiety generally appear to be controlled by medication, his hospitalizations were not
extensive in nature and generally remedied by a return to medication, and he only recently began
counseling services. Lambert’s treatment has been conservative in nature and is not as severe as
one would expect for someone with disabling mental health impairments. Unlike Lambert’s
9
assertion, the ALJ found Lambert’s depression and anxiety to be severe in nature but not as
severe as he attested to in his testimony and self-reports. Ultimately, the ALJ considered the
record and accounted for the effects of Lambert’s depression and anxiety by limiting his RFC to
simple, routine, repetitive tasks with no more than occasional social interaction.5 R. 16.
Therefore, the court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's assessment of Lambert’s
mental impairments.6
Combined Effect of Impairments
Lambert also asserts that the ALJ failed to evaluate the cumulative effect of his chronic
pain and mental impairments as required by the regulations. Specifically, Lambert highlights
that the ALJ did not take into account that a person with Lambert’s characteristics would miss at
least two days per month of work and that the vocational expert testified that this would not
permit him to maintain competitive employment.
Where a claimant has multiple impairments, the ALJ must consider the combined effect
of those impairments in determining whether the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1523; Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1989). “It is axiomatic that disability may
result from a number of impairments which, taken separately, might not be disabling, but whose
total effect, taken together, is to render [a] claimant unable to engage in substantial gainful
5
Lambert did not specifically contest his RFC as it relates to his moderate limitation in concentration,
persistence, or pace, thereby waiving any challenge raised under Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015).
Regardless, the ALJ closely employed the medical sources’ recommended limitations in the RFC and substantial
evidence supports the RFC in its entirety.
6
As a corollary to his main argument about consideration of his mental health impairments, Lambert
argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert was improper because it “did not contain all of
the facts.” Dkt. No. 19, p. 8–9. Lambert does not specify the facts omitted from the hypothetical, but notes
disagreements with the ALJ’s choice not to accept opinions regarding absences or frequency of breaks, as well as
Dr. McIntyre’s recognition of Lambert’s “serious problems.” Dkt. No. 19, p. 9. “In order for a vocational expert’s
opinion to be relevant or helpful, it must be based upon a consideration of all other evidence in the record.” Johnson
v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 659 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1989)). As I
have found that the ALJ properly reviewed Lambert’s mental impairments, it logically follows that any additional
mental restrictions are not supported by the record, and are therefore, not relevant to the RFC as given to the
vocational expert at the hearing.
10
activity.” Id. at 50. In addition to “not fragmentiz[ing]” the effect of the claimant’s impairments,
“the ALJ must adequately explain his or her evaluation of the combined effects of the
impairments.” Id. at 50 (citing Reichenbach v. Heckler, 808 F.2d 309, 312 (4th Cir.1985)).
“[A]n ALJ need not explicitly state that he or she has considered a claimant’s impairments in
combination. What matters is whether it is discernible from the ALJ’s decision that he or she did
so.” Jones v. Astrue, Civ. Action No. 7:10cv00313, 2011 WL 1877677, at *12 (W.D. Va. May
17, 2011).
Here, the ALJ found that Lambert suffered from both mental and physical severe
impairments. R. 16–22. The ALJ’s opinion reflects that she thoroughly considered all of the
evidence relating to Lambert’s physical and mental impairments when developing the RFC, and
as discussed above, substantial evidence supports her review. Although Lambert points to the
vocational expert’s testimony about two absences from work, Lambert does not point to
anywhere in the record supporting such absences. None of the medical opinions recommend
increased absences or any additional restrictions. Only Dr. Bockner recommended a need for
breaks throughout the workday, but he did not appear to suggest anything more than employerprovided breaks. The court has not found evidence supporting multiple days of absence or any
other restrictions that are not already included in the RFC. Therefore, I find that the ALJ did not
fail to analyze the combined effect of Lambert’s medical impairments.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED and Lambert’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
11
Enter: September 29, 2015
Robert S. Ballou
Robert S. Ballou
United States Magistrate Judge
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?